Abdullahi A. Gallab

Ḥasan al-Turabi, the Last of the Islamists

The Man and His Times 1932–2016

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Abdullahi A. Gallab

To my sister Zienab Ahmed Gallab

Contents

Preface

Why Ḥasan/Dr. Ḥasan and Shaikh Ḥasan al-Turabi? Each one of these names has its history, weight, and significance throughout the lifetime and the political career of the man. Some of the reviewers of my previous books about Islamism in the Sudan—*The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* and *Their Second Republic: Islamism in the Sudan from Disintegration to Oblivion*—argued that each one of these books was or is about Ḥasan al-Turabi. That might be to a certain extent true. Another reviewer of these books claims that I am "not fond of Ḥasan al-Turabi, nor the current regime in Khartoum." That might not be an accurate characterization of an implicit lesson about the contemporary status and the future of the local, regional, and world reality described as Islamism and one of its well-recognized leaders. The most important aspect of that is the complexity of the post-1964 October Revolution in the Sudan and the connection between the death of Islamism and the fate of its last leaders. And yet nothing is more necessary than this lesson and the wisdom gained from Ḥasan al-Turabi's cumulative time over generations, al-Turabi's Islamism, and his disciples as a counterrevolutionary fact in Sudanese life that has been less studied and even less understood as a phenomenon. My concern, in this book and other previous books, could easily be seen in the face of this phenomenon by exploring the axiom together, with the man, his spirit, ghost, and the ghost of his Islamism. Hence, each claim of my reviewers could have its own merit. But let us take first things first. Without Ḥasan al-Turabi in his different conditions and transformations of his life chances—from Ḥasan to Dr. Ḥasan to Shaikh Ḥasan—there would have been no al-Turabi Islamism, al-Turabi Islamists, or an Islamist regime. For both, al-Turabi and his disciples' savage Islamist regime, he directly or indirectly tormented other Islamists, and he was tormented by non-Islamists and by his own Islamists, especially those

who were considered by many as his own handpicked and nurtured disciples. This was the knot that I addressed in my previous book, *Their Second Republic.* In that book I described in great detail, in chapters 7 and 8, the threads constituting the knot that tied together some of the second-generation al-Turabi Islamists—ʿAlī ʿOsmān in particular. In *Their Second Republic* I addressed how that knot developed historically, its sociological force, its different forms of expression and opportunism, and the systems that manipulated the absence of the leader in prison to help Osman climb the ladder of the party and the regime as an opportunity. Later the theory and practice of that political Islamist group under the leadership of ʿAlī ʿOsmān permeated not only politics but also a culture that was bundled into a multiplicity of performative violence as a system of governance against the Sudanese people, their fellow Islamists, and Ḥasan al-Turabi himself. Within ʿAlī ʿOsmān's once shadowy presence and within a peculiar form of "rule," al-Turabi's Islamism saw a reversal into violence, and the brutal state took over the regime. Nevertheless, Ḥasan al-Turabi, as I said before, has remained an albatross around the neck of the Sudanese Islamism, and the Sudanese Islamist movement will stay forever as an albatross at his neck too.

Of this much we can be certain. Such is the condition and the paradox of the Islamists' history of factionalism and later the Islamist party recreated by al-Turabi from the 1964 October Revolution. That onward opened up an evil pursuit not up to the task of fermenting a revolution, though it institutionalized the tradition of fermenting violence, which he and his Islamists named the 1989 coup and the totalitarian regime that emerged out of it—*Thourat al-Inighaz* (The Salvation Revolution). That by itself, and the state the Islamists designed, unrivaled in its severity and evil, the most oppressive period in the history of Sudan. Hence, this constitutes an indictment of Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamists.

Nevertheless, al-Turabi stays as one of the most important Islamist and political figures in the Sudan and the twentieth century—what is called the "Muslim world." My previous books were about the important development of what I called the Islamist state, which is considered the first of its kind in the Sunni "Muslim World."

Ḥasan al-Turabi was "a man apart." He was not a Muslim Brother. He describes the Egyptian Brotherhood, or that organization, and the ideology of Islamism "as traditional" and branded its foundation as based on traditional forms of leadership. He asserted that "the earliest Muslim Brotherhood was led by Ḥasan al-Banna in the typical manner of a *sheikh* with followers; there is little that was democratic about it. And there was a view that that *shura* or consultation is not binding; it's informative, it's persuasive, but it's not binding on the *Amir*, the leader."[1] Moreover, al-Turabi doesn't recognize Sayyid Qutb or ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam. It seems we can read al-Turabi's moment as he

saw it emerging within its time and space. He reargued the debated issues in a different manner against the Qutbian perspective. Al-Turabi held the state as a central issue different to and colliding with the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood's dispositions of *tarbiya*, Sayyid Qutb's vanguard creed, and the Salafi isolationist worldview. From such a perspective, and a dissimilar structuring of the discourse, emerged al-Turabi's calculation. According to al-Turabi's definition of modernity, which he articulated in his meeting with the American scholars, he might have thought of himself as a more educated person with cultural capital superior to that of all the locals, such as Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha, Babikir Karrar, Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, and regional and local founders of Islamism including Ḥasan al-Banna, Abu A'la' al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.

Nevertheless, there might be a controversy about the central properties of the essential or dubious claims and the reasons for some to overlook the importance of al-Turabi and the Islamist state that he and his Islamists created. Some of these reasons could be attributed to Ḥasan al-Turabi himself. That is to say, what makes him an important personality is not his successful theory of value or the model state he and his Islamists established; it is their failure to see and accept, as a moral, religious, and civil values, the necessity to pay attention to the process by which people as citizens agree according to their free will without coercion or a military coup and the violence that emerges out of it.

Clearly, the Sudanese Islamist state (1989–present), despite its use of its institutional and rhetorical stance about Islam, the state, constitution, parliament, and/or republic, has in practice institutionalized violence and worked hand-in-hand and groomed a dictator, 'Omer Ḥasan Aḥmed al-Bashir. 'Omer Ḥasan Aḥmed al-Bashir became the first sitting president to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for allegedly directing campaigns of mass killing (genocide), rape, and pillage against Sudanese civilians in different parts of the country and in particular in Darfur. Al-Turabi's Islamists' experience that brought him and his Islamists to power through a strange form of a military coup transformed their Islamist movement and its political party—*al-Jabha al-Islamiyyah al-Qawiyya* (The National Islamic Front) (NIF)—into a military unit by planning for and executing the peculiar 1989 coup. The Islamist experience in power and its transformations from 1989 to present stand as a very important one in the history of Sudan, the region, and in general. That is not of its successes but because of its total failure. It proved that what has been advocated by the Islamists in general, and in Sudan in particular, as *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (al-Islam is the solution) or what has been described as the "Islamist or the Islamic state" is in itself an unachievable idea neither by default nor by design. However, it presented to the world a new model of and a distinctive project of separation between the state and

religion that designated the state as the field of coercion with excesses of greedy forms of *tamkeen*[2] and expulsion of religion to the private sphere as part of the coerced and manipulated public sphere.

In his review of my book, *Their Second Republic*, Professor Justin Willis claims that, I am "not fond of Hasan al-Turabi, nor the current regime in Khartoum." My question is—is that a requirement? The term *Brother al-Turabi* is a reminder of the "Whatever I am, Germany is" found in a preliminary draft of the essay "Brother Hitler" of 1938 by Thomas Mann. It is a defiant assertion against the far more potent view at the time that Germany was where Hitler was. What Thomas Mann once said: "The fellow is a catastrophe, but that's no reason not to find him interesting as a personality and destiny."[3] Here the radical aesthetic speaks who finds an unusual phenomenon gripping, regardless of what morality says about it. No one should feel "above dealing with this murky figure." Politically, after all the rest, it does not matter either, "it has its directness a refreshing effect with otherwise manifold complexity."[4] Thousands, if not millions, of Sudanese people of all ages feel strongly about dealing with Ḥasan al-Turabi as a murky figure for the evil that emanated from his Islamism, Islamists, and the regime that emerged out of them. The man who so dominated the course of al-Turabi Islamism from 1964 until his death on March 5, 2016—suffering the regime of the meanest of both his school mate Ja'far Nimairi and the most scheming of his disciples 'Ali 'Othmān—stirs up more emotions than any other Sudanese political figure in the history of modern Sudan. That is due to the scale of crimes that his Islamism committed during his presence. Al-Turabi Islamism goes in history as one among the twentieth-century-"isms": Nazism, fascism, colonialism, Stalinism—a great killer of human beings. The three most important elements of al-Turabi Islamism and his Islamists in power were their involvement in methodical and systematic patterns of terror, treating all Sudanese people in disdain, and bellowing them off by sending them en masse into exile and refugee camps.

Ḥasan al-Turabi, who prides himself as *ibn al-thaqafa al-Farancia* (a son of French culture), created his own *laïcité*, not promoted but typified by the Islamist movement. On the one hand, Ḥasan al-Turabi's *laïcité* represents a breakaway from culture, religion, and modernity. It depicted culture as primitive by despising the Ṣūfi Islam. It broke away from religion by reproaching the 'ulama and censured modernity by denouncing secularism. Typically, his brand of Islamism differentiates its field of action by designating religion and religiosity in different spheres that advance "politics over religiosity and political action over theological reflections."[5] Within this, however, al-Turabi's Islamism placed itself within a limited and limiting field of the secularism debate. However, al-Turabi attacks secularism and secularists all the time. Here, al-Turabi's Islamism built its own instruments and devices that

then functioned outside what could be described as the religious thought-of rationalization. As stated earlier, al-Turabi himself described the field of his Islamism as dominated by "students and university graduates everywhere [who] represent modernity and they are the only current which exercises any measure of *ijtihad,* any review of history."[6] How his Islamists differ from other groups that relate to modernity, according to that, is based on an assumption and generalization. He assumes that "liberal politicians and intellectuals are not interested in Islamic history, they are interested in European history; they want to transplant European institutions. They don't know how to grow them in soil. They look so much to the West that they are not actually renewing, they are not deciding any *ijtihad.* If there are any *mujtahidin*, they are the Islamists now."[7] The Sudanese *mujtahdin*, according to him, are "young people who are equal; there was no one who could proclaim to be senior in age to become an absolute *sheikh.*"[8] These groups, or *lumpen intelligencia* as described by Guilain Denoeux and Olivier Roy before him, are "not usually clerics but young, university-educated intellectuals who claim for themselves the right to interpret the true meaning of religion (their actual knowledge of Islam is typically sketchy)."[9] At the same time, their reference presents the political discourse of al-Turabi and those who blindly follow him in denouncing secularism as a "political discourse in religious garb."[10] In this sense Islamism is, inside and outside, secularism at the same time. In its "two-sided relation to modernity and the West at the very heart of Islamist ideology, lies a powerful, comprehensive critique of the West and what Islamists see as the corrupting political and cultural influence of the West on Middle East societies."[11] On the other hand, "the Islamists' reliance on concepts drawn from the Islamic tradition also indicates a desire to break away from Western terminology. Hence, Islamism is a decidedly modern phenomenon in at least two critical respects: the profile of its leaders and its reliance on Western technology."[12] Ḥasan al-Turabi added another aspect by including and modifying for his own purpose certain ideas of salafi and Wahabi Islam to his Islamism and excluded and severly attacked at the same time others. While he agrees with the Ṣalafis in denigrating Ṣūfi Islam, he takes a step further within his *laïcité* by bragging that he is a child of French culture and disapproving of the 'ulama and their institutions. Hence, al-Turabi's Islamism has floated free of modernity and its secular underpinnings, free of Islam and its scholarship, or 'ulama, and free of culture and its Ṣūfi representations. That such provocation riddled with ideological exceptionalism, one would argue, has set him free to practice his unchecked *ijtihād* and to critically challenge everybody else, since only a few people—his disciples—could be conformists. Aḥmed Kamal al-Din argues that al-Turabi "gave himself unlimited freedom,"[13] but I would say that that freedom has gone wild by giving no attention to the conventions and the rules of engagement within the local, Islamist, and Islamic discourse. It developed

laissez-faire—forms of verbal and later physical violence that evolved around a system of conflict and became a group-binding function for a full differentiation of the group and its individual members from the outside world. This is not a reaction against secularization, but a product of it. It is a combination of both "holy Ignorance"[14] and "institutionalized Ignorance."[15]

As Jacques Derrida said, "For many of us, certain [and I emphasize *certain*] end of communist Marxism did not await the recent collapse of the USSR and everything that depends on it throughout the world."[16] I will add that the end of Islamism did not await the end, the collapse, of the ISMs of the long twentieth century. Therefore, what makes Ḥasan al-Turabi the last of the Islamists that "whither Islamism. . . . Resonates like an old repetition."[17]

The central purpose of this study is to hold together more than one aspect of that, which must be taken seriously in the Sudanese, post-1964 October Revolution, its actors within the colonial and the postcolonial state, and the extent of all levels of playing fields of the Sudanese community of the state. This book seeks to explore charted and uncharted train of life and times of Ḥasan al-Turabi, his Islamism, and Islamists in a holistic way within the good times and bad times of Sudanese human experience of the long twentieth century.

NOTES

1. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) 14.

2. Tamkeen is a Quranic term associated with "those who, [even] if we firmly establish them (*maknahum*) on earth remain constant in *salah* (prayer) and render *zakat* (alms levy), enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid that doing of what is wrong; but with God rests the final outcome of events" (al-Hajj 22:21). For al-Turabi Islamists *tamkeen* represented a takeover moment by using the state to extract as much wealth as possible and to climb up to the highest level of political and state power by appropriating the most senior government positions to their co-Islamists.

3. Hermann Kurzke, *Thomas Man Life as a Work of Art: A Biography* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999) 423.

4. Ibid.

5. Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam Observed*. (see chap. 1 no. 7) 6.

6. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan Turabi* (Tampa, The World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993) 20.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," *Middle East Policy* 9, no. 2 (2002) 56–81, 62.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Aḥmed Kamal al-Din in an internet interview with the author, March 2012.

14. According to Olivier Roy "fundamentalism" is the unwanted child of secularization.

15. According to Mohammed Arkoun is a scholastic culture, giving rise to institutionalized ignorance.

16. Jacques Derrida, *Specter of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (New York, Routledge, 1994) 15.

17. Ibid.

Acknowledgments

This book is a product of critical thinking on an important and complex period in the Sudanese human experience—an experience that brought together contributions of generations of Sudanese-educated, organic intellectuals, knowledge workers, politicians who took politics as their theme, and which included the good, the bad, and the ugly. I accrued great debt and gratitude to those I call our community of conversation, who went to school, political prison, some who went into the same or different professions together and shared opinions, laughter, tears, and good and bad times. In this sense, a declaration of intent is my own way of saying thank you to the best minds of my generation. This community of conversation has been expanded and enriched by our colleagues and scholars of the Sudan Studies Association of North America, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other parts of the world.

My work has been enhanced by their encouragement, criticism, comments, and suggestions. I owe deeper appreciation and gratitude to late Dr. 'Abdel Majed 'Ali Bob, Professor 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim, Dr. Moḥammed Maḥmoud, al-Sir Sidahmed, Dr. Salman Moḥamed Aḥmed Salmān, and a good and diverse number of scholars who reviewed my previous books for academic journals, the Social Research Council (SSRC), United States, The Royal African Society, United Kingdom, websites, and other Arabic publications.

Even before 1989, when I began my frequent personal contacts with Sudanese politicians, government personnel, actors, and activists, I conducted on-the-spot and online-intensive and in-depth interviews and recorded observations about al-Turabi Islamism and with al-Turabi in person. I am grateful to all those who have made their ideas, publications, and themselves available to me ever since. I am particularly grateful to Sayyid al-Sadiq al-Mahdi for the interviews and online communication for the past few years. Over the last few years, I have benefited from the conversations and interviews I had on the topic of Islamism in the Sudan and its personalities

with many Islamists, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals whose views helped to either form or shape my ideas about the Sudanese experience of the Islamists in power and their state. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. ʿAlī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed, Dr. Ghazi Ṣalah al-Din al-ʿAtabani, late Yasin ʿOmar al-Imam, professors El-Tag Fad Allah, al-Ṭayyib Zain al-ʿAbdin, Ḥasan Mekki, al-Mahboob Abdel Salam, Aḥmed Kamal al-Din, Ṣiddiq Moḥamed ʿOsman, Dr. Souhar Salah, and other younger Islamists for the valuable time they rendered me during long interviews in Khartoum, Bonn, the United Kingdom, and other places. My thanks and appreciation to Laura Marie Thomson for providing me with an electronic copy of her father professor Cliff Thompson unpublished manuscript: *Days of the October Revolution.*

The last few years were very rich in discussion with colleagues at Arizona State University's African and African American and Religious Studies departments, their students, and centers—together with other scholars, especially those whom I met and conversed with at conferences about Islamism or the Sudanese experience. In the United States such conferences were organized by The Cornell University Institute of Comparative Modernities, the Sharjah Arts Foundation in South Africa, Afro-Middle East Centre, World Peace Foundation of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Harvard Kennedy School of Government. From these platforms we have continued the conversations on issues about Islamism, and ongoing developments in Sudan, with different Sudanese communities in the United States, Sudanese discussion groups, and websites—especially al-Rakoba, Sudanile, Huryyat, and Àbdin List. They have given space to my Arabic writings that reflect part of my scholarship and also for the insightful ideas and critical skills of their readers through the years. An important outcome of that is I feel indented to many individuals that I have never met before, and they are more than I can recall in this instance.

I am obliged to Dean Patrick Kenney and the Institute of Social Science Research for their continued support and to the School of Social Transformation, my colleagues at the African and African American Studies, Religious Studies and the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at ASU. A special thanks is also due to my gifted and efficient graduate and undergraduate research students who were assigned to me by these departments. I am very grateful to Tina Ping whose help has been greatly appreciated. I am equally grateful to Rabah and Um Salama al-Sadiq al-Mahdi for their appreciated help by providing me important texts and writings of Sayyid al-Sadiq, including transcripts of al-Jazeera interviews with al-Sādiq al-Mahdi and Ḥasan al-Turabi.

I am grateful to my publisher, Lexington Books—an imprint of Rowman & Littlefield—for being endlessly patient and the assistant acquisition editor Holly Buchanan, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the manuscript of this book. I am also grateful to the professional and careful editing from Jerryll Moreno.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS
AND OTHER MATTERS

For the transliteration of Arabic and Sudanese names of people, places, and institutions, I followed a simple style based on *The Chicago Manual of Style*, sixteenth edition, and the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. However, generally accepted English forms of Arabic words and names, such as Islam, Sudan, Khartoum, and so on are used as they appear in their English forms without diacritical marks. I have italicized any Arabic and Sudanese words followed by a translation of the word or concept. I have tried to be consistent for any given name, especially for commonly cited historical names, for which I have tried to follow the most frequently cited spellings. I have, however, left many of the Sudanese and Egyptian spellings that authors have used for their names. Finally, unless specified, all translations from Sudanese and Arabic sources, poetry, proverbs, and other expressive culture are mine.

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For this study I used several sources and resources in the field of Sudanese studies written in English, Arabic, and translated into these two languages. It is gratifying to notice how this corpus of knowledge has grown through time. In addition to that, there is a similar corpus of Sudanese expressive culture, TV and journalistic writings and interviews, YouTube videos and Sudanese discussion groups, and electronic media. Taping, synthesizing, and blending these gigantic bodies of knowledge is both intellectually edifying and investigatively rewarding. I would like to thank all those who contributed to this body of knowledge.

Part I

THE MAN

Chapter 1

An Introduction

On a particular evening, September 9, 1964, a young, unknown Sudanese professor, who had recently come from Paris after finishing (or not finishing)[1] his PhD from the Sorbonne, stole the show from other fellow university panelists at the Examination Hall at the University of Khartoum. The young professor was Ḥasan 'Abdalla al-Turabi (1932–2016), and the event focused on the warring situation in southern Sudan. Five other members of the University of Khartoum's community participated in that panel, including: Ḥussien 'Abdel Jalil, secretary of the Social Science Society and organizer of the event; Aḥmed 'Abdel Ḥalim, assistant director of the University of Khartoum's library; and student leaders 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim (Rabitat al-Tulab al-Shiuiyeen [The Association of Communist Students]), Khoujali 'Abdel Rahim Abu Bakr (al-Tulab al-Mustaqilien [The Independent Student's group]), and Ishaq al-Gasim Shadad (Hisb al-Ba'ath al-Qoumi al-Arabi al-Ishtraki [Ba'ath Party]). Al-Turabi had already started to gain attention as an articulate speaker at the University of Khartoum when he spoke at that panel, where he gave the greatest statement of his life.

Some members of General (*Elfriq*) 'Abboud's ruling Military Council and Cabinet members attended the panel. Chief among them was Major General al-Magboul al-Amin al-Ḥaj; finance minister Mamoun Biḥari; Buth Dui Thung and Ambrose Woul, two well-known southern politicians; Dr. 'Oun El-Sharief, a young university professor; and statesman Ahmed Mohmed Yasin, a former member of the defunct Supreme Council (1956–1958).[2] Yasin was appointed by Ibrahim 'Abboud to head a committee to advise his government on a resolution for what was described as the Southern conflict (مشكلة الجنوب).[3] That night, I personally heard Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi say that a peaceful resolution to the problem in southern Sudan lies in extending democracy to the whole country. In a long interview by Ahmed

Mansour, he recalled, "I said that decentralization was the solution for the Southern Problem, which means more freedoms should be given; that means the regime needs to go!"[4] 'Abdelwahab El-Affendi later wrote that al-Turabi said, "The problem of the south was first and foremost a constitutional problem, reflecting [an] assault on people's liberties both in [the] north and south, although certain additional factors caused the situation in the south to degenerate into armed rebellion. There could thus be only one solution for this problem and the problem of the country as a whole: the ending of the military rule." A report from the American Embassy in Khartoum, translated and published recently by Moḥamed 'Ali Ṣalih in many Sudanese media outlets, stated that al-Turabi said, "No to the federal solution, no to the secession solution, yes to self-government and for freedoms, dissemination of facts and a constitutional Committee."[5] Based on what was recorded by a, then, law professor at the University of Khartoum, Cliff Thompson, the debate that took place at the Examination Hall was more than an event involving al-Turabi and his disciples. It was a story with many dimensions and details that spoke to the complexity of the struggle against the military rule of that time. Thompson added, "The editor of *El-Ayam* newspaper, Beshir Muhamad Said, also made a daring decision. The next morning, the front page of his paper, unrelieved by any photo or drawing, carried Turabi's speech in full."[6]

Long before the gathering of that panel, 'Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub, secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party, wrote, in *al-Ayam Daily,* an important proposal about self-government for the south as a solution. However, people only remember al-Turabi's shorter but more appealing proposition expressed at the Examination Hall that particular evening—a single event that brought him nationwide recognition. After the downfall of 'Abboud's military regime, he continued to move up the ranks of the small Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan amidst many events, such as the October Revolution, the Round Table Conference for the southern Sudan question, the sociopolitical activities that took place at the University of Khartoum, and the Islamist movement, which were all extremely rich and significant in regard to the general development of Sudan. Each one of these, along with other influences, such as the additional political parties, trade unions, professionals' associations, Sufi brotherhoods, and the general media, operating in public or underground, experienced, and instilled profound changes in the sociopolitical field, and exceeding all that had previously taken place. If indeed every society produces its own pace and space for these kinds of changes, then postcolonial Sudan, in its production of the perceived and conceived construction of the contemporary Sudanese human experience in all its complexities, gave rise to these issues at major intersections of conflict. It has been said that these were, and might continue to be, part of the bearers of evolving dialectical

formations of the Sudanese people by and for themselves in their field of action with its localizations, worldly embodiments, and multiplicities. Hence, and for our purposes here, the knowledge of each one of these factors, and in particular Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamism, presupposes an acknowledgment of their effective influence on what has been and what continues to be the contemporary Sudanese human experience.

In many ways, the October Revolution is the single most prominent event in the history of post-independent Sudan. The revolution successfully launched a general moment of civil disobedience that sought a different state and a new regime based on the rights of citizens with respect to social justice, freedom, dignity, and accountability. The real significance of the October experience lies in its sense of innovation and efficiency as a movement led by unarmed civilians which spread throughout the whole country. Civilians consciously pursued, for the first time, in Africa and the Middle East, in particular, and the entire world, in general, a discourse and strategy of fields of power organized to an effectual and triumphant end by forcing a violent dictatorial military regime out of power. This was true in three fundamental ways. The first was that Ibrahim 'Abboud's regime was chased out of power by the collective action of individuals, organizations, and groups (professionals, workers, students, farmers, and political parties). The second was that 'Abboud's regime contributed to the growth of these collectivities by expanding public services, such as education, but at the same time violently infringing upon their public liberties in an attempt to dominate and control the affairs of the country and its citizens. The third was that the war which the state waged in the southern part of the country, which was not meant to be described as a civil war, represented the apex of this infringement on public liberties and citizens' civil and human rights. The southern Sudanese demanded action and a program of an imaginative political initiative for liberation from dispossession which could lead the way out of the construction of marginalization and the "development of underdevelopment" in the country at large. The October movement, which was initiated by almost all sectors of the Sudanese citizens as a collective and successful social and political action (not by Ḥasan al-Turabi single-handedly, as he claims), added to the value manifested in the role, the power, and the political capital of the Sudanese civil sphere, which emphatically was/is secular in its character and composition. As a result of the October Revolution, the country witnessed a new generation of politicians and leaders in most of the political parties and associations. Of course it did not take long to discover that the totality of liberation had never reached a reasonable degree of favor in its local constitutions, constituencies, or political parties' programs and expressions. Consequently, the counterrevolution manifested itself not so much as a break from liberation ideals but as their reversal. Thus, Ḥasan al-Turabi's two-faced Janus emerged.

With an evolving, more complex Sudanese sociopolitical and existential world, the Examination Hall event and the October Revolution were the rites of passage that marked al-Turabi's route to fame from Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, the unknown university law professor, to Dr. Ḥasan, the young Sudanese political star. He was recognized as a new name in Sudan—especially among students of higher education institutions—now someone who could give the small and marginal Islamist party a new image. The October Revolution added value and prestige to the faculty, the students, and the workers of the University of Khartoum, turning it into a temple for the emerging, Sudanese civil religion. Due to al-Turabi's role during and after the October Revolution and, especially, at the Round Table Conference in 1965, as well as his relationship to the University of Khartoum, he won, by a significant landslide, the top seat in the *dawair al-khrijeen* (the Graduates Electoral College).[7] This win became the epitome of pride for Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, the Islamist "leader" now "unbowed by authority and orthodoxy."[8]

The October Revolution was and will remain a way to call attention to the planned, visceral, and creative force by which the Sudanese came together as citizens and demanded social change. Prior campaigns and forms of resistance with symbolic meaning paved the way for political and revolutionary progress unprecedented in the country and in the region. The initial aim of the revolution was to create a space for all Sudanese citizens from the north, south, east, west, and center where they might coexist amicably despite their diversity of culture, faith, and ethnicity—not to create an Islamist political leader. However, in both the revolutionary and counter revolutionary developments and in the push and pull of change, which were complex and unstable enough to allow for an emergence of a new generation of political leadership, a new intellectual environment within the public and official spheres acquired new relevance and resonance to serious challenges.

The emergence of Dr. Ḥasan through the events of the October Revolution helped al-Turabi himself, his propagandists, and the conventional storytellers among his followers reshape the history (inevitably offering him a more significant role in the October Revolution than what his involvement actually warranted). Many of al-Turabi's disciples set the tone for this; chief among them was Ahmed Shamoug—first among the Islamists to publish a book about the October Revolution. Al-Turabi and the Islamists continued to claim that he initiated and, hence, owned the October Revolution, which is a claim that has been bitterly disputed by recorded history, media reports, observers, and other political parties. However, judging from the latest interview with the man in the 16-part series of شاهد على العصر (Shāhid 'Ala al-'Asr) on al-Jazeera TV that started on April 16, 2016, it seems that the totalitarian mind and personality cult created by al-Turabi himself and his disciples did not strip their trappings enough to offer a credible assessment of that event

in history. As stated earlier, the interviews which were recorded in 2010 by al-Jazeera were released after al-Turabi's death, whether in agreement with Ḥasan al-Turabi or for other reasons, including, possibly, pressures from the Khartoum regime. In the first six sessions that dealt with al-Turabi's early life, including his relationship to the October Revolution, al-Turabi's different sense of self, as mediated within his personality cult, seems hardly comparable as he articulates his memories of the October Revolution as a one-man show, disregarding any other person or prior development that made the change possible.

On November 6, 1968, at the same place that launched the new status of Dr. Ḥasan, the Examination Hall at the University of Khartoum, a group of al-Turabi's student Islamists stormed a traditional dance performance organized by the National Culture Students' Club at the university. One of the students was killed, and others were injured. The paradox then was that, while Dr. Ḥasan was a regular speaker at the students' club at the University of Khartoum—where he introduced his new version and vision of Islamism within a shifting center of gravity of the national discourse—his young disciples at the other side of the campus were introducing a new form of violence at the Examination Hall (where, ironically, al-Turabi's personality first emerged). It did not take long for al-Turabi's Islamism and its practices to show up at the Sudanese political market, including everything from the university campus and its wallpapers to the Islamist party and its newspaper, *al-Mithaq al-Islami*, in addition to open-air, political-discussion events and rallies. These were used to sell him and his version of Islamism to different generations of urban Sudanese youth with poor elementary religious education. In this respect, al-Turabi's Islamism and Islamists emerged as an autonomous and self-satisfied entity, antagonistic and violent toward almost every form of representation within the local and regional surroundings. The fundamental fact to be addressed is that the logic of violence that grew with the emergence of al-Turabi's Islamism developed within its counter revolutionary mode of operation into a wide-ranging self-constitution of action, eventually leading the way to the military coup of 1989 (no wonder why some of the leading members of the organization take pride in describing themselves or being described as *sikha* (Iron rod), *salouk al-jabha*, or *saloouk al-Ikhwan* (the gangster or the bully of the Brotherhood)). This makes faith and piety the least-needed factors of the organization's communal life, and so the foundation of the organization, at best, represents a community that developed personally and communally imagined areas of conflict which leave no room for the kind of beliefs that ponder the absolute rather than the transitory.

However, we might need to give closer and more careful attention to the relationship between the colonial state in Sudan and Islam, in particular, or religion, in general, with respect to that particular institute of education,

which was later called the University of Khartoum. The colonial state created, in and of itself, a new religious entity via its monopoly over the Sudanese, open religious space. The state could strategically deploy its authority to regulate and impose certain rules and roles and to deny access to particular religious fields and markets. The enforced social, political, and religious fragmentation turned different religious representations into appendages of the state after making a distinction between "good" Islam, which would be accommodated, and "bad" Islam, which would not be tolerated. As Nandy argues, "Colonization colonizes the minds in addition to the bodies, and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all."[9] Young al-Turabi was exposed to a variety of systems and movements, stories, and experiences that ultimately shaped his ideology. He lived under the influence of a hegemonic culture and its structures' forces, which supported and maintained the colonial system, as well as that of the national movements which resisted colonialism in Sudan (see chapter 2). But he also lived through the infancy of the Islamist movement at the University College of Khartoum as well as the emergence of Babikir Karrar and Ḥarakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM, an anti-Communist movement). Young al-Turabi lived during the time of Moḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha, another Sudanese Islamist who was "admired by young Islamists for his combative style, while arousing the hostility of Ṣūfi leaders by touching the same raw nerve the Mahdi touched a century earlier in claiming direct divine mandate to reshape Ṣūfism (and the totality of Islam)."[10] Al-Turabi was self-romantic, and hence he rarely mentioned history and its personalities so as to avoid any impediments in the establishment of his personality cult. Such a cult, as will be explained later, could be an important part of the riddle of his foundational acts that generate impact or a key to understanding al-Turabi's Islamism.

Al-Turabi's personality cult did not emerge overnight. To trace the genesis of its development, we need to go back to the emergence of Islamism as a movement whose public presence partly budded in the University of Khartoum and high school campuses after the 1964 October Revolution. Here, step-by-step, Ḥasan al-Turabi methodically and successfully consolidated his power, with strict centralization of all the Islamist party's authority in his hands. Simultaneously, his personality cult grew; he—the brilliant student, the acknowledged university professor, and the "fox-like" politician—was always celebrated as the heart of his disciples' cult, and he continued to be perceived by them as a representation and expression of an exceptional, modern Islamist *ṭarīqa* which they liked to believe in and promote as their image to the Sudanese public.[11] Dr. ʿAlī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed, a close aide to al-Turabi and a devout follower, attributes al-Turabi's prominence to his outstanding ability to "get ahead and stay ahead." He argues that al-Turabi "is not only a brilliant person but also a dynamic thinker, and by staying for

so long at the helm of the organization he shaped his leadership position, and it shaped him."[12]

To better understand these qualities in relation to the formation of his personality cult, we need to look at the history of this person and his role as part of the definition of the social phenomenon within the growth of what I call the Sudanese community of the state.[13] In one sense, al-Turabi does not strike those who study his legacy as merely a successful member of the Sudanese community of the state or as an accomplished scholar. One needs to look deeper into al-Turabi's personality cult, which was blended with an environment conducive to the Sudanese community of the state's general feeling: that their "rendezvous with destiny"[14] had been fulfilled and that they emerged as heirs of the state's colonial community and products of higher, expanding public education. This imposed an unchallenged authority that controlled the postcolonial state ever since the early formation of the modern Sudanese state. Al-Turabi had the privilege of being one of the few and first Sudanese students to be admitted to the University College of Khartoum—a year after it was established from what was originally Gordon Memorial College. After his graduation from the School of Law in 1955, he studied abroad and completed a master's degree in 1957 at the University of London. In 1964, he was one of the first Sudanese scholars awarded a PhD from the Sorbonne in Paris. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the role of emerging powers within a liberal democracy. In 1961, he visited and toured the United States. According to some writings about his legacy, he was disturbed by the racial prejudice he had encountered. After finishing his dissertation in 1964, al-Turabi traveled extensively in Europe. On his return to Sudan, Dr. al-Turabi was quickly appointed the dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum, an issue disputed by many. He left the prestigious university position within a few months to become a member of the post-October Revolution Sudanese Parliament and the secretary general of the Islamist organization that adopted the name Jabhat al-Mithaq al-Islami (جبهة الميثاق الاسلامي) (ICF or Islamic Charter Front) instead of the Muslim Brotherhood.

His strange speaking style was a mixture of sarcasm, mockery, and provocative language, with verses from the Qur'an infused as if part of his speech, mixed with some concepts reproduced from modern Arabic terms. All of this touched a raw nerve for inexperienced, foreign media and an ingenuous, Sudanese audience. Andrew Natsios, who spent years as the Special Humanitarian Coordinator, wrote on President George W. Bush's Special Envoy to Sudan, "When Western scholars and writers interview him, they tend to accept him for what he appears to be—urbane, charming, witty, and brilliant. Turabi knows how to speak to Western audiences, using language calibrated to be inoffensive but also misleading." Natsios added,

"Two Hassan al-Turabi exist in parallel universes: the moderate and thought-ful Islamic scholar who can be found when he is out of power or when he speaks to Western audiences in English or French, and the religious zealot who emerges when he is in power or speaking in Arabic."[15] The Sudanese citizens, who knew al-Turabi better than anybody else, confirmed this in their satire by declaring, "there are two Ḥasan al-Turabi[s]: one for export and the other for local consumption."

He has an enduring effect on some of his disciples, who emulate his iconic writing style and rhetoric, involving erratic movements and animated hand gestures and facial expressions. According to Ahmed Kamal al-Din—an attorney, a former disciple who maintained good relations with al-Turabi, and a self-described, independent Islamist—this style gave al-Turabi an added value of "unclaimed sacredness." Unclaimed or not, this sacredness most likely speaks of "a pure charisma [that] depends on devotion to the person . . . [rather than a] successful charisma based on devotion to his work"[16] with which his followers associated him. Some of his disciples raised him to the level of prophethood.[17] Others believed in him while in power, hated him before his death, and started canonizing him afterward. He was perceived by many as the absolute leader in Hannah Arendt's characterization who "impersonate[s] the double function of the characteristic of each layer of the movement—to act as the magic defense of the movement against the outside world; and for some time, to be the direct bridge by which the movement is connected with it."[18] He also "represents the movement in a totally differ-ent way from all ordinary party leaders; he claims personal responsibility for action, deed, or misdeed, committed by the functionary in his official capacity."[19] Thus, he "who has monopolized the right and the possibility of explanation . . . appears to the outside as the only person who knows what he is doing."[20] But he also projects himself as "the only representative of the movement to whom one may still talk without totalitarian terms."[21] But the expectation that all members of the party would work harmoniously with the devout followers to achieve the charismatic leader's goals proved to be a different matter. It was within this context that Ḥasan al-Turabi's tragedy occurred, which hasn't received the attention that it deserves among those who have been studying his legacy. Al-Turabi's story and his pursuit for power deserves more consideration, as it surpasses all bounds of what he repeatedly described as the tragic parts of *ibtila'*, which are now attributed to the brand of Islamism he created, its demise, and the essence of Islamism at large.

Dr. Ḥasan wasted no time to muscle his way up the ladder of Sudanese Islamism and to frame his own brand of secularized religion. Al-Turabi here did not recognize Ḥasan al-Banna, Abu A'la' al-Mawdudi, or Sayyid Qutb as inspirational figures, and so he contributed his success and his Islamism

to his own time and space. This is warranted by his course of action, including, for example, his opposition to the Qutbian perspective with respect to certain issues that Sayyid Qutb brought to the Islamist discourse, including his vanguard creed (this will be addressed later in chapters 5 and 6). He also opposed Ḥasan al-Banna and his Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, branding it as traditional, because its method for capturing the state (through *tarbiya*) directly collided with his. On the other hand, he and his Islamism were similar to the Sudanese Communist Party and shared Salafi's aversion to Sufi Islam (though in disagreement with their isolationist worldviews[22]); from such a perspective emerged al-Turabi's political agenda. It is evident that, from al-Turabi's definition of modernity, which he articulated later in his meeting with American scholars, he thought of himself as a person with cultural capital superior to that of all the locals, such as Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha and Babikir Karrar, as well as that of all the regional founders of Islamism including, of course, Ḥasan al-Banna, Abu A'la' al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb. His life experience and relationship with the main discourse concerning modernity within three metropolitan centers—Khartoum, London, and Paris—represent an added value to that cultural capital as part and parcel of his own *laïcité*, breaking away from culture, religion, and modernity as was previously defined. Hence, the process and function of differentiation as described by his discourse, for how and where to assemble and construct his group with God as well as his own space as an individual, according to some prevailing worldviews, has become subject to controversy. In this field, al-Turabi's Islamism represents an unthought-of form of *laïcité*—not secularization, which will be explained later—that presents religion as an enterprise and a product of manufacture, distributable through a new breed of wholesale and retail vendors. Only in this sense is Ḥasan al-Turabi similar to Sayyid Qutb. Each one is a wholesale vendor but within his own terms. Nevertheless, Ḥasan al-Turabi, the Sudanese Islamist, his Sudanese Islamism, and his Islamist followers each seek a different interpretation.

When Ḥasan al-Turabi, who prides himself as *ibn al-thaqafa al-Farancia* (a son of French culture), created his own *laïcité*, which was not promoted but typified by the Islamist movement, it was more than a personal project. As early as the mid-1950s, al-Turabi, as a graduate student in London, submitted a memorandum to the Fifth Congress of the Sudanese Ikhwan that proposed "the movement be transformed into an intellectual pressure group on the lines of the Fabian Society, and not to work as an independent party. Instead it should act through all the political parties and on all of them." Meanwhile, while he was in France , his *laïcité* represented a breakaway from culture, religion, and modernity. He started studying the French language, proving his early interest in French culture and literature. By despising Ṣūfi Islam, he depicted the culture as primitive, broke away from religion by

reproaching the 'ulama, and censured modernity by denouncing secularism (though he was, in fact, secular in nature). Typically, his brand of Islamism differentiated its field of action by designating religion and religiosity to different spheres, advancing "politics over religiosity and political action over theological reflections." Within this, al-Turabi's Islamism limited itself with respect to the debate over secularism. However, al-Turabi attacks secularism and secularists all the time. Here, al-Turabi's Islamism built its own instruments which functioned outside of what would be described as religious, thought-of rationalization. As stated earlier, al-Turabi himself described the field of his Islamism as dominated by "students and university graduates everywhere [who] represent modernity, and they are the only current which exercises any measure of *ijtihad,* any review of history."[23] How his Islamists differ from other groups that relate to modernity, according to this, is based on an assumption and a generalization. He assumes that "liberal politicians and intellectuals are not interested in Islamic history, they are interested in European history; they want to transplant European institutions. They don't know how to grow them in soil. They look so much to the West that they are not actually renewing, they are not deciding any *ijtihad* (processes of creative reasoning)*.* If there are any *mujtahidin* (the Jurist conducting *Ijitihad),* they are the Islamists now." The Sudanese *mujtahdin*, according to him, are "young people who are equal; there was no one who could proclaim to be senior in age to become an absolute *sheikh.*" These groups, or *lumpen intelligencia* as described by Guilain Denoeux and Olivier Roy before him, are "not usually clerics but young, university educated intellectuals who claim for themselves the right to interpret the true meaning of religion (their actual knowledge of Islam is typically sketchy)." At the same time, their reference presents the political discourse of al-Turabi and those who blindly follow him in denouncing secularism as a "political discourse in religious garb." In this sense Islamism is, internally and externally, secularism at the same time. In its "two-sided relation to modernity and the West at the very heart of Islamist ideology, lies a powerful, comprehensive critique of the West and what Islamists see as the corrupting political and cultural influence of the West on Middle East societies." However, "the Islamists' reliance on concepts drawn from the Islamic tradition also indicates a desire to break away from Western terminology. Hence, Islamism is a decidedly modern phenomenon in at least two critical respects: the profile of its leaders and its reliance on Western technology."[24] Ḥasan al-Turabi added another aspect to his Islamism—its resemblance to Salafism. While he agrees with the Salafis in denigrating Sūfi Islam, he takes it a step further within his *laïcité* by bragging that he is a child of French culture and disapproves of the 'ulama and their institutions. Hence, al-Turabi's Islamism has floated free of modernity and its secular underpinnings, free of Islam and its scholarship or 'ulama, and

free of culture and its Sūfi representations. Such provocation, riddled with ideological exceptionalism, one would argue, has set him free to practice his unchecked *ijtihād* and to critically challenge everybody else since only a few people—his disciples—could be conformists. Aḥmed Kamal al-Din argues that al-Turabi "gave himself unlimited freedom," but that freedom has gone wild by giving no attention to the conventions or rules of engagement within the local, Islamist, and Islamic discourse. It developed laissez-faire—forms of verbal and, later, physical violence that evolved around a system of conflict and became a group-binding function for utter separation of the group and its individual members from the outside world.

This is one of the most dangerous consequences of Islamism at large and Ḥasan al-Turabi's brand of Islamism in particular—that Islamists are characterized by an image and practice of verbal and physical violence; weirdness or fraudulence is a product and an arsenal of its political behavior. For years, Sudanese bystanders directed pejorative designations of profane culture and labels for them, such as *kizan* (tin cups), *tujar al-Din* (religion vendors), and fascists. At the heart of this stream of epithets that some Sudanese citizens fling at them is something perceived as a representation of a disingenuous, reprehensible faith. At the same time, it was clear that the Islamists had been living a culture of distance, as most of them feel that they had been under a state of social siege. Or as Paul Ritter puts it, they were in a different setting, exercising "an instrument of censure"—especially as they were finding themselves bombarded by such torrents of jokes, satirical remarks, and caricatures. All of this makes Islamism function as a political and social magnet that attracts select individuals and groups for reasons other than personal piety and makes climbing up the ladder of the organization to leadership positions, or *tamkeen*[25] and *kasb*, the true initiative. Many other Sudanese people describe this as *fasad* (corruption), a vocational matter that requires conformity among other mundane qualities and requirements rather than adherence to faith.

But beyond the violence that Islamists had directed toward almost every single group of the Sudanese population, Ḥasan al-Turabi himself became its subject and target as well—and he received it in abundance. Most importantly, this became the core of an identity of a closed and self-satisfied political body politic and the establishment of singular invocation. It is also what they consider to be the truth, which continued to deny the public existence of the Other and allowed them to see themselves only and often within the form of domination. In reality, they never saw the incoherence of the experience that such domination creates—that is, the invisibility of humanity and citizens' rights as well as the apparent lack of imagining the Other within what Badiou manifests as the state of the situation, or to use the Quranic term, *al-Nfs al-lawama*, or "the reflective or blaming self." From this emerges the dark side of Islamism and its faceless vehicles of violence and commitment to banal

evil. And because evil is rootless, and "because it has no roots it has no limitations, it can go to unthinkable extremes and sweep the whole world."[26]

This worldview made the impulse of insensitivity toward their sur-roundings a recurring phenomenon. In addition, the uncompromising stand of al-Turabi and his Islamists against all shades of non-Islamists—from Communists to other secular individuals and groups—makes no room for the Other, who is perceived by al-Turabi and other Islamists as the main threat within a Muslim society. Hence, it has become a primary goal of the Islamists to keep secularists at a distance, expelled if possible, or eliminated without remorse. These two impulses have opened the way for a callous and never-ending war of attrition between the Islamists and their insignificant Other—as the presence of each side is perceived as ephemeral. In retrospect, we have seen within the last five decades that both sides have been living in a "state of suspended extinction," as each side has been turned by the other into an object that should be eliminated through the state apparatus of coercion or private violence. Both state and private violence grew and both the sides continued to fortify their power pursuits, exploited and played out within the rivalry between superpowers. The Islamists in power invented and put in practice a new model or critical theory of savage separation of religion and the state, where the state was designated to invent and exercise all and unlim-ited forms of violence against its citizens. Some of the defining characteristics and productions of this development, which are of great significance, mate-rialized in (1) a complete withdrawal from the long-held Islamist ideology of *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the solution) and a switch to violence as the solution. Here, 'Alī 'Osmān and his collaborators of second-generation Islamists established, championed, and ruled with no limit of domination, by and large, with a centralized, regime power, exercising violence from which no person, including the Islamists themselves and their shaikh, was immune; (2) forcing the southern Sudanese people to walk away from the Islamist regime and its oppressive state but not from Sudan's field of action, as they maintained the name, Sudan, in a part of the name of their new state; (3) gradual distancing, by default and by design, from Sudan and cocooning into 'Abdel Raḥim Ḥamdi's triangle, where their "imagined," "core regime supporters" were concentrated, neglecting the rest of the country; and (4) the creation of a *janjaweed* force which devastated and pillaged Darfur and other parts of western Sudan: a recognized and authorized counter-insurgent military unit dedicated to pacifying the Sudanese population by killing wher-ever dissent expressed itself.

The second phase of al-Turabi's Islamism was the initiation of al-Turabi's strategic vision of *waḥdaniyya* or "oneness."[27] Later al-Turabi explained and continued to promote this idea as the deep-seated, grand theory of what he calls "Unitarianism," which he has assumed, developed, and followed as his

operational, high-status stipulation. Unitarianism here represents the "fundamental principle that explains almost every aspect of doctrinal or practical Islam."

Hence, through time, the idea of Unitarianism, which started as a representation characteristic of "leadership as one," has extended to embrace a total order of "not just that God is one, absolutely one, but also existence is one, life is one; all life is just a program of worship, whether it's economics, politics, sex, private, public or whatever." Hence, leadership as one was initiated and confirmed by "his new grip on the movement [that] was dramatically demonstrated in the decision to issue a communiqué on November 2nd in the name of Ḥasan al-Turabi as secretary-general of Ikhwan." This move was "even more significant, given that no such post as Ikhwan secretary-general existed then. In fact such a designation contradicted the resolutions of the fifth congress of the party [which was held in 1962] that insisted on collective leadership as a safeguard against what was seen then as the abuse by [the previous leader al-Rashid] al-Ṭahir of his position." What is not surprising was the eagerness of the younger, college-educated groups, most of whom supported Dr. Ḥasan and his new leadership. They claimed to have drawn inspiration from the 1964 October Revolution which would, in turn, be applied to the new image and prestige of the University of Khartoum and its environment. This was a sentiment that al-Turabi and his party continually reproduced, communicated, and accentuated particularly in the decisive mobilization and promotion of their own self-image. Al-Turabi repeatedly—especially when called upon to describe his group, mostly to Western audiences of journalists and scholars—claimed that Islamism "is the only modernity." It is in this form that al-Turabi's relationship with modernity, as he perceived it, drew a "marked sense of self-awareness" and a clear line between his and other forms of "traditional" Islamism—the Ikhwan in particular—that adopted the term *al-Amin al-ʿĀm* (the secretary general) for *al-Murshid al-ʿĀm* (the General Guide). From such an order (and the body of politics that emerged out of it) came a very serious, foundational consequence of al-Turabi's theory of practice and his perception of people as one. According to this, neither dissent nor disagreement could be tolerated. In this sense, the "Other" has been regarded not only as the enemy but as a threat and heresy from which society, held together with and sustained by the power-as-one, should be protected. This concept constituted the foundation of the Islamists' totalitarian pursuit, and the violence that ensued was the prime example of their regime from 1989 to the present.

When al-Turabi assumed leadership of the Islamic party in 1964, it was a small organization of no more than a couple thousand members, who were mostly students from universities, higher education institutions, and secondary schools. The ICF advocated an "Islamic constitution" and an "Islamic state."

All of these factors added to al-Turabi's personality cult, "grouping around him some of the younger and more militant members, but at the same time alienating some of the old guards who clashed with him repeatedly." 'Alī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed claims that those old guard members were not sidelined by al-Turabi but rather sidelined inevitably by their own ineptitude. In his book, *Min Tarikh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Sudan 1953–1980* (From the History of Muslim Brothers in the Sudan 1953–1980), 'Iesa Makki 'Osmān Azraq, one of the elders of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, briefly describes some of these clashes and how some of the movement's leaders complained about the harsh language of their new secretary general, Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi. Azraq particularly referred to an incident when some members of the executive committee of the movement demanded an apology from al-Turabi for publicly insulting Dr. Zain al-'Abdin al-Rikabi, another professor, a member of the executive committee, and the editor of the movement's paper, *al-Mithaq*. Al-Turabi refused to apologize and according to Azraq's story, said that he "has never been used to apologizing in public."[28] Such an account holds significance because this behavior continued to be al-Turabi's norm, even when he was asked to apologize to the Sudanese people for his role in the 1989 military coup and the atrocities committed as a result of it. Again, he said he would not apologize and stated that he apologizes only to 'Allah. Hence, he has always placed himself above individuals, colleagues, organizations, the nation, and the state. Accordingly, we are here in front of a personality that floats above history. In his interview with the Egyptian TV host, Muna al-Shazali, he explained that he does not like to padlock himself to any political, partisan, or religious formation. "I would like to talk to the human beings in the world and in existence," he echoed to his interviewer.

Ḥasan 'Abdalla al-Turabi was as much an enigma, having shrouded himself with mystery, to those who loved, respected, or feared him as he was to those who disparaged him, competed with him, or hated him. Throughout his political career, he has been accused—especially by former colleagues and disciples—of numerous shortcomings that include condescension, callousness, opportunism, and even incredulity or *kufr*. Yet, no matter how provocative, controversial, or even notorious some may have found him, he has still managed to emerge as a key player in Sudan, the region, and the world—as one capable of commanding the attention and support, if not the strict allegiance, of thousands of Sudanese people who have streamed in to listen to him for more than fifty years. He knew how to attract local and foreign media attention more so than the presidents he served or opposed. However, on the other hand, he received the harshest treatment from some of his own disciples, who put him in prison for more time than his enemies did. The late John Garang describes al-Turabi's disciples and their actions as similar to kittens who eat their fathers. Thus, while he was in prison, as

one of his former disciples al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir said, al-Turabi wrote his book, *al-Syasa wa al-Ḥukm*, "to establish a complete extrication from the history of al-Ingath while condemning it without a fourth confrontation with that past."[29] On the contrary, he directed his anger for more than a decade toward disciples who "tarnished the image of Islam." All in all, it would be difficult to rule out Ḥasan al-Turabi as one of the most important political figures in twentieth-century Sudan and the Muslim world. There might be reasons for some to overlook this fact, some of which could be attributed to Ḥasan al-Turabi himself. Yet, the fact that his personality did not match his theory of value contributed to his importance. Nevertheless, his Islamism has been missed in action and represents a desperate failure to provide an objective formalization of itself (regardless of his denial of this). This failure, as well as many others, has undermined his Islamism from within and without.

First, to understand this situation, we need to look deeply to its starting point, which is al-Turabi's failure to see and accept, as a moral, religious, political, and civil value, the necessity of the process by which people as citizens agree, according to their free will, without coercion or a military coup or the violence that emerges from it. There are many sides to this picture. It is not violence, antagonism, and exclusion that sustain Islam, it is solidarity, togetherness, and respect for human dignity and citizens' rights that make it sensitive and responsive to the habits of the heart. Without and outside of human rights, legitimate in collective life and growth, there is no salvation.

Second, until his last day, al-Turabi had not recognized that his theory of value in practice, which was lost in action for 'Alī 'Osmān and his team, produced a system that set aside the will of God, the nature of the human being, and the dream and ability of the Sudanese citizens to create a system that offers them comfort, dignity, and peace.

Third, with al-Turabi's theory of value, though missing in action, his disciples ended up producing a new form of savage separation of religion and state where the state was designated as a field of coercion or a violent system of control over the society. I describe this model of separation as savage because the state is tailored to the security imperatives of the regime for which the state operates as a coercive and violence-intensive structure to subdue, appease, discipline, and even kill citizens, including the Islamists themselves, when the need arises.

Fourth, the phases of his transformation transpired out of his evolving leadership conditions. He transformed from Dr. Ḥasan, the university professor, into the high leader Dr. Ḥasan, head of the political Islamists' party, and then into Shaikh Ḥasan, the uncontested leader—at least in appearance—who, in the end, solidified into a totalitarian leader, taking steps toward an unfulfilled Sunni *Wilayat-e-Faqih*.

Later, some of his remaining loyalists boasted that he taught his renegade disciples *libs al-shal wa istimal al-jawal* (how to wear the neck shawl and use a cell phone). One can see more in this commotion than in that insinuation, especially when other developments, such as style, taste, and modernity, were not freed but added to the weight of new and old images.

On March 5, 2016, Ḥasan al-Turabi died in Khartoum at the age of 84 and was reportedly working in his office, planning fearlessly for battle against former disciples who turned, from intimate friends, into real enemies through what he called *al-nizam al-Khalif* (the alternative system). Until his last day, al-Turabi never gave up, though his final fight proved fateful. Nevertheless, Ḥasan al-Turabi might be one of the most important political personalities in postcolonial Sudan, the region, and the Muslim world. There might be reasons for some to overlook this fact. Some of these reasons could be attributed to Ḥasan al-Turabi himself. Yet, what makes him important is his failure to see and accept, as a moral, religious, political, and civil value, the necessity to pay attention to the processes by which people as citizens agree according to their free will, without coercion or a military coup (and the violence that emerges from it). It is not violence, antagonism, and exclusion that sustain Islam or create an Islamists' state, but solidarity, togetherness, and respect for human dignity and citizens' human and civil rights. Ḥasan al-Turabi has remained an albatross around the Islamists' movement, and Islamism has remained an albatross around him in return. The debate here could be settled or continued in a manner as quiet and simple, or as violent and radical, as its beginning (at the students' forums of high institutions of learning in Sudan from the 1960s onward). It started as a counterrevolution in performance and as Islamism in practice—as a representation of the only Islamists' State in the Muslim world. It is true that such a "performance always exceeds its space and its image, since it lives in its own doing."[30] However, the events that marked al-Turabi's Islamism, when it functioned as a political doctrine and regime, might lead us to conclude that al-Turabi's Islamism has added nothing new or of value to the Sudanese human experience, in particular, or to that of Muslims worldwide, over all contemporary discourses and modes of existence. They have demonstrated the failure of Islamism in theory and practice and have swept away everything that could have given it value. There is, in reality, no "al-Turabi Islamism" or Islamism in general, either as a worldview or social movement. Like other *isms*, which attempt to limit human action with straightjackets, one could conclude that there is no system or doctrine called Islamism. That is to say what all *isms* have in common and what they indicate by their nature, to borrow from Alain Badiou, is "the closure of an entire epoch of thought and its concerns."[31]

This study aims to show that, through the internal and external and subjective and objective developments and demonstrations by which Ḥasan

al-Turabi represented himself as well as his Islamism within local and regional fields of action, this human experience might be a reliable guide and analytical tool that tells us how Islamism has been deprived of meaningful significance. Here, Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Sudanese project were guilty of all elements of failure. From this, it is important to realize that other models express the same nature and reveal the same shape of the ventures of his Islamism and its representations, as a collective, and failures, as an outcome, in Sudan and elsewhere. A political sociologist, Hazem Kandil, confirms in his work, *Inside the Brotherhood*, that "the reputation [of the Brotherhood] established over eight decades collapsed in less than eight months."[32] This interpretive claim and other inquiries of Islamists' modes of existence, as Frederic Volpi says, represent an effort to transform the traditional approach and other approaches "from rigid, analytical frameworks" into what amounts to "making sense of the modern developments in light of, but not predetermined by, the past."[33]

From Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* and Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* to Francis Fukuyama's highly controversial book *The End of History*, the literature on the demise of regimes and their ideologies is massive and wide-ranging. Narratives and counter-narratives from this repertoire of knowledge have been making an "effort to provide a coherent set of answers to the existential predicaments that confront all human beings in the passage of their lives."[34] The end of Islamism as a social and political ideology—what is impatiently foreseen by many as inevitable—is a project and order coming to fulfillment. Many would argue that the Arab Spring[35] was a self-fulfilling prophecy and self-justifying objective that revealed the power of the active forces of the corrosive actions of inner, covert, and overt realities incongruous to the ones shimmering at the top. Such realities manifest themselves in alternative realities that continue to interrogate, challenge, and confront the essence of Islamism. Hazem Kandil reported that he "asked the old, bearded man standing next to me in Tahrir Square why he joined the protests. 'They promised us that Islam is the solution,' he replied. 'But under Muslim Brotherhood rule we saw neither Islam nor a solution.' The country that invented Islamism may well be on its way to undoing its spell."[36] Many would argue that, in addition to the brothers' dismal performance in power, the poor performance of the Sudanese Islamists was an eye-opener for 33 million Egyptian citizens who marched against the Islamists' rule.

This study will address these issues, largely through a sociological, analytic biography of this era in the Sudanese, post-October human experience. In this experience, the Sudanese Islamists' movement can be viewed, in part, as a continuance of political Islam or Islamism—but in all its transformation, it could be seen as "al-Turabi Islamism." This human experience has been seeking sociopolitical change that could colonize the religious, social, and

economic aspects of the population by taking hold of the state and using it as a vessel, reaching this end through violent and nonviolent ways. Al-Turabi and his Islamism, in reality, produced a full-fledged, counter revolutionary effect that far exceeded what Islamism *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the Solution) was aiming for. In this sense, not only did it not put an end to Islamism, but, most importantly, it gave rise to serious questions that we are all now forced to attempt to answer. These questions, from which Islamism has since been able to draw substance contributing to its use of violence, instead became, in practice, the solution and, in turn, shaped a highly regimented, new model of savage separation of religion and state. In this new model, the state was responsible for regulating and distributing old and new forms of violence, making it one of the most violent forms that the Sudanese had ever experienced. It is no wonder that Ḥasan al-Turabi was not saved from this violence, as he became one of its major victims. But what happened with Ḥasan al-Turabi, the person, was precisely a displacement of the system in transformation. Though the answer to the questions and objectives of Islamism are in practice, which one cannot but reject, which represent in part what happened to the Sudanese, it is only one part of the dark side of Islamism and it discontents or is a representation of al-Turabi Islamism in action.

NOTES

1. Some accuse Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi of lying about his academic, doctoral degree. According to many sources, chief among them Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi who published his long interview with al-Turabi under the title: *The Making of An Islamic Political Leader: Conversation with Ḥasan al-Turabi*, al-Turabi spent four years preparing for his doctoral thesis in French on "States of Emergency in Constitutional Juris Prudence." The front cover page in Appendix 1 tells about an MA thesis defended in 1964, the year he came back to Sudan.

2. The Supreme Council of the state is a ceremonial office composed of five, public personas created by the postcolonial parliamentary system in Sudan. It was meant to represent the national unity of the country, not to guide day-to-day government activities or to exercise any political authority. The real political power resided in the council of ministers with the position of the prime minister. The first Supreme Council was dissolved by 'Abboud's military rule to be replaced by a ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces under the presidency of Major General Ibrahim 'Abboud. The Supreme Military Council, or the council of the head of the state, became the standard model in Sudan with minor modifications during democratically elected parliamentary systems.

3. The origin of the war in southern Sudan, which is called the Southern Problem, dates back to the 1950s before Sudan was officially declared independent on January 1, 1956. On August 18, 1955, the Equatorial Corps, a military unit composed of

southerners, mutinied at the southern city of Torit. The mutiny spread to the other three provinces in southern Sudan. By 1963 the insurgency escalated to a serious war during which southern guerrillas roamed the countryside while government forces melded the cities. In August 1964, desperately attempting to find a solution to the enervating campaign in the South, 'Abboud's regime appointed a 25-man commission to study the problem and give proposals for a solution. When the commission, in turn, asked for public dialogue on the issue, the community of the University of Khartoum engaged in debates that started with the one mentioned here and later escalated to confrontation between the students and the police who were brought into campus to disperse the demonstrators. One student named Ahmed al-Qurashi was killed when the police fired at the demonstrators. The civil disobedience continued and successfully unseated the 'Abboud's regime.

4. The 16, one-hour long, episodes of interviews by Aḥmed Mansour's program Shāhid 'Alaa al-'Asr (A Testament to the Times) was recorded by al-Jazeera, a TV station, in 2010 but aired in April 2016, after al-Turabi's death in March the month before.

5. Moḥamed 'Ali Ṣaliḥ, Wathiq Amrecia 'An Thawrat October (8), al-Rakoba website, October 2014.

6. Cliff Thompson, "Days of the October Revolution." Unpublished Manuscript.

7. One of the remarkable achievements of the October Revolution was the Round Table Conference, which convened in Khartoum, March 16–25, 1965. It brought Sudanese politicians from the North and South into agreement upon a solution to the southern Sudan question.

8. Austin Dacey, *The Secular Conscience: Why Belief Belongs in Public Life* (Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2008) 25.

9. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998) 1.

10. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 65.

11. Ahmed Abdel Rahman Mohamed, one of the closest members to al-Turabi out of the many Islamist leaders from day one, reminded al-Turabi that "he turned the Islamist movement into a Sufi ṭarīqa [sect] and [he] became its Shaikh" (see chapter 3).

12. Author's interview with 'Alī al-Ḥaj, June 2014, Bonn.

13. The community of the state represents a new organization of power that emerged out of the rise of a small class of publicly educated Sudanese citizens which continued to grow through the expansion of public education since the colonial times. This community, which was created to serve the state, included white, blue, and khaki-colored state employees in addition to white arraigned peasants of new, state-controlled farming projects, especially the al-Gezira scheme. This community of the state continued to find legitimization with its invention of a progressive self-image and cultural identity as an important part, if not the sole part, of modernity in Sudan. See Abdullahi Gallab, *A Civil Society Differed: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan* (Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 2011).

14. Ahmed Khair, *Kifah Jil: Tarikh Harakat al-Khirijin wa Tatawurutha fil-Sudan*, 2nd edition (Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sudaniyya, 1980) 18.

15. Andrew Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 86.

16. Ahmed Kamal al-Din, a recorded phone interview with the author, recording, Bahrain, March 2012.

17. Abdel Rahim Omer Muhi al-Din, *al-Islamiuon fi-l-Sudan: Dirasat al-Tatour al-Fikri wa al-Siasi* 1969–1985 (Beirut, Dar al-Fikr lil Tibaa wa al-Nashr, 2004) 127.

18. Hannah Arendt, *Totalitarianism: Part Three of the Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego, A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1985) 72.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. *Tarbiya* is an Arabic word that linguistically means upbringing, refinement, and/or growth. For Islamist movements, as defined by Ḥasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, it is a method used to groom members and to instill in them a sense of mission.

23. Arthur L. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Hasan al-Turabi* (Tampa, The World & Islam Enterprise, University of South Florida, 1993) 13.

24. Ibid.

25. *Tamkeen* is a Quranic term associated with "those who [even] if we makanahm (firmly established them) on earth remain constant in salah (prayer) and render zakah (alms levy), enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong; but with God rests the final outcome of all events." Al-Hajj 22:41. For the Sudanese Islamists, tamkeen represented a takeover by means of the state to extract as much wealth as possible and to climb up to the highest level of political and state power by appropriating the most senior positions to their members.

26. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on Banality of Evil* (London, Penguin Books, 2006).

27. One of al-Turabi's final publications was his *Tafsir* of the Quran; he called it al-Tafsir al-Tawhidi. In 2004, the first volume of *Tafsir* was published by al-Saqi publishers in London. It includes his analysis of the first third of the Quran as well as a comprehensive introduction to what he calls النظرية التوحيدية التجديدية, his Unitarian, modernizing.

28. 'Iesa Makki 'Osmān Azraq, *Min Tariekh al-Ikhwan al Muslimin Fil-Sudan 1953–1980* (Khartoum, Dar al-Balad Publishing, n.d.) 109.

29. Al-Tijani Abdel Gadir, *Ikhwanuna al-Siqar wa Mashariihim al-Kubra* (Khartoum, al-Sahafa Daily, 2006).

30. Jill Dolan, *Utopia in Performances: Finding Hope at the Theater* (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 2005).

31. Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London, Bloomsbury, 2015) 1.

32. Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2015) 1.

33. Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam Observed* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010) 42.

34. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, Basic Books, 1978) xv.

35. The Arab Spring refers to democratic movements that started with an uprising of sustained street demonstrations which spread across the Arab world in 2011. The movement originated in Tunisia and quickly spread to other parts of the Middle East. By the end of early 2012, rulers were removed from power in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen.

36. Hazem Kandil, "The End of Islamism" (London, LRB, July 4, 2013: http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/07/04/Hazem-Kandil.the-end-of-Islamism/#more-16058).

Chapter 2

Childhood, Family, Environment

Ḥasan 'Abdalla al-Turabi was born on February 1, 1932,[1] in Kassala, the capital of the Eastern Province of Kassala of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium the Sudan,[2] where his father, 'Abdalla Dafalla al-Turabi, was a shari'a court judge. Ḥasan was the third son of 'Abdalla al-Turabi. His mother Nafisa died in 1943 of a pregnancy complication. She left three sons, Moḥamed, Dafalla, and Ḥasan, and four female daughters. Ḥasan also has seven half-brothers and four half-sisters from two different stepmothers. So, when 'Abdalla al-Turabi died in 1986, he left behind a total of two wives and 18 children. His father's sojourn from the village of Wad al-Turabi (where he and other generations of the al-Turabi family were born) to emerging, urban Sudanese cities including Kassala, Um Rowaba, al-Rusaris, Rufaa, al-Nihud, and Abu Ḥamad differs from the precolonial movements of Sudanese traders and religious leaders. It was a type of movement with a definitive quality that illustrates the rules and regulations of the new colonial regime and how it was creating and deploying members of a civil service to "create secular hierarchies incompatible with the traditional order."[3] This crucial distinction worked for the presence and growth of a new community of British, Egyptian, and Sudanese individuals, distinguished and legally accepted as a group endowed by the state with the power to exercise omnipotence, supremacy of its authority, and to oversee the formation and maintenance of its hegemony. Those individuals and groups, called *Effendi* by some, were government employees, or civil servants, and military men, part of the new-salaried working class or forms of administration including chiefs of *al-Idara al-Ahliyya* (local administration) as organized by the colonial state.[4]

This power-endowed and wide-emerging group was entitled to override the claims to power of all other individuals and groups with any issue. However, the *Effendia* characterization does not capture well the variations,

stratification, and bifurcation of a growing new class, formed by the colonial event initially, that continued to consolidate its power ever since. Hence, I call this class "the community of the state" which has been generally forged as the cornerstone of the aggregate of means of the productive capacity and mode of the productive forces governing the state-dominated assets and extracting power. Within this new development an ontology has taken shape, colonizing religion and the Sudanese world as well as transforming the Sudanese population into subjects of the state.

By the time Ḥasan al-Turabi was born, the colonial state had been successful in establishing itself as an inordinate, particular system. It instituted its governing structures and institutions, together with its overly polemical, hegemonic, preponderant authority, as an absolutist entity over the Sudanese society. At the same time, the Sudanese, as groups and as individuals, represented themselves in different sequences engineering shared latent and manifest forms of resistance to the colonial state and its order. By that time *Jam'iyyat al-Liwa' al-Abyad*, *Jamiyyat al-Itihad al-Sudani* (The White Flag League), the Sudanese Union Society, and the 1924 Revolution[5] emerged representing a landmark transformation of the development of Sudanese resistance to the colonial system into spearheading the advent of a urban and provincial social movement. At the same time, the Sudanese military aspect of the 1924 Revolution evoked memories of the fate of Gordon as "British women and children gathered for safety in the palace—the scene of Gordon's death."[6]

Here, by contrast, some of the Sudanese "heretical sects," especially the Mahdists under the leadership of Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Mahdi and the Khatmiyya under the leadership of Sayyid 'Ali al-Mergani and, to a certain extent, the Hindiyya under the leadership of Sharief Yousif al-Hindi, were successfully born again out of the rural and urban accumulation of wealth and took an inventory of the modern to invent new routes for power and prestige. At the same time, some of the tribal chiefs who were successful in representing different styles of "decentralized despotism" were able to consolidate their power within their regions and peoplehoods to be recognized and defined by the state, to the dismay of other Sudanese, as collaborators. All those groups who emerged to new seats of power were enabled by saying in public that the revolutionary road of 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif and his colleagues was not eligible, and also that those involved did not represent the Sudanese Umma. This brought these necessary relations of power with the new colonial state. The colonized Sudan was incorporated into the British core system as a periphery with special privileges and as an appendage to the British Empire and Egypt's khedive. The colonial state fashioned a continuity between violent forms through the state apparatus to consolidate its centralized grip on power, while new civil forms of resistance to the colonial rule endured and

persisted within an unending adherence to an emerging nationalist form of life where old ways of state violence met a new, modern challenge. Within the dialects of such a complex situation, a new political elite emerged out of the community of the state and have dominated the Sudanese scene ever since.

Ḥasan al-Turabi, the man, grew and matured within this environment to the age of 83. The state outlived and surpassed him, as did most members of his generation. However, by now, we can see the disintegration of Wingate—al-Bashir Leventhal within the internal decomposition of the local and regional communities of the state. This is only one aspect of what makes Ḥasan al-Turabi the last of the Islamists.

This chapter and the next are broadly divided into three parts and, in their totality, encapsulate "the Master noun of modern political discourse . . . [and what is] diversely condensed within it." The first part explores the colonial state in the Sudan and its peculiar development under strange founders who laid down the foundation of this unique and novel system by colonizing Sudanese religion and transforming the Sudanese people into subjects of the state, a development that has had an enduring and profound effect on the Sudanese human experience. The second part addresses how the Sudanese heir of the Mahdi and Mahdiyya, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi, the heir of al-Khatim and Khatmiyya, (The Seal of al-Awliyya or the Ṣufi saints) Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, and the heir of al-Hindiyya, Sharief Yousef al-Hindi, competed and built new relations with the state to reinstate themselves within the new Sudanese colonial structure as independent power bases, speaking languages different from the revolutionary language of 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif and his colleagues.[7] Some, like those described by Kitchener as "the heretical sects," developed a life of their own away from the state, while others, like the heirs of Ḥamad al-Naḥlān, chief among them being 'Abdalla Dafalla al-Turabi, were integrated into the fringes of the community of the state. The third part shows how Ḥasan al-Turabi and his father, to a certain extent, as members of the new Sudanese elite or community of the state, received British public education in colonial Sudan, developing two divergent characters (father and son) in the community of the state, establishing a differentiation between the two courts of law (shari'a and civil) within the Sudanese experience of colonization of religion.

THE COGNITIVE MACHINE OF THE STATE: COLONIZATION OF RELIGION AND THE FORMATION OF THE SUDANESE AS SUBJECTS OF THE STATE

Not all British colonial states were the same nor were all colonial experiences similar. All performances of the colonial state within the Sudanese space

resulted from dialectical forces, making up the Sudanese human experience, as a whole, front and back. That is why the Sudanese colonial experience is even more unique. Of course, this does not, by any means, intend to essentialize the Sudanese human experience or present it as consistent or frozen in time and space. The Sudanese identity itself could be better described as a human experience neither limited by geography nor constrained by history. Since the colonial experience, both the good and the bad, is part of that Sudanese human experience, the life and homeostasis of the colonial experience probably happened for very profound reasons that need to be carefully considered. It is true that what Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay said about the colonial state in India could apply partly to that in the Sudan; however, other major differences also apply. Macaulay, in his speech at the British House of Commons in 1833 said that the British "Empire is itself the strangest of all political anomalies. That a handful of adventurers from an Island in the Atlantic should have subjugated a vast country divided from the place of their birth by half the globe; a country which, at no very distant period, was merely the subject of fable to the nations of Europe."[8] The Sudanese colonial experience differed in policy, philosophical theory, and practice from all other British colonies; hence, this multiplicity as one is a representation of the nature of the state created, with religious and human lifeworld penetrated, dominated, and colonized. One of the major differences between Sudan and India (and, to a larger extent, all other British colonies) is that the Sudan was "a country violated . . . by the most renowned of Western Conquerors" such as Samuel Baker (1821–1893), Major General Charles Gordon (1833–1885),[9] and Colonel William Hicks Pasha (1830–1883).[10] (Though, both Gordon and Hicks were killed in battle in the Sudan, and their troops were badly defeated.) What is more significant is that Rudolf Slatin survived defeat, prison, and other serious problems to escape from Omdurman and join Kitchener's invading army to become one of the most important builders of the Wingate colonial state. It might be true and equally important to note that "this handful of adventurers," on the other hand, whether in India, in the Sudan, or in any other colony, represented the managerial elite of a corporate institution that Edward Said rightly described.[11] That also, not to ignore the facts of the empire and the large numbers of subjugated people it colonized. In a less trivial sense, the Sudanese experience was different in that Gordon and the administration he exercised, as a system of domination, restructuring, and power, lead to the destruction of the very foundation of the state he served. Of course, there is still more to the Sudanese colonial experience and its "handful of adventurers" that is different from that of other colonies. These differences (with respect to constitutions, traits, and intricate matters) could be concentrated, almost by definition rather than by incident, to the types and practices of the entity of Anglo-Egyptian condominiums, representing

the cognitive machine of the state. This construction closely associates to violence in the colonization of the religion and lifeworld of the Sudanese, making the Sudanese subjects to the state. However, on the contrary, one would add that the colonial state and its surrogate, the nation-state, both created a situation where human progress ceased to resemble that "hideous heathen god who refused to drink nectar except from the skulls of murdered men."[12] What is more significant is that the unbroken tradition of that state, in a particular sense, is still alive over time until now with Ḥasan al-Turabi, his generation of Sudanese politicians and their political philosophies, as well as the intellectual environment within and against which they lived. To sketch what I believe to be some of the fundamental elements and processes that contributed to the making of the colonial state—the foundation of the state in Sudan—and the making and the politicization of the Sudanese people as subjects of the state, the following must be carefully considered:

First, what was unique about the second Sudanese colonial experience[13] was that the two main architects of the condominium state, Francis Reginald Wingate[14] and Rudolf Karl von Slatin, were the proprietors of rare experience and highly specialized knowledge systems concerning the Sudan, its history, its ruling regimes, and its people. The two personalities differed in character. Rudolf Slatin was born and raised in Austria as the fourth child to Michael Slatin, who converted from Judaism to Catholicism, and "lacked religious zeal of any kind and tended to steer clear of any spiritual speculation."[15] Wingate was a Scottish Jacobite and "his diaries reveal a young man of deep religious convictions—he always went to church twice on Sundays and he commented on the sermons—and his sincere Christianity guided him all his life."[16] As a director of military intelligence, his "work developed into main spheres of activity: first, military intelligence regarding the strength, dispositions and intentions of Khalifa's forces in the Sudan; secondly, the political and economic position in the Sudan itself; thirdly, the relations of the Sudan with its neighbors; and finally, the fate of those Europeans who had fallen into the Mahdi's hands" after the fall of the Gordon state in 1875. Wingate's book, *Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan*, was the beginning of a concerted effort, leading to the publication of other books under his super-vision, editorial-ship, and translation into English to revive Britain in the re-conquest of the Sudan.[17] Moreover, the two personalities differed in aims and in historical environment and experience. Wingate had carefully and closely followed all the events and developments in the Sudan from outside for about a decade. Slatin, the wild card among the colonial patron saints, had been part of, and a close associate with, the Sudanese authorities from Charles Gordon, from 1875 to 1885, to al-Khalifa Abdullahi from 1874 to 1895, watching and participating in events from inside. He even converted to Islam at one point, changing his name to 'Abdelgadir and assuming the role

of the Muazin in the Mahdist Mosque in Omdurman.[18] As a "servant"[19,20] to the Khalifa Abdullahi, as he claimed, Slatin "had not only learned a great deal about the ways of Sudan, he had also, naturally enough, acquired grievances and formed biases that, when he returned to office, he did not forget."[22] While Kitchener disliked Slatin, he and Wingate resembled each other in some fundamental attributes. They both belonged to the intelligence community, Slatin joined Wingate's Intelligence Department immediately after his escape from Omdurman, and later, he established and headed the intelligence office of the new colonial state. That made cooperation between the two of them crucial not only to the construction of the colonial state but also to Wingate's Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Wingate and Slatin complemented each other's knowledge and experiences very well. Over an exceptionally long period of time (December 1899–December 1916), as governor general with "supreme civil and military power,"[21] Wingate had conspicuously put into practice a military structure of the state based on the three financial, civil, and legal secretaries, along with a few military aides in the regions supervised by Slatin (the only "Mahdist" in the colonial camp), who "administered a heavy rebuke to the silly people who wish[ed] to shove the English Bibles down the throats of the African blacks."[22]

Second, out of the history of inhalations of the empire and its highest military personnel, Hicks, Gordon, Slatin, and other managerial elites or members of the colonial community in the Sudan, their regime, and its new disciplinary order, emerged a policy and pursuit not only to put down all forms of resistance in the country, but also to colonize religion and the Sudanese lifeworld in an effort to establish a new state as a corporate enterprise, existing, somehow, inside and outside the British imperial system. It was blind anger and hunger for revenge that grew within what Anthony Giddens describes as the powers of the "allocative resource," in addition to the "authoritative resource" that the new state created. As Giddens explains, the allocative resource refers to "domination over material facilities, including material goods and natural forces that may be harnessed in their production . . . [while the authoritative resource] concerns the means of domination over activities of human beings themselves."[23] Victorious Kitchener, on his first visit to London, was greeted with wild enthusiasm not only as "the conqueror of Omdurman, the Sudan, and Khartoum," but also as the "Avenger of Gordon."[24]

Third, one of the most important attributes of the colonial state as a central organizer of the Sudanese religious, social, and political space was what Wingate introduced and diligently followed: a policy that extended, strengthened, and maintained an imperial order that was meant to sustain British cultural and political power and separate and debase what was non-British, as inferior. On the one hand, "Wingate employed all means at his

disposal to stem the infiltration of Egyptian nationalist and pan-Islamic ideas into the Sudan. A special system of intelligence was devised in order to deal with this subtle penetration. The intelligence department, whose head-quarters were in Cairo, kept a close watch on developments in the Egyptian capital and warned its branch in Khartoum to take any necessary action."[25] On the other hand, the imperial order Wingate devised and the military rule he established developed into a total "disciplinary institution," to borrow Foucault's phrase, which continued to deal firmly with Egyptian national-ist and pan-Islamic ideas as well as Sudanese Sufi Islam and its jihadi orientations, which was Wingate's main worry during the early period of his colonial state. Wingate's fear and the Victorian suspicion of Islam were magnified and "haunted yet authorized by history; imbued with Christian values; assured of merits of industrial technology, scientific rationalism, discipline, hard work, and commercial enterprise; ideological, sometimes arrogant, and perpetually defensive, the British mission in the Sudan had about it the aura of a crusade."[26]

Fourth, another important aspect relates to the death of Gordon and what followed, the events of the 1875 Mahdist Revolution, especially as the first period of the occupation saw a number of Sufi, Mahdist, and religiously inspired revolts in the northern and southern Sudan—all mobilizing resources and symbols of resistance.[27] Nevertheless, the colonial state "soon discovered that Islam offered not only perils but also opportunities."[28] As Young explains, the essence of the colonial "doctrine of hegemony was a demonological exe-gesis of the Mahdiyya epoch."[29] Just when the colonial occupation seemed to have finally buried the Mahdist state, the ghost of Mahdism continued to haunt the scene. On the other hand, "religious charlatans, in this view, had exploited popular animosity to Turko-Egyptian rule and packaged an appeal to rebellion in the religious motif of heterodox Islam. The British design was to supplant the Mahdiyya in exploiting the anti-Egyptian animus they took to be general in Sudan, while using orthodox Egyptian Islam as an instrument to combat and marginalize Sufi Islam from which the Mahdiyya sprang."[30] This dimension of colonizing Islam differentiated the Sudanese experience from other experiences, that is, the opposition between "good" religion orga-nized and supervised by the state and "bad" religion, primarily Sufi Islam. But even within this polemical difference, which has no relevance to religion as faith, the colonial state created and modified two types of political Islam: one became the state religion, and the other, the state opposed. This renovated model, first invented by Kitchener and then put into practice as a foundation of the colonial state by Wingate and Slatin, continued to live within the Suda-nese experience and became the cornerstone of Ḥasan al-Turabi's Islamism, later producing a formula observed by the Islamist state where *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* ("Islam is the solution") was traded with "violence is the solution."

Fifth, different systems of control over Islam and the Sudanese lifeworld were initiated by Slatin, the highest ranking person in the colonial state after Wingate. Armed with his wide knowledge of the country, different Sudanese, Islamic representations, and a high ranking in the political and religious fields, Slatin became the most indispensable asset for the building of the new state, its model of political Islam, and the colonization of religion and the Sudanese lifeworld. Within the encounter with the Sudanese, Slatin initiated two processes of political inclusion. The first was to "encourage orthodox Islam while striving to lessen the impact of Sufism" which "cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they generally formed centers of unorthodox fanaticism."[31] This is not to say that that kind of policy sympathized with orthodox Islam, but rather, that it established "a Sudanese Muslim leadership which would find itself aligned to the interests of the established administration."[32] Hence, perhaps they were, to a certain extent, complicit in trying to create a political Islam for the design of a model of colonizing religion that colludes with the state against bad heretical Islam. This kind of orientation's essential dispositions of the orthodox discourse about Sufi Islam did not fit with Slatin's "nature" and his open "hostility toward Mahdists, especially the family of the Mahdi,"[33] but it did fit very well with Slatin's "nurtured" Mahdist ideology, for which one of the representations of such opposing discourse was fundamental. In reordering the religious hierarchies, the Inspector General relied on the "Board of 'Ulama," which was instituted by the government in 1901, and on several Muslim leaders such as shaykh al-Tayyib Ahmed Hashim, the mufti, whom he regarded as trustworthy. The Inspector General asked the advice of the Board whenever a religious problem occurred, and they became the sole interpreters of orthodox Islam. Moreover, the promulgation of the Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance of 1902 "established a central Islamic court of three members, the Grand Kadi (Qadi), the mufti, and another judge."[34] The Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts ordinance "vested in the Grand Kadi the power to make rules regulating the decisions, procedure, composition and functions of sharia courts."[35] Slatin was responsible for the appointment of qadis, many of whom were of "Egyptian origin and thus, were in a position to supervise their activities in the Sudan."[36] The promotion of orthodox Islam as a state religion, the later evolution of this policy, as reflected in the government's integration of Islamic studies into the curriculum at Gordon Memorial College, and the institutionalization of the orthodox "'ulama" as the only interpreters of Islam, produced an uneasy ideological conflict. This conflict resided between what was perceived as modern, official Islam, which is orthodox, and that brand of Islam described as traditional and backward, composed of "heretical sects," which was Sufi. As a consequence of that disposition, the Sufi majority has been relegated to a minority in terms of stratification of power and prestige. Such an attitude has remained

recurrent within the consequent developments in the Sudanese political arena since then and continues to play an important role in the political theory and practice of Sudan's elites, both civilian and military.

Sixth, Slatin was also the architect of the second process of control through inclusion of what "the colonial state understood to be the local institutions of tribe and kinship into the grassroots foundations of colonial domination, as well as a means by which it could derive a degree of legitimacy from association with 'traditional' social forces."[37] Reorganizing the administration of this sector of the population by appointing what is described as "tribal" or "native administration," Slatin selected leaders who were "men of his own acquaintance over those preferred by local British officials." Although, he was described to favor "the restoration of traditional values of tribal authority,"[38] Slatin was the architect of another system of an indirect way of colonizing the lifeworld of the Sudanese that fashioned a form of "decentralized despotism."[39] He established this structure through a group of handpicked personalities that were assigned the duties of local chiefs. Their appointment or restoration at the helm developed into what was called indirect rule; its structure fit very well with the stipulations of the military rule of the colonial state and its attempts of legitimizing "relations of authority."[40] This form of indirect colonization constructed a new order of "tribal" settings and rankings. He formally instituted all that by locating this new order and differentiation into the colonized "native" local traditions to indicate continuity with the past. These different forms of invented tradition were modified replications of a British ruling experience established in India based on "the notion that 'authority once achieved must have a secure usable past.'"[41] This past, as Cohen further explains, which was being codified by both the British in the colony and at home, had British and local components and a theory of the relationship between these two parts.[42] Later, the colonial and postcolonial states and political orders experienced different forms of acceptance and denial of the construction and invention of "tribal" structures, which maintained a principal system of marginalization that benefit the rulers, as a necessary part of the political process of nation-building.

Seventh, a more foreground, on reflection to issue relating to a major attribute of the colonial state is the notion of the racial construction and differentiation of the colonized human landscape. When the British invaded the Sudan in the closing days of the nineteenth century, they drew upon the "Victorian doctrine of racial degeneration," which "supported views of 'oriental' history as a legend of decay, of the erosion of Islam and decline of its once glorious civilization to ignorance, indulgence, and excess. But if Arabs were deemed backward, fallen from levels they had once attained, they were nonetheless more highly evolved than Africans." The "African" or the "Negro," within that concept, as Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston—one of the

leading British empire-builders—noted, "more than any other human type, has been marked out by his mental and physical characteristics as the servant of other races."[43] The Negro, according to Johnston, "is possessed of great physical strength, docility, cheerfulness of disposition, a short memory for sorrows and cruelties, and an easily aroused gratitude for kindness and just dealing. He does not suffer from homesickness to the over-bearing extent that afflicts other peoples torn from their homes, and provided he is well fed, he is easily made happy."[44] As R. Hunt Davis concludes, "the result of Johnston's work and that of later scholars such as the ethnologist C. G. Seligman was to create a climate of opinion that lead most Westerners to think that everything of value in Africa originated outside the continent, usually from supposed Caucasoid sources."[45] On this doctrine they superimposed the idea of racial difference between northern Sudanese ethnic groups, described as Arabs, and other ethnicities, depicted as Negros, in other parts of the country. This ideology of difference, which was intensified by the totalitarian condominium military regime, organized the Sudanese societies "so that it [the ideology] produced on the best possible terms, from the viewpoint of the mother country, exports which provided only a very low and stagnating return to labour."[46] It transformed the population landscape into a system of racial ranking which divided the people into Arab-Semitic people over Hamites or Nubians, and Nubians over Sudanic and Nilotic peoples (Negroes). This defined ranking was both created by, and served, the political regime that designed it. Sir Harold MacMichael, a longtime British administrator in Sudan, editor of *Sudan Notes and Records* from its first issue, outlined that raking and racial design. In the first issue of the journal, the racial difference between the Nuba of Nubia and the Nuba of South Kordofan, the former being Arabs and the later Negroes, was outlined.[47] MacMichael the author of several books about the Sudan, chief among them *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan* which appeared in 1922 and it has since become a classic in the field of Sudanese anthropology and history,[48] wrote "the line of division, geographical, ethnical, and cultural, between the predominantly Arab north and purely negroid south is well marked and obvious, and still, as we shall see, is potent as a political factor."[49] He came to this conclusion after he gave a broad generalization of the country and its people. He described some as a "highly educated, intelligent and progressive element" that came to being in towns and large villages, others as of an "aboriginal pagan stock" in the Nuba Mountains, the third as a "primitive negroid . . . of whose origin little is known," and the fourth as "a quick-witted, musical brown folks of medium stature," which are the Zande.

But what makes MacMichael's conclusion especially important is that he represents one of the proto-colonialists. Mahmood Mamdani describes this group as representatives of "the confluence of two institutions, scientific

racism and scientific bureaucracy," that were "key to shaping"[50] the colonial power. Out of this came out the "drive for mastery over men," as Ashis Nandy explained, not merely as by-product of "a faulty political economy but also of a worldview which believes in the absolute superiority of the human over the nonhuman and the subhuman, the masculine over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the ahistorical, and the modern or progressive over the traditional or the savage."[51] Here, "it has become more and more apparent that genocides, ecodisasters and ethnocides are but the underside of corrupt sciences and psychopathic technologies wedded to new secular hierarchies, which have reduced major civilizations to the status of a set of empty rituals."[52] This might be better understood, if could apply "phenomenological and semantic method of analysis, it has seemed useful to characterize certain racist postures as *auto-referential* (those in which bearers of prejudice, exercising physical or symbolic violence, designate themselves as representative of superior race) in opposition to *hetro-referential* or 'hetero-phonic' racism (in which, by contrast, the victim of racism, or, more precisely, the process of racialization, who are assigned to an inferior or evil race)."[53] I will add to that another impulse of those who were subjected to prejudice and colonization were nominated by their oppressors, who caused them to see themselves as different from some groups who were within their same human milieu. These poses in their totality and separately "not only question how race myth forms, but also question of whether racism is in dissociable from it."[54]

This also leads us to direct our attention to the important and central aspect within the Sudanese colonial experience which relates to the colonization of Islam in particular and religion in general by the colonial state, in tandem with the creation of different Sudanese peoplehoods, created and controlled and constrained by the state via asymmetrical systems including marginalization of some but transforming their identities and allegiances as subjects of a punitive state. What differentiated Sudan experience from other experiences in other British colonies seems to be driven by the history of an uneasy relationship that shaped the virtual and the physical nature of interaction between the Sudan and the British Empire, and how that produced the offshoots of a system of control based on the experience of colonizing, regulating the religious spheres and the Sudanese way of life and different forms of resistance to the colonizing entity. It is thus a mode of control, extraction, uneven development, violence, and resistance that created all the conditions of the emergence of dominant state and dominated subjects. The state whether colonial or postcolonial is rich in signification, wherein it forms confrontation between power groups and communication between its human elements. Within the dialects of all these conditions as they confront one another it never stops transforming itself as a living, violent, sacred, secular model for

the regulation and control of the Sudanese lifeworld and the formation of its people. That is why I would say, without considering that the complexities of the Sudanese condition is not atypical but rather constitute different continuous forms of colonization of religion and lifeworld, confrontation and conflict characteristics of the state as a living organism and within the accumulation of all that relates to history, race, religion, identity, and culture, from the early colonial days to present, could be not only a reference to itself but has always put itself into question and transformation. Hence, the significance of the collective time of Ḥasan al-Turabi within the Sudanese human experience could be one of the most decisive within the constitution of the order of the Sudanese colonial and postcolonial era and for the regimes of change and counter change initiated by 1964 October Revolution.

TIME PAST AND TIME FUTURE

Ḥasan al-Turabi's father, 'Abdalla Dafalla al-Turabi (1891–1990) was born into a famous religious family who had settled in the village of Wad al-Turabi, 52 miles southeast of Khartoum, where his great-grandfather Hamad al-Turabi was buried. 'Abdalla al-Turabi joined the Sudanese judiciary as a *qadi shar'ii* (shari'a judge) in 1924. He received his education from al-M'ahad al-'Ilmi of Omdurman. Both the institution and the time were of great significance. The institution relates to the policy of the colonial state toward religion as it could serve by design the state in colonizing religion.

Al-M'ahad al-'Ilmi in itself is one example of colonization of Islam in practice. The colonial authorities saw a need to and a plan for colonizing the entire educational system as a "large part of imperial image construction was concerned with the creation of positive and negative stereotypes."[55] From 1902, the official founding of Gordon Memorial College, to the time Ḥasan al-Turabi was born in 1932, the colonial administration officially established Bakht al-Ruda as a primary school Teachers Training Center after transferring al-Urafaa school for training elementary school teachers from Gordon Memorial College to the new location in a rural place close to al-Douiem, a small town. By then, all the educational systems were successfully accommodated within "the mechanisms of control linked to structures in the society which provide stability, power and status."[56] That is by putting together a carefully crafted image of the colonizer and the subject. This image creation, as Mangan explains, "has a crucial place in the dialects exalting the colonizer and humbling the colonized. The created image was the rationalization without which the presence of the colonizer was inexplicable."[57]

However, this brought to being another example that added to the experience of the colonization of religion that started by the Board of 'Ulama,

which was instituted by the government in 1901. Both entities, in addition to the state-centered shari'a courts which had wide-ranging jurisdiction largely over a codified state-controlled system of family law, instituted a system of colonization of religion as a system able "to fabricate a hegemonic ideology that made its own interest look and feel like the interests of all."[58] For those conflicting attitudes and impulses in relationship to both the colonization of religion and the Sudanese lifeworld al-M'ahad al-'Ilmi, which was established first as an Islamic school in 1901, at the Omdurman mosque, where some of the "'ulama" would teach Islamic studies instead in the privacy of their own homes, was an important part of a system of unchallenged hegemony which in essence acts as a peculiar form of "dominance without hegemony" which represent God and religion as coeval social facts that could make the colonization of religion possible by calling both without being under the obligation to any as a reality.

In 1912, the colonial state appointed Shaikh Abu al-Gasim Hashim as the head of al-M'ahad to be upgraded under the supervision of the "legal Secretary of the Governor General. Bowing to modernity, the clerics introduced arithmetic, Arabic composition, and dictation into the purely theological curriculum of traditional education."[59] Of course, here there was another aspect other than "modernity and its discontents." As in other colonies, the introduction of the British system of education "as taking place in institutions, meaning buildings with physically divided spaces marking off one class of students from another, as well as teachers from students, in addition to other policies and processes of regulation and certification and rewards, could not help but precipitate in the erosion and transformation of what the British wanted to preserve; that is, . . . Muslim learning."[60] The modernization of al-M'ahad has institutionalized the inferiority and marginalization of that type of learning. It steered a strange route in which the state that exercises its power of the modern entity over all Muslim life and meaning by colonizing them, and designing an institution and ideas that remain a refuge for both regulated Islamic studies as supervised by the state and the closemindedness of its staff and students as described by al-Tigani Yousif Bashir.[61]

'Abdalla al-Turabi landed a position of Qadi Shar'ii in 1924 in the time of post-World War I where serious change was driven by collective actions of modern political movements in both the Sudan and Egypt. The 1919–1922 Egyptian revolution against the British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan, led to Britain's recognition of Egyptian independence in 1922. Since the first day of the condominium, Egypt had an army and thousands of its population serving as employees at all levels of the Sudan government. "For as long as Egypt had been an informal colony and later a protectorate of Great Britain, however, the problem of Egyptian 'infection,' as Britain put it, had somehow been kept in check. Everything changed with the outbreak of the Egyptian

Revolution."[62] The Sudanese-Egyptian political modernity brought together two non-commensurable logic of civil society in both countries. The first is what is later called *al-Nidal al-Mushtarack* that brought together emerging political groups whose slogan was the Unity of the Nile valley or *Wahadat Wadi al-Nil*, in an attempt to unite both the Sudan and Egypt to cast off the British colonial yoke. The second was the one that supported the slogan that calls for *al-Sudan lil-Sudaniyyn* or Sudan for the Sudanese; that is to call for an independent Sudan from both British and Egypt.

It was also by dissimilar references, Wingate attempted to shape rising Sudanese nationalism which according to him should "develop under the British guidance, training and cultivating her institutions and watching over the interest of her people."[63] In 1919 the British administrators decided to take steps to put the structure that Wingate and Slatin one day designed to colonize the Sudanese life world in action. They organized a delegation to meet King George V in London to congratulate him on Great Britain's victory in the War. The delegation praised the British colonization for assisting the Sudan in material and moral advancement. The 10 notable representatives included Sudan's highest religious leaders, including Sayyid 'Ali al-Marghani; Abel Rahman al-Mahdi; al-Sharief Shaikh al-Tayib Ahmed Hashim, the Mufti; Shaikh Abu al-Gasim Hashim, president of the Board of 'Ulama; Shaikh Ismail al-Azhari Qadi of Darfur, and four tribal leaders: Abdel Azim Bey Khalifa of the Ababda, Ali al-Tom of the Kababish, Ibrāhīm Farah of the Jaaliyin, and Awad al-Karim Abu Sinn of the Shukriyya. This move and those who were included in it were vigorously "condemned by the Egyptian press, however, likewise in the Sudan: they began to be attacked as traitors or puppets of the British. In 1920 to counter this image, the three religious leaders"—[Sayyid 'Ali al-Marghani, Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi, and al-Sharif al-Hindi] sponsored republishing *al-Hadara Newspaper*, the first Sudanese newspaper in the country.[64]

The emergence of the Sudanese nationalist movement, in its new form, was by no means harmonious or nonconflictual. There is, then, this double bind of modernity in both the subject and object of the emergence of the members of the community of the state from one side and the accumulation of wealth and prestige on the other that started to speak of conformist and nonconformist or revolutionary and the counter revolutionary narratives. What was not conformist, then, the military regime headed by the Sirdar of the Army and the governor general of the Sudan.

But though a peculiar way of colonization of the Sudanese lifeworld, *abstract Baraka*[65] (blessing) as an acknowledged expression values the two Sayyids (Sayyid 'Ali al-Marghani and Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi); one single-handedly turned it into a practical mode of production for an urban form of capitalist accumulation while the second turned it into a mode of

production for a rural form of capitalist accumulation. None of the heirs of Hamad al-Turabi tried to reinvent the Mahdiyya of their grandfather. However, Hamad's *Baraka* remained a laissez-faire for the Sudanese public to take it as they choose. Later, the issue of reinventing that tradition, the image the legacy of Hamad as an early Sudanese claiming Mahdiyya, stayed lingering behind the political scene and in particular within the competition with al-Sādiq al-Mahdi and Moḥmed Osman al-Mergani and each one's neo-Mahdiyya or -Khatmiyya, Ḥasan al-Turabi kept image of his great-grandfather alive as a Mahdi with a PhD from Sorbonne or his ambition of establishing a Sunni Wilayat al-Faqih.

'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim argues that young Ḥasan al-Turabi, as a son of *shari'a qadi*, was "born on the wrong side of the colonial track, . . . [he] witnessed a close emasculation of his father, home and tradition. At a young age he saw firsthand the Manichean worlds of colonialism in which a dispossessed native space such as the qadi's court had been pitted against a merciless modern space such as the civil court."[66] The colonizers and their carefully chosen *effendi* clients wore suits and polished shoes (*jazma*), while the rest wore stereotypical *jallabiya*, *'imma*, an open informal robe to be worn instead of a coat and *markubs* (locally made shoes) and could be punished for violating the dress code. That, as Nandy rightly argues, "haunts us with the prospect of a fully homogenized, technologically controlled, absolutely hierarchized world, defined by pluralities like modern and the primitive, secular and the non-secular, the scientific and the unscientific, expert and laymen, the normal and the abnormal, the developed and the underdeveloped, the vanguard and the led, the liberated and the savable."[67] Within this "brave new world" was the relationship between the colonial state in Sudan and the colonized Islam, in particular, and religion in general. The colonial state was created in and of itself a new religious entity via its monopoly over the Sudanese open religious space. The state could strategically deploy its authority to regulate and impose certain rules and roles and to deny access to particular religious fields and markets. The enforced social, political, and religious fragmentation turned different religious representations into appendages of the state after making a distinction between "good" Islam, which would be accommodated, and "bad" Islam, which could not be tolerated. As Nandy argues, "colonization colonizes the minds in addition to the bodies and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all."[68]

From a very young age, al-Turabi and his generation experienced, witnessed, and told about a variety of new systems and social movements, stories, and experiences that were ultimately stamped in their consciousness and later shaped their worldview as they saw or heard of ordinary Sudanese men, women, workers, and students courageously protesting and confronting the hostile state. For Ḥasan al-Turabi all that might have been more complex if not to a certain degree different.

He also experienced the oral stories about the legacy of his grandfather Amad al-Nalan Ibn Moḥamed al-Bidairi, who was known as Wad al-Turabi (1639–1704). In addition to the everyday stories, Amad's biography was chronicled in the work of Muhammad al-Nur al-Nur wad Daif 'Allah, who lived in al-Ṣultana al-Zurqa (Funj Sultanate, 1504–1821): *Kitab al-Ṭabaqat fi khusus al-awliya' wa 'l-salihin wa 'l-' 'ulamā' wa 'l-shu'ara' fi 'l-Sudan.* According to Wad Defalla, al-Naḥlān invented a new way to see religion in the Sudan at that time. He was known as the first person in the Sudan to declare himself as *al-Mahdi al-Muntazar* (the expected Mahdi). Some Mecca 'ulama thought that his ideas were heretical when he tried to advocate being a Mahdi, while there during the hajj period, and he was badly beaten. According to Trimingham, he "was a Malāmati and his claim to be the Mahdi was regarded as one of his excesses." In his article about al-Turabi's theology, 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim argues that al-Turabi's chroniclers invariably assume or suggest "that his Islamic revival is by and large a continuation of his family's clerical, Sūfi, and Mahdist traditions, which go back to the seventeenth century." Ibrāhim adds that al-Turabi's "biographers rightly point out that his family, from Wad al-Turabi's village on the Blue Nile south of Khartoum, has a long tradition of teaching Islamic sciences and practicing Sūfism. But the religious compulsions these writers associate with his family diminish al-Turabi to a mere bearer of a tradition."

He is not a mere bearer of tradition, it is true. However, that tradition influences al-Turabi's background more than 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim enumerated in his aforementioned article. First, Ibrāhim maintains that "al-Turabi does not view his village or lineage as 'traditional' in the sense that others use it in claiming the influence of cultural traditions in his life." Second, al-Turabi, according to Ibrāhim, "described his people as adept at forging tradition rather than submitting to its alleged imperative. He described them as 'free' and open to change." Wad al-Turabi villagers, according to Ibrāhim, at first started as Qadiriyya followers and later switched to Khatmiyya. Third, during the Mahdiyya revolution (1881–1898), some of the villagers fought with the Mahdists—although later, at the end of the Mahdist state and the advent of the colonial rule in 1898, some "found it convenient to switch back to Khatmiyya, since colonialism showered them with political favors for opposing Mahdism." But neither that openness to change nor convenience of going back and forth from Khatmiyya to Mahdism gave the Islamist Ḥasan al-Turabi or his party a convenient place among those villagers. They did not support his election to the Sudanese national parliament and, during the 1968 election, "he lost his bid to win a seat in his home constituency." Nevertheless, all of these elements worked in the background to promote a personality cult different from any other formations. Most importantly, the realization that the aim of remembering such historical heritage was not

to inform an overpowering philosophy or sway his Islamism and Islamist followers negatively left him free to add to his self-image to the Sudanese mind.

On one hand, acceptance of such unmitigated renowned origins, one would suggest, has left no ground for controversy. On the other hand, al-Turabi's origins have not satisfied everybody, especially those who hold that there is more to one's character than a memory of a late grandfather and his tomb. In this sense, there are many aspects of primary self-efficacy actions and their consequences that grew out of al-Turabi's active self and the products that make a claim to his charismatic experience. That becomes even clearer where and when he makes a claim to what his personality bequeaths as it continues to stimulate, subliminally or premeditatedly impressing and affecting in different ways his Sudanese public. However, all of that succeeds only insofar as it adds to his personality cult and convinces some of his followers by adding unique experiences, such as his great-grandfather's claim to be *al-Mahdi al-Muntazar*, fittingly or deleteriously, and his active self as a latter-day Mahdi with a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne.

Later, some of his remaining loyalists boasted that he taught his renegade disciples *libs al-shal wa istimal al-jawal*. In this sense, one can see more to in this commotion than that insinuation, especially when other developments such as style, taste, and modernity were not freed but added to the weight of Mahdism in its new and old images. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, who claims to be the true chronicler of al-Turabi's "intellectual and political views and positions," argues that al-Turabi's marriage into Sudan's first family to Wisal al-Mahdi, al-Sādiq al-Mahdi's sister and the great granddaughter of Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi (1844–1885), "was a consummation of an undeclared alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and Ṣādiq al-Mahdi wing of Ansar." Thus, regardless of the threads of history through the great-grandfathers, al-Naḥlān and al-Mahdi conceal the posterity of the messianic inspiration that has profoundly shaped the course of al-Turabi's pursuit to power, his awareness of expectations, and the way his personality cult was built. But what has been experienced in this field aroused different and diverse responses from both his followers and detractors. The legend and arrangements that emerged out of that development in its complexity has deeply influenced and typified al-Turabi's ambition, his personality cult, and his cult following by producing a multiplicity of ramifications.

NOTES

1. Although Ḥasan al-Turabi's birth certificate indicates he was born January 1, his real birthday, according to some sources, was February 1.

2. The Condominium of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan referred to the manner by which Sudan was conquered and later ruled as a colony between 1899 and 1956, as a condominium of the United Kingdom and Egypt (ironically, Egypt itself was colonized by the United Kingdom then). The condominium was unique in that the system of governance it established, under a British governor general, was answerable not to the co-domini, but to the British alone, and not to the Colonial Office in London, but to the Foreign Office. The British assumed the responsibility of ruling Sudan on behalf of the Egyptian Khedive. However, the overall practice and the structure of the condominium ensured full British control. The preamble of the 1899 agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt referred to Sudan as "certain provinces . . . which were in rebellion against the authority of his highness [the khedive]." The agreement stated that "the supreme military and civil command in Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General of Sudan. He shall be appointed by the Khedival Decree with consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government" (and shall be removed only by the Khadeval Decree, with the consent of her Majesty's government). The British governor general (*Al-Hakim al-'amm*) was a military officer who reported to the Foreign Office in London through its resident agent in Cairo. In practice, however, the governor general exercised extraordinary powers and directed the condominium government from Khartoum as if it were the Colonial Administration. Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded Kitchener as Governor General in 1899. In each province, two inspectors and several district commissioners aided the British governor (*mudir*).

3. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi, Oxford).

4. See Khalid al-Kid, *The Effendia and Concepts of Nationalism in Sudan,* a PhD dissertation translated into Arabic by Moḥamed Osman Mekki al-Ijael and published in July 2011 by Abdel-Karim Cultural Center in Omdurman Sudan.

5. For more about the 1924 Revolution, see Elena Vessadini's *The 1924 Revolution: Hegemony, Resistance and Nationalism in Colonial Sudan.* The White Flag League represents an emergence of the first organized association of different Sudanese members of civil entities in a nationalistic, anti-colonial movement. The Sudanese Union Society was established by five young men, four of them Gordon College graduates: Ubayed Haj al-Amin, Tawfiq Salih Jibril, Mohi el-Din Jamal Abu Sief, Ibrahim Badri, and Suliman Kisha, a business man. The Society started as a cultural club but eventually turned more to political activism. Later it expanded to include an impressive number of soon-to-be important Sudanese intellectuals of their time such as Khalil Farah, one of the most famous Sudanese musicians and songwriters; 'Abdalla Khalil Sudan, prime minster from 1956–1958; Arafat Moḥmed 'Abdalla, the editor of al-Fajr nationalist journal; Khalfallah Khalid, who later became minister of defense; and Moḥmed Saliḥ al-Shinqiti. The 1924 Revolution was the first anti-colonial insurgency to embrace a nationalist discourse.

For more about the transformation of resistance to the colonial state in Sudan, see Abdullahi Gallab, *A Civil Society Deferred: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2013).

6. Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990) 42.

7. 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif (1896–1948) was a prominent nationalist whose family background was a product of the complications of Moḥamed 'Ali Pasha, the Ottoman viceroy responsible for Egyptian slavery and the dislocation of certain Sudanese groups during the first colonial period of Sudan: *al-Turkiyya al-Sabigh* (1821–1875). The roots of his parents belong to Nuba of Kurdofan and Dinka of southern Sudan. 'Ali himself graduated from Gordon Memorial College, then Khartoum military School in 1913. After several years of service, during which he rose to the rank of lieutenant, he was dismissed from the army for his political activism. In 1921, he founded the United Tribes Society, an organization that called for the independence of Sudan where governance was to be shared by tribal and religious leaders. Later, he became an advocate of the "claim of the Sudanese nation." Ali and his colleagues, 'Ubayd Ḥajj al-Amin, Ṣalih 'Abdel Gadir and Ḥassan Sharief, founded the White Flag League of which 'Abd al-Latif was the president, as the first modern political Sudanese organization and movement setting the start of the 1924 revolution. The movement brought together military officers, government officials, qadis, imams of some mosques, merchants, trade unionists, women, postal clerks, teachers, and students from different parts of Sudan. Ḥassan Sharief had written a poem which could be considered as the manifesto of the movement:

> Truly we are the first to have disobeyed the government
> The Sword was hanging threatening over our heads, and the law is really blind
> We do not care, even the Shadows of the dead around us are pitch dark
> The dumbfounded inhabitants are doing nothing
> Even if the destiny guides us with irony
> To prison, to exile, to death.
> (Translation from Arabic to English is quoted from Elena Vezzadini: *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory and Anti-colonial Resistance in Sudan*.)

For his political activism and his role in the 1924 Revolution, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. After that he was released but exiled to Egypt where he died in 1948.

8. Thomas Babington Macaulay, *The Works of Lord Macaulay Complete* (London, Longmans, Greens, 1879) 8: 117.

9. Major Charles George Gordon, (1833–1885) also known as Chinese Gordon, Gordon Pasha, and 'Gordon of Khartoum, was a British army officer and administrator glorified by the Victorian Imperial state, Christianity, and the general public. His death in a faraway country—Sudan—was perceived as a tragic fate "of a lone English man sacrificing himself for Glory, Honour, God, and the Empire." Gordon, who remains to be a subject of interest through time, is considered by many historians as "something of an oddity." He entered the service of the Egypt Khedive Ismail (1830–1895) in 1873 and later, in 1877, became the Governor General of Sudan only to resign his position in 1879. In 1884, Gordon arrived at Khartoum to make preparations for an orderly evacuation of Egyptian and European troops, civilian employees, and their families as the revolution gained unprecedented amounts of territory throughout the country and directed its long march toward Khartoum, the capital. Gordon did not obey his orders, and he was killed with some of his soldiers.

His death stirred an outcry and popular movement of anger in Britain which has been seen "as one of the first stirrings of popular imperialism in Britain."

The British re-conquest of Sudan lead by Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener in 1898 was seen by many, including Queen Victoria, as the final revenge for Gordon's death. After the conquest, Gordon's palace was rebuilt, statues were erected in front of the palace and in many places in England including Trafalgar square, and a college in colonized Khartoum was named after him (Gordon Memorial College). The college was built in 1899 and officially opened in November 1902 and later became the University of Khartoum, which produced generations of the community of the state.

10. Colonel William Hicks was a British officer who entered the service of Egypt Khedive in 1882. In 1883, he commanded a force of 8000 fighting men, primarily from the remnants Egyptian nationalist leader of the revolt against Khedive Tawfik rule, Colonel Ahmed Urabi's, disbanded troops against the Sudanese revolution. His force was ambushed in a dense forest at Kasgale 30 miles south of El-Obeid. Hicks's army was destroyed, save 300 soldiers.

11. Rudolf Slatin, Baron von Slatin, was born in 1857 at Ober St Veit, near Vienna, and died in 1932. An Austrian soldier in the service of Britain in Sudan, he became famous for his stay in Sudan during the Mahdists' rule (1883–1899). He converted to Islam and renamed himself Abdelgadir in order to improve morale among his Sudanese troops. He was appointed governor of Darfur province by Charles Gordon before being captured and held prisoner by the Mahdists. His forty-year experience in Sudan and his knowledge of the country, its people, and its language proved to be invaluable for the establishment of the colonial state in Sudan. He was among the inner circle of Wingate's confidants and reigned supreme as inspector general.

12. Karl Marx, *The First Indian War of Independence 1857–1859* (Moscow, Foreign Publisher House, 1969).

13. Sudan was colonized twice. The first was called by older Sudanese generations *al-Turkiyya al-Sabiqa* (1821–1875) and the second, *al-Turkiyya al-Lahigh* (1898–1956).

14. Sir Reginald Wingate was born in Scotland in 1861 and died in 1953. He was a British general and imperial administrator, principal founder of the colonial state, and governor general of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan until 1916. He succeeded Kitchener as governor general of Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army in 1899.

15. Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate: Administration in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1916)* (London, Frank Cass, 1970) 149.

16. Roland Wingate, *The Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of General Sir Reginald Wingate Masker of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (London, John Murray, 1955) 82.

17. These books include Slatin's *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*; Charles Neufeld's *A Prisoner of the Khaleefa*: *Twelve Years of Captivity at Omdurman*; Joseph Ohrwalder's *Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp*.

18. Al-Khalifa Abdullahi (1846–1899) the successor of Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi after his unexpected death in 1885. He was born in western Sudan, Darfur, and was educated trained by his father to be a preacher and a holy man. He ruled independent Sudan for 13 years. In 1896 an Anglo-Egyptian force under the command of

Herbert Kitchener began the conquest of Sudan. Al-Khalifa resisted that for almost two years. Although he created a new military corps, *mulazmimiyah* and *Jahadiyya,* his forces could not prevail against the British new lethal machine gun the Maxim. After the Karari Battle, he withdrew to west Sudan where he hoped to rally support. On November 24, 1899 a British force under the command of Wingate engaged his forces at Om Dedibekrat and he was killed fighting that day.

19. In his book, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan,* Slatin described himself as a servant to the Sudanese ruler al-Khalifa Abdullahi in Omdurman while in actual fact most scholars dispute that as they noted that Slatin won the confidence of al-Khalifa who appointed him in the role of a minor court official, one of his body guards and was one of his advisors and interpreters.

20. Martin Daly, *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898–1934* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1986) 62.

21. Roland Wingate, *Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of Sir Reginald Wingate Maker of Anglo Egyptian Sudan* (London, John Murray, 1955) 129.

22. Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate: Administration in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1916)* (London, Frank Cass, 1970) 48.

23. Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Stanford, Sanford University Press, 1955) 7.

24. "Programme For Kitchener's award of Freedom in London." Quoted in Martin Daly, *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898–1934* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1986) 24.

25. Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1916)* (London, Frank Cass & CO LTD, 1971) 19.

26. Janice Boddy, *Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007) 24.

27. See, Abdullahi Gallab, *A Civil Society Deferred: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2013).

28. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State: In Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994) 110.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1916)* (London, Frank Cass & CO LTD, 1971) 95.

32. Ibid.

33. Martin Daly, *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898–1934* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1986) 63.

34. Ibid.

35. M. I. Khalil, "The Legal System of the Sudan." *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (October 1971) 20.

36. Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1916)* (London, Frank Cass & CO LTD, 1971) 50.

37. Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." *African Affairs Journal London* 97, no. 388 (1998) 305–341.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996) Chapters 2–3.

41. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (London, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 9.

42. Bernard S. Cohen, "Representing Authority in Victorian India." In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (London, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 168.

43. Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, *A History of Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899) 91.

44. Ibid.

45. R. Hunt Davis, "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History." *African Affairs* 72, no. 289 (October 1973) 17.

46. Sir Harold MacMichael, *The Sudan* (London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1954) 17.

47. H. A. MacMichael, "Nubian Elements in Darfur." *Sudan Notes and Records* 1, no. 1 (January 1918) 30–48.

48. For more about MacMichael see Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, "Breaking the Pen: (of Sir Herold MacMichael Ibn Hicks) The Ja'aliyyin Identity Revised." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Science* 5, no. 1 (1988).

49. Ibid.

50. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001) 76.

51. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983) iv.

52. Ibid.

53. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, and Class Ambiguous Identities* (London, Verso, 1991) 39.

54. Ibid.

55. J. A. Mangan, ed., *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience* (London, Routledge, 1993) 6.

56. Ibid 7.

57. Ibid.

58. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000) 15.

59. Ibid.

60. Bernard S. Cohen, *Colonialism and Its Firms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996) 48.

61. Al-Tigani Yousif Bashir (1910–1937) is one of the great Sudanese early-twentieth-century poets. He was expelled from al-M'ahad because he made a statement in a debate among the students of al-M'ahad which was considered blasphemous by claiming that the poetry of Egyptian Ahmed Shawqi is as superior as the Koran compared to the poetry of his competitor Hafiz Ibrahim.

62. Elena Vezzadini, *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory & Anti-colonial Resistance in Sudan* (Suffolk, James Currey, 2015) 1.

63. Muddathir Abel Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study of Constitutional and Political Development, 1899–1956* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969) 61.

64. Elena Vezzadini, *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory & Anti-colonial Resistance in Sudan* (Suffolk, James Currey, 2015) 1.

65. The *abstract Baraka* does not perceive or consider labor or service as an exchange commodity. It considers dedication and exchange of commodity or labor as a calling and satisfaction is inherent throughout the process.

66. 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim, *Manichaean Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and Islamic Renewal in the Sudan, 1898–1985* (Leiden, Brill, 2008) 330.

67. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983) vi.

68. Ibid vii.

Chapter 3

Ḥasan al-Turabi School Days

Ḥasan al-Turabi entered Ḥantoub secondary school (higher secondary) in 1948 where he graduated a year earlier.[1] His record of success and excellence at the high school and his overall achievement at all levels of learning institutions, through what was considered as miraculous speed, became part of a pride that he and his disciples had continued to brag about ever since. For all of them, such an achievement was not only a fundamental demonstration of his intelligence, but it was also an indication of human excellence based on the affirmation to an accomplished condition of a genius. However, it was not the person by himself, rather the new public education that was where the system of elite establishment of higher education enters the picture. Thus, it supplied some background to the emerging new Sudanese world that marked atypical sets of differentiation and organization of fields of power and prestige, and it reproduced social structures and situated a midpoint in the struggle between new groups of Sudanese people and the colonial state. Thus the record of success of Ḥasan al-Turabi, set as a pathway of transmission by this disciples and himself, on the one hand, and the communication of that as an agenda for comparative prestige in the national field of power, on the other, turned him into a sacred personality to some of his disciples, or a worshiped hero of sorts.[2] These were the manufactured identities of al-Turabi and the academic titles: Ḥasan the student of Ḥantoub high school; Dr. Ḥasan the university professor who graduated from the Sorbonne; and Shaikh Ḥasan who worked for a Sunni Wiayat al-faqih, who did not meet the magic of leadership and the clearest though often treacherous desire and route for the highest state acquisition.[3] Moreover, his disciples, who once belonged to a younger generation of the Sudanese-educated community of the state, acted on what they discovered through their everyday political practice—that he was an incompetent administrator[4] who "looked

the part, but could never really inhabit the role."[5] This was apart from the principle fact that actors do not act in a vacuum but rather in concrete social situations governed by a set of objective social relations. This is a reality that has been overlooked by many. Ḥasan al-Turabi either stayed in denial or neither accepted nor understood such a social function. That is where al-Turabi passes from fantasy to prison several times, and finally to failure to admit or enter a socially viable world where the actual and symbolic vacuum of his leadership was energized as his disciples under the smooth, though cunning and ruthless leadership of 'Alī 'Osmān to dominate the fields and ways to power, according to that, to rise to the highest echelons of the party and the state higher offices. Instead, al-Turabi continued until the last day of his life to blame his demise to *khiant al-'ihood and fitnat al-Sulta wa al-Maal*: betrayal of covenants and temptation of power and money.[6]

ḤANTOUB AND AFTER: THE FRUITS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

Ḥantoub was one of the first three highly regarded public schools in colonial and postcolonial Sudan.[7] It was founded by Mr. Lewis Brown as a boarding public school at the east bank of the Blue Nile in 1946. The reputation of these old schools, in general, and Ḥantoub in particular, continued for a considerable time to preserve a special image of excellence, which might be considered, in the light of the events of the colonial and postcolonial times, the gateway that granted its graduates power and prestige, and for the rest of the lives of those graduates, what appeared as subject of actions that effectively fall on those individuals, though not necessarily the object of their thoughts nor actions. Nevertheless, that image bestowed on each of these old-school graduates, together with the graduates of Gordon Memorial College, which later became the University of Khartoum, an everlasting badge of honor no one had ever heard of in the precolonial the Sudan. By and large Ḥantoub stayed and maintained its prestige as exuberant affirmation of that image and its badge of honor. An example of that has been included in Sudanese satire and idle talk, though it was not the refutation of that phenomenon and its relationship to power and prestige, especially when some Sudanese compared the legacy of Ja'far Nimairi, who was at the bottom of his class (Ṭish Ḥantoub), and Ḥasan al-Turabi, the first of his class (Awal Ḥantoub).[8] The collective privilege of the image of Ḥantoub granted each one of them power and prestige, without discriminating between either one, as they moved in practical life regardless of each one's educational rank. Others from the same generation, especially classmates of each of Awal and/ or Ṭish Ḥantoub, received an additional advantage when selected to high

offices during the reign of Ja'far Nimairi and Ḥasan al-Turabi. Hence, in talking about Ḥasan al-Turabi and his generation, we are taking about a long, extended and maintained episode of dominance of public education in general. However, and as Karl Marx theory of domination, "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also control the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it."[9] Ḥasan al-Turabi is one of the most memorable representatives of this generation and one of those who took pride in being a product of its system of education. His relationship to the bounds of that, in the development of his image as Dr. Ḥasan, and successes and failures of his Islamism as Dr. Shaikh Ḥasan, on the one hand, and finally his mortification and demise, on the other, made him and his disciples losers in modernity.[10] This legacy is not "the history of the great thinker, but of the banishment of the small man to the margin" and the end of Islamism.[11] The common denominator to all that points to the developments of the twentieth-century Sudan and its human experience. This, of course, raises one of the many important issues of the emergence and consolidation of the foundational particularities of the twentieth century—the state and the simultaneous creation of "old Sudan."[12] It should now be clear, as explained in the previous chapter, that the emergence of the twentieth-century Sudan in its different phases, histories, and experiences—colonial, postcolonial, and Islamist rule—is a sociopolitical phenomenon that is one aspect of a single factor that included other socioeconomic developments. I will be bringing in each of them, as they all produced the Sudanese human experience of the twentieth century. The colonial endeavor, as many of colonial writers such as Kitchener, Wingate, or Douglas Newbold and other colonial administrators have noted, did not stand by itself behind the emergence that century.[13] Neither did other political, social, and religious developments, as some Sudanese historians try to claim. Nor was the community of the state, what I consider the nationalist struggle of the new generations of educated elite, the single factor for the production of a performing counter-power. In reality many of these issues have found themselves intertwined whenever conflict, violence, or conformity becomes meaningful. This is particularly so in relation to accounting for the development of the structures and processes of the Sudanese state in totality and the system generated out of the actions and reactions of the Sudanese population as a whole within the different stages of the twentieth century that remain foundational for this human experience. The formation of the twentieth-century Sudan, within the course of which the old regimes were rebuilt and new ones emerged, was a product of the developments that became observed as part of the universe and the dialects of the intensification of the Sudanese population's consciousness of different routes of development and incomplete liberation, on the one hand, and

the expansion of the state that rules over them as subjects of the state rather than citizens in their own rights, on the other. The proposition that I argue here is that the history of the Sudanese twentieth-century human experience, its decisive moments of what people did, and the series of transitions from the time of Kitchener/Wingate throughout that of ʻOmer al-Bashir all were too complex in the construction of the Sudanese human experience to be told in full here. However, the zones of interaction between various cultural, religious, and political groups in various parts of the country that created conflict, peace, and change through time remains part and parcel of the Sudanese human experience. Hence, we will need to excavate the layers and sedimentations of what has been buried under the current edifice of this Sudanese human experience and at the same time see how that played an important part of the collective time in the life and thought of Ḥasan al-Turabi—the man, his Islamism, his generation, and how that remains a critical component of the successive development of each and every phase of the development of the Sudanese life. Six aspects remain with continuing significance as components of the creation of the dialects of the construction, the expressions, the mediations of this human experience, and its coalescence into contingents of a powerful mix of historical events and the causal connection to existence that bequeathed to the Sudanese identity and underpinned the foundation of this long Sudanese twentieth century.[14]

FIRST: THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE STATE

The colonial experience works as a referent in the historical knowledge system, the performance of power; the exercise of violence; and the way a regime of governance was created, circulated, framed, and maintained. This process turned out to be one of the foundations for this long century and became obvious and was taken for granted as a fundamental factor for the interpretation of the whole myth and meaning of the Sudanese political life and its sign posts and growth of its whole system of governance that still circulates in the country. Within this system, the promise, transformation of many aspects of Sudanese life, and sanctification of social divisions that empowered some groups have been identified to be significant for this purpose. One important aspect of the newly created system is education, either as "a mode of relating to difference in which difference is either congealed or concealed . . . or as "difference is neither ratified nor erased but negotiated."[15] Through the development of the educational system social mobility became a more hopeful interpretation of the opportunity for power and prestige by occupying eminent positions from those over whom

they would rule. It turned some of them into sacred beings. New public education was one of the most important developments of modern Sudanese life, which was the route to the emergence of a countrywide generation of civilian and military Sudanese and the creation of Sudanese order. Members of the public educated Sudanese have been "exposed at so fast a pace to such earthquakes of change . . . [and] institutional contradictions, [as they] do not usually impute to the big ups and downs of the societies in which they live."[16] As early as 1920s "some Gordon College students, who were beginning to embrace ideas of nationalism for Sudan (partly through the inspiration of Egyptian nationalist writings) began to resist government efforts to elicit tribal labels."[17] However, the Sudanese emerging nationalism "had clear modular characteristics that lent it affinity with many anti-colonial nationalist movements elsewhere in the colonial world. To focus only on the Anglo–Egyptian–Sudanese triangle would limit our vision to an unacceptable degree, because political developments in the Sudan after the Great War were a reflection and a consequence not only of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute but also the 'spring of the colonial nations' that was sweeping through many parts of the world."[18] Within the 1924 revolution, some graduates of Gordon College, the *effendi* class, as the British described them, mobilized all these meanings and added to them in a characteristic nationalist impulse, some essential but diverse meanings and narratives to Sudaneseness.[19] I call that Sudanese class produced out of public education the community of the state. That community was first produced by, steeped in, and introduced to Sudanese life, by the colonial state, and it continued to expand to produce new spheres of influence as "the most efficient or equitable 'conveyer belt for ambition.'"[20] Later, that status class and its individuals and groups became, within the new order of things, the essential element of a different economic and social capital "that not only guarantees preferential and speedy access to positions of command"[21] but also to a "high degree of autonomy and internal differentiation according to the same anatomy between money and culture that organizes the field of power at large [and] enables it also to internecine conflicts by recognizing rewarding diverse claims to scholastic, and thence social, excellence."[22] All that became the base for a new sociopolitical differentiation in the Sudan. Members of the community of the state, within their acquired specialized knowledge and system of education, have been connected to a progressively and economically rewarded practice and ascent to higher positions in both the state and the society. In addition, the new particular public educational institutions and their graduates continued to dictate the rules of the space of possible virtues or vices attributed to state endowment of power and prestige together with the social rewards, and lack thereof. No other form or system of indigenous, religious, or traditional education

played such a major role in the structure of merit, social space, and distribution of cultural capital, power, and prestige.

The most important aspect of the production of the public education and its relationship to the state is that it emerged and developed as "a privilege and [was] symbolically instituted and guaranteed by the state that is, the right to the exclusive exercise of a certain function and the benefit of an income," a right that "intimately tied up to the state, both in its historical development . . . . and its operation."[23] In addition, the community of the state developed not only the sense of responsibility to serve the state but also the interest and device the processes of people-making, as "inventors of civil virtue defend a philosophy that claims to be resolutely political. Rejecting the 'retreat' into libraries, they propose to find a set of civic duties benefiting those who must exercise civil responsibilities for the sake of the entire nation."[24]

The wellspring of that particular development materialized as many different associations of those who claimed civic duties and exercised civil responsibilities of modernity, Islam, and other ideologies for the sake of the nation. These associations were first aroused in the conversations and socializations of the students of the Gordon Memorial College. The college was described variously and called by Britons who worked at it "The Eton of the Soudan" or "Winchester by the Nile." Gordon Memorial College was in its incarnation "a school in the British 'public' style, the college trained students 'for life.'[25] It attempted to make out of each student the jack-of-all-trades, the sportsman, the man of strong character and code of service—in other words, an individual fitting the ideals of the British district commissioner."[26] In certain regards, the students of the college gradually started to see the college not only as "a laboratory of colonial service" but also to see in themselves a "vanguard" of sorts that shaped personal identity and imbued them "with a leadership mentality that exceeded the bounds of their jobs."[27] At the same time and as part of "the civilizing mission" with the intent to become specialists who admired British and Western advancement but despised their own. Such conditions set more or less some characteristics of emerging members of these vanguard groups and their proposed forms of the communities. That could explain why and how the college was the "laboratory" for origination and development of vanguard-oriented political parties of the left, the Islamists, and the statists. Despite real similarities of these groups there are important differences between the three. The three would like to see their respective ideologies as the "riddle of history solved," the state is their executive entity, and the rest of the population are subjects. The difference is that for the left they consider their ideology as the only modernity; the right considers Islamism as the only modernity; and statists see themselves as the most worthy. Within al-Turabi's generation the prime examples could be 'Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub, who shared with al-Turabi the

experience of Ḥantoub but not Gordon College. Among the Islamist are Babikir Karrar, Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha, and Ḥasan al-Turabi and from the third group, on the one hand, 'Aḥmed Khair, Moḥamed 'Aḥmed Abu Ranat, Mansour Khalid, Ja'far Moḥmed 'Ali Bakhiet, and Badreldin Sulaiman to name a few. On the other hand, the military plays the role of the midwives for delivering the state for the statists.

That, everything being equal, will elicit favor inculcated as the propensity of the classroom culture that binds together the academic and the practical life—of those described or called *abnaa al-dufaa* (classmates). This, in actual fact, not only governs the competition of the school days but also rules the professional life, aspects of ambition, and tastes of intellectual prowess go deeper into everyone himself and then into the framework and invented forms of cooperation that feed pragmatically or opportunistically such individual-ism and sometimes selfishness.

The first of these abovementioned developments is the discriminate choice of classroom or school friends to a higher position, especially during military regimes' upward mobility to ministerial leadership positions. Given the choice structure described here, it is apparent that what privileged this phenomenon was what made military regimes desirable for some and it was how they provided opportunities for higher positions without the painstak-ing conditions of elections and other requirements and scrutiny needed for such positions—which has typically been the case for democratically elected systems. Second, the logic of urgency of this phenomenon turns the realities of classroom evaluation into a progressive and continuous reality of hope and jealousies among former classroom or schoolmates as they never ceased to classify each other and themselves according to past academic success or failure. Third, the generative schema that shaped the military and civil-ian members of the community of the state that proved to be true about all military coups—civilians assume that they can control and rule over the situation after the coup succeeds. Close reading to the Sudanese experience in this respect shows the failure to exercise the hegemonic appearances of civilians, like 'Abdallah Khalil, al-Rashied al-Ṭahir, 'Abdel Khaliq Maḥjoub, Aḥmed Suliamān, 'Alī 'Osmān, and Ḥasan al-Turabi, who were known for their record of excellence in school as brilliant students. Accordingly, they overlooked the fact that different situations could multiply higher possibilities for them than might be offered to army officers with poor performance in school. Each of these historic Sudanese personalities did not consider that the hidden academic scripts of poor performance during school days could change inside the new power-laden situations, as the time provided such military officers like Ibrāhim 'Abboud, Ja'far Nimairi and 'Omer al-Bashir—sooner or later—after they assume power. In the aftermath of the coup each one of those who conspired with, or participated in staging a particular coup

at different times, faced the sad reality where the dark side of those hidden transcripts altered the character of actors in different situations as they violently "spoken directly and publicly in the teeth of power."[28] Ḥasan al-Turabi committed that mistake twice: the first when he reconciled with Nimairi, 1976,[29] and the second when he instructed ʿOmer al-Bashir to go to the palace as a president.[30] In contemporary societies, as Jeffrey Alexander argues, "the props and stagings of action are always shifting, and it is difficult for actors and audiences to know where and when to put themselves into the scene."[31] Fourth, the integration of the state is as one entity that haphazardly distributes awards and punishments. This appeals to some members of the community of the state for military rule, and it is the shortcut to distribution to awards.

SECOND: THE MODERNIZATION OF POVERTY

There were additional implications that directly resulted from the seemingly improved and modernized sphere of public boarding school education and the degradation of the indigenous systems of both education and forms of work. Albert Memmi assures that "the deprivations of the colonized are almost direct results of the advantages of the colonizer."[32] He adds, "however, the colonial privilege is not solely economic. To observe the life of the colonizer and the colonized is to discover rapidly that the daily humiliation of the colonized, his objective subjugation, are not merely economic. Even the poorest colonizer thought of himself to be—and actually was—superior to the colonized."[33] The first generations of the community of the state were "identified as much with colonizers and with the colonized."[34] Here it is important to seriously look at the generational experiences of al-Turabi, the father, and al-Turabi, the son, as part of the Sudanese community of the state as "matched against [the colonizer community of the state] experience," to abridge Jean-Paul Sartre's statement in his introduction to Memmi abovementioned here. Ḥasan al-Turabi, the professor of law, for better or worse, who turned his back on his father's system of law, and happily chose the English and French languages, dressed in French-style, double-breasted suits instead of his father's *goftan*, *jallabiya*, and *markoub*,[35] found himself "one small notch above the Moslim on the pyramid, which is the basis of all colonial societies. His privileges were laughable, but they were enough to make him proud and to make him hope that he was not part of the mass of Moslems which constituted the base of the pyramid" that included his father. This is not an Oedipus complex, but it is where he and his Islamism resent the ʿUlama and despise the Sufis.

The introduction of public education represented a radical break with previous or traditional systems of learning. What was unprecedented, without a

doubt, was the state "acting as agent as the central bank of symbolic credit, . . . [where] the academic title is a public and official warranty, awarded by a collective recognized authority, of a competence whose technical and social boundaries and proportions can never be disentangled or measured, but which is always independent of subjective, partial evaluations (those of the bearer himself or his close relations, for example)."[36] As a result, the pursuit and attention to public education as a tool for upward mobility not only prejudiced the livelihood and image of indigenous education, including all mosques and other religious and non-British-based systems' education, such as al-Azhar,[37] but it also governed the way to access the new educational system. Accordingly, this steady lowering of the standards and status of all types of indigenous schooling and those who lacked public education together with the professions related to it meant that those growing numbers of individuals who continued to do such works remained poor and were considered illiterate. One result of this structural poverty, or the modernization of poverty, was the disinterest in and the marginalization of the old system of education, work, and their resulting products.[38] The colonial state, as Binan Chandra rightly cauterizes its function, "follows, in the long run, anti-industrialization and anti-development policies. And it does so precisely because it is guided by 'the national situation' not of the colony but of the metropolis."[39] As more people plunged into poverty, the majority of the population plummeted into an uninterrupted slide toward an all-encompassing development of underdevelopment, illiteracy, and marginalization. Within the progression of development of underdevelopment, the government benefits from cheap labor as more people were transported away from their homes to be turned into workers in the emerging colonial government capitalist projects in the creation of the infrastructure, such as railways, river-way transportation, and ports. In addition, dams and other construction projects, as well as a Gezira scheme and other colonial extractive economy activities, to name a few, allowed wealth and poverty to take on a different shape.

Other aspects of poverty modernization added to the marginalization of the already-marginalized south, west, and east of the Sudan. It was another form of colonization of lifeworld to another sector of the Sudanese citizens. It was Sir John Maffey, the Sudan governor general (1926–1933), the chief priest of the native administration, who introduced his general program of "carving up Sudan into a number of traditionally based polities which would . . . function as 'protective glands' against the infection of rural population by the 'septic germs' of democracy and nationalism."[40] For Maffey's policies to succeed the British district commissioners "became white 'paramount chiefs' administering what they regarded as 'their' people in accordance with customary law, relying heavily on sub-chiefs or councils of elders. This net effect was an amalgam of direct and indirect rule. In this way the British

succeeded in administering the south on the cheap."[41] Another step further in the colonization of the lifeworld of the Sudanese citizens of the south and its progressive effects of modernizing poverty and marginalization was the application additional barriers called the Southern policy or the Closed Districts Act. The Southern policy spelled "separation until the South is strong enough to stand upon its own feet and to develop in accordance with its own ethos."[42] Raphael Koba Badal argues "yet, until about 1945 the British contributed next to nothing to the realization of the declared objective. Instead, they insisted that the South remain uncontaminated not only by external influence but also by internal 'progress.'"

Within this new development, public education and government jobs were made a criterion of modernity. A new form of stratification of upward and downward mobility and aggregates of mass produced, poor population, and geographical and economic marginalization zones emerged concurrently as a new social phenomenon and as a result of this development. The colonial state formed its homogenous system and salient characteristic, as most groups became dependent on its opportunities and "good will" as the job provider for both the educated and the uneducated. At the same time, other groups were subjected to structural underdevelopment as an overt consequence of a style of extraction, a system of control, and incentives and dis-incentives of rewards and punishment. That is/was what made "colonialism as shared culture which may not always begin with the establishment of alien rule in a society and end with the departure of the alien ruler from the colony."[43] Here, it is more important to look deeper in into the colonizers' and colonized experiences when matched against each other and their victims are all "throttled by the colonial apparatus, that cumbersome machine constructed" by Wingate, and now, after giving the Islamists—'Omer al-Bashir—"every satisfaction, turns against them and threatens to crush them."[44] Maybe it did even more than it did to Ḥasan al-Turabi.

On the other hand, all sectors of the population, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, became increasingly dependent on what the government provided in the field of employment, transport, education, medical, and other services. Machines powered by steam, coal, and electricity, which were a monopoly of the state, and the growth of their material production, in addition to new efficient communication and transportation systems, had a profound effect on the power, capacity of material production, and security of the state. The connection between poverty production and the government's mode of operation points to the distance between the colonial system and its institutions on one side, and various groups of the population on the other.

Another factor of this new system in the Sudanese life was that the majority of people were left behind within the realm of traditional types of work

or production, including rain fed agriculture, rural economy, and simple jobs, which meant they remained poor and most of them were turned into an underclass or part of the urban economic marginalized some. Thus, when viewed from the bottom, it might be even clearer to see the progress of structural poverty and the human sacrifices offered at the altar of the colonial state. Most profoundly affected were the rural poor in the entire country who were rapidly driven into the bottom of the new social stratum in the country. In a short time, the colonial state was not only the original core of the capitalist development in the country, which dominated and transformed the social structure, but it was by far the most important agent in the importation of the most pressing needs—from the train to the pencil—and the sole exportation body for all raw material, from cotton to Arabic gum, and other products. Within the Sudanese community of the state, Islamists emerged as what Rogers M. Smith describes as a "political people" who accepted such characterization to their primacy. Members of the community of the state, regardless of their other political, ideological, and professional affiliations could be described as "political" because they "are communities 'imagined' to impose binding obligations and duties; and many human associations beyond that [Benedict] Anderson calls 'nations' fall under this definition." Moreover, they could be described as "political people" because they represented "a potential adversary of other forms of human associations, because its proponents are generally understood to assert that its obligations legitimately trump many of the demands made on its members in the name of other associations."[45] The Sudanese Islamists emerged as a "political people" according to their historians in 1946[46] out of seven members of a group who met secretly one night at the western sport field at Khartoum University College, discussed the idea of an Islamist organization that might "confront the communist onslaught and resist British colonialism with the intention of establishing a righteous society based on Islamic ideals."[47] Within its transformations, which were conflict riddled, the movement turned under Ḥasan al-Turabi into a "strong and wide" political people who depicted their group "as a distinct society entitled to ultimately override the claims of not many but all other groups, and entitled to do so not just in regard to a few issues but all issues."[48] Ḥasan al-Turabi's Islamism emerged and circulated outside all systems of Sudanese political culture to create its political people. Other factors played a key part in its transformation today. In both cases, the Islamists held the state, denied it to other non-Islamist citizens, turned it into a coercive-intensive, domination of "antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate," or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force."[49] At the same time, they used the state to distribute rewards to some and injustice to other in an uneven manner.

**THIRD: THE VISIBLE HAND OF TOTALITARIANISM
FROM COLONIZATION OF SUDANESE
LIFEWORLD TO SAVAGE SEPARATION
OF RELIGION AND THE STATE**

I describe the colonial regime as totalitarian because its state is, by any crite-
ria, a violent one-party system that manifested itself by recognizing no limits
to its authority and strived to regulate every aspect of public, religious, and
private life through a variety of means, including coercion wherever feasible
and in ways of perceiving its presence as a reality taken for granted by
members of the Sudanese communities. Colonialism as a totalitarian experi-
ence predated the European nationalist and socialist regimes of the twentieth
century. The colonial state deeply influenced the Sudanese way of life through
the heavy "visible hand" of its totalitarian system of domination. It found
expression by transforming the state into a structure of coercive and hege-
monic enterprises that abolished all human rights by enforcing a system of
extraction and representing itself as the single entity that controlled all public
and private spheres and markets. It also did so by elimination of competition
to imports, which were advertised "as a magic medium 'though which Eng-
land's power and influence could be enforced and enlarged in the colonial
world.' Commodities are not simply the vanguard of imperial rule; they create
the empire all by themselves."[50] J. S. Furnivall argues "it is indeed, generally
true that colonization has arisen out of commerce, and not commerce out of
colonization: the doctrine that trade follows the flag is quite modern, and in
history the flag has followed trade."[51] At the same time, "neither imperialism
nor colonialism is a simple accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported
and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include
notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination: the
vocabulary of classical nineteenth century imperial culture is plentiful with
words and concepts like 'inferior' or 'subject races,' 'subordinate peoples,'
'dependency,' 'expansion,' and 'authority.'"[52] The structural grasp of all
these colonial fields of action, power, extraction, and domination relates
directly and indirectly to long- and short-term systems of creation of imagined
and real periphery, modes of differentiation, production of both homo- and
auto-referential racism, and the construction of peoplehood through differ-
ent forms and exercise of cultural hegemony and direct forms of violence.
The hidden transcript of Kitchener's haste to call for the establishment of
Gordon Memorial College was defined and eloquently described by the poet
and "the prophet of British imperialism in its expansionist phase," Rudyard
Kipling in his famous poem Kitchener's School. He wrote:

> They terribly carpet the earth with dead,
> And before their canon cool,

They walk un armed by twos and threes
To call the living to school.

However, the living were called also to Al-Suq al-Afrinji (the European market), which carries the same stamp of differentiation similar to other institutions described before. That it represented modernity and the other Arabic markets represented the native. It was not only an epitome of the leadership of trade over the state, it is an open-air advertisement and main supplier for "a host of commercially produced 'things' to sustain a civilized life" for consumption and symbolic exchange in taste for groups of the community of the state.[53] There, Scotch drinkers, double-breasted suit wearers, cigarette smokers, and Derby shoe wearers grew assuming and opened new perspectives that appealed to such mass-marketed merchandize and connected such patterns of taste and consumption to a culture concomitant to modernity. Ḥasan al-Turabi expressed a similar false consciousness of modernity when he claimed that "Islam is the only modernity, because if the modern sector in our society represents modernity, then the modern sector is dominated by Islamic currents, students and university graduates everywhere represent modernity as they are the only current which exercises any measure of ijtihad."[54] He adds, "the modern elite, mostly Western educated and probably younger. Even their dress sometimes is different."[55] Even the remaining disciples of al-Turabi after the 1999 split among the ranks of Islamists and the removal of Shaikh Ḥasan from power claim that he taught them *libs al-shal wa Istimal al-jawal*, that is to say that he changed their appearance to look fashionable wearing the neck scarf and using the cellphone. Such excursions that dramatize modernity by connecting it to such a particular group's appearances "which may be experienced as unhappy consciousness, sometimes disguised as arrogance, is also a source of their pretention, a permanent disposition toward the bluff or usurpation of social identity which consists in participating 'being' by 'seeming,' appropriating the appearances so as to have the reality, the nominal so as to have the real, in trying to modify the positions in the objective classification by modifying the representation of the ranks in the classification or the principle of classification."[56] There are certain aspects of continuity and discontinuity between that historical experience of the colonial state in colonizing religion and the present Islamists' regimes that matters. It matters because it is still inside and outside the fields of power relations and the way the state has been used not only as a colonizing vessel to religion but also as violence supreme in relation to human life.

That leads us to another major issue of colonizing religion and another similarity between the colonialist and the Islamists experiences. This major aspect of colonizing religion in general, and Islam in particular, during the colonial period was that the state created in and of itself a new religious entity

via its monopoly and control over the Sudanese open religious space and its different representations. The state could deploy its authority strategically to regulate, impose certain roles, and deny access to particular religious markets. The enforced social, political, and religious fragmentation turned different religious representations into appendages of the state. The colonial state, from its first day, embarked on strategies that monopolized and organized the course of action through which the regime could pursue its policy to impose control over the entire population. Yet, though the language and the rulers are different, schemes and arrangements of colonizing religion, followed by the Islamists, are so little different from Wingate's state. However, the Islamists' project was capable of overcoming the colonization aspect to the savage separation of religion and state by turning the coercive-intensive state into a coercive only state.

For the colonialist state, one aspect of their strategies arose out of a policy of inclusion, while the second was derived of arrangements of exclusion. The guidelines of this policy were carefully drafted in Kitchener's famous memorandum to the new military rulers (*Mudirs*) of the different districts of the Sudan. Kitchener made a clear distinction between "good," which would be accommodated, and "bad" Islam that should not be tolerated. The state of affairs for the Islamists, however, was totally and entirely exclusive and self-satisfied as all other religious representations are considered. For them, all other religious representations, in addition to those they describe as secularists, who may be different from each other, have been placed within the parameter of bad Islam that should not be tolerated. Hence, both the colonialists and Islamists did not hesitate to employ all forms of particularistic violence, whether described as a civilization mission or orientation, against whoever considered an enemy of the "totalist" state. So, the state was designated a specific function, which was the ungodly use of force and the ungodly *tamkeen*, which is a form of extraction through the use of the state as a monopoly of the Islamists.

The other shared aspect of colonization of religion between Governor General Wingate and the Islamists is the one that Wingate and his right-hand man, Inspector General Rudolf Slatin Pasha, employed as one of the predominant determinants of the state policy. Slatin was not only the second highest ranking person in the colonial state, but also the de facto "Grand Mufti" par excellence. The Islamists similar to Wingate and his Grand Mufti Slatin sought to eradicate not only "centers of unorthodox fanaticism, but also to conquer those whom they waged jihad against in the South, Nuba mountains and also those they described as secular groups and orientations." For Wingate and Slatin, and similarly for the Islamists, who both claim to be seeking to regain or support "good Islam," other Muslims and the Sudanese, who are not Muslims represent the external Other. But as the colonialists had their grand

mufti, the Islamists had their "Mahdi with a PhD from the Sorbonne." If we combine the distance of each one of these two experiences from the culture and their attempts to forcibly impose religion as an ideology void of faith and theological knowledge or "deculturation effect which is not followed by acculturation," we might reach two important conclusions. First, by developing such an ideology both experiences were transformed into a totalitarian "fundamentalist-type" of governance. Second, as both experiences lacked what al-Turabi described as *fiqh al-Hukm* (theology of rulership), both experiences have used religion to adapt to their own needs and self-interests. These attempts by these regimes to colonize religion have been rejected by Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. Hence, both extreme regimes relied on coercive power to impose submission or to chastise disobedient subjects of the state populations. And perhaps equally important, Islamists legitimization does not come from past experience or heritage similar to other religious representations in the country, especially the Ṣūfi *turq* (singular *ṭarīqa* or order) that they despise, or the 'ulama, whom they deride and ridicule. Nevertheless, they do not qualify to perform the functions of the 'ulama who gained and solidified their legitimacy from institutionalized religious knowledge and their function as judges, imams, and teachers. However, both the colonial and the Islamist states' form of state interventionism and control of the Muslim life was conducted as a function of the state through reordering the high-ranking 'ulama as state employees.

The most important aspect in the separation of religion and state within the Islamist experience in the Sudan drives from the fact that a situation was created from the first day of the coup in 1989. Since that day, the regime positioned itself as a cultural and political minority by a name they chose for themselves and with a religious marker that was political in essence and ignorant of the main tenants of Islam as its leaders admitted and was explained here before. They were tempted by worldly pleasures; and although they advocate that Islam is *din wa dawla* (a religion and a state), it became evident later that their relationships were based on kinship. In addition to that, and maybe out of that, they developed individualistic traits as they were nurtured to consider politics as an opportunity. In an interview conducted with Ḥasan al-Turabi by the Islamist oriented London magazine Impact International in March 1993, however, he explained briefly his major task in the Sudan, which was "to Islamise public life—civil, business, police, military, economy and culture in all their dimensions." He added that "our power lies in our Iman, and we need a lot of shawkah (material power) in order to face the challenges that confront us."[57] Some of these challenges he referred to could include the "gap between military and civilian, and this explains perhaps some of the political instability and military takeover; after a while the civilians became very jealous, and the people followed them although most of the uprising was

not necessarily popular. It was elites, trade unions, professional unions, and government; that's how it all started, most of the time. We want to overcome this."[58] For that reason, al-Turabi perceived the solution was the militarization of the entire society. He argued, "I think the idea is to dissolve the army, just dissolve the army in society, so to speak. The idea of popular defense force goes some way to do that. But people should organize for their own defense. If the army needs to broaden its base, then it can call upon these forces. Otherwise, these forces are people who are engaged in their daily occupations and go only when they are needed."[59]

The militarization of society came out of a grand scheme of what the Islamist called during their heyday al-Mashru al-Hadari. Within that grand scheme comes al-Da'wa al-Shamila as the operational plan. The Islamists' approach to al-Da'wa targeted first all other Muslims whose understanding, observance, and practice of Islam were viewed by the Islamists as faulty or incomplete. An approach that puts in practice the Islamists' deeply rooted mode of reductionism and disrespect to all other religious expressions and representations. Second, the Islamists "introduced new content into the message of al-Da'wa. Rejecting the confinement of religion to matters of private faith and ritual, they emphasized that Islam was both din wa dawla. In addition to enlarge the domain of Islamic regulation, the Islamists propagated a new, activist, interpretation of proper Muslim conduct."[60] Consistent with other developments within the Islamist movement in the Sudan for the last two decades and especially during the lifetime of the first republic, an ideology-driven *da'wa* has emerged, and according to professor el-Tag Fadalla's characterization, it turned the *da'wa* into one of the tools of the political pursuit. So, al-Da'wa al-Shamila turned out to be the Islamist's burden that could replace the white man's burden. Each one of these projects had its violent dark side. Out of such al-Da'wa al-Shamila emerged ideas of jihad against citizens in the south, west, east, north, and center, and the militarization of society. In the south, the war took a jihādi overtone as the state described its violence against the insurgency there as jihād. In the north, the ghost houses, the Islamists' dwellings of horrors where Islamist torturers, "committed the cruelest acts of mental and physical torture including beatings, mock executions and sleep and food deprivation." The militarization of society according to 'Omer al-Bashir means that the militarized "civilian population [and] has led to the creation of a large Popular Defense Force PDF." All of that quickly grew "to fit different situations. In the Nuba Mountains, for example, it has been integrally associated with jihad, while in much of Northern Sudan, it is a component of Islamic social planning." Later, it developed into the Janjaweed in Darfur and renamed as Quāt al-Dam al-Sari'e (Rapid Support Forces) deployed demonstrators in urban parts of the country including Khartoum, the capital. Many attribute the idea of al-mashru al-hadari to 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha who established one of the

largest ministries in the history of the country under the rubric of the Ministry of Social Planning and who developed the concepts of al-Da'wa al-Shamila and al-Enqlab al-Islami, the Islamic total transformation, which is a term that might have been borrowed from the Iranians and owe its currency to the Revolutionary Guard Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami. The separation of religion and state model of the Islamist regime became manifest when the security, intelligence, and the police state expanded and incorporated all those units. Then the vesting of power and no separation except that between the state and religion was defined. As it turns out, the Islamists were successful in creating a coercion-intensive state separate and standing on an independent base. In addition to that the state became an overseer and protector of a rampant corruption as another form of violence which expanded through *al-tamkeen*.

The other aspect of separation was the action the regime took against the legal community. One of the fundamental issues that the Sudanese achieved through the October Revolution was the separation of powers, and within that independence the judiciary was recognized. At the same time, even before that "after independence, bar association members were uniquely positioned to command the public's trust and lead efforts to mobilize citizens. Many older Sudanese lawyers still speak with pride about the guidance legal professionals provided to nonviolent people's movements to topple both 'Abboud's military regime in 1964 and the Nimeiri regime in 1985."[61] The Islamists quickly took very serious measures in the aftermath of the coup "to set up a parallel system of justice to deal with threats to its security."[62] This system started by detaining members of the legal profession along with politicians without charge and continued to purge the legal profession within the Islamists strategy to immediately put "the sweeping power of the legal profession under executive control."[63] In addition, the regime "captured and imprisoned key leaders of the bar association's main office in Khartoum and quickly reopened it for business with loyalists in command."[64] The regime took leading members of the bar either to "Sudan's notorious prisons at Kober and Port Sudan to 'ghost houses' or other unofficial prisons to be tortured. Ironically, one of these unofficial house prisons was set up in the "confiscated offices of the . . . Sudan Bar Association."[65]

Other innovations of major importance that the Islamists introduced to shape their violent state confirms what 'Abdullahi An-Na'im describes as "whatever the state enforces in the name of shari'a will necessarily be secular and the product of coercive political power and not superior Islamic authority."[66] To turn the state into a coercion-intensive system, the Islamist with their new penal code "cemented the notion that disagreements with government's rule would be akin to disrespect to Islam [crime of ridda or apostasy], a crime punishable by death."[67] One of the paradoxes of Islamism in power that Ḥasan al-Turabi who supervised that code one day was threatened later

"with trial for apostasy like [Mahmoud Mohamed] Taha in 1985. A special pamphlet directed against al-Turabi and declaring him an apostate was published by the official Majalat al-Figh al-Islami in 2006 under the title Risalat al Qul al Fasl fi al-Rid al-amin al-kharij 'an alasl, wherein al-Turabi's statements which are contradicted by the Qur'an are repudiated."[68] In addition the Public Order Courts (al-Nizam al-'Am) that deal with petty infractions of Islamic law (e.g., dress and alcohol) fail to meet the minimum standards of a fair trial.[69] Moreover, application of these laws "upon non-Muslims and discrimination against women by using Islamic devices, such as honor, reputation, and morality, are used by Public Order Police (al-Shurta al-'Ama) and Popular Committees (neighborhood associations) to protect the 'moral health' of the society."[70] By transforming the state into a coercive vessel, the courts and "corporal punishments, echoing the words of the legal historian Douglas Hays, [are] routinely used as a "splendid occasion for lessons of justice and power."[71] Many Sudanese courthouses are designed like Western-style motels, with two floors of courtrooms opening onto exterior corridors. Floggings (many, if not most, for alcohol-related offenses) "are administered in these open walkways or terraces alongside courthouse buildings, visible and audible to those on the premises and passerby in the street." Many upsetting videos that circulated worldwide show the moment Sudanese women were flogged in the street by the police and how they cried in pain while a judge was, in attendance, watching. Within all of these practices, laws, and innovation of the system of torture and violence, the Islamists transformed the state into a comprehensive system whose functional designation was to maintain the regime through a coercive mode of operation.

At the same time, the Islamists as a desperate population transformed into identity groups defined by their tribal affiliations, celebrated religion at their homes as *tilawa* (group reading of the Quran), fasted for two days a week, and met with select few confidants for the sun-set breaking of the fast and group prayer. Other than that religion, for the wealthy Islamism has become a drive for plural marriages that 'Omer al-Bashir himself encouraged by setting the example for other Islamist officials. I call this separation savage because it has been enforced through coercive means.

So far, collecting together all these developments, we can arrive at the essence of Islamism itself and the developments that existed in some of its complex, but savage, forms of governance, that attempts to maintain their monopoly overpower, control the population, and extract resources through a system that operates directly and indirectly with internal and external violence.

That leads us to another major issue of colonizing religion which is based on the formation of what could be described as a state religion. This major

aspect of colonizing religion in general, and Islam in particular, during the colonial period, was that the state created in and of itself a new religious entity via its monopoly and control over the Sudanese open religious space and how the different forms of their religiosity affect and intersect with areas of their social and public life. The state aggressively deployed its authority strategically to regulate, impose certain roles, and deny access to particular religious markets. The enforced social, political, and religious fragmentation turned different religious representations, the religious studies, and law curriculum into appendages of the state. The colonial state, from its first day, embarked on strategies that monopolized and organized the course of action through which the regime could pursue its policy to impose control over the entire population. Yet, though the language, English for the first ruler Wingate and Arabic for the second one 'Omer al-Bashir and the rulers as stated are different, the scheme and arrangements of colonizing religion, as explained before, followed later by the Islamists are so little different from Wingate's colonial state. However, the Islamists project was capable of overcoming the colonization aspect to the savage separation of religion and state by turning the coercive-intensive state to coercive only state.

For the British colonialist state, one aspect of the of the strategies of those who laid the foundation arose out of a policy of a totalitarian form of inclusion to control and discipline, while the second was derived of a system and arrangements of exclusion to discipline and punish. The guidelines of this policy were carefully drafted in Kitchener's famous memorandum to the new military rulers (Mudirs) of the different districts of the Sudan. Kitchener made a clear distinction between "good," which would be accommodated, and "bad" Islam that should not be tolerated. The state of affairs for the Islamists, however, has been totally and entirely exclusive as all other religious representations are considered. For them, all other religious representations in addition to those they describe as secularists, who may be different from each other, have been placed within the parameter of bad Islam that should not be tolerated. Hence, both the colonialists and Islamists did not hesitate to employ all forms of particularistic violence, whether described as a civilization mission or orientation, against whoever considered an enemy of the "totalist" state. So, the state has been designated specific function, which is the ungodly use of force and the ungodly tamkeen, and is a form of extraction through the use of the state as a monopoly of the Islamists.

If, in addition, al-Turabi continued to argue that he was neither aware of some of the practices of his Islamists or he might have looked upon those who turned against him when they fell victims of temptation of power and money, as a careful self-protective leader. He cannot wholly escape from the evil of his Islamist's and Islamists' experience.

NOTES

1. What Ḥasan al-Turabi never mentioned in this respect was that the idea to skip a year at Ḥabtoub Secondary School to join Gordon Memorial College came as a suggestion from Ḥasan's older brother Ḍafalla al-Turabi. When Ḥasan was at the secondary school, Ḍafalla was a lecturer at the department of engineering. According to Ḍafalla, in an interview with Masaki Kobayashi—a PhD student at Durham University in 1995 then,

> Ḍafalla advised his brother that faculty of law at Gordon Memorial College took new students every two years, and unfortunately there would be no recruitment in two years' time; therefore if he had wanted to study law as soon as possible he had to finish his secondary school in one year's time. Otherwise he had to wait another year. Hasan asked the headmaster of the secondary school, Mr. Lewis Brown, to allow him to skip the third grade. Mr. Brown gave Ḥasan his permission, but told Ḥasan that he should do it on his own responsibility. (Masaki Kobayashi, University of Durham, 1996, 256)

2. In a caption for a photo of young Ḥasan al-Turabi, 'Abedelraḥim 'Umer Muḥi el-Din described al-Turabi in his book *al-Islamiuon fil-Sudan: Dirast al-Taṭour al-Fikri wal Siasi 1969–1985* (The Islamists in the Sudan: Study on Intellectual and Political Development 1969–1985), he stated al-Turabi yearned for the horizon where there were looming assurances of prophethood and good tidings of God's promise of succession. A few months before the death of al-Turabi, 'Amar al-Sajād, one of the leading members of al-Turabi's political party claimed in a WhatsApp discussion group, that al-Turabi was *nabi asrihi* (the prophet of his time) and he had exceptional qualities.

3. Neither Ḥasan al-Turabi nor his disciples describe his pursuit to assume the highest position in the state of Sudan as a form of a Sunni *Wiayat al-faqih*; however, it is my own interpretation of that Ḥasan al-Turabi is law *faqih*, which combines the role of a theoretician and practitioner who hoped to assume that position in the eventual assumption of state leadership of the Islamists established through the military coup in 1989. I wrote that assumption several times in both Arabic and English since the 1990s; neither Ḥasan al-Turabi nor his disciples contested that.

4. 'Alī al-Ḥaj was elected secretary general of al-Turabi's National Congress in March 2017. He was the deputy secretary general of the Party and one of al-Turabi's loyalists. He was a longtime competitor of 'Ali 'Othmān. He told the author in a recorded interview with him in Bonn, Germany, in July 2012, that al-Turabi gets frustrated when somebody criticizes 'Ali 'Othmān. He also said that al-Turabi confided to some of his confidants that 'Ali 'Othmān showed cowardice in certain situations and that could be one of his character flaws.

5. Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Performance and Power* (Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2011) 138.

6. 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha (1944) who was the first vice president of the Islamist regime in Sudan from 2005 to 2011, and he was the real power behind the Islamist state since its inception in 1989 until 2013. He had been the strong man of the Islamist party since at least 1985 when he was elected deputy secretary general to

Ḥasan al-Turabi. For more information about 'Alī 'Osmān, see Chapters 7 and 8 of Abdullahi Gallab, *Their Second Republic: Islamism in the Sudan from Disintegration to Oblivion* (London, Routledge, 2016).

7. The other two schools are Wadi Syidna, established in 1946, and Khor Taqqat, established in 1951.

8. Ja'far Moḥamed Nimairi (1930–2009) was the president of Sudan from 1969 to 1985. He was a military officer who came to power through a military coup in May 1969, named the "May Revolution." Both Ḥasan al-Turabi and Ja'far Nimairi, who was two years ahead of al-Turabi, graduated from Ḥantoub secondary school. It was rumored that 'Abel Khaliq Maḥjoub, (1927–1971), the secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party who was executed in Khartoum by Nimairi in the aftermath of the 1971 coup attempt along with a large number of the Communist Party's leadership in 1971.

9. Karl Marx (with Friedrich Engels), *The German Ideology Including the Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy* (Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2011) 67.

10. In 1992 in a Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, organized by the World and Islam Studies Enterprise and University of South Florida Committee for Middle Eastern Studies, al-Turabi described himself and his Islamists as the only modernity. He added "Islamic leaders, like himself, they know the West very well, and they are part of it and they are not, definitely not hostile." Round Table with Ḥasan al-Turabi, University of South Florida, Committee of Middle Eastern Studies, May 10, 1992.

11. Zygmunt Bauman, *Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2016) 4.

12. I use the term "old Sudan" to describe Sudan that privileges the Wingate-'Omer al-Bashir state, which cruelly ruled over the Sudanese as subjects of the state. The "new Sudan" is the one many Sudanese aspire to. It is a Sudan that would privilege citizenship and could only begin to become possible if "we the people of the Sudan" could emerge to replace the state-centered system.

13. Examples of these writings are many. As A. J. Mangan rightly elucidated, the colonial educational curriculum was designed to "shape the ruled into patterns of proper subservience and 'legitimate' inferiority, and one in turn to develop in the rulers' convictions about the certain benevolence and 'legitimate' superiority of their rule." One chapter in the elementary school reading text, for example, describes Kitchener as the one who conquered Sudan and introduced urbanization. A major text about Wingate, by his son, is titled *Wingate of the Sudan*. Another one about Newbold is titled *The Making of the Modern Sudan*. In his introduction to M. A. Nigumi's book *A Great Trusteeship*, Sir James Robertson (1899–1983), the last governor general of Nigeria and the Civil Secretary of the Sudan colonial government from 1945 to 1953, stated "a recent Indian Writer in The London Times wrote that it was his opinion that those who have, until recently, lived and flourished under British rule should show some appreciation of the way in which Britain has actually brought their countries to their present hopeful position." Moḥamed Nigumi, a Sudanese architect who had been working for several years in Nigeria during Sir Robertson's tenure as Governor, wrote a book that could be described as a prime example of "the colonized mind" to

quote Ashis Nandy. In 1989, Francis Deng and M. W. Daly describe in their coau-thored book, *Bonds of Silk*, that "the human factor of the British Administration of Sudan as "Bonds of Silk."

14. More elaborate discussion on the construction of the Sudanese new identities or the Sudan in the twentieth century can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of Abdul-lahi A. Gallab, *A Civil Society Differed: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2011 (cloth print)–13 (paperback printing)).

15. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subal-tern Studies* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002) 140.

16. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 3.

17. Heather J. Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism, and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003) 32.

18. Elena Vezzadini, *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory & Anti-Colonial Resistance in the Sudan* (Sufflock, James Currey, 2015) 22.

19. *Effendi* is widely used as a title in Sudan to describe government employees. During the colonial time the term was used as a title of respect or courtesy.

20. Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elite, and Betrayal of Democracy* (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1996) 52.

21. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State of Nobility*, xi.

22. Ibid.

23. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State of Nobility* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996) 380.

24. Ibid.

25. Heather Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism, and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003) 44.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990) xiii.

29. In 1974 the opposition to Nimairi, which was made up of the Umma Party, the NUP, and the Islamists, coalesced into what was called the National Front. They actively staged a military takeover attempt to Khartoum. The rebels who came from Libya received training and support from many Arab countries, especially Libya and Iraq. The Sudanese national army was successful in defeating the attempt and resumed order. In 1977 Nimairi was elected for a second term as president. He attempted to consolidate his power by reconciling with the Northern opposition groups in what was called the National Reconciliation. Al-Sidiq al-Mahdi accepted that, while al-Sharief Ḥussien al-Hindi of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) refused the deal. Later, within a short time, al-Sādiq al-Mahdi withdrew for the government and the state political party. Al-Turabi saw an opportunity in that and thought by filling the vacuum he could control his schoolmate Ṭish Ḥantoub. When Nimairi felt that al-Turabi exhausted his functions, he created his own Islamism and ended up getting rid of al-Turabi and his Islamists by cracking down on them and sending al-Turabi to el-Obied prison.

30. It took Ḥasan al-Turabi 10 years after the coup and a year after he was humili-ated, but he was finally deposed from all positions of authority by 'Omer al-Bashir, to admit that he instructed al-Bashir the night of the 1989 coup to go to the palace *raisan* president and to send himself to prison *ḥabisan* a captive.

31. Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Performance and Power* (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2011) 3.

32. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1991) xii.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. The colonial state set a standard of dress to differentiate and stereotype the difference between its subjects. This dress code dressed the judges of the civil courts, who ranked higher, in full European attire and dress; the shari'a court judges, who ranked lower, wore a cultural design or local cross-dressing as a sign of going native. The first reflects modernity while the other is meant to represent the opposite. The lawyers of the civil court wore full suits and polished shoes, while the other wore *goftan, jallabiya,* and *markoub*, and could be punished for violating this dress code.

36. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State of Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1989) 376.

37. Many Sudanese consider Egyptian university education, as well as former Soviet Union and East European university educations, as inferior to the University of Khartoum and British university systems.

38. See Galan Amin, *Modernization of Poverty: A Study in the Political Economy of Growth in Nine Arab Countries 1945–1970* (Leiden, Brill, 1980).

39. Binan Chandra, "Karl Marx, His Theories of Asian Societies and Colonial Rule." In UNESCO, ed., *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris, UNESCO, 1980) 437.

40. Quoted in Raphael Koba Badal, O*rigins of the Underdevelopment of the South-ern Sudan: British Administrative Neglect* (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1980) 9.

41. Ibid.

42. Many ordinances were created by the colonial authorities which culminated in 1930 Closed District Act amended in 1953.

43. Ibid.

44. Jean-Paul Sartre in his introduction to Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1991) xxiii.

45. Rogers M. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 20.

46. For more information about the early history of the Sudanese Islamists' move-ment see, Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 36–44 (see chap. 1, no. 1).

47. Moḥamed Khair 'Abdel Gadir, *Nashaat al-Ḥarkah al-Islamiyya fi l-Sudan 1946–1956* (Khartoum, al-Dar L-Sudaniyya lil Kitab, 1999) 66.

48. Rogers M. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood*, 22.

49. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks I* (New York, Interna-tional Publishers, 1971) 57.

50. Janice Boddy, *Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007) 38.

51. J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York, New York University Press, 1956) 4.

52. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, Vintage Books, 1993) 9.

53. Janice Boddy, *Civilizing Women*, 35.

54. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan Turabi* (Tampa, The World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993) 20.

55. Ibid.

56. Pierre Bourdieu, *A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984) 253.

57. An interview with Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, "Challenging Times, but Madinah is our Model." *Impact International* (London, February 12–March 11) 7–9.

58. Arthur L. Lowrie, "Islam, Democracy, the State and the West," 29.

59. Ibid.

60. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003) 126.

61. Mark Fathi Massoud, *Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 123.

62. Carolyn Fleuer-Lobban, *Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan: Conflict, Law and Social Transformation* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2012) 88.

63. Mark Fathi Massoud, *Law's Fragile State*, 123.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. 'Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008) 7.

67. Ibid.

68. Carolyn Fleuer-Lobban, *Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan*, 92.

69. Ibid 89.

70. Ibid.

71. Mark Fathi Massoud, *Law's Fragile State*, 127.

Part II

THE ISLAMIST

Chapter 4

The Great Transformation

The historical time of Ḥantoub School and later the public education of Ḥasan al-Turabi represented an endowment and emergence of a "pointillist" aspect in al-Turabi's character that he never departed from for the rest of his life. This was the engagement of a feeling of excellence in school and his idea about the Mahdi family in particular, and the al-Merghani family and Sufi Islam in general, as a political phenomenon. What was well known about young Ḥasan al-Turabi as a student in Ḥantoub, especially among his peers, is suggestive. It sets, in one aspect, very easily with the fact that he excelled in academics. Until what could be considered the last and the more exclusive interview by al-Jazeera TV that covered all aspects of his life, as explained earlier in the introduction, he couldn't stop bragging about his achievement in school and that he skipped one school year in Ḥantoub secondary to take the Oxford exam, which he achieved with distinction. He also said that he was a good soccer player, but that was not the reason for his popularity in school like Ja'far Nimairi. The other component was that he was remembered for being very critical of the al-Mahdiyya era in the Sudan, its leader Moḥamed Aḥmed al-Mahdi, and his family. It should come as no surprise that the heirs of al-Mahdi, Sayyid 'Abdul Rahmān, al-Khatim, and Sayyid 'Ali and their families were emerging as a new age of important Sudanese hierarchical personalities endowed with wealth, as well as social and political status, while the heirs of Ḥamad al-Turabi, including his father, were not. Moreover, it was clear that the neo-Mahdism and the neo-Khatmiyya were utilized effectively in people-forming associations, later political peoples, and it added to the power and prestige of each one of the two Sayyids based on institutional conditions that a neo-Naḥlanism could ill afford. However, al-Turabi single-handedly created his Turabiyya or neo-Mahdiyya. But what makes his Mahdiyya important is threefold: first, it emerged from the rank of

the community of the state; second it was deeply rooted in his own conviction on his own part; and third, it follows a twist and strange manipulation to one of the fundamentals of his long exposition of three of the schools he severely criticizes. The schools include 'Ulama, Ṣufism, and Secularism. To facilitate understanding al-Turabi, the person, and his Islamism, it might be tempting to see an analogy between al-Turabi's engagement with emerging realities and conversations of 1940s Sudan and its fields of intellectual and political activities.

Al-Turabi's criticism to al-Mahdiyya might not come out of his own reductionist thinking, as that neither affords us certain uncorrectable nor substantiated knowledge about al-Mahdiyya. However, here more than else-where, it might help us to get closer to many Sudanese discourses that may have been developing at that time. It also helps to bring us closer to what members of the community of the state ruminate at their homes, offices, and/ or within their neighborhoods, clubs, and social and political gatherings. The words they utter and the judgments they make were part of the three steps in memory information processing. It might be an influence that came through his father, his neighborhood community of *affendiyya*, and the socializations of the national and regional conversations and Sudanese intellectual debates. Moreover, since the early 1920s members of *affendiya* which Moḥamed 'Omer Bashir describes in his book *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan* "the growth of nationalism among the Sudanese."[1] He adds that "the first phase of political propaganda by leaflets and circulars developed into a second phase of political organizations and associations."[2] The telegram as a new mode of communication allowed for the circulation of such ideas and propaganda country wide. I call this new nonreligious trend of political communication [that] introduced itself as a challenger to the monopoly the religious leadership enjoyed traditional systems of communication in the field of resistance to colonial regimes. This new trend played a part in stimulating other emerging groups, such as the labor formations, and at the same time it created differ-ent uneasy relationships and culture wars with Sufi religious representations, particularly, Sayyid 'Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Mahdi, and Yousif al-Hindi. This trend came together under the name of Jam'iat al-Itihad, or the "Union Society."[3] The time Ḥasan al-Turabi attended high school in the early 1940s was an important time for the history of ideas in the Arab world, colonized parts of the world, emerging local and international communist groups and states, the West at large, and hence the whole world. It was the time of the movers, shakers, and shapers of the twentieth century. A deeper look at the Sudanese community of the state in their groups, clubs, and new media may provide a more luminous source of light in the study of Ḥasan al-Turabi and his generation. It is against this background that we have to view, on the one hand, al-Turabi's direct environment, and his absorbed

preoccupation with the study of all other communities around him on the other hand. The sense of being born and living most of his early childhood in closed communities of members of al-Ḥai al-Britani (The British Quarter) and their exclusive clubs, which consist of British and Sudanese government employees, including his father, was an important life experience.[4] Part of the intellectual debate of the time might be a direct effect of the influence of what was popularized by the Egyptian school of modernization championed by Ṭaha Ḥussein, Maḥmoud ʿAbbās al-ʿAggad, Salaama Musa, and others, including Sayyid Qutb. What the Egyptian and British papers and magazines brought to readers in the Sudan was critical. Moreover, it was dismissive, of various aspects of what was considered and characterized by many as a "traditional" Muslim way of life, forms of religiosity, Islam as *turāth* (heritage), and their old and new institutions, including *Massied*, the Quranic educational children schools. The colonial state, its communities, missionaries, colonial anthropologists, and some groups of the Sudanese community of the state not only contested all institutions of the Sudanese traditional institutions, but it also converted the entire classical tradition into what Sherman Jackson describes in a different setting as "an ideological flea-market or license to abandon the value and/or concept of orthodoxy."[5] It was the time that the colonial state implanted what Nugugi wa Thiong'o called "the colonial cultural bomb's" aiming to "annihilate a people's belief in their names, their languages, their environment, and their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves."[6] That is to say by trying to manipulate the past that might help them manipulate their future. That means "it makes them see their past as wasteland of non-achievement, and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance with other peoples' languages rather their own."[7] During his childhood in Kassala and other urban parts of Sudan, Ḥasan al-Turabi lived in the closed communities of al-ḥai al-Britani (the British Quarter) where government officials, including his father, reside. Young Ḥasan al-Turabi was neither offered the freedom, like most children of his age, nor allowed to socialize freely with other children within the ordinary Sudanese everyday life. His father did not allow him go to *Massied* as most of the children of his generation. Instead, he gave him home education. As he remembers, his father taught him many things, such as Arabic language and literature, the Quran, and Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Turabi remembers that he learned more from his father than from any other teacher he had. However, as he said in al-Jazeera interview, he did not like his home-school teaching for two reasons. First, it deprived him from living his childhood like other Sudanese children, including playing soccer, which he loved. Second, his father's teaching style was based on memorizing the dry text rather than learning what the text means. He said although that was dry and useless at that time, it

became useful to him at a later time when he began utilizing that knowledge by adding depth to his own linguistic expressions, and it gave additional meaning to his speeches and writings by developing his own style.

Al-Turabi's hostility toward these two families—the al-Mahdi and al-Merghani—and their systems of religo-politics became an integral part of his inner experience and continued, especially during the postcolonial period. Moreover, it became an important background narrative of value that pervaded the discourses of his Islamism, and it was invoked by other members of the community of the state to which many appealed to justify their ends and articulate a political discourse they claimed was related to modernity and understood to explain self-definition and reproduction of difference of each. For example, al-Turabi described the parties that informed the neo-Mahdiyya and neo-Khatmiyya endeavors as contributing factors to *hokum al-Butat* (families rule). Al-Turabi was not alone. This idea was present from the beginnings in the rhetorical discourse of those who described themselves as modernists. Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha, another Sudanese Islamist, described them as *taifiyya* (sectarian); the Communists and their left allies in the all-left groups condemned the Khatmiyya, the Mahdists, and their political parties as *al-Ahzab rajieyya* (reactionary parties).[8] Being influenced by the prevailing conditions of his time, the intellectual environment of his surroundings, and their material circumstances, young al-Turabi took the production of such objective articulation of the discourse of that time as part of his belief system. To him, in particular, the Arab proverb *al-nas yashbahoon Zamanhum akthar mima yshbhoon Abāhum* (people resemble their times more than they resemble their parents) could be relevant. Young Ḥasan al-Turabi was therefore more vocal than other young Sudanese of his generation in not only criticizing but also sharply mocking every aspect of the Sudanese Sufi traditions and 'Ulama, which included his father. This attitude made him an oddly isolated figure, if not hated, from a larger sector of the Sudanese Sufi population and other mainstream Muslims. This, as we will see later, could relate partly to temperament, lost and found feelings of his particular Naḥlan Mahdist heritage, and to accidents of time and place that relate to Islamism and other isms. With this attitude, instilled by such an impulse, al-Turabi and his Islamists came to be wholly out of sympathy for Sufi Islam and any other Islamic representations other than theirs before, and especially after, they assumed power.

For al-Turabi, however, there was a different route to his self-made neo-Mahdism. As public education continued to grow, it began to produce and add to the professional, cultural, and religious groups of the community of state. It also added to the human capacity that developed within the community of state and in his own self-image, which he carefully crafted using the capital of he established as a Mahdi with a BA from Khartoum, MA from London, and

PhD from Paris. Later he endowed his neo-Mahdism the groups he helped create as a class of their own in relation to an Islamist capitalism and a secular hierarchy incompatible with the traditional order, as "intimate enemies" of the postcolonial state. Later they ended up as intimate and real enemies of al-Turabi himself.[9] This, however, is an identity "from whom al-Turabi [was] already somewhat abstracted and alienated."[10] Such splitting of one's self, to protect one's sanity and to insure survival, makes the subject an object to oneself and differentiates the violence and the humiliation one suffers from the "essential constituent" of the self.[11] That is to say, "it is an attempt to survive by inducing in oneself a psychosomatic state, which would render one's immediate context partly dreamlike or unreal. Because, "in order to live and stay human, the survivor must be in the world but not of it."[12] These inward-looking persons, groups, and their exclusivist self-images developed a worldview and political ideologies of self-affirmation that were reflected in the practice and the discourse of the elite of political parties in their multiple centers and in the civilian collaborators with the military regimes. The reproduction of this Islamist class within its self-image, as they continued to enter the political sphere, introduced a new form of stratification that valued them as a self-satisfied, closed, and small community. It also devalued the local Sudanese majority as Other—within their different forms of religious, social, and regional representations—and as backward. This situation made the Islamists, together with other competing ISM social groups, not only an intimate enemy of the state, but also an intimate enemy of their own society as well. Partha Chatterjee makes this connection and describes similar situations as "imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by an alien culture. But it also involves a rejection, 'in fact, two rejections, both of them ambivalent: rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standard, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet cherished as marks of identity.' This contradictory process is therefore deeply disturbing as well,"[13] This cognitive representation through which these groups assembled made the state that they serve the colonizer over them and the rest of the population. That is to say, the state continued to expand its power and establish its hegemony over them, and through them over the entire population of the country. In this sense, the state had never been the instrument of the nation, but it continued to act as an instrument of itself, by itself. Further, the state continued to affirm its existence, and its enlarging domain was dependent on its monopoly of the means of violence and coercion. That is by permitting actors to exercise their actions externally and internally. The construction of an intensive violence state transformed the members of the community of the state into servants of the state and its interest rather than being "civil servants" who serve the interest of their fellow citizens. That calls attention

to the fact that the state, since the colonial time, has grown and continued to be a "leviathan" of sorts through which totalistic politics and ideologies gave effect to its rule. On the one hand, what al-Turabi and his Islamists considered, at the start, as an opportunity by holding the state through a military takeover, did not alter the character of the state. Rather it altered the character of Islamism, and in this sense they traded *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the solution) into violence as the solution. Within that they rejected Islamism and al-Turabi himself, who spent a considerable period of time in either actual, home, or virtual prisons. On the other hand, the self-representation of the community of the state continued to animate and embody hegemonic impulses perceived through a status and power deferential endowed by the state. Bourdieu describes a different situation in which the state "is first and foremost the 'central bank of symbolic credit'" that endorses all acts of nomination whereby social divisions and dignities are assigned, proclaimed, and promulgated as universally valid within the purview of a given territory and population."[14] Moreover, "the academic title is the paradigmatic manifestation of this 'state magic' whereby social identities are manufactured undercover of being recorded, social and technical competency fused, and exorbitant privileges transmuted into rightful duties."[15] Within the community of the state, through time, the "rest" of the Sudanese population has always been described as plagued by *al-jahl, wa al-jū' wa al-marad* (ignorance, hunger, and pestilence) out of their own choice. At the same time, these members of the community of the state are perceived by themselves as a "vanguard" of sorts, who "started to look to life and Sudanese society through modern spectacles and evaluate them within the modern standards, which were a mixture of authentic religious culture and the irresistible European culture."[16] For a long time, indeed since the emergence of the new community of the state in the Sudanese life, these groups and the state that endowed them power and prestige failed to see and appreciate "the rest" of the Sudanese people in their own terms. At the very beginning of the colonial days, throughout the transition to the postcolonial state, and until the recent time of the rule of the Islamists, the Sudanese "Other" has been ruthlessly deprived from their livelihood and citizenship. This is the main blind spot of generations of the community of the state, which they inherited from the colonial regime. Such a blind spot was a foundation based on prime crimes carried out by the colonial and postcolonial Sudanese systems within their governmental practices rather than their theoretical, philosophical, or moral bases.

First, they did not see marginalization was a burden from which marginalized populations sought to be freed. What Anthony Giddens claims could be true at all times and across different human societies is that "in the modern era, men no longer accept the conditions of life into which they are born as necessarily given for all time, but attempt to impose their will upon reality

in order to bend future into a shape which conforms to their desires."[17] That is how the community of the state turned the demand of those marginalized communities into conflict and the conflict into war. Once done, the national army was deployed to kill members of their own milieu, turn everything with the Islamist state into jihad against their country's own citizens, and conspire to divide the country.[18]

Second, they did not see that during the Sudanese social change that certain Sufi traditions supplied a comprehensive political ideology and plan of action where religiosity and capitalist accumulation were joined together. The crime was that the community of the state within their different ideological orientations did not see the powerful fusion of emerging new covenants of religiosity, capitalism, and politics disseminating through history from the colonial period, the development of major political parties, to the time of the Islamist movement's development into *tujar al-jabhah* (the Islamic Front Merchants), and to the transformation of the party into a corporation. They also did not see how out of that the coup and the regime transpired. To understand how these developments emerged and acted together and differently, we need to return to the colonial days where and when neo-Mahdiyya and neo-Khatmiyya where an Islamist capitalist corporation emerging within each one's distinctive form of engagement and transformative potential. There are three important models where each political paradigm was replaced by an economic and social framework in which economics triumphed over politics, to borrow from Alain Touraine.[19]

URBAN CAPITALISM

The first paradigm sets itself within a significantly important era that Sudanese society started to take new routes to new forms of life. In terms of production at home, the row material and market, and at the core state—the empire—the Industrial Revolution was transforming the world through the expansion of capitalism. The system of the colonial extraction that made the colonial state an appendage of the core state and the local regime evolved as a capitalist enterprise that expanded with increasing rapidity. That was the shift from gunboat diplomacy into exploitation and extraction administration within a mechanism of a new world system. Within the new mechanism, two forms of indirect rule developed that tightened the grip of the colonial system and its local regime around the empire and the local labor force, which kept the empire, as a for-profit enterprise, in control of peasantry production as the supplier of raw material and the colony function of trade appropriation as the distributer of imported finished manufactured goods. Janice Buddy pointed out that the colonial state prospered by transforming

and conditioning the population into the labor force in its different forms and new differentiations.[20] All that was made possible via the new systems of transportation and communication caused the constructive dynamic of this state of dependency to be run and controlled from the outside. The local colonial state acted as the agent of that enterprise to observe how efficient that process could work. The first form was based on the development of dependency on the empire's core state, and the second was based on under-development or progressive marginalization. This social change did not come without the reproduction of technical qualifications of transforming the overall situation that, Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani and Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi attempted to maneuver for short-term gain, which was converged to be utilized for worldly success that paved the way for different forms of accumulation. Sayyid 'Abdel Rahmān, who gained and consolidated his power as the absolute leader among the Mahdist families, earning him the title of Imam of the Ansār, was endowed with the spirit of Nabi Isa, which could be manifested on him at the appointed hour "to secure the permanence of the Mahdiyya."[21] This idea of spirit of Nabi Isa "became popular among the frustrated Mahdists . . . who identified the British administration with the anti-Christ and asserted that both the Mahdi and Khalifa Abdullah had prophesied its appearance."[22] They believed that al-Ishāra, or that pronouncement to begin jihad by that appointed hour, will be announced by Sayyid 'Abdel Rahmān. Through an alternative to confrontation with the colonial state, as explained in his memoirs, he engaged himself and his people in a common effort to build the economic enterprise. On the other hand, Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, in persistent and patient work, succeeded, not only in countering the colonial policy toward Sufi Islam, which Kitchener described one day as heretical sects, but also in reinstating al-Khatmiyya Ṭarīqa as a legitimate socioreligious practice without much constraint. It was the spirit of the Ṭarīqa that the colonial regime branded as the government Ṭarīqa, but the Khatmiyya and its leadership believed they created a dent in the colonial body of state religion. By this Sayyid 'Ali counterbalanced the policy of state religion, which was explained before, with a private one. At the same time, the colonial state saw in these developments one form of managing dissent. Through these new spirits of *al-Ishara* and the Ṭarīqa both Sayyids began exercising power, utilizing economic and knowledge systems to regain inherited prestige, shaping new political life, and formulating, in theory and in practice, religiosity for the accumulation of wealth and power.

In fact, it was clear to most Sudanese at that time, a new Sudanese society was emerging that was favored by education. It became an alternative conjecture to upward mobility even to those who belonged to disadvantaged families. Other factors played an important role as causal beginnings of the emergence of this new social change. At the same time, it was true that the

two Sayyids became primary poles that competed with the state. They were nominated and endowed with confidence by educated young Sudanese, who added value that gave them distinction as long as they pledged a collective or individual belief in the authority that awarded them an added political and social value. Hence, at the same time, a different mode of acquisition of fame, status, and privilege took different forms and milieus that they became recognized for. These forms represented an emergence of a new urban rural capitalism. The first emergence of rural capitalism grew and maintained its disposition around Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani[23] and the Khatmiyya Ṭarīqa[24] as a gateway to social mobility together with the growth of new aspects of intersectional relationship between the ṭarīqa networks, the new modes of transportation especially the railway, the spread of public education, and the expansion of the local and international markets. The Khatmiyya became strongly established as a religious organization that fit Mayer Zald's description of a social movement because it provided an "infrastructure of social relations that were mobilized for other purposes."[25] Specially, these infrastructures provided "a repertoire of skills and protected social structure, which so that when a larger political ideology and movement impinge[d] upon the group, the religious organizations and personal [could] easily be mobilized."[26] In addition, the biweekly religious participation, as well as their inner socialization, created "networks of relations and similarities of perception that that help[ed] unify later behavior."[27] Finally, the religious organization affected "the readiness to participate in political movements" in a more indirect way. The Khatmiyya, in its new mode of action and resource mobilization, fostered and maintained contacts with diverse social groups from different parts of the country, including merchants. This group suffered under the hand of the "Mahdist state, which not only put Khatmiyya traders out of business, it also came down heavily on trade itself."[28] In addition, the mobility among the internal immigrants from different parts of the rural northern Sudan constituted the majority of working class in the "railways and docks in communications, exports, and imports. With the exception of the Danaqla, almost all of these immigrants were Arabic speakers who belonged to the Khatimiyya Sufi order."[29] To most recuperating urban centers in the country, expanding farmers' communities in the north, and nomadic groups in the eastern Sudan, the Khatmiyya reintroduced and reinforced, in an organized manner, solidarity, a strong sense of Brotherhood, and an orderly socialization system where cooperation produced different tangible rewards. These processes, which turned the Khatmiyya into what its activists described later as *safienat* Noah (Noah's ark), have produced social cohesion and a collective identity that have turned the ṭarīqa into a new socioreligious movement and to a great extent a new and growing countrywide network of merchant groups. The introduction of the railways as both a communication

and a transportation system revitalized the urban center, enhanced the growth of trade, and propagated the circulation of capital.

The new emerging entrepreneurial groups who found refuge in the security of the *ṭarīqa* raised the professional and social status of entrepreneurship. It soon became apparent and believed by its followers that the *ṭarīqa*'s *baraka* (blessing) became the source of an emerging accumulation of capital institutionalized and organized around Sayyid 'Ali with significant transformative potentials within the religious, social, and political fields of power. Consequently, "in a short while there was comfort when it was reported [in the meeting of the northern governors of the Sudan] that 'Ali al-Mirghani's prestige was rising 'owing to greater activity and the efforts of the Omdurman merchants'; though he increasingly kept his distance from the British, and as early as 1933 began to reactivate the *ṭarīqa's* links with Egypt."[30] In other words, those other forms of discontent that did not agree with the Mahdist impulse gave rise to different modes of mobilization. These modes of mobilization captured a complex dynamic of social interactions that felt at home with an uneasy form of resistance to the colonial order, which affected the accumulation of capital. This accumulation of capital enhanced the readiness to participate in political social movements from more indirect to direct forms of resistance.

This complex Sudanese situation, which began to express itself at the turn of the twentieth century, was the foundation of a long-standing existential experience of a country that "was not a new state, and some resistance was essentially a replication of earlier resistance to experiences of state building, which had been exploitative and remembered as such."[31] In addition, the capitalist growth, as represented by Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, freed itself from the political power as a new consciousness of collective religious and national belonging. Such growth cross-fertilized these new anti-colonial resistance movements and their communities of conversation with social capital in circulation as a resource basis for the new organizations of Khirijin (graduates), Ashigaa groupings, and Hisb al-Sha'ab (The People's Party). What is most important is that al-Turabi describes his people at Wad al-Turabi home village "as free and open for change . . . [who] fought on the side of the Mahdists to the chagrin to the Khatmiyya, who opposed the Mahdi unrelenting . . . some of them found it convenient to switch back to Khatmiyya."[32] Interestingly enough, his people did not support his candidacy for parliament in the general elections in 1968.

RURAL CAPITALISM

The second paradigm shift was the case of al-Gazira Abba (Abba Island), the semiholy location and the spiritual base of the Mahdists or the Ansār.

Al-Gazira Abba turned into a magnet for new and old generations of Ansār from western parts of the Sudan and different parts of Muslim West Africa, especially northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and in support of Sayyid ʻAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi (1885–1959).[33] Abba Island was the site of the first battle in 1881 where Moḥamed Aḥmed al-Mahdi (1844–1885)[34] started his revolutionary war (1881–1885) against the Turkiyya colonial state (1821–1885). The belief of the second coming of al-Mahdi, and the neo-Mahdism as advocated by al-Sayyid ʻAbd al-Raḥman enhanced the devotion spirit and work ethnics that turned that location and White Nile area into a new cotton farming and production field competing with the state-controlled field of cotton production al-Gezira scheme. This higher agricultural and economic development around Abba Island and other parts of White Nile was responsible for a new consideration of rural accumulation that made al-Sayyid ʻAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi the wealthiest Sudanese. His family and close supporters also developed a new rural neo-Mahdist spirit that joined capitalistic enterprise with the pursuit of gain and accumulation. That helped Sayyid, his family, and some of his close supporters to take a step further and link power with the emergence of this new transformation of their life chances. Such development allowed those who gained new socioeconomic prestige to play an active role in the Sudanese scene and those who competed with the Sayyid to understand that the meaning of Mahdism had changed. Such a change existed in different forms; chief among them was the development of a disciplined and motivated cheap labor force that energized al-Ansār's group and turned his new agricultural project into a functioning enterprise. It did not take long for al-Sayyid to change the character they said wanted to present a new: Hizb al-umma Umma Party and other parties related to the Sayyids. From the very early days of the emergence of the Umma Party and the appearance of the three Sayyids: ʻAli al-Mirghani, ʻSayyid ʻAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi and al-Sharief al-Hindi, a strong attitude against what is called *taifiya* started to dominate the political discourse. Ahmed Khair, one of the leading intellectuals of that period described the emergence of the Umma Party as "the birth of the sign of evil and aberration in the 20th century."[35] However, it might have been difficult for Ahmed Khair and most generations of the community of the state to see how different forms of Sudanese capitalism triumphed over politics. From time to time, some followers of the two Sayyids tried to reiterate, each one separately, that it was the British plan to make Sayyid the king of the Sudan. However, it has never been clear to us how both urban and rural capitalism "freed themselves from political power and emerged as the 'basis' of social organization."[36] Within that situation each Sudanese capitalist entity, including the state, became a gateway to power and prestige and internal and external legitimate and illegitimate opportunity—a phenomenon, to borrow from Alain Touraine, "at

once fascinating and disturbing."[37] Within this situation both Aḥmed Khair, Mohmed Aḥmed Abu Rnanat, Abu Mansour Khalid, Ja'far Bakhiet, Badr eldin Suliman, and others, including, the military stand as prime examples for those who found their way to power and prestige via the nomination of the capitalist state. On the other hand, for many members of the community of the state it might have been that the emphases on educational back ground as an opportunity to produce different but separate routes through the nominations of the Sayyids and their capitalist entities. For Ḥasan al-Turabi, his route to power and prestige was different from the family background or in addition to it and his relationship by marriage to the granddaughter of 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Mahdi, which started to develop in al-Turabi's mind since that time and make him look for and lead him and others to a different and new "sacred group." The qualities that positively defined anyone of these sacred groups are connected to their direct or indirect relationship to the state as the "central bank of symbolic credit." Within this changing situation in the Sudan and the region, the making of the meaning of the state and the Sudanese community as subjects, and the growing educated subjects as surrogates of the state, has not changed, though it underwent general metamorphosis to could be a nation-state in space and time. The power of these sacred groups, which I call the community of the state regardless what it could look like, is part of their heterogeneity, their totality, and their incompleteness that continued to be distinguished.

THE ISLAMIST CAPITALISM AND ITS
PATTERNS OF STRATIFICATION

Max Weber lamented at the conclusion of his book, *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, the loss of religious underpinning to capitalism's spirit has led to a kind of involuntary servitude to mechanized industry. No wonder the loss of religious underpinning to al-Turabi Islamist capitalism has led to a kind of greed and human suffering. Some of Sudanese leftist scholars[38] and writers describe it as *rasmaliyya tofiyliyya* (parasitic capitalism) because it does not tie its origin to an industrial or agricultural mode of production independent from the state.[39] The Islamist movement's rendezvous with power, and how they captured the state, has largely been fused with their compact with a different and extreme form of accumulation and extraction induced by greed and exploitation of human misery. What stemmed from the many strands connecting *tiger al-Jabha* and foreign currency dealings was the Islamist party's mode of operation, which transformed the party from just a corporation to a new class of young Islamists with Ḥasan al-Turabi's as the corporation's first CEO and the Islamist party, Sudanese state, and al-Turabi

himself as their major victims. The vast array of the violence that started from the first day they assumed power via the military coup was part and parcel of a new method of regulation for social thinking and a variety of violence. This new methodology provided a clue about the transformation of the state into an apparatus that assumed when and in what matter and manner accumulation unfolded. Rewards could be in cash and in kind, which have hastily been described as *tamkeen* and *kasb* for an emerging class of the Islamist within effective complex processes of appropriation of indiscriminate violence and inequality toward the rest of the population. Today, three decades after the Islamist military coup of 1989, we can easily see the triumph of the unhidden hand of the Islamist capitalism and how it replaced the political paradigm *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the Solution) to trade it by *al-Unf hwa al-Hal* (violence is the Solution). According to that they freed themselves from al-Turabi as a political power and emerged as a ruling organization, which was called al-Ingaz. The dissociation of Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamism from the corporation turned to a ruling organization started the first day when al-Turabi was sent to prison and 'Omer al-Bashir to the palace while Ali Usman and his social class constructed "an image of a society where 'non-social,' where cultural categories replace social categories, and where each person's relations with self are important in mastering the world used to be."[40] Ghazi Salah al-Din, a leading Islamist, said once to me that "the first causality to the coup was the Islamist movement." He added, "I feel ashamed to say that the Islamists did not rule."[41] The first statement could reflect part of a reality as were other causalities including Ḥasan al-Turabi; however, the other statement might suggest an irony as the Ali Usman group transformed cultural, or as the Sudanese describe them as tribal elite, ruled.

One of the most important developments after the national reconciliation and the inclusion of the Islamists within the Nimairi's regime was the transformation of the Islamist movement into an invisible corporation[42] with a national and international scope hiding behind what was called the Islamic economy, its banking system, and their Islamist managers and workers. Different Islamist groups and individuals including managers and workers have been transferred and promoted back and forth from the party to the private economic institutions, from government to the public sectors and from private and public sector to government. In this way these groups developed and shared knowledge, accumulated wealth, and developed new tastes as markers that set them apart from the rest of population and fellow Islamists as a new and a distinctive class. Within their different phases of ascendancy to wealth, status, and power, these groups and individuals worked together within what is called the expanding "Islamic economy" and its banking system, with new groups of what was called first tujar al-jabhah (the Islamic Front merchants), and their Islamist state. The structure of relations and mutual interests the

corporation and the capitalists developed as the new actors who worked together and exchanged benefits created an ideological and political hegemony that gave them the ability to control the social and political practice of the Islamist party and later the state. Some of the Islamist scholars discovered very late that "the market mentality and the capitalist groups that started to become active and expanded until they were about to 'swallow' what was remaining from our Islamic organization which we did not join in the first place except for running away from wild capitalism."[43] Other Islamist scholars saw only one side of this development, namely the power that a group within the political organization had gained from its relationship with this complex development. In fact, it was not the party that took over the financial systems, as al-Tigani Abdel al-Gadir claims, on one hand, but rather it was the financial institution that took over the party and transformed it into a corporation in order to oversee all political activity and control the livelihoods of those affiliated with the party. On the other hand, this development produced not only a secret group or a "super *tanzim*"[44] (super apparatus), as Abdelwahab el-Affendi describes it, but also an objective quality of the Islamist organization itself that changed the structure of group solidarity among an emerging social class. It opened the way for serious transformative processes that led to a different situation where the central point of corporation was disclosed by a new appearance after the coup to reveal a new facade which is the Islamist state. The more the institutions of this corporation—banks and other financial institutions—and their affiliates—Monazamt al-Dawa and other organizations—expanded their influence within this facade by becoming themselves as the basis of a sociopolitical system, the more they freed themselves from the political power of Shaikh Ḥasan al-Turabi and the more they shaped the regime, undertaking its political and social roles and turning it into the state that oversees that expanding structure of the corporation. Sharing a mutually compatible top-down model, the nature of the universe that emerged out of this phenomenon was essentially inherent in the capitalistic nature of the corporation and in the expressive culture of the Islamist movement, not as expressed by al-Turabi one day but by making him the victim of the new regime and its state because everything continued to replace the political paradigm through the growth of the new social class and the wealth that emerged as the bases of the corporation, its social relations, and its mode of production. Within these developments serious internal changes emerged and expressed themselves in a political and economic regime. The state identified itself as "Islamic," and in that particular mode they pretended to claim to describe themselves as grounded in al-Turabi's ideology first and later Islamist without al-Turabi. Finally, the corporation developed a life of its own to swallow the state, the party, and their memberships. One can clearly see examples of the manner of what could be described as different aspects

of identity management, stratification, its pedigrees, and the ways and means of admission in and exclusion from the new Islamist corporate field of action, state, and privileged class. These emerging groups within their distinctive regional and ethnic backgrounds came to be housed in collective strata within the changing Islamists structure as a class for itself whose practice mediated factors and conditions and the state of the system.

A major development, with deep effects on social, economic, and political life in the Sudan during the 1970s and after was the high and different patterns of migration (*hijra*) of Sudanese groups and individuals, in general, and the Islamists, in particular, outside the country to Saudi Arabia, Arab Gulf States, and other countries. As explained earlier, the Nimairi regime began its rule with unprecedented oppressive actions against all forms of opposition from the first day he assumed power. Accordingly, many of the political personalities, including the Islamists, faced imprisonment, purges, and difficulties obtaining government employment. Given that Nimairi's regime identified itself from the first day as a radical socialist, pan-Arab, and progressive force opposing regional and international reactionary states, its policies sent waves all over the region. The new Sudanese regime's rhetorical stance evoked memories of the Arab Cold War in the minds of the Saudis and other conservative Arab rulers, and it alerted them to a new wave of Nasserism in the region. This situation, combined with the activism of the Sudanese opposition, heightened the Saudi concern of an imminent communist or Nasserist threat. By that time and accelerating through the 1970s, high numbers of Islamists of all ages and qualifications migrated to Saudi Arabia and to some of the Gulf States in order to find a temporary refuge from what they perceived and described as an oppressive communist regime. The Sudanese Islamists who fled the country at that time confirmed to King Faisal, the Saudi authorities, and other Arab rulers that not only Nasserism, but a communist threat, was sneaking in through the back door. Similar to previous generations of Islamists who migrated to these Arab countries, the anti-Communist stance of the Sudanese groups afforded them easy access to positions of rank and responsibility in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Thousands of Islamists together with other Sudanese expatriates crossed the Red Sea by air to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries. Studies estimate that Sudanese "migrants constituted 10% of the male population between the age of 20 and 34. In 1985, it was estimated that two-thirds of Sudan's professional and skilled workers were employed outside the country."[45] In their newfound refuge, Sudanese Islamists created new networks, discovered new forms of inter- and intragroup solidarity, and achieved political and financial empowerment. The greatest element of empowerment emerged with the growth of what is called Islamic economics and its financial institutions. There are two basic influences underlying that growth. The first of these influences was

related to the growing numbers of Islamists scholars like Khurshid Ahmed, N. Naqvi, and N Siddqui who dominated the International Center for Islamic Economics at King Abd-al-Aziz University, Jeddah. Secondly, by the mid-1970s, young Islamist economists and groups of businessmen in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf started the first Islamic Banks in Dubai, the Sudan, and Egypt. Moreover, other Islamic economic institutions began to grow to cover areas of investment, business, and finance, in addition to relief and *da'wa*. By that time it was clear that Nimairi's dream of an economic transformation based on a breadbasket strategy was a failure. These failed government policies, as Robert Tignor explains, could have been partly the result of little or no attention the economic planners gave to "the country's historical economic experience." As Tignor elaborates, "instead, they sought to create an entirely new political economy, based on the importation of western technology and Arab and western capital. They pushed to the side the one group with knowledge of the economic and financial conditions: the local businessmen." Other factors, primarily the arbitrary and massive nationalization and confiscation of private businesses in 1970, the falling price of cotton, which accounted for 61 percent of total export earnings, and the rise of oil prices crippled the economy and compounded the difficulties and hardships of everyday life.

For the most part, the *hijra* of highly experienced, educated, and skilled labor to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States became the dream and the pursuit of Sudanese individuals and families. Those who stayed to look for jobs in government and other fields in the increasingly inhospitable local labor market found themselves as part of a growing invisible poor due to rising inflation and higher costs of living. Most profoundly affected by these factors was the political and social status of the country's middle class who worked hard as individuals and families but remained poor just the same. In addition, the system of oppression ensured that the whole society could not express their resentment or their disagreement with the regime's policies. The direct result of this situation, together with the progression of dictatorial rule, was the rise and proliferation of both the economic and the political underground markets in the country.

The rise of these underground markets was part of the reason why Nimairi's regime was forced to seek quick fixes for the deteriorating economic situation in the country from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The introduction of the IMF recipe "advised devaluing the Sudanese pound, restraining demands for imports, redirecting attention to the traditional sectors of agricultural and economic activity, like the Gezira, as a means of stimulating exports, and controlling the expansion of the currency, particularly by imposing limits on banks loans."[46] But the IMF recipe and the rescheduling of the Sudanese debt as dictated by the Paris Club—a group of official creditors whose role was to find solution to the payment difficulties

experienced by Sudan—only added to the economic crisis the country experienced. "By 1984 the Sudan's debt was estimated to be over USD 10 million, the repayment of which would require more than 100 percent of all export earnings."[47] The multiplication of the local, the regional, and the international factors acted individually and together to demolish the modest welfare state in the country that had at one time provided free education, free medical services, and subsidies on the basic commodities that the poor needed the most.

Another strand of significance was the introduction of the Islamic banks to the country and the opportunities that it opened for the Islamists to create their own niche in the political and economic markets. This launched the process of reshaping their organization and transforming it into a corporation. Both Nimairi and the Islamists saw Islamic banking as a desperately needed opportunity. For Nimairi and his ailing economy, this was an opportunity to bring in some hard currency in order to help his bankrupt treasury. He opened the country for Islamic financial institutions starting with Faisal Islamic Bank. The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi prince, Muhammad al-Faisal Al Saud, was officially established in the Sudan in August 1977, by the Faisal Islamic Bank Act and started its operations in May 1978. ‘Abdel Raḥim Ḥamdi, a well-known Islamist considered to be the architect of the Sudanese version of the Islamic economy, who was an economic consultant to the prince at that time, played an important role in facilitating this process. It was clear from the start how leading Islamist personalities from different areas of specialization dominated the upper administrative offices of the bank creating a strong link between the bank and the party. When we look at the Faisal Bank annual report for 1984 we find the upper echelon of the bank includes very famous leading Islamist personalities like Muḥammad Yusuf Muḥammad, Yasin ‘Omar al-Imam, Rabi‘i Ḥasan Aḥmad, Aḥmad Ibrāhim al-Turabi, Yusif Ḥamid al-Amin, Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Bayli, and Yusuf Ḥamid al-‘Alim, together with well-known Islamist businessmen, such as Bashir Ḥasan Bashir, al-Ḥaj ‘Abd al-Khaliq, as well as a list of Islamist bankers and economists and professors that included the banker al-Bagr Yusif Mudawi, Musa Ḥussein Dirar, Abdien Ahmed Salama, and al-Sidiq al-Dardiri.[48] In addition, the Faisal Islamic Bank and all other Islamic Banks and their affiliates were all favored by tax exemptions. In turn, that situation gave the educated Islamists groups together with a new emerging group described as tujar al-Jabhah an opportunity to control and/or benefit from these institutions and to manage them as the economic arm of the Islamists' political institution at the beginning. It is in this connection that a corporation under the guidance and supervision of al-Turabi continued to grow. Most prominently, al-Turabi gave both religious and political cover to operate that way. He argued that "despite the fact that this initial temptation [to wealth] almost terrorized the newcomer to business and made him renounce his desire, the condition

improved when the elements working in the free economic field increased. [Accordingly,] individual bogey to earn a living and to struggle against [such] temptation has become an educational and organizational bogey that made the necessity to maintain free work exchanged for embarking on such a field for the sake of obtaining the interests of *da'wa* [religious call], education, and also the movement through it."[49] This explanation has important conse-quences, since it connected the operation of these financial institutions to the party's mode of operation and situated al-Turabi as the CEO of this corpo-ration. Consequently, as al-Turabi observes, "things started to get better when the elements working in the field of free economy increased and the personal concern in getting a living and resisting temptation became an organizational and educational concern, the necessities of assuming free work has changed to become a general orientation for the interest of the *da'wa*, *tarbiya* and the movement."[50] But al-Turabi's notion of *da'wa* and *tarbiya* disguises the very existence of the corporation and its mode of appropriation, while revealing his awareness and appreciation thereof. Hence, many of Islamists inside and outside the country have become active participants and beneficiaries of this Islamic economy and they have changed themselves from propertyless, educated, barefoot activists into a propertied middle class. By the 1980s the Islamist movement owned about 500 companies with a capital of more than USD 500 million inside the country and USD 300 million outside the country according to Hidar Ṭaha.[51] A change of fortunes for a significant sector of Islamists came with new approaches to politics and social life. The modus operandi of transformation that is the most effective means to overcome the record of weakness—or the phase of *marahalat al-istda'f* (phase of weakness) to the phase of power or *marahalat al-tamakien* (phase of power)—and to bring about an Islamic state is an economic approach that would empower the Islamists' middle class and their organizations and bring in these institutions under the guardianship of al-Turabi.

The long experiences of well-placed Islamists who found employment in oil-rich Arab counties have taught them to fill financially rewarding positions in the state and the private sector without constituting a political threat to their host country and its political system. It is for this reason that Islamists in oil-rich countries have exercised and experienced a separation of wealth and dissension.

This new development did not provide jobs for young graduates because places on the boards of Islamic banks and corporations and leadership in trade unions and professional associations were for middle-aged Islamists only. However, during the heyday of the Islamists' state in the Sudan from 1989 to 1999, economic wilding—morally uninhibited pursuit of money by individuals and businesses at the expense of others—had gone on the rampage.

The ambitions of this invisible corporation and al-Turabi, its chief executive officer (which were to challenge and control the state from without during Nimairi regime and finally to take full control of it from within and from without through the military coup in 1989), and the regime that emerged out of it produced different reactions. The first attempt to gradually turn the corporation into an invisible government controlling the May regime from without led to a violent response from Nimairi and his regime, and it ended up putting most of the Islamist leadership including al-Turabi in prison in February 1985. The military coup of 1989, however, was the corporation's ultimate answer to reinstate itself as the sole government in the country and as a pilot scheme for an Islamist state. Ever since, and under what they described as *al-Mushrou al-Hadari*, the corporation and its CEO *Shaikh,* Ḥasan ruled the country together with those who were affiliated with the corporation. Throughout that period of time, the Islamists as artisans, workers, and employees of the corporation and the franchises that sprang out of it accepted and willingly carried out the dictates of the corporation, turning its Islamist project into a regime, and building a new personality cult around *Shaikh* Ḥasan. The Islamists inside and outside the Sudan contributed immensely to the personality cult of al-Turabi and his leadership built upon the primacy of the role of the *Shaikh*, the "modern" Islamist jurist, as the political and religious reference and the architect of an Islamist order and its controlling ideology. He continued to be the one who creates and defines the concepts, presents the ideas, and initiates and explicates the political and religious *ijtihad* as everyone in the Islamist movement "left all the thinking to the Secretary General."[52] Moreover, by celebrating al-Turabi as an almost infallible thinker and leader, above criticism, the Islamists at the higher end of their intellectual scale produced books, such as Abdel whab el-Affendi's *Turabi's Revolution*, Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*, and T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone's, *In Whose Image: Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan*. There were also many new PhDs including Amin Ḥasan Omer, al-Tigani ʿAbdel Gadir, Mohamed Wagii Allah, and Mohamed Haroon among others, in addition to several PhD dissertations, master's thesis, and thousands of media interviews and articles. On the lower end, many foreign public relations promoters and image builders such as Sean Gabb, Director of the Sudan Foundation in London, Mansoor Ijaz, the founder and chairman of Crescent Investment Management LLC (CIM), and Lyndon LaRouche worked hard to sell al-Turabi's image to Western audiences, media, and governments and to build websites and design programs for that purpose. All of that came in addition to local journalists and other writers who made their careers contributing to this personality cult. Out of all that narrative, an innovative and modernized Sunni equivalent of *velayat al-faqih* (the rule of the

jurisprudent), tantamount to the divine orders of *Shaikh* Ḥasan, emerged to reinvent an infallible personality. In such a situation, *Shaikh* Ḥasan, the sole arbiter and the supreme holder of religious considerations in the Islamists' political and social constitutions, is entrusted with absolute power to exercise political and religious authority and to lead local and international Islamist regimes. But toward all forms of opposition, the Islamists and their leader worked hard to control the mind, as much as possible, by promoting this cult and shrouding it with myth and evidently controlling all forms of communication. The Sudanese Islamists' project under the leadership of *Shaikh* Ḥasan according to the Islamists propagandists "fits the requirements of the comprehensive civilization project" which the Sudanese Islamists present to the world as the alternative "to the current project, and they [the Sudanese Islamists] represent an alternative to the international leadership on the road of social and civilizational progress."[53]

The military coup of 1989 and its aftermath were accompanied by a close association between the corporation and violence as one of the main operative factors within the progression of the Islamist project. The combination of these broad strands of the project, including the state as "community, the state as a hierarchy, and the state as coercive apparatus,"[54] highlights the distinctive feature of the Islamist state. Although the military coup in itself was a violent act, violence continued to be used "not only to set a group apart as an enemy but also to annihilate it with an easy conscience."[55] That violence had not only been confined to militaristic and coercive dimensions, but equally to ideological and political ones. In these dimensions lay the deployment, mobilization, and organization of jihad as a broader strategy carried out by the state as a multifaceted sort of violence against Sudanese citizens "with an easy conscience." Violence has, therefore, become an operative function that characterized the regime's approach to political engagement, disagreement, and resolving conflict.

With the demise of al-Turabi in 1999, the regime found for itself a different expression within a public military authoritarian project. The crisis over the leadership among the Islamists was deep and had many direct and indirect effects, and side effects. Some of these effects were doctrinal, others were not. Chief among these doctrinal factors was that a faction within the Islamists preferred the military leader as an alternative to the Islamist *Shaikh* and they accepted the usage of the coercive power of the state against the ideological leadership *Shaikh* Ḥasan's brand of regime and the dictates of the corporation. Here, such a turn is significant as it indicates that neither the religious practice nor the Islamist character of the regime was so unique. It is precisely in such an understanding that Ghazi Ṣalah al-Din's comment that the "Islamists did not rule" is more of an irony rather than a reality.

But against these realities and background, it might be clear that what could be the deep operative factor that promoted the disintegration of the entire

Islamist project was a combination of moral and religious circumstances relating to the distance and the sharp contrast between the practice of a regime advocating Islam and what the ordinary Sudanese Muslim understands and expects from an Islamic rule. Against these views, what could be of great significance here is the serious disconnect between an emerging social and economic structure—a corporation—growing within its own terms of *tamkeen* (being well established) in power and wealth and a well-ingrained culture of *taqwa* (righteousness), or the ideals of an imagined Islamic model of rule, imbedded in a creed of justice and delayed gratification as the operative factor in the Sudanese Muslim worldview. Just as the unrestricted self-indulgence of the corporation continues to grow and fortifies its ways and means, the constitutions of the culture of the *taqwa* increasingly gains more value, and clashes sharply rejecting such pursuits for wealth and power—or what the Sudanese describe as growth of *al-habro malu*. The corporation, the *Shaikh* within his personality cult, and their Islamist partisans worked together to create the first Islamist republic, its peculiarities, and its internal conflicts. It appears that the varying and conflicting interests of the CEO on one side and those of the power groups—military and civilian—running the government on the other, who perceived an imminent danger in *Shaikh* Ḥasan's program, were the origin of the palace coup against al-Turabi in 2000. While above all else, it appears that the moral dilemma of the regime at large which progressed through its lifetime was the function of the failure of the Islamist project. Within the conditions surrounding the rise and development of the Islamist project, ideology—regardless of its representation—found itself subordinate to military rule for the second time in the history of the Sudan. The first time was under General Ja'far Nimairi and the second time was under General 'Omer al-Bashir. History was replete with military rulers challenging their patrons. The major difference between the two occurrences is that the first one followed a bloody pursuit to reach its goal, while the second one used the prison as a medium of state power to succeed its ideological *Shaikh* leader. Here, an examination of the broad environmental factors containing the reproduction of the multiple dimensions of the corporation, the set of positions taken by the Islamists to impose what the Sudanese describe as *nizam shimoli* (a totalitarian regime), and the progression of the first Islamist republic needs to be matched by the main trends of the sociopolitical factors and within their interaction and dissociation in time and place.

NOTES

1. Moḥamed 'Omer Bashir, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan* (London, Rex Collings Ltd, 1974) 72.

2. Ibid.

3. For more see Abdullahi A. Gallab, *A Civil Society Deferred: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan* (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2013) 105–113.

4. *Al-Hai al-Britani* is the British residential ward where the all colonial state functionaries including Sudanese *affendiyya* reside. It is a semi-closed closed district where common Sudanese were not allowed to enter.

5. Sherman Jackson, *Islam and the Blackman: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 8.

6. Nugugi wa Thiong'o, *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (London, James Currey, 1986) 3.

7. Ibid.

8. Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha (1909–1911 January 1985) also known by his followers as *Ustaz* or *Al-Ustadh* (revered teacher) Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha. He was a Sudanese Islamist thinker, leader, and trained engineer. He graduated from the engineering school of Gordon Memorial College, now the University of Khartoum, in 1936. Mahmoud and other intellectuals established the Republican Party in October of 1945. The party's policy of direct and open confrontation with the colonial authorities led to his arrest and subsequent imprisonment in 1946. He was sentenced to prison for a year when he refused to abstain from political activity against the colonial government. In response to the mounting protest orchestrated by the Republican Party, he was "pardoned" by the British governor general and released after fifty days in prison. He developed what he called the "Second Message of Islam," which postulated that the verses of the Qur'an revealed in Medina were appropriate in their time as the basis of Islamic law, (shari'a), but that the verses revealed in Mecca represented the ideal religion, would be revived when humanity had reached a stage of development capable of accepting them, ushering in a renewed Islam based on freedom and equality. He was executed for apostasy for his religious preaching at the age of 76 by the regime of Ja'far Nimairi.

9. Although al-Turabi has been accused by some Sudanese and Saudi Salafi enemies and other Egyptian Muslim Brothers of being secular, he never admitted his relationship to secularism. He kept attacking his enemies and competitors as *'ilāmanyien* (secular) while bragging all the time of his relationship to the French culture.

10. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998) 109.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Bartha Chatterjee, *The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus: Comprising Nationalist Thought and Colonial World, The Nation and its Fragments, A Possible India* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 2.

14. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State of Nobility*, xvii.

15. Ibid.

16. Aḥmed Khair, *Kifah Jil: Tarikh Harakat al-Khirijin wa Tatawurha fil-Sudan*, 2nd ed. (Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sudaniyya, 1980) 18.

17. Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marks, Durkheim* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971) xi.

18. At a news conference with United States Rex Tillerson on April 13, 2017, in Moscow, the Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "the President of the Sudan, 'Omer al-Bashir, there was a warrant for his arrest issued by the International Criminal Court, several days later the Obama administration decided that in order to settle the problem, Sudan had to be split into two. The South Sudan was established, and Obama administration tried to help them secure Omer al-Bashir's agreement to this splitting up. President Bashir upheld his end of the bargain, he cooperated; Sudan was split into two parts, in accordance with the Obama administration's plan."

19. Alain Tourane, A *New Paradigm for Understanding Today's World* (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2007) 1.

20. For more information about that see Janice Boddy, *Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007).

21. Ḥassan Aḥmed Ibrahim, *Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdi: A Study of Neo-Mahadism in the Sudan, 1899–1956* (Leiden, Brill, 2004) 31.

22. Ibid.

23. Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani (1878–1968) was the great grandson of Moḥamed 'Osman al-Khatim (1793–1852) the founder of the Khatmiyya Ṭarīqa. He was born in Missawi Island in the Shāygiyya region. He lived in exile in Cairo during the Mahdist era. He lived outside the country until the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1898.

24. The Khatmiyyah ṭarīqa was founded by Sayyid Moḥamed 'Osman al-Merghani (1793–1852) who was born in Ta'f of Arabia. His lineage as verified by al-Jabarti in his book Tareekh al-Jabarti (al-Jabarti's History Part two) has descended to Prophet Mohamed. Al-Merghani according to the advice of his teacher Ahmed Ibn Idris traversed the Nubian and Mahas lands in northern Sudan to Kordofan and reached to Darfur and Borno land. In Bara, Kordofan, he was married and had his first son Sayyid al-Ḥasan.

Among his achievements was the establishments of the first teaching center for education of women in Sudan. His literary contribution to Islam spanned a wide range of topics from the explanation of the Quran, Taj al-Tafseer (the Crown of exegesis), listing of Hadith (Fateh al-Rasool) and Munjiyat Al-Abeed in Fiqh and Behavior. In addition to his sufi poetry *al-Noor Al-Baraq fi Madh al-Naby al-Misdaq*. There are more than 112 books authored by him many of which are to be disclosed.

The most famous of his sons were Mohamed al-Ḥasan, Ja'far al-Sadiq, Hashim, and Sir al-Khatim.

Sayyid Moḥamed 'Osman claimed in his Mawlid al-Nabi: *al-Asrar al-Rabania* to have had a vision in which Prophet Mohamed praised him and instructed him how to compose that Mawlid, in a poetic style, which his followers recite during their biweekly gatherings of organized *liliyya dhikr*. In the biweekly liliyya it has mentioned in the Mawlid the recitation was conducted in the presence of Prophet Mohamed. From its early days and up to now the Khatmiyyah followers observe Sayyid Mohamed Osman's dress code which consists of a long jallabiya shirt open with a collar at the front and a turban. Al-Merghani disapproved the patched garb of the dervishes and asceticism and other practices-followed by other *ṭarīqas*—such as the *khalwa* (withdrawal to solitary prayer). It has been the tradition of the Khatmiyya Ṭarīqa for the representative shaikhs or khulafa, upon appointment at that position to wear a special uniform endowed upon them consisting of *Jallabiya* with neck collar,

goftan (outer garment), turban, and abiya (cloak). In what has been considered as Sayyid Mohamed Osman as his biography, *Kitab al-Ibana al-Nuriyya fi shan Sahib al-Tariqah al-Khatmiyya* (unpublished manuscript), his companions "shone among people by reason of their fine appearance." *Al-Ibana* biography was written by Khalift al-Khulfa (grand Khalifa) Ahmed Mohamed al-Nasayh who also wrote the other biography Manaqib al-Sayyid al-Ḥasan al-Merghani. Sayyid Mohamed Osman was believed to be a wasila, an intermediary with the prophet and khatim al-awliya (the seal of the sufi saints).

It was Moḥamed 'Osman's oldest son, Sayyid Mohamed al-Ḥasan who was born in Bara Kordofan (1819–1869) who began a systematic propagation of the *ṭarīqa* in Sudan, Egypt, and Eritrea by his extensive tours and by maintaining close relations with a number of holy men of his time. Al-Ḥasan's fame, propagations, and tours materialized in the abandonment of many other ṭarīqas for the Khatmiyya. Later, al-Turabi's family abandoned the Ansār orientation for Khatmiyya. Ḥasan al-Turabi himself was named after al-Ḥasan al-Merghani.

Descendant of Sayyid al-Ḥasan became principle leaders of the *ṭarīqa* and Sudanese religo-political figures. Sayyid Moḥamed 'Osman al-Merghani (1930–present) is contemporary of Ḥasan al-Turabi and might be perceived by the Islamists as competitor and rival to him.

25. Mayer N. Zald, "Theological Crucibles: Social Movements in and of Religion." *Review of Religious Research* 23, no. 4 (June 1982) 19.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990) 24.

29. Ahmed al-Awad Sikianga, *Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1996) 24.

30. Peter Woodward, "In Footsteps of Gordon: The Sudan Government and the Rise of Sayyid Sir 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi, 1915–1935." *African Affairs* 84, no. 334 (January 1985) 47.

31. Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990) 25.

32. Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, The Traditionalization of al-Turabi, that is, "A Theology of Modernity: Ḥasan al-Turabi and Islamic Renewal in Sudan," *Africa Today* 46, no. 3 (2003) 195, 28 p.

33. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was the posthumous son of Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi. Abd al-Rahman was constantly watched during the early years of the British rule according to the advice of the inspector general of Sudan colonial government. Later, after Slatin resigned his position in 1914, by that time, Abd al-Rahman emerged as an undisputed leader of al-Mahdi family. He was allowed by the government to tour parts of Sudan especially, western Sudan where the colonial government was not strong and Ali Dinar was considered dangerous. Since Britain was at war with Turkey and Ali Dinar was an ally, Wingate's ruling regime, thought that the "the danger of the old Mahdism" was 'infinitely less, and the Sayyid could turn to an ally. For his followers he was Nabi Isa and the British were Dajjal, anti-Christ. The Ansār started to come to Abba Island in high number. The Sayyid started to invest in the spirit of the

Ansār work ethics. In the 1920s a large private pump scheme was established at Abba Island on the White Nile. Later, more schemes started to spread along the White Nile. By 1944, he started the formation of the Umma Party whose prominent leader now is al-Sādiq al-Mahdi the grandson of Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi.

34. Moḥamed 'Ahmed bin 'Abd Allah was a Sudanese religious leader who started as a Samaniyya follower and teacher before breaking away to proclaim himself al-Mahdi al-Muntazar (the expected one): the messianic redeemer who rises up after an era of oppression, corruption, and injustice to cleanse the entire Muslim faith worldwide. Mohamed Ahmed was successful in liberating Sudan from foreign rule. By then Egypt was under British occupation, the Queen Victoria's government made several attempts to protect European interest—especially the Suez Canal in the wake of successful nationalist movement. All of these attempts were doomed to failure and ended in the death of the British governor general of the Sudan Major General Charles Gordon (1833–1885) by the Mahdists. The various versions of the virtual image of Gordon's death which "was sanctimonious and reassuring image," wrote British Historian, Dennis Judd, on the hundred anniversary of the event, "confirmed the prejudices of many Britons who saw Imperial confrontation in terms of a conflict between the forces of darkness and disorder and upholders of Western civilization and Christian values." Most importantly, that single event shaped all aspects of the second colonization of Sudan (1898–1956) and its violent state was for many the final revenge for 'Gordon "martyrdom." Generations of al-Mahdi's family continued to play important roles in Sudanese social, religious, and political life. Al-Turabi himself was married to al-Mahdi's great granddaughter. Many consider that marriage added to al-Turabi's image. Until the last day of his life, al-Turabi never stopped being critical of al-Mahdi's family who's role he considered in Sudanese politics as *hukum biuotat* (family governance).

35. Ahmed Khair, *Kifah Jil* (Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sudaniyya, 1970) 152.

36. Alain Touraine, *A New Paradigm for Understanding Today's World* (London, Polity, 2007) 1.

37. Ibid.

38. Economist Dr. Sidgi Kabalo argues that the term *al-Rasimaliyya al-Tofiyliyya* is a theoretical qualitative addition that defines a type of Sudanese capitalism the Sudanese communists developed to describe a capitalism that deals with money transaction in a way different from commercial capitalism.

39. Taj al-Sir Osman Babo, *Nashaat wa ta Tatour al-Rasimaliyya al-Tofiliyliyya al-Islamoyiya fi al-Sudan* (the development and growth of the Islamist parasitic capitalism).

40. Alain Touraine, *A New Paradigm for Understanding Today's World* (London, Polity, 2007) 3.

41. Ghazi Salāḥ el-Din al-'Atabāni, interviewed at his office by the author at his office, recording, Khartoum, Sudan, January 4, 2006.

42. For more detailed information about the corporation as an extreme capitalist mode of the Islamist before and after it converged into the Islamist state see Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan,* first edition by Ashgate 2008 and second edition by Routledge 2016 Chapter 4.

43. Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir, *al-Rasimaluon al-Islamoon, mada yafaloon fi al-harka al-Islamia* "The Islamists Capitalists: What do they do with the Islamic Movement" (Khartoum, al-Sahafa Daily, December 12, 2006).

44. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Mudilat al-Suber Tanziem fi Siraat al-Islamien (Sabiqan) fi al-*Sudan (The Dilemma of the Super Organization in the Struggle Among the (former), Islamists in the Sudan* (Khartoum, Al-Shahafa Daily, November 29, 2006).

45. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996) 195.

46. Robert L. Tignor, "The Sudanese Private Sector: An Historical Overview." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 2 (1987) 201.

47. Ibid.

48. Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, *Annual Report, 1984* (Khartoum, 1985) 2.

49. Quoted in Hydar Ibrahim, *Siqout al-Mashru al-Hadari* (The Collapse of the Civilizational Project).

50. Ibid.

51. Ḥadar Ṭaha, *al-askar wa* (Cairo, Markaz al-Hadara al-Arabia, 1993) 55.

52. It is significant to note that the title *shaikh* Ḥasan al-Turabi is recent and it was formulated and exclusively used to replace Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi after the 1989 coup in order to personify his role as the chief ideologue of the Islamist movement. In fact, the term *shaikh* meant no more than a title of respect for a senior religious or tribal personality. A closer look, however, shows that the title *shaikh* gained a new meaning to describe the role of al-Turabi as the grand jurist and the supreme religious and political reference to the movement and the regime before 1999.

53. Amin Ḥasan Omer, *al-Mushrou al-Islami al-Sudani: Qiraat fi al-Fikr wa al-Mumarsa* [The Sudanese Islamic Project: Readings in the Ideology and Practice] (Khartoum, Markaz al-Dirasat wa al-Bihouth al-Igtimaitatu, 1995) 23.

54. Charles Tripp, "States, Elites and the Management of Change." In Hassan Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver, eds., *The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa* (Richmond, Surrey, Curzon, 2001) 212; Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York, Pantheon Books, 2004) 8.

55. Ibid.

Chapter 5

The Road to Islamism

Ḥasan al-Turabi entered Gordon Memorial College, where he majored in law, in 1951. As stated before he obtained a good grade in the examination—something unusual for someone who completed his secondary education in three years, which normally took four years then. What is important about that is that it became part of his legacy, and he and his disciples continued to evoke it to add to his personality cult. In different interviews with Ḥasan al-Turabi, including that with Ahmed Mansour of al-Jazeera TV, he said he was interested in medicine, arts, and law, but he finally chose law school. As stated before, different accounts, including that of his brother Dafalla, explain why Ḥasan completed high school in three years and why he chose law school. But both the existence of this episode and its timeliness have something to add to the foundation of Ḥasan's personality cult. His college experience was a reflection of the most important indications of the different influences he and most of his generation lived. It was no wonder that young Ḥasan al-Turabi lived under the influences of a hegemonic culture and its structures' forces. Such forces supported and maintained the colonial system; "Thomas Babington Macaulay, the man commonly credited with the introduction of English education,"[1] once advanced this idea about the British imperial experience and the consolidation of "the British Empire by propagation of English law and English culture."[2]

Indoctrination of both the colonized and the colonizer, new power structures arose in Sudanese society within the small class of publicly educated community of the state, which continued to grow through the expansion of the public education. Hence, al-Turabi's choice to study Western law as his major explains that. As of course, such a choice puts him within a privileged category within the community of the state and within the fields of power more prestigious than that of his father's and his group of shari'a lawyers,

who were also state employees. Ḥasan al-Turabi remembers[3] that he attended an optional course in the department of shari'a law during his final year at the college and he was awarded a prize for attending that course. However, not only scholars of shari'a studies but also those of the Egyptian educational systems together with all other disciplines that formally specialized in the non-Western world found themselves looked upon. This approach to education, which was consistent with the colonial mission, believed the world was "made up of 'modern' states and those primitive peoples."[4] But '"the high civilizations,' for example, China, India, Persia, [and] the Arab World . . . were not 'modern' like the pan-European world."[5] Hence, the answer "the Orientalist seemed to put forth was [that] there was something in the composite culture of these civilizations which had 'frozen' their history, and made it impossible to move forward to 'modernity,' as had the Western Christian world."[6] It followed that these countries, their religious heritage, require change as both the colonial view and the Islamist, which is a product of public educated elite, follow the same assumption for those societies if they were to move forward to modernity.

It is important to look deeper into how those new generations of Sudanese young people were brought together at Gordon Memorial College—considered the highest and the most prestigious school of learning in the country. "By proxy in all symbolic capital,"[7] they were nominated to higher degrees, and "prestigious family names, etc., as well as all potential symbolic capital (exceptional jobs, famous works, etc.), were brought in by each of his classmates, as well as the entire society of alumni."[8]

All of these actions, together with many other views, especially Ḥasan al-Turabi's, sometimes express more than other Islamists in relation to "modernity" and the "modern world," and they need to be considered because they developed and produced a culture of inclusion and exclusion. Ḥasan al-Turabi, his disciples, and the important transformation of those views are important especially because some of his disciples and followers turned not only into independent actors but also real enemies.

The other most profound influence that came out of the college was the way the education institutions linked socialization with the field of ecology and its impact on the general discourse. Overt and covert competition, fields of political skirmishes among rival student movements—the left in particular—became all that represented the "rite of the institution." In other words, the processes those students underwent to achieve in or outside the classroom "could turn into charismatic qualifications . . . recognized by others and by itself as worthy as being so."[9] All that was reflected in the essential and magical efficacy of institutional dubbing that characterized the self-satisfaction of all public education that produced Sudanese brands of ISIMs, including Islamism and Communism, in the most concrete way possible. That is the

main reason that these two orientations dominated Gordon Memorial College, the University of Khartoum, and other higher education campuses for a very long time. Within this each member of all these orientations believed that "they purified himself by the very act of detaching himself from the base and trivial matters that debased his nature."[10] This helps understand Islamism, which is similar to other ISIMs in their secular foundation and pursuit of the absolute as a movement that envisioned itself as an exclusive club of the public schools. It is also similar to other ISIMs that degenerated as things fell apart when they were unable throughout their successive transformations to avoid disintegration and final collapse through dependable structures of thought and reliable conditions of knowledge.

Until recently, the Islamist movement was very careful about publishing information pertaining to its history. Its members were accustomed to keeping a social distance from the Other to the extent that some accused them of being as secretive as a "Masonic" Fraternity. As in other Islamist groups elsewhere, "one looks at members' educational backgrounds, [which] reveals that highly educated [Islamists] . . . come overwhelmingly from natural sciences. There are also clerics, lawyers, and businessmen—the first necessary to expound the Brothers' religious positions, the second to defend them in court, and the third to manage and expand their wealth."[11] What is important about the official and nonofficial narrative of the Islamist historians, both self-made and academic, was that they both tell us two things dominate their stories. First, they did not consider within their discourse the factors behind the birth of Islamism in Sudan. Second, most of them described the movement as a self-made, unique development that came from nowhere. More importantly, the Islamists in Sudan together with those elsewhere "associate social sciences with Westernization. And well-bred Brothers understand that these sciences were founded on secular materialist philosophies that do not apply to Muslims" (Tariq 2013). The perception is that inductive experimental knowledge, such as chemistry, is natural, but deductive speculative knowledge, such as political theory is colored by ideology (Mahmoud 2005:29).[12] Another important aspect in this field is that history is included to disrespect social sciences as brother Hassan Hatthout remarked: "I have never once read history—ancient, medieval, or modern—without my conscience whispering: 'God knows best.' The honesty of history is measured by the honesty of its authors. And its authors are normally the mighty. And the mighty normally lie." This attitude toward social sciences and humanities has its deeper roots. Ḥasan al-Banna "chastised those who abandon the natural sciences and waste their time with 'abstract philosophies and unproductive, fanciful sciences' ([1949] 1993:156)."[13] Different generations of Sudanese Islamists do not eschew students of social sciences, but they describe these disciplines as *karsha* (the cheapest of meat that includes the stomach and intestines of the animal).

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SUDANESE ISLAMISM

The Sudanese Islamism myth of origin is shrouded mystery partly for the above mentioned reasons and for others. Chief among the other reasons could relate to internal conflicts among different groups and factions of the Islamist movement itself, as each group tried to conceive of itself, or reveal more or less of itself, and sometimes what each one narrated what it could narrate in relation to the movement's enemies. Especially, the Sudanese Communist party, which in a way represented the overturning of traditional relationships between the Islamists and their Communist rival, developed their ideas as their vanguard party. Moreover, most of the movement's history has been kept in the memory of different personalities who describe themselves as the institutional mind of the organization. The emergence of Ḥasan al-Turabi as a leader of the Islamist movement introduced him, and he introduced himself, within a personality cult that generated, whether from his success or failure, the "world-view" of Islamism. His self-concept, which dominated the Islamists discourse, became the emphasis he and his Islamists embodied—what I call "al-Turabi Islamism." Al-Turabi's personality cult made him believe, and made some of his disciples believe as well, that he was invincible and stood higher than the party itself. He positioned himself as Islamism's sole theoretician, historian, and spokesperson. According to that some of his Islamist members of his party turned their adherence to him into "political spirituality." Later, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, one of the leading Islamist and a close ally of al-Turabi for some time, blamed al-Turabi for turning the Islamist movement "into a Sufi tariqa [brotherhood] and [becoming] its *shaikh*."[14] This, as would be explained later, was one of the serious problems about the transformation of the Islamist movement into a corporation. It would also later be explained as partly due to the inability of Ḥasan al-Turabi to free himself from the political power the way Sayyid Abel Rahman and Sayyid Ali did before it became the basis of the social organization and its universal significance. All this turned a social reality in political terms and proved, as will be explained later, to be the order and disorder of al-Turabi Islamism and the arrow and the wound of Ḥasan al-Turabi himself. In this sense, I would like to explain what made al-Turabi the last of the Islamists-*khatim al-Islamouieen*—who met his fate at its crucifix.

In this respect, we need to first consider the ever-growing research and researchers whose work focuses on the study of this phenomenon and explore that outside the narrative of what and how the Sudanese Islamist scholars and their self-made historians present themselves, their leadership, and their movement. However, we rarely find any of the Islamists themselves trying to define what Islamism is or even trying to contest what some international Muslim or Sudanese, Sudanist scholars, and journalists have introduced,

which has been a significantly important narrative to the field of study of Sudanese Islamism, Ḥasan al-Turabi, and Islamism at large.

We first have to come to some understanding about the meaning of "Islamism." As more time goes by, the question about this phenomenon persists, and sometimes this expression is confused with different things, such as Islam, fundamentalism, neo and global jihadism, neo-Shi'ism, and Salafism.

In fact, Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and knowledge workers have debated the terms immensely. To borrow Shahab Ahmed's important remark, some people "seek to say the word 'Islam' in a manner that expresses the *historical and human phenomenon* that is Islam in its aptitude and complexity meaning."[15] Ahmed adds, "I am precisely *not* seeking to prescribe how Islam is as a Divine Command and thus *not* seeking to prescribe how Islam should be followed as the means to existential salvation. . . . [However] Islam has actually been a matter of human history, and thus . . . suggesting how Islam should be conceptualized as means to a more meaningful understanding both of Islam as human experience, and thus the human experience at large" (emphasis in the original).[16] Hence, the theoretical question "What is Islam?" and the theological question "What is Islam?" are not the same. As Andrew Rippin elucidates, "understanding whether we are talking about a 'religion' (whatever that the concept might mean) or a 'civilization' (weighted down in a nation of history) or a 'culture' (evaluated in terms of its material accomplishments) or a 'people' in (anthropological sense) is a difficult and multilayered matter of significant complexity."[17]

The most important element of the debate about Islamism is that the issue at hand is rather of an *ideology* than of a *theology*. This ideology presents and expresses itself, to borrow the words of Karl Marx, as "anxiously conjur[ing] up the spirits of the past to [its] service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language."[18] The terms *Islamist* and *Islamism*—widely used to denote a choice of political ideology unified in well-defined ways and differentiated from other Muslims in specific doctrinal ways (rather than the simple fact of being born Muslim)—are applied here to describe current individuals, groups, and manifestations of Islamist movements, political Islam, and those who are sometimes wrongly described as fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists. That is to say, "if *Islamist* is normatively closed, then in effect, *Muslim* is empirically open."[19] Nikke Keddie argues that the term "Islamism is probably the most accurate, distinguishing belief ('Islamic') from movements to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state"[20] Bassam Tibi, who argues that "Islamism is a cultural political response to a crisis of failed postcolonial developments in Islamic societies under conditions

of globalization." He claims that "though Islamism is political, it remains religious."[21] He further asks "how can we understand Islamism as different from Islam without denying the connection between them?" His answer is "in Europe, the dialects of Enlightenment in a time of great crises led to Communist and fascist rule. Just as these European ideologies contradicted the Enlightenment, Islamism contradicted the humanism of Islam."[22] However, when it comes to Islamism and its relationship to other "isms"—secularism, fascism, and communism—things might be more complex than Tibi's conclusion allows. And it would be easy to show that Islamism has relationships to all of those, as the landscape of each has been shaped through "cultural discourses of Orientalism, post-colonialism, or the war on terrorism; economic institutions of state corporatism, private capitalism, or economic globalism; and the political structures of nationalist or neoliberal states."[23]

Ḥasan al-Turabi's Islamism, which has been blamed by some of the Salafis of the Sudan and Saudi Arabia as secular, has its relationship with the French *laïcitě*, as will be explained later. Moreover, many of those who oppose Islamism in Egypt and the Sudan emphasize what they see as a fascist origin of Islamism. In doing so, they refer to discourses and practices of its founders and focus on its inherent violent impulses and legacy. In the Middle East, as well as in the West, some scholars prefer the term "political Islam" because, as Beinin and Stork argue, those scholars "regard the core concern of these movements as temporal and political."[24] They further explain that these movements use the Qur'an, the Ḥadith, and other canonical religious texts to justify their stances and actions. Further, Beinin and Stork maintain that "today's Islamic thinkers and activists are creatively deploying selected elements of the Islamic tradition, combined with ideas, techniques, institutions, and commodities of the present and recent past, to cope with specifically modern predicaments."[25] Broadly speaking within any categorization of the current Islamist movements, there are five main, important characteristics in the landscape of these groups that need to be identified within the sociology of Islamism.

WHAT IS ISLAMISM?

Islamism as a political project in its different forms and representations, and, within its different strategies and discourses, has advocated a political ideology based on Islam that can be reduced to, a certain extent, the sociological requirement of a certain sector of the society. Although all Islamist groups assert the primacy of Islam using *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the solution) and call for an Islamist order, it was a paradox that 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha after more than a quarter century in power of the only Islamist state, discovered that slogan should be reviewed.[26] The Islamists are not different from

other postcolonial elites—those whom I call a "community of the state"—
who thought they had a compact with modernity and hence despised other
forms of Islamic representations, such as the *'ulama* and Ṣufi, as backward.
Not only that, but they have always perceived the secular and the non-secular
Other—to borrow from Thomas Metcalf—as having no "intrinsic validity."[27]
So, in one sense, the Islamists perceive themselves as *fiaa qaliyala* (small
group)—"surrounded by an atheist, pornographic, materialistic, secular
culture which worships false gods: money, sex, or man himself."[28] In another
sense, in its historical development, the resurgence of Islamism could be
attributed—in addition to what Tibi illustrated above—"to the failure of the
naïve liberalism of the 1930s and Third World socialism in the 1960s and
1970s, and partly because of tremendous influx of rural folk into increasing
politicized sub proletariats and petit bourgeoisie."[29]

The emerging Sudanese breeds of Islamists, in their early and other gen-
erations within the majority of membership and leadership positions, are
closely associated with the development and the spread of public education.
The Sudanese Islamists, as other members of the community of the state,
share a background of public and Western education. Some of them earned
their graduate degrees from Western schools. The formal structure of these
movements is firmly related to that "tremendous influx of rural folk." When
the Islamists came to power, it became clear that most of those who were
awarded high positions in all sectors of the state on the elaborate policy
of *al-Tamkeen* "belong to a specific class that is marginalized from state
institutions and do not own the economic means of production."[30] Al-Tigani
'Abdel Gadir reflected on that later when we wrote describing different forms
of an assault or scramble for the spoils of the state when they came to power.
He described them as "our *gubsh* [barefoot] brothers who used to eat with us
fava beans and lentils [poor people food] and reside with us in *Um Dirawa
wa al-Droushab* [poor neighborhoods], those wretched of the earth became
ministers and governors."[31] He added, "we felt at first that was a good omen
. . . as we felt that we found a rock that would close the gate for corruption and
blocks the road to brokers and mafias and turns toward the poor and disad-
vantaged." Islamists believed that "the correlation between social origin and
academic success reduced their homogenizing operations despite the fact that
"they live with the values of the city—consumerism and upward social mobil-
ity."[32] However, this social mobility within the emergence of the Islamist
barefoot: *gubsh*, members of the Sudanese marginalized class in power, and
the representation of the reinvention of a new progressive application of
assabiyyah as state policy of what the Sudanese describe the Islamist state
under 'Omer al-Bashir and 'Alī 'Osmān as some form of tribal *assabiyyah*
and the state violence toward Sudanese citizens and the vulgar and toxicity
of environment as represented by 'Omer al-Bashir and Nafi 'Ali Nafi as a

representation form of violence[33] based *assabiyyah* that influenced the rise and fall of Ḥasan al-Turabi Islamism. Another viewpoint that shows *unf al-badiyyah* in action and still persists as even a more critical aspect of the sociology of the Islamists in power. Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir called it *Uhud mentality*—referring to the Uhud battle, which was fought in AD 625 between a force of the small Muslim community of Madina and a force from Mecca, the town from which many of the Muslims including Prophet Mohamed emigrated in AD 622 after years of persecution. During that battle while the Muslim force had been close to victory, some of the Muslim force, especially the archers, breached Prophet Mohamed's orders and rushed to collect Meccan spoils. That move allowed for a surprise attack from the Meccan force, which caused chaos and disorder within the position of Muslim forces. Many Muslims were killed, and even Prophet Mohamed himself was badly injured. Such a rush to collect the spoils was described in the Sudanese satire *al-habaro malu* as reinventing the relics of an old famous Sudanese Sūfi verse that refers to those who rushed toward piety and gained their rewards from God. But it means the opposite, a scramble for the spoils of the state and the scramble for young middle class women for multiple marriages.

As explained in *The First Islamist Republic*,[34] the Sudanese Islamist groups have developed a self-image and an assurance of their origin's history that position them within their own specific time and place. Although adopting Islam could be perceived as a positive thing within a Muslim society, that by itself does not qualify such Islamist groups to perform the functions of the 'ulama who gained and solidified their legitimacy from institutionalized religious knowledge and their functions as judges, imams, and teachers who issue fatwa in matters relating to Islamic knowledge and Muslim life. Accordingly, they "will not be the ones to open up the 'ulama corpus." The Islamists "reproach the 'ulama" as they claim to be thinkers and to stand out as self-proclaimed spokespersons of Islam as *din wa dawla* (religion and state). At the same time, they go further to tell their secular competitors that their compact with modernity could be pronounced in a more authentic fashion. Bassam Tibi observes that Islamists "seem to overlook the distinction between two different traditions of knowledge in Islam: Islamic religious sciences and rational sciences (philosophy and natural sciences)."[35] This discourse, which differentiates their ascribed authenticity, is entangled with competing understandings of both Islam and modernity, as well as with essentialist definitions of both Ṣufi Ṭarīqa and the 'ulama. Clearly, this brings in a self-imaging invention of the group that has underlain its actions all through its life. At the same time, such self-imaging and narration of the history of the movement has an enduring impact on the mood and politics of the movement. In a broader perspective, this invention of self-imaging reproduced three important developments in the life of the Islamist movements.

First, by promoting such a self-image and the rhetoric associated with it, the movement defends "the essence or experience itself rather than promote[s] the full knowledge of it and its entanglements and dependencies on other knowledges." In this sense, they "will demote the different experiences of others to a lesser status."[36] Second, as Moḥammed Ayoob explains, such "decontextualizing of Islam allows Islamists in theory to ignore the social, economic, and political milieus within which Muslim communities exist. It provides Islamists a powerful ideology that they can use to purge Muslim societies of the 'impurities' and 'accretions' that are the inevitable accompaniments of the historical process, but which they see as the reason for the Muslim decline."[37] Finally, the most important aspect of this discourse and its historical narration is that it makes the Sudanese Islamists a self-sufficient political association rather than a religious movement.

Mark Juergensmeyer points out that the Islamists "are concerned not so much about the political structure of the nation-state as they are about the political ideology undergirding it."[38] That might explain how and why the Sudanese Islamist model turned into that savage separation of religion and state. According to that separation they transformed the state into a coercive force to protect and maintain their political identity and exclude others by distributing power and resources in an unequal way.

Finally, the masses that follow these movements are young, educated men and women who live within the values of the modern city. They constitute what Roy labels as "lumpen intelligentsia."

Their Narrative

That might lead us to give attention to five categories of different forms of narrative, historiography, and genealogy of the Islamist movement as articulated by its own members. By the mid-1970s a new young generation of academics, writers, and journalists from the ranks of the movement started gradually publishing manuscripts prepared for graduate degrees, primarily, at British universities.

The first category includes Dr. Ḥasan Mekki's dissertation published as a book. Mekki, who was among the first Sudanese Islamist academics to write a study about the Islamist movement, published *Harakat al-akhwan al-Muslimiin for al-Sudan 1946–1969* (The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the Sudan 1946–1969) in 1982. Considered the first semi-official history of the Sudanese Islamism, Mekki's book was published when the movement was officially banned by the Nimairi regime, though its leadership participated in the government and the regime single party al-Itihad al-Ishtraqi. For this reason, el-Affendi explains, "the book does not tackle the period after 1969, and it is circumspect about a number of issues. However,

it remains an important source on the movement's early history."[39] Mekki tried to justify his attempt to turn his manuscript into a book translated into Arabic to advocate that "the presence of the movement did help in the serious study from researchers and writers. Similarly, the Islamists themselves did follow that presence with study and analysis. The result of all that it subjected its heritage to loss and its history to distortion."[40] After that a few dissertations and other writings were published in book format. Later, Ḥasan al-Turabi himself wrote several books including his most important one about the Islamist movement titled *The Islamic Movement in Sudan: Its Development, Approach, and Achievement*. The book was published in 1989 and translated into English by Abdelwahab el-Affendi in 2008. Al-Turabi's book was described by el-Affendi himself as "a self-evaluation of the movement's trajectory and its ideas and political orientations. It is based on transcribed seminar presentations and discussions of the ideas and practices of the movement, which made it more open and adaptive, and which brought it into the center of Sudanese politics. The book covers the period up to 1986, when the radically restructured National Islamic Front became the third largest party in the parliament."[41] In addition to these some unpublished dissertations were produced by some members of the Islamist movement before the coup, including al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir Hamid's, *Islam, Sectarianism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Modern Sudan, 1956–1985* from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London August 1989.

The second category of publications was produced after the Islamists assumed power through the coup of 1989. One of the important books was an early introduction to al-Turabi that placed him and his Sudanese Islamism within the context of modern Sudanese history. The publication was a dissertation by Abdelwahab el-Affendi later turned into a book published in 1991 under the title *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*. El-Affendi outlines "Turabi's 'ideological revolution'—the radical transformation of the ideas and practice of the movement, which made it more open and adaptive, and which brought it into the center of Sudanese politics. The book covers the period up to 1986, when the radically restructured National Islamic Front became the third largest party in parliament. Moreover, those who were considered as the institutional mind of the movement gave part of their testimony about the history of the movement in TV interviews."[42] Another book, by Tunisian journalist Hamdi Mohamed Elhachmi is *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*. This book was translated into English by Ashur A. Shamis. It incorporated "a series of interviews conducted over a decade by a sympathetic Tunisian journalist. They cover a wide range of issues (internal politics and evolution of the movement, religious reform, Sudanese politics, and Islam and the West). They offer interesting insights into the

evolution of al-Turabi's thinking during the period in question and his main pre-occupations during that period."[43]

Another publication of this category is a book by one of the older members of the Islamist movement, Mohamed Khair Abdel Gadir, who was one of the founders of *Ḥarakat al-Tahrir al-Islamic* at the Gordon College in 1948. Abdel Gadir explains the emergence of the nascent movement in his book *Nashaat al-Harkah al-Islamiiyya fi al-Sudan 1946–1956* (The Emergence of the Islamist Movement in the Sudan 1946–1956). Another veteran of the movement, 'Iesa Makki 'Osmān Azraq, produced a badly written and poorly designed book, with no date, titled *min Tariekh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimien 1953–1980* (From the History of the Muslim Brotherhood 1953–1980). An unpublished dissertation by a non-Sudanese PhD student Masaki Kobayashi titled *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Hassan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement.* Kobayashi's project was defended in 1996 at the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham, UK.

The third category in this field includes publications that appeared after the 1999 *mufasala* (divide). Chief among these publications is Abdel Rahim Omer Mouhy al-Din's book *al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Siraa al-Hawa wa al-Hawiya Fitnat al-Islamien fi al-Sulta mi Muzakirat al-Ashara ila Muza-kirat al-Tafahum maa John Garang* (al-Turabi and the Ingaz: struggle of Identity and Interest: The Islamists' temptation (to evil) for power from the Memorandum of Ten to the memorandum of Understanding with Garang). In his book, Mouhy al-Din documented the conflict that took place in 1999 between al-Turabi and some of his disciples. He gave a good explanation of that development or *al-Mufasala* conducted many interviews of some of the leading members of the movement. Another important book was produced by al-Mahboob Abdel Salam, one of the closest young members to al-Turabi, published an important book considered by some as the unofficial perspective of Ḥasan al-Turabi on the first ten years of the al-Ingaz regime. According to El-Affendi "this is the mirror image of Gallab's[44] work, dealing with al-Tura-bi's decade in power, but this time from the perspective of al-Turabi's camp. Using plenty of inside information, the book chronicles the inner struggles within the movement and the regime, but insinuates that al-Turabi's oppo-nents had been conspiring against him from the beginning and were the main culprits in the excesses of the regime."[45] An unpublished PhD dissertation by Suhair Ahmed Mohmed Salih under the title *Islamism and Democracy in Sudan: The Role of Hasan al-Turabi, 1989–2001* appeared in 2012 from the University of Westminster, UK.

The fourth category includes long TV interviews conducted by Islamist journalist al-Ṭahir Ḥasan al-Tom titled *Mourajaat* (Reviews). When the sun of Islamism started to fade, new historians of Islamism presented themselves as heirs of Babikir Karrar, and they offered a different narrative about the

nascent period of Islamism in its relationship to Babikir Karrar. Chief among
those, 'Abdalla Zakaria and Nasir al-Sid, gave some detailed information in
TV interviews about the development of the movement. Both Nasir al-Sid
and Zakaria were considered among the closest to Babikir Karrar whom
they believed was the founder of the Sudanese Islamism. Another TV inter-
view within this series is the one conducted with Aḥmed 'Abdel Rahaman,
a close ally to Ḥasan al-Turabi, who was sidelined with the ascendance of
'Alī 'Osmān to prominence.

The sixth category includes the 11th Series of interviews al-Jazeera jour-
nalist Ahmed Mansour conducted with Ḥasan al-Turabi four years before his
death and released after his death in March 2016.

These reified categories are not inclusive. They are not opposite pairs, and
they do not include the publications about Sudanese Islamism produced by
non-Islamist Sudanese, Sudanist, and international scholars and journalists
who published several books.

PROVINCIALIZING OF SUDANESE ISLAMISM

In January 2006, I interviewed late Yasin 'Omar al-Imām, the movement's
commissar general par excellence, member of its leadership bodies since the
1950s, a parliamentarian, and editor of its newspaper *al-Mithaq al-Islāmi*
1965–1968, among other leading positions.[46] For some of the Islamists,
Yasin represented one of the institutional memories of the Islamist move-
ment. For Ḥasan al-Turabi, Yasin was a double dipper whose experience
as a Communist for some time and an Islamist for all time was needed.
Moreover, Yasin was one of the few indigenous members of urban Omdur-
man, whose socialization, knowledge of urban families, and genealogies
were all an asset in an organization made of *goubsh*. In addition to all
that Yasin brags about, sometimes jokingly and sometimes mockingly, he
was *salouk al-Jabh* (the vagabond of the Islamist) competing with another
Omdurmani prominent member of the Communist party, Ahmed Sulaiman,
who also bragged in a similar way that he was *salouk al-hizb al-Shioui* (the
vagabond of the communist party). Yasin smoked in public and enjoyed
playing cards (not gambling), a widely spread socialization habit among the
Omdurmani and the urban Sudanese population, especially among those who
do not involve themselves in gambling. In that interview with him, Yasin
reiterated in clear terms the uniqueness of the movement. He noted that "in
1949 a group of young students including Babikir Karrar, Moḥamed Yousif
Moḥamed, Yousif Ḥasan Sa'id, and Moḥamed 'Aḥmed Moḥamed 'Alī came
to Khartoum from the rural parts of the country. They formed *Ḥarakat
al-Taḥrir al-Islāmi* (Islamic Liberation Movement) at Khartoum University

College." Al-Imām adds that *al-Harakat* "advocated high moral standing and it was anti-Marxist."

The nascent left movement at the Gordon Memorial College was called the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation.[47] Al-Imam distinguishes between two important aspects of the nascent Islamist movement. While he claims that "it had no relationship to *Ḥarakat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen* (the Muslim Brotherhood movement) . . . it was the Communists who continued to call its members Ikhwan." Other Islamist scholars, such as Ḥasan Mekki, 'Abdelwhab El-Affendi, and some of the Islamist politicians, including Ḥasan al-Turabi, reiterated similar narrations. Moḥamed al-Khair 'Abdel Gadir, a founding member of *Ḥarakat al-Tahrir al-Islami*, explains in his book, *Nashaat al-Harkah al-Islamia fi l-Sudan 1946–1956* (The Emergence of Islamist Movement in the Sudan 1946–1956), that the seven members of the group met secretly one night at the Western sports court at the Khartoum University College, and discussed the idea of an Islamist organization that might "confront the Communist attack and resist the British colonialism pursuant to the establishment of a righteous society based on Islamic ideals." He added that this was the way those who were present understood their mission, "though they had no clear vision of how that idea could work, or from where it should start, or what to do next. They just relied on God, sincerity of their orientation, and the resolve of the youth." 'Abdel Gadir confirms Yasin's claim that the groups had no direct relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt. He adds that some of them had not even heard of that organization. In this case, it seems that "the notion thus possesses a critical normative dimension, and even a political dimension in so far as it designates the way individuals or communities become subjects, outside the establishment and its powers and norms—even if new forms of knowledge and power come into being in this process."

In other words, it is important to see the different paths and courses that movement has taken from one development within the Sudanese social movements, society, and its development through time. For most of its detractors, Islamism has been described as a disease outbreak that infected the Sudanese body politic as early as the 1940s of the condominium rule in the country. Indeed, since the birth of the movement, these three currents with their conflicting accounts or silence have been persistently underlying a cold culture war between the Islamists and their secular opponents and may be mistrusted by other academic or elite individuals or groups. This complicated phenomenon seems to be deeply rooted in an intellectual quest that sees Islamism in essence as a less composed configuration of a religious rather than a political movement, or one that perceives it as a religious movement void of religiosity. Hence, a cautious inquiry of the movement and its emergence could therefore serve four important endeavors: (1) prevent simplistic appending

of the movement to nowhere; (2) dispute such arguments and claims that the movement is a unique and novel phenomenon; (3) challenge the notion that it was an outbreak from history's quarantine house; and (4) confirm that the elementary form of the movement is like other developments within the Sudanese community of the state's sociopolitical life with multiple sources and sets of reproduction that could be subject to or associated with certain self-affirmations of factors that might be rooted in that particular existential experience of Sudanese colonial encounter.

The serious problem with Yasin and Abdel Gadir stories about the origin of Sudanese Islamism is that they both disregarded the Sudanese primary concern with modernity, and the production of social movements in their essential aspects to nationalism and how it was felt in much of the Sudanese recent history. It might be similar to other colonized countries' emergence of nationalist movements, which had aims, values, and ideals of progress, as expressed by Ahmed Khair in his book *Kifah Jil*.[48] This is similar to those of European renaissance, which marked Europe's emergence from the Dark Ages into the light of "modern civilization." Most importantly, Khair emphasized an important aspect that Egypt and the Arab East followed a similar route under Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciple Mohamed Abdu. It in turn shaped the Sudanese movement and its approach to modernity. As soon as they started establishing their political structures—like the League of Sudanese Unions, the White Flag League, the Graduate Congress, the Southern Sudanese Graduate Congress—and new different expressions of resistance to the colonial rule started to grow, power groups began to emerge. "Shorn of violence that existed from early resistance of the 1924 revolt," as Peter Woodward writes, "Sudan was becoming a highly political milieu in which the state was the common element endeavoring to shape collaborators while having to adapt emerging realities to which it in fact was contributing."[49] However, Partha Chatterjee, put it better by describing the attempt, is deeply contradictory: "It is both imitative and hostile to the models." It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it also involves a rejection, "in fact two rejections, both of them ambivalent: rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity."[50]

This encounter, with the introduction of mass public education and socioeconomic development, inculcated emerging generations of Sudanese differentiated groups "a culture of the self," and new forms of labor. These new forms of labor, with their close relationship to the state as the biggest employer, produced the state's organic and nonorganic intellectuals, as well as a new sense of citizenship and characteristics of other, different, political

formations and demands. These developments combined and divided seven different communities of conversations, discourses, and ambitions to hold the state together. The first includes regular and civil service personnel (white-collar workers). The second group includes members of trade union organizations (blue-collar workers).[51] The third group (khaki-collar workers) includes the military, in the first place, and in the second place, regular forces. The fourth group refers to the private khaki-collar workers, who include the Christian guerrilla forces and insurgency organizers and leadership in the south. In addition, the colonial distribution of labor, especially in al-Gezira scheme[52] brought a new peasant community subject to the state polity and management (white araaqi workers). The fifth group emerged out of the growth of rural and urban forms of capitalism and the expansion of the market and new different forms of agricultural systems, such as White Nile pump irrigated cotton plantations. The sixth group was the structural transformation of the marginalization within the closed districts and most of the areas subject to indirect rule that were left alone to work out their own salvation as best they might. They faced, in each case, progressing regressions in their life chances; the main culprit was the colonial policies and their tendencies and results.

Simultaneously, the structural changes that came with public education brought with it students political organizations that included Islamists, Communists, other types of Leftists, Pan-Arabists associations. It also brought with it trade unions media and other knowledge workers in the northern part of the country. In addition, it helped the emanation of an unwritten contract between some members of the community of the state and religious leadership and market and "lords of poverty" of the marginalized population. While, at the same time, limited church and public education produced most of the southern Sudan political elite. Each one of these political groups and organizations committed itself to certain exclusivist ideologies that followed or propositioned doctrinaire order for the state, modernity, and society. It is important to look at Gordon Memorial College and later the University of Khartoum, as well as other institutions of public education. In particular, it is telling to examine them within their social backgrounds, their practical activities of providing the consciousness and foundation for the development of political group training and orientation, the rise of new Sudanese realities that shaped the last phase of colonial, and the following postcolonial era. Each group entertained self-assurances that only their group represented a self-contained model of political representation. This is very true in the emergence of both the Sudanese left and Islamism. By virtue of their upbringing, these different political schools and their representations among the community of the state developed a self-image, which claimed that, although they might be a minority in terms of numbers, they were a majority in terms of

status. Hence, they either openly rejected or discreetly undermined the rules and the results of the democratic game. As long as the democratic game puts down the Umma Party or their other "sectarian" rivals, the Unionist party would maintain an advantageous position.

Primary opposition between the different ideological schools and their varied political affiliations reflects a self-image and underlies, to a certain degree, a lifestyle and selective affinities that grounded each one of those ideological schools and the political affiliations they each produced. This primary opposition reflected its secondary opposition within the political discourse, as well as rivalry and antagonism that reflects a degree of status-inconsistency. At the same time, within the minority political representational discourses, neither the Islamists nor the Leftists saw themselves in that way. These representational discourses embodied, from one side, a reductionist impulse as they describe the majority parties and their selective affinities as *taqlidi* (traditional), *ta'ifi* (sectarian), *rajii* (reactionary), and/or *muhafiz* (conservative). They all share the view that these parties, and the social groups that support them, were part of an old, static order, which was inimical to social and political progress, and which had to go. At the same time, the attitude of these minority groups toward each other was less benign than one might imagine. The modes of reductionism in which these parties were interlocked have paved the way for a remorseless and never-ending war of attrition between the Islamists (with all of their different feathers), the Communists, and the Regional Leftists. The main political parties and their religious and social associations in their totalizing discourses perceived these minority parties as *tanzimat 'aqa'idiyya* (ideological organizations) either born out of alien *musturada* (exported ideologies) or as a product of the rejection of the mainstream associations. In retrospect, we have seen, within the last five decades, both sides living in a "state of suspended extinction." That is, each side has been turned, by the other, into an object that should be eliminated through the state apparatus of coercion and/or private violence. Both state and private violence grew stronger over time, especially during military rule, when the ruling elite and their rivals continually resorted to different sorts of armed violence. Moreover, these modes of reductionism and the mutual hostilities have generated the most enduring and consequential political and cultural wars, with aims of not only humiliating the "Other," but also of eliminating them completely, whenever possible. Within such an environment, public debate becomes in conducive to reason and civility. All too often, a military coup, which progresses into a dictatorial rule, has silenced all kinds of public debate and, with it, has stifled any possibility for reason and/or civility.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this state of affairs continued to enlist military aid to resolve political conflicts. This process of coercing opponents

through military rule forced most, if not all, political organizations to take turns in acting as clandestine organizations, receiving harsh treatments from different regimes. And through the mode of the coup or violence, each group transforms its "Othering" impulses and past negative feelings or hostilities into an organized form of subjugation of the "dreaded Other." Behind every military coup in Sudan—successful or abortive—there has been a civilian political party or a group of conspirators. All the while, groups of civilian, as well as military collaborators, took part in every military regime. Hence, the self-fulfilling prophecy about the Islamists as *jihaz fashisti* "a fascist appa-ratus," as their communist enemies used to describe them, has become both the living example and the enduring legacy of their rule during their republic, especially in the period between 1989 and the present. Next chapters will address these developments, which led the growth of the Islamist movement and its downfall from disintegration to oblivion as headed by Ḥasan al-Turabi and 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha.

It is important to differentiate between the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood as an outcome of the active efforts of the Egyptian mother organization and Ḥasan al-Banna's persistent attempts to expand his move-ment outside Egypt. As for the Sudan, al-Banna and his organization had long given attention and interest in Sudan. This interest reflected itself in many ways, including the attention of the presence of Sudanese students in Egyptian universities as early as the 1930s. According to Abdel al-Latif al-Khalifa, who was a college student in Egypt then, some of the Sudanese students were attracted to the Islamist movement because of the ideas that Ḥasan al-Banna and some of his campus disciples like Mustafa Moumin who emotionally charged young students of Egyptian universities and some Sudanese as well. Abdel-Latif maintains that some of the Sudanese students were attracted to the camps and the military training that the Brotherhood formed.[53] This was the "Special Organization" created by al-Banna, "which trained its members in the use of firearms." Al-Banna also formed "within the association select groups of Rovers *(Jawala)* and *(Kata'b)*, modeled on Hitlerite brownshirsts and blackshirts."[54] Abdel-Latif maintains the first Sudanese youth who joined the Brotherhood in Egypt were Jamal-al-Din al-Sanhuri and Shaikh 'Abel Rahman al-Sayem later, were followed by Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid. He adds that the Egyptian press had an important role in spreading information about the Brotherhood in Sudan. In another attempt to expand the movement in Sudan al-Banna, he sent a letter to Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi asking him to support the organization. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman "politely and diplomatically declined [the] personal and passionate plea from [the] *murshid* Shaikh Ḥasan al-Banna to support the Brotherhood."[55] Moḥamed al-Khair Abdel Gadir maintains that al-Banna stated in an address celebrating Sayyid Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani's visit

to Cairo in 1948 that the Brotherhood's relationship with the Khatmiyya started as early as 1937 in al-Ismailiyah.[56]

In 1947 the secretary general of the Egyptian Brotherhood, Abd al-Hakim Abdin, visited the Sudan, and the public lectures he gave led to the recruitment of a few young Sudanese. Among them was Ḥamid 'Omer al-Imam-Yasin's older brother, Mohamed Moḥmed Ṣadiq al-Karuri, al-M'ahad al-'Ilmi graduates, Ali Talballah, Shawqi al-Assad, and Sulaimān Musa. Later, and as an outcome of the growth of the Brotherhood in the Sudan, Mohamed al-Khair maintains that, the emerging chapter was under the supervision of an administrative office headed by Shaikh Awad Omer al-Imam, the oldest brother of Yasin for a short time. After that al-Banna appointed Ali Talballa to be the Amir of the Brotherhood. He adds, some of the Egyptians resident in the Sudan, such as Jamal Amar, a teacher from the Egyptian ministry of education, Mustafa Jabr from Egyptian department of irrigation, played an important role in propagating the Brotherhood.

What is the most important difference between the Sudanese Brotherhood and the other Islamists is that from the days of the leadership of Babikir Karrar to al-Turabi, they refused to give *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance) to the Egyptian Brotherhood *Murshid.* This issue remained one of the most important areas of contention and was behind the first split among the ranks of the merging movement in the 1950s.

BABIKIR KARRAR FACTOR

Those who are in the view that the Sudanese Islamist movement was self-made, novel, and came from nowhere emphasized the role of Babikir Karrar (1930–1981) as its founder. Some of the enemies of Ḥasan al-Tarabi from the Islamists, especially after the *al-Mufasala* (split) of 1999, tried to propagate that Ḥasan al-Turabi was a phony prophet who recycled Baber Karrar as not only the founder Sudanese Islamism but also its truly real and great thinker. Others tried to undermine al-Turabi's legacy and his role during the founding period of Sudanese Islamism by relating his recruitment at high schools to one of Babikir Karrar's followers, which many extricate and criticize strongly: 'Abdullahi Moḥmed Aḥmed. However, Abdullahi himself continued to brag about when he created his own biography. In July 2006, a group of Islamists, some of them among the staunch antagonists of Ḥasan al-Turabi, participated in an event memorizing the 25th anniversary of Karrar's death. But who is Babikir Karrar?

Karrar was born in Wad Madani, on the bank of the Blue Nile about 85 miles southeast of Khartoum. Besides its economic significance as the capital of al-Gezira, the largest single farm for cotton irrigation in the world,

Wad Madani was a highly significant intellectual center during the nationalist movement. It was as important as Khartoum, and residing there were some of the most prominent members of the Wad Madani Society of the 1924 revolution, including officers such as 'Ali Abd al-Latif, civilians such as judge Mudather al-Bushi, and farmers such as Ḥasan Ismail al-Mufti.[57] Later during the 1930s and 1940s, Wad Madani was an important hub for the nationalist movement again. It was there and then that the "post-1938 Sudanese nationalist movement [was shaped] into a very different form from that which the founders of the Graduates' Congress had envisaged."[58] It is important to note that "the actual formation of the Congress idea was spearheaded by members of Abu Ruf group (especially 'Aḥmed Khair and his Wad Madni branch) [and was] strongly supported and encouraged by members of al-Fajr group." However, 'Aḥmed Khair himself maintains that the idea of forming a graduate congress was introduced first in "the month of June, 1935 in [an open letter published] in *al-Sudan Newspaper*. However, it did not receive attention from the leaders of public opinion." Later in May 1937, the exposition of the Graduates' Congress idea came in a lecture titled "Our Political Duty after the 1936 Treaty," which 'Aḥmed Khair delivered in Wad Madani. Indeed, "Aḥmed Khair's exposition reflected clearly the conceptions of different groups of the nationalist younger generation of graduates after deliberating over that in the capital. It was then adopted at the graduates' club in Omdurman, as he emphasized that "their duty is to achieve intellectual unity . . . by this meant organizing of enlightened section in association that would exploit the country's sources of strength."[59]

What is remarkable that Babikir Karrar, Moḥamed Yousif Moḥamed, Ja'far Nimairi, and 'Abd al-Rahmān Nugdalla lived and grew in that environment in Wad Madani. Young Ḥasan al-Turabi, at the age of 12 in 1944, was also in Wad Madani for a short time in elementary school. Later, he was transferred to Rufaa boarding elementary school to have a direct experience with another Islamist Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha. Two important personalities played important roles in the life of those young students. The first was Sa'ad Amir Ṭaha, a member of the Communist Party who fled persecution in Egypt where he was a student at university and was employed as an elementary school teacher in Wad Madani. Amir recruited both Karrar and Yousif to the communist party. At the same time Sa'id was recruited to the Communist Party in 1946 when he was at the Wadi Siyyidna high. It is important to note that by that time the Egyptian National Liberation Movement (ENLM) under the leadership of Henri Curiel came into existence attracting many Sudanese students in Cairo contemporaneously with similar growth of a visible group at the Gordon Memorial College.[60] The other important personality was Aḥmed 'Abd al-Rahman's maternal uncle al-Sayem Mohmed Ibrāhim Mosa. Al-Sayem had a greater influence on Babikir Karrar, Mohmed Yousif, and

Aḥmed ʿAbd al-Rahman, especially after he came from Egypt as one of a Muslim Brother activist on behalf of Ḥasan al-Banna. According to Moḥmed Yousif, al-Sayem's main message to them was about the spread of communism among the ranks of Sudanese students in Cairo. So, when they entered the Gordon Memorial College, he and Karrar found the presence and influence of communism even stronger.

It is important to note that, communism, not party, in the Sudan, but in relationship to progress, was part of the intellectual discourse of the 1940s. Aḥmed Khair, who was not a communist but one of the concerned intellectuals of that time, wrote an article in *al-Nil Newspaper*, which owned was by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi, titled "To the Members of all Branch Committee and Members of Congress in the Provinces." He stated, "among the strong states of today there are some that came into existence only a century ago. And the Communist state was able to make its historical stand in less than a quarter of a century ago. It was Stalin who said a long time ago that nations do not crawl like children but progress in historical leaps and bounds. And he has been proved right and his critics wrong."[61] In addition to several writings in Sudanese newspapers, members of younger Sudanese students in Gordon Memorial College managed to set up the first Communist-organized group under the name of the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL). Simultaneously, other Sudanese students in Cairo universities organized around Curiel (ENLM).

Here, Karrar and Yousif formed the first secret group that was primarily an anti-Communist one. They called it Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Movement [ILM]). The first group he recruited included Moḥamed Yousif Moḥamed, Yousif Ḥasan Saʿid, Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed (Mawlana), Mohamed al-Khair Abdel Gadir, Adam Fadal Allah, al-Tayib Mohmed Salih, and Ahmed Mohamed Babikir. Babikir Karrar and Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha before him laid the foundation of Sudanese strands of Islamism based on each one's configuration of the world around him.

NOTES

1. Suresh Chandra Gosh, "'English in Taste, in Opinions, in Words and Intellect' Indoctrinating the Indian through Textbook, Curriculum and Education." In J. A. Mangan, ed., *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience* (London, Routledge, 1993) 182.

2. Ibid.

3. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Hasan al-Turabi's Responsibility on the Movement* (Unpublished PhD thesis Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Durham, 1996) 257.

4. Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham, Duke University Press, 2004) 8.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*: *Elite School in the Field of Power* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1989) 122.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Quoted from Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility* (102), who took that expression from Durkheim's description of the effects of the "negative cult" or asceticism (*cf.* E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915) trans. J. S. Swain (New York, Free Press, 1965) 309.

11. Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (London, Polity Press, 2015) 34.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. 'Abdel Rahman 'Omer Muhy al-Din, *al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Siraa al-Hawa wa al-Hawiya Fitnat al-Islamien fi al-Sulta mi Muzakirat al-Ashara ila Muzakirat al-Tafahum maa John Garang* (Khartoum, Marawi Bookshop, 2006) 180.

15. Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015) 5.

16. Ibid.

17. Andrew Rippin, *Defining Islam: A Reader* (London, Equinox, 2007) 2.

18. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Rockville, Wilde Press, 2008) 7.

19. Donald Emerson, "Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity." In Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzengar, eds., *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010) 26.

20. Quoted in Fred Hillday, "Islam in Danger: Authority, Rushdie and the Struggle for the Migrant Soul." In Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, eds., *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam* (London, Pluto Press with Transnational Institute, 1995) 71–81.

21. Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and ISLAM* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012) 3.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., *Political Islam Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley, University Press of California, 1997) 3.

25. Ibid.

26. 'Alī 'Osmān the first vice president of the Sudan Islamist regime.

27. Thomas Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997) 34.

28. Olivier Roy, *Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010) 8.

29. Michael M. J. Fischer, "Islam and the Revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie." *Daedalus* 111, no. 1 (Winter 1982) 101–125.

30. Davis.

31. Al-Tigani Hamid Abdel Gadir, *al-Rasimaliyoon al-Islamiyoon, mada yafaloun fi al-Harka al-Islamiyya* (The Islamist Capitalist, What do they do with the Islamist Movement?) *al-Sahafa Daily*, 2006.

32. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994) 23–26.

33. Late 'Abdel Khaliq Maḥjoub, the secretary General of the Sudanese Communist Party, introduced a concept that was not further developed but which brought into question Ibn Khaldun's theory of *assabiyya*h; Abel Khaliq describes it as Unf al-Badiyyah, which could be translated into "the violence of the margin." I would argue that Unf al-Badiyyah in this respect could be seen haunting the totality of the Sudanese *umran* as represented in Sudanese civil society and representations of modernity including that within the Islamist movement. Therefore, both 'Abdel Khaliq's theory of Unf al-Badiyyah and Ibn Khaldun's theory of *asabiyyah* could be appropriate and complementary theories to examine the darker side of the reproductions of marginalization within the Sudanese experience.

34. See 'Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*.

35. Bassam Tibi, "The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology." In Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education* (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago, 1993) 73–102.

36. Ibid.

37. Moḥammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality." *World Policy Journal* 21, no. 3 (Fall, 2004) 1.

38. Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, University of California Press, 1993) 6.

39. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Hassan al-Turabi in Oxford Bibliographies* http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0200.xml.

40. Ḥasan Mekki, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan 1969–1985* (The Islamist Movement in the Sudan 1969–1985) (Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sudaniyya lil Kutub, 1999) 11.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. According to al-Effendi, in this book, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan*, "Abdullahi Gallab concludes that al-Turabi's blueprint of Islamic democracy has failed dismally. Arguing that the Sudanese experiment represents the 'first modern Islamic republic,' he finds that its failure to produce a viable democratic system signifies the failure of modern Islamism in general. In addition, the ensuing crisis in Sudan has led to the disintegration of the Islamist movement."

45. Ibid.

46. Yasin died at his home in Omdurman, June 22, 2013.

47. For more about the early history of the Sudanese left, see Mohamed Nuri el-Amin, *The Emergence and Development of the Leftist Movement in the Sudan During the 1930s and 1940s* (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1984).

48. Ahmed Khair, *Kifah Jil: Tarikh Hadarat al-Khirijin wa Tarawuruha fi al-Sudan* (A Struggle of a Generation: History of the Graduate's Civilization and its Development in the Sudan) (Khartoum, Sudan: al-Dar al-Sudaniyya, 1970).

49. Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990) 54.

50. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London, Zed Books Ltd., 1986) 2.

51. Blue-color workers in Sudan are primarily the urban proletariat, which includes skilled and unskilled wageworkers in industry, construction, commerce, communication systems, and railways in particular and other public services. The Gezira scheme and other large-scale systems of agriculture created new groups of rural-waged proletariat. The emergence of this proletariat class provided a new sense of identity that entailed a clear break with old ways of life. At the same time the knowledge they accumulated about their collective demise and the boundaries of their collective power of their solidarity enticed them to work together and fight for issues like fairer wages and a better standard of living. A new structure of networks emerged, different but not necessarily parallel to the political parties, nor similar to the *ṭarīqa*, this last having brought together urban and rural groups in loose coalition. Moreover, trade unions and professional associations discovered that they had something to offer in the sociopolitical world of practice as organizing bodies for a "class for itself" both to their members and to the country at large as entities concerned about resistance to the colonial state and within the sociopolitical process. For more about the Sudanese labor movement, see Saad al-Din Fawzi's, *The Labor Movement in the Sudan* and Ahmed Sikainga's *Slaves into Workers and City of Steel and Fire*, Tim Niblock's *Class and Power in Sudan*, Peter Cross's, *British Attitudes to Sudan Labour: The Foreign Office Records* as Sources for Social History in The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

52. The British colonial regime in Sudan turned, in partnership with multinational capital, millions of acres between the Blue and While Nile rivers, which before was inhabited by farmers and pastoralists into a vast irrigation project dedicated to the production of cotton. It was called the Gezira scheme. The scheme ultimately became the largest centrally managed irrigation project in the world. It started operation in 1925 and continues to operate today under the management of the Sudanese government ever since. The "almighty Gezira scheme" as described by its first chairman and managing director, Arthur Gaitskell, was one of the models of the manifestations of the colonial project. Here, Sudan gained the highest significance to the strategy of the economic benefit and the welfare of the British Empire. As an extension of British imperialism and its disciplinary methods, the al-Gezira project "presented an attempt not simply to remake or reform the rural Sudanese society, but to create a (colonial) Sudanese society, a homogeneous [force] of hardworking and disciplined peasants" according to Tony Barrnett. Victoria Bernal adds, the scheme is "miles and miles of irrigation canals and uniform fields stretched out in a huge grid dominate space, its

grid schedules for agricultural operations commands time, and above all, its hierarchy of inspectors and bureaucrats supervising, documenting, and disciplining strive to control the people of the Gezira. In Foucault's terms, the Gezira scheme must be understood as a "'disciplinary institution'" (1979:139). Moreover, and in a very different context, in spite of the economic purpose of the scheme, it "had a powerful lure for the colonials quite apart from what it could produce." It "captured British imagination, being compared to the Panama Canal (Himsbury 1923) and even the pyramids in an article in the *Manchester Guardian*" (Ransome 1925).

More than the other white- and blue-collar workers under the colonial system, the new white *arraqi* landless peasant workers felt simultaneously alienated from their products and enslaved within the system. However, they discovered that their organized collective efforts might help them as a group and might offer an added value to the sociopolitical world of practice.

53. 'Abdel Latif al-Khalifa, *Mudakirat Abdel Latif al-Khalifa: Waqafat fi Tarikhna al-Muasir bien al-Khartoum wa al-Qahira* (Memoirs: Perspectives in our Contemporary History between Khartoum and Cairo) [Khartoum, University of Khartoum Press, 1988]) 187.

54. Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1990) 49.

55. Ḥassan Aḥmed Ibrāhīm, *Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi: A Study of Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan, 1899–1956* (Leiden, Brill, 2004) 239.

56. Moḥamed al-Khair 'Abdel Gadir, *Nashaat al-Ḥarakah al-Islamiiyya fi al-Sudan 1946–1956* (The Emergence of the Islamist Movement in the Sudan 1946–1956) [Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sadaniyya lil Kutub, 1999]) 61.

57. Elena Vezzadini, *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory & Anti-Colonialism Resistance in Sudan* (London, James Currey, 2015) 59.

58. Ibid.

59. Muddathir Abd Alraḥīm, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development 1899–1956* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969) 153.

60. Henri Curiel (1914–1978), an Egyptian Jew and a son of a millionaire banker, was born in Cairo. Curiel was the founder of the Communist Party in Egypt in 1922 and contributed immensely to the founding of the Sudanese Communist Party. Curiel remained one of the most prominent revolutionary figures in the Middle East until his assassination in Paris and was a pioneer of genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace contacts when it was illegal, risky, and many thought it impossible. He supported the Algerian Liberation front and founded Solidarite, for which he was respected and kept offering support for anti-colonial resistance movements in Africa and Asia and several other countries. Curiel was assassinated in Paris in May 1978.

61. Quoted in Moḥammed Nuri El-Amin, *The Emergence and Development of the Leftists Movement in the Sudan During the 1930s and 1940s* (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1984) 61.

Chapter 6

From Ḥasan to Dr. Ḥasan

ISLAMISM AND CAMPUS NOBILITY

For all of the al-Turabi Islamists, Babikir Karrar was assumed to be the founder of Sudanese Islamism. A wholly rebarbative caricature emerged and circulated with a sinister grin, as most of al-Turabi's detractors—especially after *al-Mufasala*—insidiously reworked the legacy, contribution, and image of al-Turabi as a phony prophet who "refurbished" Karrar's ideas. Under the guise of this, Ḥasan al-Turabi found himself repeatedly conjuring up an image of an Islamist impressed by the activism of Babikir Karrar. However, each one of these assertions is meaningless without the other. The more the image of Karrar was inflated and al-Turabi's debated the more the role of the college/University of Khartoum nobility is identified as foundation of Sudanese Islamism. The more that al-Turabi Islamists succeeded in the Sudanese public sphere, limited as it was, and professions opened up to them, the more vociferously they were identified on one hand—by some—as an exclusive part of the University of Khartoum nobility and on the other hand by themselves as a self-satisfied entity.

Karrar himself was the product of nationalist movements that resisted colonialism in Sudan, as explained before, and he was part of the Sudanese Islamists search for authenticity—while remaining in the spotlight on campus as springboard for prominence outside campus in high schools, and within the growing field of Islamism outside in the Sudanese political open market.

In this way Babikir Karrar's growing campus nobility and his brand of Islamists later became the core of al-Turabi's Islamism, and they found themselves facing six binds. Since then al-Turabi and his brand of Islamism, together with its emergent ʿAlī ʿOsmān class, grew with an inherent impulse of unpredictability and crisis that riddled the growth of Islamism, as they were

not able to function adequately within their defined parameters. Nevertheless, they continued to make primarily violent choices, especially after October 1964, and then after they assumed power in 1989, it was a "solution" for internal and external challenges and growing pains. Each one of these binds and the choices the Islamists made to address them, coupled with a ruthless, sustained repression, has been blind in the sense that they lack empathy, conscience—penalty of evil—and significant consequences. It might be clear to all observers that, including some of the Islamists themselves, the outcome was the end of Islamism, and Ḥasan/Dr. Ḥasan and Shaikh Ḥasan al-Turabi as the last of the Islamists.

First Bind

Even before the emergence of the Islamist movement as a small organized group on campus, it was clear that there was an attraction to communism among some of the younger generation of the educated Sudanese graduates and students of Gordon Memorial College. It is because of this that the anti-colonial sentiment, to a certain extent, had adopted the discourse and the representational form of an emerging Communist movement. That did not by any means represent adoption of communist ideology or party membership. We see many similar sentiments reflected in the articles in Sudanese newspapers similar to the one published by Aḥmed Khair in *al-Nil Daily*, which was quoted in the previous chapter. Simultaneously, and in addition to that, we see communist activists, such as Sa'ad Amir, actively recruiting high school students to communist anti-colonial cause. Some students like Babikir Karrar and Yousif Sa'id were attracted to that for a while. Later, in college, Karrar and his rural and "rural located" and isolated boarding schools— Ḥantoub and Wadi Siyyidna students, came together in a secret group first to protect themselves from the encroachment of the "urbanized Khartoum raised" students and left-oriented college individuals and groups who some of them were communists. This urban rural fault line has continued to be one of the main demarcations of difference between the Islamists and the left-oriented college student movements ever since. Since its early days, the small emerging community of the state changed in many ways. This is so not only within the urban rural fault lines of the left but also among the Islamists themselves. Dafalla al-Ḥaj Yousif, one of the early Islamists, remembers proudly what differentiated him from other Islamists that time when he was an Umdurmani (from uraban Umdurman). Ḥasan al-Turabi was not one of the founding members of Karrar's group, but he lived through the infancy of the Islamist movement at the University College of Khartoum and the emergence of Babikir Karrar and *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami* (ILM), which

later adopted an institutional voice as an anti-communist group. According to al-Turabi, both Communist and ILM members made attempts to win him over to their sides because of his radical views as a vocal critic of al-Mahdi and the Mahdiyya during his Ḥantoub High School days. So far, one would argue that the Islamist anti-communism, anti-atheism, antisecularism, and defaming Abd al-Khaliq Maḥgoub relationship to Henri Curiel is evidence of an alien root to Sudanese communism and secularism. It can be an upgraded form of the same early anti-communist sentiment the Islamists developed earlier that was later used by al-Turabi as the leader and chief strategist of his own Islamism when he found the Sudanese Communist Party gained some prominence in the Sudanese political field. However, the Islamists and their movement since its early days—according to its own historians—were concerned with signs of struggle between and against leftist tendencies and those affiliated with the Communist movement in Sudan rather than the struggle against the colonial system. At the same time, it was clear that the major Sudanese political parties, the communist, the Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha *Gamhorieen* (Republican), the labor, the new peasant movements, and the entire nationalist movement and its personalities in Sudan were all mobilized in aid of the nationalist project and its conversation within its anti-colonial movement. However, it has been noted that inside the Islamist movement as a political party and as a regime, it was finally defeated from within by its own generational leaders. They were leaders who from the first day strongly preferred a military person, such as 'Omer al-Bashir, from the margin for their republic to anyone from the Sudanese Other. This was so even if that Other was Ḥasan al-Turabi at one time. Affirmation of several symptoms implicitly tended toward the old fault line of the urban rural conflict as it turned into an infinite practice of violence. After the *mufasala* some of al-Turabi supporters referred to this rural urban fault line by reminding the other group of al-Turabi's "civilizing mission" as he taught that rural group *libs al-Shal wa Istimal al-jawal* (how to wear the neck shawl and use a cell phone). The infinite practice of violence was a phenomenon related to the Islamists and their state. Its very brutality had large-scale consequences, as the Islamists saw evil everywhere intertwined with the hatred for the Other. This hatred created a new subjective type of relationship between religion they claimed they were related to and the state that they created, which was never a representation of a religious state. It has been, in actual fact, a separation between religion and the state where the state was designated to invest in the worst forms of violence by actors whose objectives were neither religious nor human. Finally, the Islamist state kept the rural militias of *Janjaweed* in its pay, which was a sham from the beginning to end, to play a double game by terrorizing both urban and rural populations in different parts of the country.

Second Bind

Al-Turabi claims that "he decided to join the ILM partly because of the weakness of the ILM. Ḥasan initially wondered whether it was worth joining the ILM, because he thought that the level of their knowledge and practice about Islam was less than his. However, when he saw the struggle between ILM and the Communist movement and the weak position of ILM toward its opponents, he felt that he should help the ILM to confront the strong Communist movement."[1] However, according to Mohamed al-Khair 'Abd al-Gadir, one of the founding members of ILM, it was Moḥamed Yousif Moḥamed who was assigned to help with writing the ILM's "manifesto," and he copied from Mohmed Ḥussian Haykal's book *Hayyat Mohamed* (The Life of Mohamed) "ideas about the Islamic civilization and the helplessness of European civilization in providing happiness to human beings in addition to ideas about social justice in Islam."[2] Later, Mohamed Yousif narrated that differently, he tried to reinvent that myth of uniqueness and sometimes tried to refashion the early history of the movement and congeal it within a contemporary context. This kind of refashioning of history manifests itself in such testimonies.

> Muhammad Yousuf wrote the communiqué to launch the movement, stating that the world was divided into two big warring blocs and the third force which should have stood up to these giants and apart from them was ineffective with its energies dissipated and wasted. Thus it was imperative to set up a new order based on Islam, because Islam was the only force capable of standing up to world powers. To achieve this, one had to start by setting up an Islamic society and an Islamic state based on Islamic socialism, and for this purpose it was imperative to liberate Sudan from colonialism so as to clear the way for the Islamic state.[3]

What is at issue here is the mode in which the third force is framed to fit a modern definition that was not part of the contemporary discourse.

Also, Yousif Ḥasan Sa'id, another founding member of ILM, was assigned to write a research paper about Islam and economic issues. Later, they started to receive some of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers' publications—primarily Ḥasan al-Banna's *Rasaiel* (messages) and Sayyid Qutb's *al-'Adala al-Ijtmaeiya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) from some of the Sudanese students studying in Cairo, like Mohamed al-Sayem.[4] What is most important is that it held the movement together by endowing different generations with what has been perceived by the Islamists, in general, and al-Turabi Sudanese Islamists, in particular, as "a unified Islamic view." This developed into an inner and outer group distinction that made the relationship between the two perceived as black and white. Although the Islamist started and continued

primarily as a product of public education, it was of a spirit that Hazem Kandil describes as "anti-intellectualism" that had always been what drove the whole cultivation and the maintenance processes of their identity.[5] This attitude toward "those who, in Collini's (2006:37) description, relish 'complicating the simple and obscuring the obvious,' manifests itself, first, in privileging sentiments and practices over enquiry; second, in the methodological censuring of arguments, and finally, in an aversion toward those with a background in social sciences. These three strategies work together to curb members likely to foster disagreements among the Brothers."[6] In general, the Islamists vigorously reject social sciences to be averse to secularism and all forms of Westernization and cultural intrusion as they have been claiming that is the way in keeping their "doctrine," or culture, or both pure within their declared raison d'être. It is not surprising that some of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt, together with the Saudi and Sudanese Salafi al-Turabi antagonists, continued to severely attack him and describe him as a secular person. Many books, articles, open attacks, and accusations, as would be explained later, continued and have not stopped even after his death. One of the well-known Sudanese Salafi activists, Moḥamed Mustafa 'Abd al-Gadir, and other Sudanese Salafis went far to describe al-Turabi in public as *kafir* (unbeliever) and *halik* (irredeemable or destructible) even after his death.[7] Whatever the case, the Sudanese Islamist movement favors obedience among its members over analytical thinking; so they have always promoted those from the fields of natural sciences, including *aṭibā bi la ḥidoud*[8] (physicians), lawyers, and engineers, who have no opinion. And they sidelined social scientists whose critical attitudes led them to withdraw from the movement.[9] This led us to examine the curious relationship between violent Islamists, before and after their regime, and natural science. It felt fragile because it was stubbornly violent against anything that opposed it. According to that Islamist reliance on vocal and actual violence and their idea about the state, when in power, as a representation of them, outwitted their political and ideological discourse. As a result the movement grew as a closed and self-satisfied entity psychologically detached (*'uzla shu'uriyya*) from their surrounding with "little knowledge and deep faith" as Yousif al-Qaradawi would ask.[10] When they assumed power they were caught in a dilemma, as al-Mahboob Abdel Salam clearly confessed, what was very clear from the regime's early days in 1989, *al-Boas al-Fikri* (the poverty of knowledge) of all those who claimed to be specialized in classical Islamic field of Islamic fields of studies and even those who lived all their life with the Islamists movement.[11] Moreover, al-Turabi later admitted that the main problem they experienced in power was that they suffered from a deficiency in *fiqh al-Hukum* (the jurisprudence of governance).[12]

Third Bind

However, within the Islamists' narrative about leadership during the infancy of the ILM, there were two important aspects. The first was that most of the ILM's founding members admitted that Babikir Karrar and Moḥmed Yousif played a leading role in forming the group. However, they said that there was no elected leader of the group, but because of Karrar's overwhelming character, he was taken as one though did not "receive formal ratification." The second was that during al-Turabi's youth and adulthood, he and some of his colleagues lived through the time of the early emergence of Moḥamoud Moḥamed Ṭaha—another Sudanese Islamist who was "admired by young Islamists for his combative style, while arousing the hostility of Ṣūfi leaders by touching the same raw nerve the Mahdi touched a century earlier in claiming direct divine mandate to reshape Ṣūfism (and the totality of Islam)."[13] Hence, and many of the founding members of the ILM agree with el-Affendi's sources, "ILM members, who were all students, did not feel confident enough to lead an Islamic movement, and kept looking around for someone who would guide them. In 1951 Muhammad Yousuf traveled to Rufaʿa to meet Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha who was in retreat there, after a lengthy discussion he decided that Ṭaha's views were too unorthodox for him to lead the movement."[14] Another member of the ILM, Yousuf Ḥasan Saʿid, made a similar attempt to find a leader in Shaikh ʿAli ʿAbd al-Rahman, but once more he came back unconvinced. Later, and most likely due to *alwalad al dofaa* (classmates) competition or jealousies, Yousuf Saʿid was dismissed, as he maintained in a later interview in June 2017 or he was "quick to relinquish his post and resign rather than fight Karār and his group."[15] Those who blame the deeply rooted history of split and conflict among the ranks of the Islamist movement should trace that back to its founding days of Islamism and the history of the Islamists as a "band of warring brothers." However, what is important about Karrar's legacy and contribution to Sudanese Islamism, which al-Turabi built on later and became part of his insatiable drive for success, was the mobilization of the University College of Khartoum/University of Khartoum production of "nobility."

Al-Turabi joined Babikir Karrar's ILM in 1951. It might be difficult to assert such intellectual influence; however, many would argue that Babikir Karrar's intellectual influence on al-Turabi was more than meets the eye. In many respects, Karrar's ideas of the Sudanization of the Islamic movement, and what was considered by some as unorthodox views regarding women and social justice, might have had a deeper influence on al-Turabi's thoughts. From a very early period, Karrar acted as if he was the representation of the conclusion arrived at by such ideological thought and the solution for such questions. But once again, historically, two distinct

types of "models" of what is described as Sudanese ideological parties were built on the ambitions of being authentic: Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha of the Republican Party first and 'Abdel Khaliq Maḥjoub of the Communist Party later. In this sense, one could say that al-Turabi could have followed the Sudanese tradition rather than Karrar's. Yet, al-Turabi's Islamism was not based on the Muslim Brotherhood, as al-Turabi himself was not a typical Ḥasan al-Banna Muslim Brother, as will be explained later. In this sense, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was not a model to emulate, as he clearly said to Moḥamed Elhachimi Ḥamdi "the Islamic movement in Sudan is very much aware of its own history. It might in its early days have assumed the form of Egyptian experience, which in turn has emulated an earlier model of Islamic life, mainly characterized by education and reform."[16] Al-Turabi carefully explained that "within a short time, however, and after the initial stage of its existence, the movement developed a marked sense of self-awareness, positioning itself accurately within its own specific time and place parameters."[17] Hence, such a position in Islamism endowed him with the knowledge of how to act, how to live, and what schemes of Islamism to consider relevant to the personality cult of "the leader" in a totalitarian setting and to a certain extent in establishing the Islamist republic after 1989. And so he observed how he and his Islamists disconnected themselves from religiosity to pursue an un-Godly approach, which would explain an earlier point that the Islamists created a new model of separation of religion and the state. Al-Turabi clearly explains what they planned to do and what to avoid in a situation in which "the activists become prisoners of the means or forms they [were] using to reach God; this can prove an obstacle when life around them changes, and we have been trying to avoid such situations."[18] The general political development that followed the 1989 coup undermined religion in every sector, because the means and forms used before to reach God where replaced by violence, and eventually violence became the state.

Fourth Bind

In very different terms, the college nobility of Karār *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami* fought a very vicious fight against other Egyptian-oriented Brotherhood branches in Sudan. Al-Turabi then was a student in his last year in college, and later the fight continued during al-Turabi's absence in Britain (1955–1957) where he prepared for his MA at the University of London. During al-Turabi's last year at the University College of Khartoum different branches of Islamism held what was called the 'Eid Congress. Before that congress, in 1951, members of the ILM met for seven hours with Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, to bring the Brotherhood members to ILM ranks. According to Yousif Ḥasan

Sa'id the meeting materialized into nothing. Another similar attempt was tried with those who were members of the 'Ali Ṭalballah group, who officially adopted the name al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon in 1954. On August 21, 1954, at Omdurman Club, a group of Islamists from the three branches met, and they decided to adopt the name al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon, which represented a triumph to those who identified with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. A new body was elected to lead the movement headed by Mohamed al-Khair Abdel al-Gadir while Ali Talballah was sidelined. However, in an attempt to reconcile with Karrar, the congress agreed that "the movement would be "a Sudan-based" undertaking (i.e., not directly connected with the Egyptian group), and it should maintain independence from all other political parties."[19] Although this tendency transformed into the main trend that built the contemporary Islamist movement. The divisions among the ranks of this trend have been a significant factor over the course of the last 50 years. In all of these instances, tensions and conflicts arose among the ranks of the Islamists not simply over *ijtihad* or Islam-related issues and constructions. Rather, the Islamists' uneasy disagreements, confrontations, and splits were over issues that related to undercurrent frustrations, which prompted the growth of power groups within the movement that succeeded in chasing out each emerging leadership and its supporters. Considered in this light, perhaps, one can find a pattern repeating itself in different forms four times since 'Ali Talb Allah managed to regroup his Egypt-oriented Brotherhood members to force Mohamed Khair 'Abdel al-Gadir to resign as the secretary general of the movement. The removal of 'Abdel al-Gadir was to be followed by a serious conflict, which ended up in a major split that forced the celebrated founder of Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami, Babikir Karrar, and his supporters to secede and establish a rival organization under the name al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group). That dispute, according to Islamists' historians, was due to Karrar's fascination and enthusiasm for "revolutionary aspects of Mahdism."[20] El-Affendi argues that "Bābikir Karār was fascinated by Mahdism, a factor which could have contributed to his alienation from the rest of Ikhwan who came mostly from a unionist background."[21] But such disrespect for certain aspects of the Sudanese life experience is the trend that defined the Islamists' pursuit that their legitimation does not come from the past similar to other religious representations in the country. This trend has been clearly reflected in the articulations of the Islamists in general and al-Turabi in particular. But the other and most serious competing tendencies that led to the conflict were twofold. On the one hand, Karrar was an advocate of a revivalist ideology that incorporates an Islamic socialism as "the basis of which is spiritual brotherhood, and community and moral economic life." For that reason, some consider Karrar, in many respects, the thinker and the leader for the Islamist movement since its inception. It nearly goes

without saying that those who embraced his ideas that blend Sudanese-based traditions with Islamic socialism were intellectually oriented and progressive, while those who opposed them were conservative and more responsive to the influence of the Egyptian Brotherhood. On the other hand, the conservative trend has also rejected Karrar's emphasis on the primacy of *tarbiya*, or spiritual, upbringing and political awakening of the people as a prerequisite to political activism.

The removal of Karrar was followed by the emergence of a younger generation led by al-Rashid al-Ṭahir. But al-Ṭahir's leadership was severely damaged by his implication in a failed coup attempt in 1959 and his subsequent imprisonment. In prison, "only a minority of loyalists expressed solidarity with him, while the majority were of the opinion that he should be disavowed. This left al-Ṭahir feeling abandoned and alienated him from the brotherhood even further."[22] Furthermore, "his dismissal from the leadership in 1962 while still in prison made al-Ṭahir even angrier because he felt there was no proper hearing of his case. On his release from prison in 1963, al-Ṭahir opened a legal practice in his hometown of Gadaref in a deliberate move to maintain his distance from former colleagues."[23] After the 1964 October Revolution, al-Ṭahir was brought back into the leadership and later chosen to represent the Ikhwan in the second Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa government only to be bulldozed with others by al-Turabi, the October Revolution celebrity who had recently come from Paris to assume the Islamist's leadership since that day.

Fifth Bind

The fifth bind relates to the time after World War II when they went beyond the Islamist "small history" of the iron box they locked themselves into, to a singular ethos seeing themselves as an anti-communist entity. This is how they continued to develop the inherent tendency against the Other and arrive at large-scale violence, torture, and ethnic cleansing in 1989 after they assumed power. Yet, the Sudanese nationalist movement took a different turn after World War II, and there were many nontrivial reasons to look at beyond the Islamist small history and its narrative. In order to situate the Sudanese movement in its post-World War II period, one might need to explore the world's transformations that led to an adequate notion of ant-colonialism. It may also be necessary to explore how the distinct successive phases of the nationalist's desire developed into a modern and united country. What happened in post-World War II era had profound effects on colonized regions of the world. The war and its consequences changed the balance of power, as the major colonial empires in Africa, France, and Great Britain were no longer as great; they were reduced to second rank, and the United States and

Soviet Union emerged as the new world superpowers. They also introduced themselves as anti-colonial powers, and they supported what the new United Nation promoted and supported: the demand of self-determination among colonized peoples and the ratification of the UN charter in 1945, which placed it right in the framework of international law and diplomacy.

The 1940s was an important landmark in the pressure of Sudanese national-ism, it was also a landmark in the development and "buildup of the organs of self-government with the aim of eventual independence."[24] Sudan's Governor General, Herbert Huddleston (1940–1947), "convened The Sudan Admin-istration Conference on April, 1946. Working under the general direction of Civil Secretary, Mr. Robertson (later Sir James), the conference was essentially a body of Sudanese government employees, of whom eight were British. To these were added sixteen Sudanese members: eight represent-ing the Advisory Council, seven officials, and Sayyid al-Ṣiddīq, the son of Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdi."[25] However, on one hand, the expressions of the Sudanese nationalism and its functioning within the socio-historical conditions of that particular period clearly shaped the field of discourse as a battleground for political power of the emerging and competing Sudanese political entities. Sayyid ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi's "usefulness to the gov-ernment, first appraised in 1914 and proven decisively in 1924, was revealed again in 1931 when he helped to settle a strike at Gordon College. As usual the government was privately embarrassed by its public obligation to Sayyid, and as always he exploited his advantage to win new concessions. From 1931 he began concerted attempts to win over the educated class who had, in 1924, largely dismissed him as an opportunistic collaborator."[26] This time Sayyid ʿAbd al-Rahman achieved three goals: first by supporting charities espoused by graduates and by unceasing publicity, through the Mahdist Council of the Intelligentsia and other devices, he portrayed himself as the natural patron of the educated."[27] Second, in his competition with Sayyid ʿAli al-Mirghani, he used his "notable advantages, wealth, and apparent success in influencing the government . . . [and] turned his attention to the educated elite," which he substituted for the unfavorable position of his numerous followers who were "poorer, less educated, and less influential than those of Sayyid ʿAli."[28] Third, by 1945 Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥman officially estab-lished the Umma Party separate from the Ansār. However, the "association with ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Mahdi was so obvious that, far from succeeding in separating his religious and political roles, the Umma Party was widely seen as a step toward combining them with a modern party apparatus. Indeed, the party quickly subsumed the small *qawmiyyin* [Nationalist] group of moderate independents like Aḥmed Yusuf Hashim and Moḥamed Aḥmed Maḥjoub. But rather than provide an umbrella for no-unionists, the Umma convinced

many non-Mahdists to support the Ashiqqa against the Sayyid's apparent monarchical tendencies."[29]

On the other hand, al-Siddiq al-Mahdi (1911–1961) later, al-Turabi's father-in-law and father of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi al-Turabi's intimate enemy, is younger than 'Abdalla al-Turabi Ḥasan's father, brought an ancient problem so directly a new: First by the introduction of neo-Mahdiyya by Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥman. Second: it was followed by the public appearance of the second generation of his son al-Ṣiddiq. Third, the emergence of the younger generation of his grandson al-Sadiq and to a certain extent his granddaughter Wisal al-Siddiq as al-Turabi's wife. Unlike al-Turabi's father, who graduated from al-M'ahad al-'Ilmi, al-Ṣiddiq Mahdi graduated from the college of engineering at Gordon Memorial College. Profoundly, the neo-Mahdism father gave to Sudan a son and grandchildren driven by inner dynamism, ambition, and success different from most of those human beings by whom they were surrounded, including the heirs of Wad al-Turabi. But there is also a certain parallel between the grandchildren al-Sādiq al-Mahdi and Ḥasan al-Turabi that deserve attention. Above all, both were filled with passionate desire but different temperaments to dominate their Sudanese society. Al-Turabi's desire was to violently alter it, while al-Ṣadiq wished to be accepted democratically to rule over it. Al-Turabi, who was cynical about the Mahdiyya and the al-al-Mahdi family while he was at high school ended in marriage to the daughter of al-Sidiq al-Mahdi and the sister of al-Ṣadiq in 1961. Wisal al-Ṣiddiq al-Mahdi, whom al-Turabi met as a student at the University of Khartoum, was a reminder to him to "his father's treatment toward his sisters because 'Abdalla did not send his daughters to school. Although 'Abdalla gave his daughters a minimum education including reading and writing, he did even allow them to attend his open classes in the house. Hasan felt that was unfair."[30]

Sixth Bind: Islamism and Murderous Identities

Among different parties, the colonial and the nationalists, the Advisory Council, "seen by its sponsors as 'the most far-reaching step yet taken in the government's declared policy of associating the Sudanese Administration with their country' [as stated by Henderson] was criticized because it excluded the south and contained too many sanctions."[31] Each one of the colonial systems, and the anti-colonial movement in regard to the phenomenon of racism, led the Sudanese to articulate their identity violently, and the issue of identity then became murderous. The idea of Sudan that the Sudanese were concerned to develop involved a new kind of knowledge, religion, anthropology, history, literature, and politics. The colonial state related to the historical time

of the Sudanese, the racial construction, and differentiation of the colonized human landscape.

When the British invaded Sudan in the closing days of the nineteenth century, they drew upon the "Victorian doctrine of racial degeneration," which "supported views of 'oriental' history as a legend of decay, of the erosion of Islam, and decline of its once glorious civilization to ignorance, indulgence, and excess. But if Arabs were deemed backward, fallen from levels they had once attained, they were nonetheless more highly evolved than Africans."[32] In the colonized Sudan, "a social organization of tradition" emerged within the Sudanese community of conversation that related to the vicissitudes of the high culture or civilization of an Arab origin and Islam. It was a minimizing factor of the dominate colonial culture that took on the emerging discourse of *Ummatn Asluha lil Arab Dinuha Khiaru Dinin Youhab Izuha Khalid la Yalien* (a nation whose origin is for the Arabs; its religion is the best religion to be loved; its glory is immortal unrelenting).[33] Thus, all ensuing local expressions of the Sudanese Arab identity in its relationship to the past found its unity of meaning, basic paradoxes, and different articulations in their imaginations and memories within such provinces of meaning. The Islamist at first advocated an "essential" allegiance of identity they recognized themselves as Muslim first and their orientation is universal; later they deteriorated to find for each one of them as many ingredients of tribal identities as they could.

The "African" or the "Negro" within that concept, as Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston—one of the leading British empire-builders—noted, "more than any other human type, has been marked out by his mental and physical characteristics as the servant of other races."[34] The Negro, according to Johnston, "is possessed of great physical strength, docility, cheerfulness of disposition, a short memory for sorrows and cruelties, and an easily aroused gratitude for kindness and just dealing. He does not suffer from homesickness to the overbearing extent that afflicts other peoples torn from their homes, and, provided he is well fed, he is easily made happy."[35] As R. Hunt Davis concludes, "the result of Johnston's work and that of later scholars such as the ethnologist C. G. Seligman was to create a climate of opinion that lead most Westerners to think that everything of value in Africa originated outside the continent, usually from supposed Caucasoid sources."[36] On this doctrine they superimposed the idea of racial difference between northern Sudanese ethnic groups, described as Arabs, and other ethnicities, depicted as Negros, in other parts of the country. This ideology of difference, which was intensified by the totalitarian condominium military regime, organized the Sudanese societies "so that it [the ideology] produced on the best possible terms, from the viewpoint of the mother country, exports which provided only a very low and stagnating return to labour."[37] It transformed the population landscape into a system of racial ranking, which divided the people into Arab-Semitic

people over Hamites or Nubians, and Nubians over Sudanic and Nilotic peoples (Negros).

This defined ranking was both created by, and served, the political regime that designed it. Sir Harold MacMichael, a longtime British administrator in Sudan, editor of "Sudan Notes and Records," and author of several books about Sudan, chief among them *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan*, wrote "the line of division, geographical, ethnical, and cultural, between the predominantly Arab north and purely negroid south is well marked and obvious, and still, as we shall see, is potent as a political factor."[38] MacMichael, after a visit to the South in 1927, described the Upper Nile as a "Serbonian bog" of the "lowest racial elements," a "monkeydom of nations" in a state of "semi-simian savagery." MacMichael came to this conclusion after he gave a broad generalization of the country and its people. He described some as a "highly educated, intelligent, and progressive element" that came to being in towns and large villages, others as an "aboriginal pagan stock" in the Nuba Mountains, others as a "primitive negroid . . . of whose origin is little is known," and still others as "a quick-witted, musical brown folks of medium stature," which are the Zande.[39] But what makes MacMichael's conclusion especially important is that he represents one of the proto-colonialists. Mahmood Mamdani describes this group as representatives of "the confluence of two institutions, scientific racism and scientific bureaucracy," that were "key to shaping" the colonial power.

Out of this came out the "drive for mastery over men," as Ashis Nandy explained, not merely as by-product of "a faulty political economy but also of a worldview which believes in the absolute superiority of the human over the nonhuman and the subhuman, the masculine over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the ahistorical, and the modern or progressive over the traditional or the savage." Here, "it has become more and more apparent that genocides, ecodisasters, and ethnocides are but the underside of corrupt sciences and psychopathic technologies wedded to new secular hierarchies, which have reduced major civilizations to the status of a set of empty rituals."[40] The basic premise of the dynamics of the phenomenon of "the idea of the south." It was not the character of the Sudanese citizen by which the colonialists split the country into Arabs and Negros but was the colonial racism and other peoplehood's impulse of a homo-referential that created the north as the dominate power and the South as an annihilated some; thus it turned the subject into object. At a phenomenal level, the "southern" Sudanese found themselves as the Other who lacked self-worth, or as has been said again and again, as a second class citizen. The Islamists throughout their history, only once, put the S in "South" in their agenda when Ali Talb Allah's short leadership of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood or *Ikhwan*. Abdelwahab el-Affendi described Talb Allah's attitude as "influenced by the romantic vision which coloured the view of early nationalists toward the

south. Originally belonging to the pro-Egyptian Ashiqqa Party, he champi-
oned vigorously for north–south unity in the run-up to the 1947 Juba Confer-
ence and even married a southern woman to emphasize his commitment to
unity. His successors were not so keen on the issue, and their attention was
more attracted to events in the north or across the border in Egypt."[41]

   What was more important, however, for the entire Sudanese citizenship,
the Sudanese consciousness, and their understanding of their political, moral,
and human considerations, was that the Islamist rule, in particular, was more
responsible for giving insignificant opportunities and reasons for its Islamist
ideology to disintegrate and for forcing different Sudanese communities to
walk away from their regime and its state than many precolonial and post-
colonial regimes. The presence of 'Omer al-Bashir in Juba on July 9, 2011,
celebrating the independence of the Southern Sudan Republic, was a reminder
of another bizarre celebration for the same event in Khartoum. Al-Ṭayib
Muṣṭafa, owner of the radically Islamist Just Peace Forum, the notorious
daily newspaper *al-Intibaha*, and al-Bashir's uncle—who the journalists'
satires describe as the presidential uncle—celebrated the South's secession
by slaughtering a black bull and lifting placards expressing their jubilation.
Mustafa and his forum members toured different parts of Khartoum during
which they distributed sweets and claimed that secession of the South marked
Sudan's true independence. Mustafa, his paper, and his forum zealously advo-
cated for the separation of the South on blatant racist and religious grounds.
They agitated that the north and the south constituted two irreconcilable
entities in terms of race, religion, culture, and political affiliations and ori-
entations. But this is not all. Mustafa and his forum were not alone in harbor-
ing such racist attitudes toward Sudanese citizens. Al-Bashir was famous for
using racist slurs, epithets, and unacceptable terms to describe other Sudanese
from the South and Darfur. Yet, to take the problem of negative impulses
seriously, the key issue is that Islamism by itself was the chief source of the
deeply embedded counter revolutionary attitude and the iron cage in which
it and its members have been imprisoned for ages. This attitude permeated
other isms, including colonial and postcolonial totalitarian traditions and
experiences, which became remarkably similar but paradoxically enough
complementary to the Islamist one. Yet no matter how people evaluate these
turn-of-past events, that particular story was in most respects a reminder of
many missed opportunities by making the "Sudan the possible" impossible.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH FACTOR

In the summer of 1955, the University College of Khartoum sent Ḥasan
al-Turabi to London to study law at the University of London. According

to al-Turabi, he studied jurisprudence, criminal law, constitutional law, and international law at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at King's College. It was the time when "the inevitability of decolonization over a near term became more apparent year by year; security decisions were pushed upward to the metropolitan capitals." Which "in the process, they became suffused with more global reason of the imperial states. Sudan is a case in point; the abiding fear in London of an enlarged and militant Egypt astride what was still regarded as the Suez 'lifeline' to British position in Asia played pivotal role in London's decolonization strategies.[42] Overriding priority was given to organizing a power transfer process assuring an independent separate Sudan."[43] This turning point in Sudan's colonial government brought despair. "Sir Robert Howe assumed that Egypt would 'employ every means, fair or foul, to undermine the British position and capture 'the soul of the Sudan'"[44] When al-Turabi arrived in London, he left behind him at home "the future of the Sudan, whether it should have become completely independent from both Egypt and Britain, or linked in some form of association with Egypt, was vigorously discussed throughout the country."[45] Some assumed that the victory of the National Unionist Party in the first national election, and the subsequent appointment of Ismail al-Azhari as the first Sudanese prime minister, would lead the Sudanese to finally choose a union with Egypt. For the majority of those who were considered "unionists" then, and the Khatmiyya and their leader Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, in particular, who cooperated with Egypt during most of the colonial period, that relationship with Egypt was a move in the right direction. The view of "unionism" "as a means rather than an end [was] gradually developed after the disappointment of 1924, and it was fostered throughout by oscillation of Egyptian governments and advocates of the Unity of the Nile valley between the notion that was based on sovereignty, conquest, and the right of the Egyptians to rule Sudan on one hand, and the contradictory view that it was based on fraternity and brotherhood of the Egyptians and the Sudanese on the other."[46] Furthermore, "unionism" as a strategy "served the purpose of resisting and counteracting the rumored plans of the Anṣār for creation of a Mahdist monarchy in the Sudan." Within this Cold War between the two Sayyids, in 1953 Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Mahadi "allayed the fears of his political and sectarian opponents by publicly declaring that he was not interested in monarchy but favoured the establishment of a democratic republican regime in the Sudan."[47]

Three important events dominated the Sudanese debate during that period. The first took place even before al-Turabi left Sudan for London. On March 1, 1954, The Umma Party leaders and membership and the Ansār were embittered by their unexpected defeat at first the national elections, clearly and violently demonstrated that they would not, under any circumstances, accept any form of association with Egypt and that the unity of the country

would be jeopardized unless Sudan became independent. The first march was planned by the new Sudanese government for the ceremonial opening of the new parliament. A large number of foreign visitors, including General Mohamed Najib, the president of Egypt, were invited for the occasion to tell the world, including Egypt, that the Sudanese were taking steps toward independence. "The Anṣār demonstrators clashed with the police and security forces to whom the arrangements of the day had been entrusted. Hundreds of people were injured and several were killed. The ceremony was cancelled, and the guests, including Najib, left Khartoum the same day or shortly after. Even those who were genuinely convinced that the Unity of the Nile valley was the best policy for Egypt and Sudan began wondering whether the realization of this aim would be possible in the future."[48]

The second event was the humiliating dismissal and crack down on various members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were allies to Nāsir before, for their vocal opposition to Nāsir's administration later. The Sudanese anger for the dismissal of Najib was captured by a prominent Sudanese poet and later member of the first independent Sudan head of State Council, Aḥmed Moḥamed Ṣalih, in a poem titled "'Ila Najib fi 'Aliya hi" (To Najib in his Glory), which was published in Sudanese newspapers and learned by heart by many Sudanese. Najib "who was half Sudanese and played an important [role] in concluding the Agreements in 1952 and 1953, was held in high regard by the Sudanese."[49] Moreover, was "Nāṣir's suppression, first of the Muslim Brotherhood, with which the Sudanese generally sympathized, and then the Communists whose counterparts in the Sudan were thereby also alienated."[50]

The third event was the Suez Crisis, which was also named the al'idwan al-thoulathi (Tripartite Aggression) in Arabic. It was an invasion of Egypt in late 1956 by Israel followed by the United Kingdom and France. The aims were to regain Western control of the Suez Canal, which was nationalized by President Nāṣir that year, and to remove the Egyptian president from power. After the fighting started, political pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations led to a withdrawal by the three invaders. The episode humiliated Great Britain and France and strengthened Nāṣir.

The Sudanese declared independence from the parliament. On December 19, 1955, the following resolution was unanimously approved: "We, the members of the House of the Representatives in Parliament assembled, declared in the name of the Sudanese people that the Sudan is to become a fully independent state. The Arabic version reads . . . the Sudan has become a fully independent sovereign state. It was a *fait accompli* which neither Egypt nor Britain could prudently refuse to accept."[51]

From al-Turabi's early time in London to the final days of his life, a very complicated relationship developed between him and his brother-in-law

al-Sādiq al-Mahdi. When I tried to describe the relationship of al-Turabi to al-Sadiq in written messages as an "intimate enemy," al-Sadiq politely declined to comment on that. When al-Turabi arrived in London, al-Sadiq was already in Oxford. He transferred from the University College of Khartoum. Al-Turabi gave Masaki Kobayashi an interview about al-Sadiq's transfer to Oxford, which al-Sadiq disputed as a similar disagreement with the same person. According to al-Turabi, al-Sadiq "escaped from the Sudan because of the trouble between the Mahdi family and the police . . . on March 1, 1954."[52] Al-Sadiq gave his interviewee a detailed account about the transfer to Oxford. He said that "the reason for the transfer was administrative trouble with the college authority and not the problem Dr. al-Turabi mentioned.

Al-Sadiq entered the school of science in the college in 1953 but did not attend the first and second terms—only the third term. When the third term ended in 1954, despite the initial agreement between the college authority and al-Sadiq that he could move to the second year, the authority told him that he had to repeat the first year. However, the authority offered an alternative to going to Oxford. Al-Sadiq accepted the offer, took the entrance examination of the University of Oxford, and entered the university in 1954."[53]

Al-Turabi later added within the same interview to emphasize his professed difference to Marxism that allowed him to bring al-Sadiq "to more traditional Islamic ideas." According to al-Turabi, young al-Sadiq's ideas while at Oxford "were theoretically inclined to Marxism. His religiosity was less than Hassan, and Hassan often argued with al-Sadiq" about that. Reflecting on (at least) the professed "indifference" of Ḥasan al-Turabi to some moral considerations to his relationship with his brother-in-law, it might be hard to squire with evident hatred and cruelty so visible through the years that included all kind of injustice, prison, humiliation, and exile inflicted on al-Ṣadiq during the Islamist regime.

In 1995, al-Ṣadiq, while in exile in Cairo, published a short book titled *al-Wifaq al-Firaq byna al-al-Oma wa al-Jabha fi al-Sudan 1958–1995* (Accord and Discord Between Umma and Jabha [political parties] in the Sudan 1958–1995). In this book al-Ṣadiq tried not to refer to Ḥasan al-Turabi who arrived in Paris in 1959. He maintains that he was the only Sudan student in France at that time. He first took a diploma course in public law at the Sorbonne, and after he completed his PhD graduate program in comparative emergency law in which he compared the laws of Britain, France, and United States. About 12 years after Sayyid Qutb arrived on American shores, al-Turabi visited the United States for two months in the summer of 1960. The purpose for that visit, according to him, was to learn more about American law. It seems that al-Turabi was not aware of Qutb's impression of the States at that time and even after. His impression of the United States, as he said to his interviewee, was that "American society was very diverse, very

open, very simple, and naïve. American people work harder than the French people; however, they were the most ignorant people in the world: they did not know anything about other countries."[54]

His life experience and relationship with the main discourse about modernity within three metropolitan centers—Khartoum, London, and Paris—represent an added value to that cultural capital as part-and-parcel wholesalers of his *laïcité*, breaking away from culture, religion, and modernity. Ḥasan al-Turabi, who prides himself as *ibn al-thaqafa al-Farancia* (a son of French culture) created his own *laïcité*, not promoted but typified by the Islamist movement. It was more than a personal project. As early as 1962 as a graduate student in Paris, al-Turabi submitted a memorandum to the Fifth Congress of the Sudanese Ikhwan that proposed "the movement be transformed into an intellectual pressure group on the lines of the Fabian Society, and not to work as an independent party. Instead it should act through all the political parties and on all of them."[55] At the same time he attested that he started studying the French language while he was in England.[56] On the one hand, Ḥasan al-Turabi's *laïcité* represented a breakaway from culture, religion, and modernity. It depicted his own culture as primitive by despising the Ṣūfi Islam. It broke away from religion by reproaching the 'ulama and censured modernity by denouncing secularism. Typically, his brand of Islamism differentiated its field of action by designating religion and religiosity in different spheres that advanced "politics over religiosity and political action over theological reflections."[57]

Within this, however, al-Turabi's Islamism placed itself within a limited and limiting field of the secularism debate. However, al-Turabi attacked secularism and secularists all the time. Here, al-Turabi's Islamism built its own instruments and devices that then functioned outside what could be described as the religious thought of rationalization. As stated earlier, al-Turabi himself described the field of his Islamism as dominated by "students and university graduates everywhere [who] represent modernity, and they are the only current which exercises any measure of *ijtihad*, any review of history."[58] How his Islamists differ from other groups that relate to modernity, according to that, is based on an assumption and a generalization. He assumes that "liberal politicians and intellectuals are not interested in Islamic history, they are interested in European history; they want to transplant European institutions. They don't know how to grow them in soil. They look so much to the West that they are not actually renewing, they are not deciding any *ijtihad*. If there are any *mujtahidin*, they are the Islamists now."[59] The Sudanese *mujtahdin*, according to him, are "young people who are equal; there was no one who could proclaim to be senior in age to become an absolute *sheikh*."[60] These groups, or *lumpen intelligencia* as described by Guilain Denoeux and Olivier Roy before

him, are "not usually clerics but young, university educated intellectuals who claim for themselves the right to interpret the true meaning of religion (their actual knowledge of Islam is typically sketchy)."[61] At the same time, their reference presents the political discourse of al-Turabi and those who blindly follow him in denouncing secularism as a "political discourse in religious garb."[62]

In this sense Islamism is inside and outside secularism at the same time. In its "two-sided relation to modernity and the West at the very heart of Islamist ideology, lies a powerful, comprehensive critique of the West and what Islamists see as the corrupting political and cultural influence of the West on Middle East societies."[63] On the other hand, "the Islamists' reliance on concepts drawn from the Islamic tradition also indicates a desire to break away from Western terminology. Hence, Islamism is a decidedly modern phenomenon in at least two critical respects: the profile of its leaders and its reliance on Western technology."[64] Ḥasan al-Turabi added another aspect to his Islamism by being inside and outside Salafism at the same time. While he agrees with the Ṣalafis in denigrating Ṣūfi Islam, he takes a step further within his *laïcité* by bragging that he is a child of French culture and disapproving of the 'ulama and their institutions. Hence, al-Turabi's Islamism has floated free of modernity and its secular underpinnings, free of Islam and its scholarship, or 'ulama, and free of culture and its Ṣūfi representations. That such provocation riddled with ideological exceptionalism, one would argue, has set him free to practice his unchecked *ijtihād* and to critically challenge everybody else, since only a few people—his disciples—could be conformists. Aḥmed Kamal al-Din argues that al-Turabi "gave himself unlimited freedom," but I would say that freedom went wild by having given no attention to the conventions and the rules of engagement within the local, Islamist, and Islamic discourse. It developed laissez-faire—forms of verbal and later physical violence—that evolved around a system of conflict and became a group-binding function for a full differentiation of the group and its individual members from the outside world.

Hence, the differentiation processes and functions of his discourse for how and where to assemble and construct his space as an individual and a group with God, according to some prevailing worldviews, has become subject to controversy. In this field, al-Turabi's Islamism represents an unthought-of form of *laïcité*—not secularization—that presents religion as an enterprise and a product that functions through a system of production that could manufacture and distribute its product through a new breed of wholesale and retail vendors. Only in this sense is Ḥasan al-Turabi similar to Sayyid Qutb. Each one is a wholesale vendor but within his own terms. Nevertheless, for Ḥasan al-Turabi the Sudanese Islamist, Sudanese Islamism, and Islamist each seek a different interpretation.

Such a worldview and conduct made this impulse of insensitivity toward their surroundings a recurring phenomenon. In addition, the uncompromising stand of al-Turabi and his Islamists against all shades of non-Islamists—from communists to other secular individuals and groups—makes no room for the Other, who is perceived by al-Turabi and other Islamists to constitute a main threat within a Muslim society. Hence, it became the Islamists primary goal to keep secularists at a distance, expelled if possible, or eliminated without feeling remorse. These two modes of impulses opened the way for a callous and never-ending war of attrition between both the Islamists and their insignificant Other, as the presence of each side is perceived as ephemeral. In retrospect, we have seen within the last five decades that both sides have been living in a "state of suspended extinction," as each side has been turned by the other into an object that should be eliminated through the state apparatus of coercion or private violence. Both state and private violence grew stronger over time, especially during the Cold War when the governing elite and their rivals continued to accord and fortify their power pursuit to be exploited and played out within the rivalries and competition between the superpowers.

Nevertheless, al-Turabi made desperate attempts to go to the Sudanese political market, turning to everything from the university campus and wallpapers, to the party newspapers and magazines to sell himself and his version of Islamism to different young generations of Sudanese with poor elementary religious learning. In this respect, al-Turabi's Islamism and Islamists emerged as an autonomous and a self-satisfied entity antagonistic to almost every representation within the local and regional surroundings. It has always been self-denying democracy advocating for a vague notion of *shura*. It has never been a professed commitment to human rights, a policy of choice, or tolerance of the Other—a situation that earned them the reputation of being fascists.

NOTES

1. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Ḥasan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement* (University of Durham, unpublished dissertation, 1996) 40.

2. Moḥamed al-Khair 'Abdel Gadir, *Nashaat al-Ḥarakah al-Islamiiyya fi al-Sudan 1946–1956* (The emergence of the Islamist Movement in the Sudan 1946–1956) (Khartoum, al-Dar al-Sudaniyya lil Kutub, 1999) 66.

3. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 48.

4. Ḥasan al-Banna, who was assassinated at the age of 42, did not leave behind more than "a sketchy memoir, and collection of epistles (*rasa'il*): a patchy compilation of memoranda, public speeches, organizational propositions, and handful of

homilies. Among these, brothers are mostly required to familiarize themselves with ten-page Epistle of Edification (*Risalat al-Ta'alim*)—usually shortened to the teachings—which lay down ten pillars of oath of allegiance (*arkan al-bai'a*)" (Kandil 2015: 17).

5. Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015) 10.

6. Ibid.

7. https://youtu.be/8kmmm2MiJ2U.

8. The Sudanese satire detects the noticeable number of physicians in the leadership of the Islamist movement and regime as *Médecins Sans Frontières*, or Doctors without Borders.

9. Within the recent history of al-Turabi Islamism and after 1964, many medicine and other natural science students who were called *cadir al-'unif* (the violence staff) emerged. Chief among them was al-Tayyib Ibrahim, nicknamed *sikha*, or the iron rod. He was a medical student who was notorious for the use of a rod against students' political opponents. From the late 1960s to the late 1990s, these Islamist students resorted to violence in order to intimidate their opponents and advance their cause. Many students lost their lives in these campus wars. Later, after the Islamists assumed power through a coup in 1989, more members from the natural sciences assumed leading positions in the notorious security apparatus and its infamous ghost house. Those include, but are not limited to, geneticist Nafi 'Ali Nafi (PhD) from the University of California, Davis and Salah Abdalla (Gosh) from the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Engineering. Gosh was accused of being an architect of the genocide in Darfur. He was "listed in a confidential annex to a January 30th Security Council report that identifies the 17 Sudanese individuals whom a panel of the UN experts concluded were responsible for war crimes and impeding the peace process. The panel recommended to freeze foreign assets and ban international travel for these individuals. They include also, Mohamed al-Atta Fadl al-Mula, the Director General of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (2009–to due). Al-Atta, graduated like Salah from the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Engineering. Before he broke with the Islamists after al-Mufasala, Khalil Ibrahim, the founder of the main Darfur rebel group, Justice and Equality (JEM), was Amir al-Jihad in South Sudan recruited *Dababeen* (Tanks suicide bombers) against SPLM/SPLA insurgency.

10. The psychological detachment or separation from society or state by feeling or consciousness, as opposed to actual or physical separation from society, is one the issues that the Islamists followed as a practice different to *al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra* (excommunication and migration or flight), which was established by 'Ali 'Abdullah Isma'il but became better known after 1969 under the leadership of Shukri Mustafa, an agricultural engineer from Asyut.

11. Al-Mahboob Abd al-Salam, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Soudaniyya: Dierat al-Daw wa Khiout al-Dhalam,* [the Sudanese Islamic Movement: The Circles of Light and the Threads of Darkness] (Cairo, Maktabat Jazirat al-Ward, 2009) 120.

12. Al-Turabi said that in a TV interview with the Egyptian journalist Muna Shazali http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksTo7V0Jels (2011).

13. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 44.

14. Ibid.

15. An interview with Dr. Yousif Ḥasan Saʿid conducted by Ḥasan Abd al-Hamid published in www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=حوار-مع-د-يوسف-حسن-سعيد

16. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Leader: Conversations with Ḥasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) 14.

17. Ibid.

18. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Harka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan: al-Tatuor, al-Kasb, al-Manhaj* (Khartoum, Maʿahad al-Bihouth was al-Dirasat al-Ijtamaiyia, 1992) 26.

19. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 55.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 78.

23. Ibid.

24. Muddathir ʿAbdel Rahim, *Imperialism & Nationalism in the Sudan* (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1986) 157.

25. Ibid.

26. M. W. Daly, *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934–1956* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 72.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Hasan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement* (University of Durham, unpublished dissertation, 1996) 37.

31. Moḥamed ʿOmer Bashir, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan* (London, Rex Collings, 1974) 165.

32. Janice Boddy, *Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press) 32.

33. This verse is from the famous poem of the Graduates Congress *lil ʿOula* (To the Heights) by Khidir Hamad (1910–1970), who was one of the early Gordon College graduates who effectively participated in establishing the Graduates Congress. He was the secretary general of the National Unionist Party. He assumed ministerial positions in several Sudanese governments and leading positions in the Arab League. He was a member of the Sudanese Head of State Council from 1967 to 1969 when it was dissolved by Nimiari military coup 1969.

34. Sir Harry Johnston, *A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899) 91.

35. R. Hunt Davis, "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History." *African Affairs* 383–400.

36. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin." *Journal of Peace and Research* 9, no. 2 (1972) 105–120.

37. Ibid.

38. H. A. MacMichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan: and Some Accounts of the People Who Proceeded them and the Tribes Inhabiting Darfur* (New York, Barnes and Nobles, 1967) 17.

39. Ibid.

40. Nandy, Exiled at Home vi.

41. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa," *The African Affairs* 89, no. 356 (July 1990) 371–389.

42. What has been described as the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 began on July 23, 1952 by the Free Officers Movement. It was led by Mohamed Naguib (born in Khartoum in 1901 and died 1984), the first president of the republic of Egypt, and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), the second president of Egypt from 1956 until his death. The Revolution was initially aimed at overthrowing and abolishing the monarchy to establish a republic, end the British occupation to Egypt, and secure the independence of Sudan.

43. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994) 203.

44. M. W. Daly, *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934–1956* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 352.

45. Muddathir 'Abdel Raḥim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study of Constitutional and Political Development* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969) 221.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Hassan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement* (Durham, Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham, 1–6) 43 Unpublished Thesis 1966.

53. Ibid.

54. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in Sudan: The Impact of Hasan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement* (University of Durham, unpublished dissertation, 1996) 37.

55. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 64.

56. See, for example, Dr. 'Azzam Tamimi, *Murajaat maa al-Mufakir al-Islami Dr. Hasan al-Turabi: Session 1* (London, al-Hiwar TV, November 2009).

57. Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam Observed*, 6 (see chap. 1, no. 7).

58. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan Turabi* (Tampa, The World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993) 20.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam." *Middle East Policy* 9 no. 2 (2002) 56–81, 62.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

Part III

FROM THE REVOLUTION TO COUNTERREVOLUTION

Chapter 7

October: The Revolution
and Its Generation

One of the many notions of pride as a distinguishing feature of conduct within the Sudanese human experience is imbued with its own relationship to the 1964 October Revolution. This notion conceptualizes "the very historicity of forms of [the Islamists human] experience"[1] and its compact with modernity, which reflects, in a sense, an essential development of the dialectic, plan, and execution of a serious attempt at liberation.[2] This existential project emphasizes that "the history of nations, beginning with our own, is always presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of the subject."[3] Ḥasan al-Turabi and most of his disciples continue to brag that he was the leader of the October Revolution. However, Ḥasan al-Turabi did no full or systematic exposition, articulated any narrative, or published anything about the 1964 October Revolution. Yet he and some of his disciples took it for granted that he was not only the leader of the 1964 October Revolution in the Sudan but also the soul and incarnation of that revolution. None of them tried to consider how complex the invention of modernity would be.

In many ways, one conclusive example of the 1964 October Revolution is that it is the most prominent single event in the history of post-independent Sudan. It unleashed, provoked, and marked the most serious reactions to the comparable and incomparable aspects of deliberating the power and authority of an emerging Sudanese civil society together with a Sudanese civil religion. Most of those who contest that now, however, tend not to grasp that a new age in which liberation could have been at hand, and an open material world, a state, and a good society could have emerged that would have provided the way to a new Sudan. This is better understood if we examine the matters of consciousness that could stimulate and inspire citizens to forge their own way to their true political roles and cause them to be cognizant of their actual identities, their social conditions, and how they could order their lives

together. Yet, as substantial, tangible, and complex as these issues could be, liberation might come in many different ways and forms.

Perhaps even more telling in the Sudanese situation is that the citizens were qualified to liberate themselves not only from the dictatorial military rule but from at least three other distinctive systems and practices that must be well defined if they are to become germane. These systems and practices include the nature, function, and ideology of the state within the Sudanese historical time and, in particular, within the Islamist experience. There are long-term, deep liberation issues here that need to be seriously scrutinized. This leads us, as this chapter develops, to the quintessential and foundational moment for al-Turabi's Islamism in the Sudan in which Islamism became a "counterrevolutionary" movement delivered in that form to the movement's members and later to the Sudanese people at large—before and after the 1989 coup. This development came along with the figure of Ḥasan al-Turabi, for whom there was no distinction between him and the 1964 October Revolution because he and his disciples believed and advocated that Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi was the leader of 1964 October Revolution. Al-Turabi and his followers might have received most of the blame, not unwittingly so, for describing their leader as a revolutionary and then continuing to claim as much from October 1964, up to his death, only to then try to canonize him ever after. But, since al-Turabi's early days of leadership of the Islamist movement to this death, his political character troubled and was troubled by other revolutionary figures, his disciples, the movement, different regimes, and the Sudanese scene.

Although the advent of Islamism in the Sudan began, as explained before, in the 1940s, it is al-Turabi's disposition after 1964 as its leader and victim that illustrates the essence of a brand of Islamism in the Sudan. The 1964 October Revolution is the rite of passage that allows us to understand how and where the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements were related and how they gave rise to the political practices of his Islamists as disciples, their development into intimate enemies and later real enemies, and their cruelty which is dimly seen by some Sudanese as no more than his own making during the first and second Islamist republics. This is in actual fact the Islamists banality of evil in action and its hurricane of violence, which saved no friend or foe, when it separated itself from the Sudanese community as a *kizan* (minority group) threatened by the spirit of October for some and the ghost of October for others, a condition which has been as dilemmatic for their regime as previous totalitarian rules in the Sudan.[4]

What is most significant with regard to al-Turabi's legacy is the forces within which social conflict arose. That is to say al-Turabi stood out and carried along as a matrix of subjectification, or "high leadership," "Shaikh Ḥasan" of his Islamism, while his Islamists and its grave digger both emerged as a victim and victimizers of a violent state designed to be and to do so as an

apparatus of violence, greed, vulgarity, and virile power.[5] Hence, al-Turabi is an albatross on the neck of his Islamism, and his Islamism is an albatross hanging on his neck by a thread that continued to hold on tight even after his death. He was entirely consumed by his role as a "maker" and high leader of Islamism but Islamism itself.[6] That does not mean that his road to power within his own Islamism was an uneasy ride or that it represented an uninterrupted success story. On the contrary, success was anything but inevitable, and his Islamism lived and died even before him. For that reason, he was the last of the Islamists.

OCTOBER 1964, THE REVOLUTION, ITS PEOPLE, AND THE PREMISES OF MODERNITY

Bismic al-Akhdar ya October al-Ard to ghani (by your Green name Oh October the earth sings) rejoiced young Mohamed al-Makki Ibrāhim and with him Moḥamed Wardi and the Sudanese people, young and old, who continued to sing that ever since. When they started singing, they were fully aware of a new historic twilight of an understanding that "was in the offing, which was necessary to make sense of a world unfolding in front of the young revolutionary."[7] Many saw that twilight of upcoming revolutions, and a few sensed the counterrevolution that would try to derail them.

The culture of the 1964 October Revolution that overwhelmed the nation and its surrounding societies in African and Middle Eastern fields called for liberation from the oppressive regime, and what was inherited from a violent colonial state came with the ideas of the moderns possible. October stays as an event in time and as a culture of the most serious modes of existence, of conversations of modernity, and a significant sociopolitical vehemence mitigated by a great awaking of the complex diversity of the Sudanese society. The legacy of the awakening is the obligation for an all-encompassing national agenda for change in the nature, function, and ideology of the state and performance of governmental systems based on citizenship. This towering experience is an embodiment of "New Sudan" or "Sudan the Possible" and the earnest national supplication for liberation from a myriad series of contrivances and mentalities of "totalist" politics, ideologies, and systems inherited from the colonial and postcolonial state. Consider the Sudanese as subjects to that state and the devices the state cultivated throughout these colonial and postcolonial periods to subjugate them.[8] All of these affected the dictatorial rule of General Ibrāhim 'Abboud (1958–1954) and other similar regimes that followed in the identical way from 1969 to 1985 and 1989 to the present, though with an upgraded violent and oppressive state apparatus that the state acted upon. The extended release of such reactions transcends time

and place, and the deeper meanings of that towering experience. The winning vision of the extended reactions highlighted the fundamental feature that produced the main constitutions of consciousness. This "reality-defining" means of comprehension of such a complex Sudanese condition of its social world "has long been dreaming of something that it can acquire if only it became conscious of it." The fundamental features of that condition, which neither Ḥasan al-Turabi nor his Islamist disciples and other counterrevolutionary enemies from the left acknowledged or understood, include but are not limited to several key points.

SEARCH FOR A STATE AS A STRUCTURE OF INTELLIGIBILITY

The 1964 October Revolution successfully launched a general movement of civil disobedience that sought a different state (as a structure of intelligibility) and a nationality based on a community of citizens. Both are based on an agreed-upon social contract that composes the rights of citizens and citizenship to social justice, freedom, dignity, and accountability to its citizens. The real significance of the October experience lies in its high degree of innovation and efficiency as a movement, led by unarmed civilians, and which spread throughout the country. Civilians consciously pursued, for the first time in Africa and the Middle East, a discourse and a strategy of organized fields of power relations to an effectual and triumphant end by forcing a violent dictatorial military regime out of power. This was true in five important ways. The first was that Ibrāhim 'Abboud's regime was chased out of power by the collective action of individual citizens, organizations, and groups (professionals, workers, students, farmers, and political parties). The second was that 'Abboud's regime contributed to the means of their growth by expanding the public services, such as education; but at the same time, his regime violently infringed upon the public liberties of these individuals, organizations, and groups through modes of violence in an attempt to dominate and control the affairs of the country and its citizens. The third was that the services given to the subjects should have rendered their silence. Fourth was that the war the state waged in the southern part of the country was meant to be described as a civil war; it represented an apex of this infringement on public liberties and citizen's rights. The southern Sudanese demanded an act and a program of imaginative political initiative; however, liberation from dispossession could not only put an end to but lead the Sudanese out of marginalization and "development of underdevelopment" in the country at large. The way that state read the southern in particular, and marginalized areas' grievances as an act of rebellion that challenged its authority, ambition, and its ruling elite

(the community of the state), was inaccurate. And it was the most dangerous reading in the history of the colonial and postcolonial Sudanese condition. Five, it was also inaccurate and dangerous that the 'Abboud regime and the state perceived the demands of Sudanese citizens to organize political parties, trade unions, and other associations of their choice as an unlawful undertaking that would require anyone participating in or calling for, to be punished.

Civil Disobedience and Citizenship

The civil disobedience movement, which was initiated by almost all sectors of Sudanese citizenship in October as a collective social and political action, resulted in the successful execution of this revolutionary process and added to the value manifested in the role, the power, and the political capital of the Sudanese civil sphere. The sphere was emphatically secular in its character and composition. The 1964 October Revolution released the latent characteristics of all the aforementioned social groups with the marginalized underclass, rural, and urban middle class as they all acted as social units and "predicators of movement and organizational success."[9] So too, all that success gave rise to an alternative social contract based on a new form of belonging. This contract could have helped the state make a serious transformation from a system established as the foundation of the colonial rule that perceived and treated the Sudanese as subjects to the state of a new Sudan where subjects liberated themselves through the revolution.

The Sudan Narrations

As in any time and place, there were those who were less fascinated by such narrations and the potential sociopolitical outcome of a new Sudan, its contents, and discontents. Such attitudes go together with the type of predictions that could confuse and gravitate what some would like to keep personal or group treasured or valued resources to themselves. Hence, although transformation is not a stance of a historical determinism, there are continuous forms and forces of collective, another of social differences, and a third of "quiet noncollective encroachment" that worked to counter to such transformation. While roots of all these forces were not necessarily embedded in or inspired by the Sudanese civil imagination, the failure or success of any one of them could be reinforced by the failure or success of each or both of the other abovementioned two.[10] For all of these reasons, it might be true, as Robert Bellah elucidates in a different situation that "history of modern nations shows that segmentary rational politics is not enough. No one has changed a great nation without appealing to its soul, without stimulating a national idealism, as even who call themselves materialists have discovered."[11] That

is why if the October experience stands for a contemporary political memory, inspiration, or the enduring dream of generations of Sudanese, it is that urge of belonging and aspiration for a new social contract that refuses to accept any reversible condition to the desired Sudanese social life to come and the imagining of that deferred civil society to materialize.

DISCOURSE OF LIBERATION: CIVIL RELIGION

The complexity of the construction of the political discourse of liberation, the victory of the 1964 October Revolution as a civil movement, the counter-power that disputed it and even sometimes nullified the institutional power of the "old Sudan," and its military state represented and defined one of the most profound developments in the Sudanese political experience in itself and in its search for a new covenant. The eyes of the whole world, together with the Sudanese, were watching that October day to see "how the great experiment in newness is faring"; today there are more lessons that could be gained from this experience.[12] Chief among these lessons is what confirms the general Sudanese belief that the military can take power by force, but there is no way for them to remain in power indefinitely. That is because the military coup and the regime that comes out of it are in essence a manifestation of a counterrevolution as it stands as an impediment outside of the Sudanese mode of political belonging. Thus, we can easily see that general Sudanese belief has been confirmed by the successful execution of the April 1985, Uprising against the Ja'far Nimairi dictatorship (May 1969 through April 1985) and the continuous patterns of encroachments, social movements, and no-movements in opposition to the current Islamist regime.[13] Remarkable here is that the belief is nowhere more apparent than in the understanding that has grown into a form of dual political imagination, which has been persistent in the Sudanese collective mind and its political culture. What could be described as a Sudanese civil religion or a religion of modernity has emerged out of this dual political imagination. It is described here as the great experiment of newness. Related to this were the ideals of freedom, equality, progress, and public welfare. This civil religion has rituals that have commemorated the 1964 October Revolution ever since. Later, it seemed that the April 1985 uprising that brought down Ja'far Nimairi's 16-year dictatorship was a natural evolution and confirmation of that belief and its authority.

The April 1985, intifada, as the Sudanese describe it, gave considerable momentum to the nation's commitment to the October experience of new-ness and to its ideals. The paths that led to the ideals of the 1964 October Revolution and the nostalgic commitment to these ideals has reconstructed

a civic and sympathetic association with this Sudanese civil religion and its shrines, which includes the University of Khartoum, the birthplace of the October revolution. It endowed respect to the revolution's poets, entertainers, and artists who contributed to the national discourse and to the articulation of the values of that existential experience. The works of those intellectuals and knowledge workers have stayed alive as an open book recited time and again and sung whenever relevant circumstances have arisen. Examples of such artists, entertainers, and poets include Moḥamed al-Makki Ibrāhim, Fadl 'Allah Moḥamed, Hashim Ṣidiq, Maḥjuob Sharif, Moḥamed Wardi, 'Abd al-Karim al-Kabli, and Moḥammed al-Amin to name a few. The dual nature of the newly awakened Sudanese political imagination is reflected in the considerable nationwide appeal, dialectic of conversation, and motivating power of collective action. It is also mirrored in the enormous fear that military regimes on the other side would feel an expected uprising against their regime as an outcome of their breach of social, political, and constitutional contracts.

This unique Sudanese political experience, however, has given many groups within the political and intellectual sectors more confidence in their power, and it has raised distinctive forms of practices and conversations in different directions. Contrary to what one might imagine, some of these conversations do not keep a balance or harmony between the discourse, ambition, and practice of some groups and the liberating ethos of the October experience and its obligations. Emotional enthusiasm to the revolutionary spirit, which has swept some people away, has revealed itself to them in a deterministic presumption that an uprising to overthrow the Islamists' regime is expected and inevitable as long as the forces that ousted the military could be mobilized the same way before. In an interview with al-Sādiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party and the Imam of the Ansār sect, explained that he and his party promote what he called *al-jihād al-madani* (civil jihād) in which the public sphere will be instrumental to unseat the Islamist regime through such forms of civil disobedience. In a sense, this orientation might open up inroads to the province of the "value of pluralism." Especially as other attitudes and ideas about civil disobedience have been published in most of the Sudanese political literature or delivered by groups opposing the Islamists regime for the last 27 years. Moreover, and in every single demonstration against the Islamist regime, the street cry has always been—*'āid 'āid ya October* (coming back again October). Most of those who filled the streets in 2013 calling October back were born during the time of the regime. The tragedy the regime deployed as the Hemeti[14] *janjaweed* militia force was renamed by the regime as "the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces." Human Rights Watch described them as "Men with No Mercy" to slaughter them. In 2016, the young opposition groups inside the Sudan were more creative in avoiding the brutal militia; they used social media to organize the Sudanese

citizens to exercise a different form of disobedience by staying in their homes. The campaign was partly successful. Hence, all the lessons learned from fighting this current regime seemed to indicate that the Islamists acted consistently before and after establishing their ruling regime as a counterrevolutionary force to stifle attempts toward a system that the Sudanese would respect and devote their lives to, rather than one that they are forced to obey but puts their lives at risk.

This has been increasingly true in two ways. The first concerns the Islamists' dedicated efforts to betray the progress toward a national covenant for a liberated Sudan. The second is that since the first day of their state in 1989, the Islamists proved to be not only aware that their regime adamantly opposed all aspects of a liberated Sudan, and they took measures to avoid any form of civil uprising against their hold on power. Such pursuit does not arrive from a non-historical field of action. It is part and parcel of a counter-revolution orientation and practice the Islamists persistently pursued.

In the years that followed the October revolution, there was a seditious reality—sometimes latent but uncontested—in the foreground of the Sudanese political scene, and at the background of everybody's mind, of what remained from the October achievements and what might come out of that. As a result of the 1964 October Revolution, the country witnessed the rise of a new generation of politicians and a new and younger leadership in most of the political parties and associations. Some of these new leaders participated enormously not only in compromising but they also sometimes vigorously and violently acted against the ethos of a possible new social contract for a liberated Sudan. Whether or not they conspired with the military to overthrow the democratically elected government through military coups, some of these coups were aborted or defeated and some turned violently against civilian conspirators. The mutual hostility and conflict within this new leadership was implacable since day one. Whether by default or by design, that was no less true for those who took over from the older generation. The result was that the next generation of leaders also devastated the Sudanese political and social landscape during this time and on critical occasions. Each saw in himself and his program a political party or an ideology that was a divinely prearranged "errand into the wilderness." Hence, most of those new players were decidedly narrow minded and provincial in their partisanships, both in nature and agenda. Individually, they were condescending to each other as well. In other words, because each side functions and maneuvers from an essentially different conception of authority, weight, power, and measure of moral and political sentimentality, neither side will ever be able to persuade the other of the futility of its own claims. Yet, while conversation could be open sometimes, the etiquette, value, or ideal of courteousness and civility

is absent. Similar attitudes were clear, also, behind each other's talk to the media, as well as during face-to-face conversations and within their contribution to the public discourse. Of course, it did not take long to discover that the totality of liberation had never reached a reasonable degree of favor in its local constituencies or political parties' programs or expressions. Consequently, the counterrevolution manifested not so much as a break from the liberation ideal but as its reversal—a reversal that centered on the role of the state. Hence, the verbal ferociousness, toxic language, and antagonism, in addition to violence, continued to be conjoined and sometimes to have had a mutual tone and temper of absolute disdain. Hence, the identification of irrelevant conflicts easily shifted to other impulses and the ability to differentiate between a number of groups in which the role of liberation was banished or replaced by anti-liberation discourse. Nevertheless, and especially in mass movements, there are always people who sincerely believe the opposite.

As a reopening of history, October revolution opened the door to a younger generation of Sudanese politicians, activists, knowledge works, and intellectuals in all fields. By way of illustration, we can draw a rough contour map for some of these emerging personalities who dominated the Sudanese field of post-October leadership. Although the following list is not by any means comprehensive, it provides a rough contour map of personalities which includes the following figures to name a few:

The Islamists
   Babikir Karrar
   Al-Rashid al-Ṭahir
   Sadiq Abdalla Abdel Magid
   Ahmed Abdel Rahman
   Ḥasan al-Turabi
   Ja'far Shaikh Idris
   Moḥamed Saliḥ 'Omer
   Moḥamed Yousif
   Souad al-Fatih
   Osman Khalid Midawi
   Yasin Omer al-Imam
The Communists
   'Abd al-Khaliq Maḥjub
   Aḥmed Suliamān
   Moḥamed Ibrāhim Nugud
   Joseph Garang
   Al-Ṭahir 'Abdel Rahman
   Farouq 'Abu 'Iesa

Umma Party
  Al-Sādiq al-Mahdi
  Moḥamed Ibrāhim Khalil
  Al-Hadi al-Mahdi
  Ahmed al-Mahdi
The Democratic Unionist Party
  Moḥamed 'Uthman al-Mirghani
  Al-Sharif Ḥussein al-Hindi
  Musa al-Mubark
  Salih Maḥmoud Ismā'il
  Moḥamed Tawfi
  Mohamed Jubara al-Awad
  Shaikh Ali Abdel Rahman
The Sudan African National Union (SANU)
  William Deng
  Samuel Arow
  Tobi Madut
  Joseph Udoho
The Southern Front
  Abel Alier
  Bona Malwal
  Hilary Lugali
  Peter Jat Kouth
National Party Nuba Mountains
  Father Philip 'Abbas Ghaboush
  Nahdat Darfur
  Aḥmad Ibrāhim Diraij
'Alī al-Ḥaj of Darfur Front: later the Umma Party and Muslim Brotherhood
  respectively
  Beja Congress
  Sirour Ramli
  Ḥashim Bamkar
Statists
  Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa
  J'afar Karar
  Mahjoub Moḥamed Ṣalih
  Aḥmed 'Abdel Ḥalim
Trade Unions
  Al-Shafi'Aḥmed al-Shaikh
  Al-Ḥaj Abdel Rahman of the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation
    (SWTUF)

Fatima Aḥmed Ibrāhim of the Women's Union
Shaikh al-Amin, and Yousif Aḥmed al-Mustafa of the Farmers Union
Army (Free Officers)
  Ja'far Nimairi
  Khalid al-Kid
Lawyers
  'Abdel Majid Imam
  Babikir 'Awad Allah of the judiciary
  Abdin Ismail, Amin al-Shibli,
  Makawi Khoujali
Academics
  Mohamed 'Umer Bashir
  Al-Nazier Dafalla
  Yousif Fadl
Poets and Writers
  Jamal Mohamed Ahmed
  Mohamed 'Abdel Hai
  Mohamed al-Mahdi Magzoub
  `Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim
  Mohamed al-Makki Ibrāhim
  Al-Nur 'Osman Abakar
  Salah Ahmed Ibrāhim
  'Abdallah Ḥāmid al-Amin (Poets and writers)
Journalists
  Bashir Moḥamed S'aid
  Mahjoub 'Osman
  Mahjoub Mohamed Salih
  Abdel Rahman Mokhtar
  Moḥamed Mirghani
  S'ad el-Shaikh

In addition to those, Moḥamoud Moḥamed Ṭaḥa emerged as a thinker and a political leader of a different Islamist movement called the Republican Party—later the Republican Brothers. An auxiliary group of statists advisors, such as Omer Haj Musa, Mansour Khalid, Ja'far Moḥamed 'Ali Bakhiet, Ahmed 'Abdel Halim, Bader el Din Suliamān, and others, continued to fuel the fires of these diametrically opposed legions and their leaders. This new generation of politicians and leaders entered the Sudanese political scene with competing visions or no visions at all.

The first important outcome of the October revolution was the expansion of the horizon of the liberation geography. That reflected itself in the opening

of this horizon for where it might go. The new generations of October revolutionaries who were apart in their defiance to the 'Abboud regime were wired together in the Round Table Conference debating for the first time one of the most serious national issues. Via television the interested Sudanese audience carefully followed the unfolding events of such an issue of great historical importance not only to the Sudan but also to Africa and the world at large. Those who were denied civil rights during the military regime of Ibrāhim 'Abboud came from prisons, underground hiding places, and exile. Sitting in as Professor al-Nazier Dafalla, the vice chancellor of the University of Khartoum and the chair of the conference, he said in his opening speech "no order of preference further and more important, that we are not as opposing teams; but that we are gathering in equality with one common objective which is: the good of the Sudan."

It was the first challenge for Ḥasan al-Turabi, the rising star of the Islamists, who was forthright in his criticism of 'Abboud regime policy in the Sudan and at large at the University of Khartoum Examination Hall on September 9, 1964. However, although al-Turabi was one the three delegates representing the ICF, Mohamed Yousif Mohmed delivered the party's speech.[15] In his plea to conference, Mohamed Yousif requested, "let us make this conference a success by reaching the practicable democratic solution that shall consolidate democracy in our country and make the South a fortress for liberation and solidarity not a base for imperialist influence and not a theatre of massacre and conspiracy against the security of the Sudan and the peace of the African continent." However, it seems that the Islamists when it comes to the issue of the South, they are not whole hearted with spirit about the October Revolution. According to Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "some *Ikhwan* commentators have said that the policies of the military regime were beneficial to southern Muslims, for many mosques were built and education was brought within reach of Muslims, who earlier boycotted mission schools and thus enjoyed no education."[16]

It was clear that the Islamists were not aware of the repercussions of the 'Abboud regime's forced Islamization and Arabization, which

> southern politicians regarded . . . as intensified northern colonization and a campaign to eradicate emerging Southern nationalism. The introduction of Friday as the day of rest provoked widespread school strikes and subsequent trails of assumed ringleaders. During 1960–1961, the number of Southern Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries increased studiedly; the arrival of exparliamentarians and former civil servants in Congo and Uganda drew the international attention. Another bout of school strikes in the autumn of 1962 dramatically increased the number of refugees, as former pupils went abroad in search of education. Many schools remained closed until after the peace agreement in 1972.[17]

COUNTERREVOLUTION

The aftermath of the October revolution revealed that all parties had conflicting interests and tendencies to resolve political conflicts through different forms of violence, which they exercised on each other and on different sectors of the Sudanese population. Most of them tried to get ahold of the state directly or by proxy through military offices to turn it into an instrument of oppression in their own hands and forge its coercive power against their rivals. Needless to say, the continuation of these hostilities generated warfare that affected the political, religious, and social fabric of Sudanese life. Hence, along with this power struggle, the continued war of attrition between rival political entities and self-contained models of political representations was affirmed through the language and power of state antipathy or perceived personality. Perhaps the most vociferous expression of that development was creation of the culture of violence deployed from an external field of power that was based around the military coup as a mode of change. In all instances of military takeover, the regimes that emerge subsequent to the coup turn into a system of an uneven distribution of rewards, oppression, and inequalities that in one way or another reinforce the violent face of the state and enhance its instruments as a vessel of coercive force.

A significant corollary of the coup-related violence is the development that resulted from the prism through which most state actors, especially the military, viewed the plight of Sudanese citizens, who found themselves marginalized. Depressingly, it is not hard to see the clash between most of those marginalized citizens and the state in its violent and nonviolent actions, even after October 1964, and the Round Table Conference, 1965. They showed how the counterrevolution turned all contingencies of marginalization into an extended release of violence. Only through this can one see the rise of resentment and different forms of expression of grievances in the periphery, which the centralized state and its community has never fully understood and which continued to be perceived by different regimes as a rebellion that needed to be firmly dealt with. This, however, turned violence of both sides—the state and the rebels—into one of the main topics of conversation between both entities. Attempts to enforce compulsion—as a way of adding sufficient devotion to the higher national ideals of unity and conformity, as well as the presentation of the state as a grand form of disciplinary actions—ensured the state's continued existence and demonstrated its overarching power. Operations of counter-violent expressions by those who felt excluded or marginalized became the preferred modus operandi to ensure recognition. The collective attributes of that form of state power, and the counter-power over the state, have drained human and material resources, and they became an added value to progressive forms of the development of underdevelopment. But this

phenomenon involved a causal relationship between the state's reactions to the violent and nonviolent dissension and the demands of the emerging geographies of marginalization and the poverty-enhanced ruralization of urban centers. Rural dislocated poor, who fled marginalization and its discontents of war, famine, and poverty, left behind a disrupted way of life and tried to find protection in urban areas in which resources were continuously exhausted and incredibly scarce. In addition to the same processes that created ruralization of the urban centers, other factors caused a swell in migration from these urban centers to outside the country as oppressive regimes drove away workers, professionals, and artisans by the thousands, forcing them, instead, to seek employment in oil-rich Arab countries, in particular, and other countries in general. That phenomenon made the Sudan a country with one of the highest internal and external displacement populations in the world.

It is all a losing battle against what the Sudanese could see through their experience of what liberation is all about. It is not surprising then that the two long-ruling regimes, the May regime, from 1969 to 1985, and the Inqaz, 1989 to the present, were established by two of those post-October personalities: Ja'far Nimairi and 'Omer Ḥasan Aḥmed al-Bashir. Nimairi's and Bashir's regimes remain the most violent in the history of the post-independent Sudan. They represent the Janus faces and the doorways, the beginnings and transitions, and maybe the ends of the counter to the Sudanese search for a social contract and a pact of liberation. At the same time, the end of 'Omer al-Bashir's is an end to the postcolonial state and a postcolonial era. Hence, the end of Islamism and the might of the state in the hands of the counterrevolutionaries "goes hand-in-hand with deciphering the transformed consciousness that must promise and deliver the emerging world."[18]

This proportionately long introduction is meant to situate the central aspect of the void between the twilight of liberation and the counter forces that impeded its progress but diverted into hostilities overbearing the better part of Sudanese post-October history. This multifaceted chain of events includes the collective grievances and the hierarchies of discontent within their violent and nonviolent forms that have been evident for more than a half-century. They represent the embedded tension between the quest for changes that derive and embody the October spirit to charter a new Sudan and the counterrevolutionary impulses that act against it. So that might help to understand how the Islamist movement developed into a counterrevolutionary movement in the hands of Ḥasan al-Turabi, who presented himself and his Islamists as embodying Islam and shari'a. That was in actual fact an embodiment of a counterrevolution in its two fronts: The first is the hegemonic move that came before the establishment of the real subjugation associated with the coup and its first Islamist republic, and the other is the one that followed after that.

THE COUNTERREVOLUTION FORERUNNERS

The unbroken thread of the post-October story of Islamism and its antago-nism toward the Other, (*al-ilmanieen* [the secularists]), in general, and the Communists in particular, in addition to the one that they describe as *taifiyya* (sectarian parties) and the traditional political parties, was reformulated. It then escalated with the emergence of Ḥasan al-Turabi as the new leader. It remained closely connected to him and to his renegade disciples who forced him out of power in 2000. It is true that the 1964 October Revolution and its aftermath brought the war between the Islamists and their sworn enemies, the Communists, from the open space of university campuses to the public space. This shift led to the curtailment of public space and the deprivation of citizens from all forms of public goods during the first and second Islamist republics. This brings into view the different forms of violence as the dark underside of the Islamist political attitude and mode of governance. The basis and roots for these attitudes and polity can be found in the history of Islamism from its early days and later as one of the strands of Ḥasan al-Turabi's *laïcité* as it redefined its field of action and evolved in different directions that concurred on the attitude but differed in reason and strategy. Perhaps it might be clearer now, at this juncture, when Islamism has run into oblivion and has been subjected to systematic historical critique that even some of its adherents can plainly see how it has acted as a counterrevolutionary force.

After the end of 'Abboud's regime, both the Communists and their Islamist rivals claimed the leading role in the revolution, while each one was trying to lessen the role of the other. But at a more profound level, this new major fault line over which the battle between the two continued and widened and spilled beyond the university campuses, high schools, and institutions of learning to include the entire Sudanese political landscape. These first started when the Islamists discovered that the Communists held more leadership roles in most professional organizations and trade unions and were successful in dominat-ing the National Front of Professional Organization (NFPO) that emerged as the ruling body after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime.[19] The NFPO was established on October 25, 1964, and initially consisted of Sudanese faculty members of the University of Khartoum, Khartoum Technical Institute, rep-resentatives from student unions, and representatives of physicians, lawyers, and judges. Almost immediately, they were joined by representatives of engineers, teachers, the Gezira Tenants Association, and the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF).

After the downfall of 'Abboud, negotiations between different political groups and organizations led to the formation of a transitional government under the premiership of Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa. Khalifa was known as a neutral person with good knowledge, and he was highly respected in the

South, "which was hoped would stand him in good stead in dealing with the southern question."[20] The Islamists claimed that the "communists had for the first time the chance to be the virtual rulers of Sudan" through the NFPO.[21] Although the October government that succeeded 'Abboud's regime was not explicitly threatening, it was of a transitional nature by composition, structure, and mandate. The Islamists were not alone because other political parties and actors felt threatened too. Out of the 15-member government of Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, seven were from the NFPO, including al-Shafi' Aḥmad al-Shaikh of the SWTUF and Shaikh al-Amin Moḥamed al-Amin of the Gezira Tenants Association. Five members were from the political parties (one each from the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, the People's Democratic Party, the ICF, and the Communist Party), and two were from the South and what has been considered as strategic ministries. It was clear that the cabinet "represented a number of ideological strands, mainly of the left but by no means all communists."[22] However, the idea of the NFPO emerged as a representation of what the Sudanese perceived as the new or modern political players who made the 1964 October Revolution a success. It presented an attractive alternative to the basic structure of the political parties, or what the Communists described as the old or traditional forces; however, this was not clear at the beginning. But it did not take that long for political groups to enunciate louder what they suspected as a significant latent threat, which turned into a possibility of a new coalition or unified politics that would follow—sooner or later—the ideology or strategy of the Communist Party. It was clear that the animosity that lay beneath this surface of fighting between these parties spawned a new culture war.

That sense of threat and its alarming prospects arose less from any NFPO policy during its early days than from when some of NFPO members began to promote ideas that could result in a serious change of political practice that induced terror in the hearts of the main political parties, the Umma Party, and the Unionists in particular. This collective feeling of threat served to bring the Islamist political parties together with other right-leaning parties, especially the Umma Party, other political groups in opposition of the NFPO, and those who stood behind it. This culture war escalated even more when the NFPO and the left's arguments started to take an ideological path and a political stand blaming all the ills of the Sudan on what they described as the reactionary forces that came from an alleged a long hibernation rather than a time of clandestine activity. Hence, the left and those who dominated the NFPO perceived themselves as the real revolutionary forces that organized the overt and covert struggle against the 'Abboud regime and mobilized the Sudanese in an unprecedented movement that lead to the downfall of the regime. For these reasons, the NFPO began to voice demands for themselves and that their constituencies should have

a place and a space not only within the public sphere, but a metamorphic role within the legislative and the ruling structure that would accommodate and secure them a place at the state's helm. The political parties and the Islamists perceived one of these demands not only as a threat, but as a direct challenge to their authority and a serious impasse that would lead the ruling system astray; the NFPO demanded that 50 percent of the parliament seats be allocated for the modern forces. The NFPO "proposed special constituencies for workers, tenants, and intellectuals and finally tried to resurrect the old Graduates' Constituencies."[23]

In addition, the radical policies that the new government of Sir al-Khatim set out to enact were more alarming for the political parties and their main allies and supporters. These included a collective purge of senior government officials, preparatory plans for dissolving the native administration, and active policies supporting the Arab, Soviet, and international leftist regimes, their organizations, and radical liberation movements. Consistent with that agenda, "branches of the front were being established in different parts of the country, and it seemed possible that the front would engage as one unit in forthcoming elections."[24] Considered in this light, the overall agenda of the professional front, and the Communist Party behind it, was perceived by the political parties as a serious threat to their right to exist. They immediately "realized that such an arrangement would, in effect, perpetuate the status quo and, indecently do away with their political organizations."[25] This development counts not for its particulars or suggestions, but for diverting the discourse of the 1964 October Revolution away from an agreed-upon conversation toward a new covenant. The agreed-upon conversation would have followed the round table modality where—at the very least—citizens would have been involved and motivated by civic virtue that would open the door for innovation for liberating the Sudanese people from tyrannical states and uniting them rather than turning it into a lukewarm monologue uniting only convinced sectors of the population.

In a clear response to the mere content of these claims and actions, the Communist Party and its allies in the left planned, somewhat imperfectly, to phase out other political representations in serious contradiction to the ideals of October. Given such a move from the left, it would have been odd not to expect a strong counterreaction within these other representations. But, on its own terms, the other side resorted to another route that also diverted from the ideals of October. The expansion of these special agenda structures, when coupled with street violence from one side, turned both sides into a field of counterrevolutionary forces. This had serious consequences, and it critically damaged Sudanese momentum to seize the opportunity to liberate the country from the clutches of the inherited state. Further, these diversions from the spirit and the ideals of October have certainly overshadowed the political life

on a continuous and a regular basis since, and they are likely to do so as long as the current state or one similar is in power.

Over and above this, the added dimension of violence within all its forms and frequencies augmented one further serious tier in this counter-revolutionary development. The enormous implications of this serious step change have to be sought in the complex formations of discourse and actions that transformed the nature of political responses to the violent takeover of the state. The ideological discourses, effects, and patterns of practice were not necessarily produced by the real superiority of power of either party, as both the left and the Islamists were still at the fringes of the Sudanese field of power. For this reason, each one tried to negotiate terms and pursue an indisputably larger internal power in order to declare a certain victory and advocate for their own sociopolitical, nationalistic, or religious standard for the future society. Here, all groups sanctioned one form of revolutionary or religious violence. For each one of these groups, violence emerged as neither aberrant nor abhorrent.

For al-Turabi it was an opportunity to negotiate terms and pursue a joint encounter against his Communist enemies. He relied on a common cause that other groups with related concerns about the new left agenda that NFPO also acknowledged. As long as these other groups represented an indisputably larger internal power, and they exercised violence, his new strategy would lead to a victory in the name of "saving the country from Communism." The success of this strategy taught him a lesson as a strategist for his new political style of opposition and as a self-reinforcing approach.

On one hand, the window of opportunity availed itself in many curious ways. It took the forms of individual and group campaigns that simultaneously opposed most things in a manner that would pave the way for a self-enforcement. Instead of criticizing the Front, its associations, and unions or its government and their programs, Al-Turabi launched a campaign against Communism itself, its local party, and its allies to underpin concern and opposition to various aspects of any sociopolitical change. Finding himself successful in attracting other anti-Communist groups, he went a step further to organize "the National Front of Parties (NFP) as a counter-weight to the leftist-dominated NFPO and then started a battle over NFPO, aiming to control it or, failing that, to destroy it."[26]

But whatever the case, the most important aspect here is that the Islamists under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Turabi transformed a political event into a religious one to achieve specific political goals. These dissimilar groups found common ground based on their concerns about Communism, and they transgressed new complaints to encourage a themed platform to save the country from Communism. By taking this approach, the Islamists were able to control and lead these concerned parties "from without," As a result, the

NFP was able to apply pressure, and the Umma Party's Ansār brought people en masse from western and central Sudan who demonstrated by "roaming the streets at night and chanting Mahdiyyah war songs."[27] This evoked recent memories of violent riots on March 1, 1954, that Ansār incited against the visit of Egypt's General Muhammed Najib to the Sudan.[28] The NFPO government of al-Khalifa conceded to the pressure by submitting its resignation. Six days later, al-Khalifa "formed a new government, composed of ministers from the Umma Party, the NUP, the ICF, and the Southern Front. The radical experiment was over."[29] Throughout their collaborations, the Islamists depicted themselves as traditional rather than modern, as the Communists had described them, so the Islamists were able to frustrate the program of their rival. In other words, what al-Turabi's worldview shared in common with what he described as *taifiyya* has typified how the counter-revolution program worked regardless of the prevailing assumptions of al-Turabi and the concepts he used about the divergent interests of these new bedfellows, who had been on the opposite end of the political spectrum.

Nevertheless, the impulses and orientations of those who described themselves as modern forces stayed alive in the Sudanese political life. And within their internal reading to an evolving world, they allured the imagination and the support of the left without asking themselves from where and what point of view they operated. Within less than three months, al-Turabi and his emerging young Islamist group "managed to get enough signatures among the nineteen or so founding organizations within NFPO to disavow its Communist-dominated leadership. When presented to the government, the prime minister agreed to withdraw recognition of NFPO, and from then on to deal only with representatives of political parties."[30]

On the other hand, al-Turabi, who became the new secretary general of the Islamists, wasted no time in his stratagem of reappropriation of the Other's comparable political strategies, especially when they proved to be successful as a source of insight to future rebuilding of an Islamist vanguard party and the oversight of the left. This became apparent at a more subtle level regarding how to emulate the Communist Party's vanguard model as a new opportunity and a field of conflict within his own party at the same time. Al-Turabi noted that the Islamist movement was influenced "through competition by numerous Communist approaches and ways of doing things, such as strict obligation of secrecy, careful member selection, and founding of what might look as innocent platforms and intensifying tactics and focus on the strengths of modern sectional organizations."[31] According to al-Turabi, "in 1965 the movement reached another turning point with the launch of the ICF as an umbrella for the movement's public activities. From then the movement developed very rapidly to an extent that neither the leadership nor the organization could match."[32] But one could go farther to argue that

the most visible sociopolitical properties of the ongoing battles between the Islamists and the Communists stemmed out of the Islamists' sense of fear. These most visible properties also caused both parties diverged from the field of liberation and the challenge to each group's own limits. This means that liberation was not just the way in which structural interests of the Sudanese citizens were imminently looming, it was also the action by which the means, ways, and interests of the state and the country conducted themselves. Taking a thoroughly historical approach to study the deeply rooted fear, turned into and continued to comprise and reproduce the Islamists competing program of animosity since the early days of the movement. The success of the Communist vanguard model in regard to 1964 October Revolution and the stances adopted in the aftermath of the downfall of 'Abboud's regime compounded their fear and turned the Islamists' performance into a single-issue politic.

It was an eye-opener to the Islamists and their new secretary general that the success of the Communist Party of Sudan was due to three main factors. First, it was the role they "played over the years as a major campaigner for various social and economic reforms."[33] Second, it was the Communists' ability to build, and most of the time infiltrate, the leadership of professional associations and trade unions. Even though political parties were officially outlawed during the six years of 'Abboud's military rule, "the Communists had continued to function, albeit underground, while all others actually disintegrated as organizations."[34] Third, through their organizational experience, the Communists were "able to gain access to, and frequently control of, professional associations despite their own small numbers."[35] Hence, the lesson learned from the Communists Party's effective re-emergence after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime was the means by which it positioned itself as a vanguard and "a proponent of the interests of workers and tenants; whereas the other Sudanese parties generally ignored those interest groups."[36] The vanguard model put the Communist Party, to a certain extent, at the fore of a mass-action political movement of the 1964 October Revolution. That experience provided the practical and political leadership that led to close ties between the Communist Party and the Sudanese left, which was clear during the early days after the success of the 1964 October Revolution. This constituted ideological threats to the Islamists, especially when it turned into a generalized political action of the Communists in as much as there was apparent sympathy for the party from wide sectors of the Sudanese-educated elite. That sympathy translated into the leading program for the Front and later the victory of most of the Communist Party candidates at the Graduates Electoral College of 1965 general elections. But even before the general elections, the Islamists and their new allies felt that there was something significant at stake. Yet as troubling as such feelings were, "the more radical the actions and pronouncements of the Front (NFPO) became, the more

vociferous were the demands of the old politicians to change the composition of the cabinet. There was talk of and even genuine concern over 'saving the country from Communism.'"[37] This, then, opened a window of opportunity for the Islamists to act as a counterrevolution. The chance came about not because of their enmity to the Communists and their allies, which had always been there, but more importantly because the Islamists overturned the original idea of dialogue invested in the political public sphere as one of the main ideals of 1964 October Revolution. Thereafter, they assumed a different direction that invested in violent actions as a viable future voucher to politics. Most significantly, and what speaks to al-Turabi, the strategist, the Islamists under his leadership increasingly developed two-tiered mega and minor institutional frameworks within which internal and external conflicts took shape and were challenged. More to the point, these minor and mega institutional frameworks developed around larger conflicts. These larger conflicts simultaneously grew out of and exploited the political or religious capital of the opposing ends. Al-Turabi defined the opposing ends as Ṣūfi- or Salafi-oriented groups or an internal power group to be realigned for a specific goal, while he and his Islamist standing continued to be adamantly partisan in nature, violent persuasion, and agenda. The mega strategy emerged and was successfully presented by the association and the collective move with what the Islamists and other "ideological parties" described as "the traditional parties." They then banded together with their new Islamists allies to constrain the NFPO and its political program. This move helped the Islamists to rethink their political presence and their program of action over and beyond their traditional anti-Communist pursuit. According to their own historian, Ḥasan Mekki, the Islamists were aware, maybe for the first time, that they "did not seem to have made any substantial breakthrough anywhere in the modern sector. . . . In trade unions, among educated women and in the professional organizations the hold of the left seemed secure."[38]

Nevertheless, the Islamists tried to deploy instead a "from without" mega strategy that would bring together some of the concerned "traditional political parties" and groups to move with violence and speed to meet a specific political goal. It was through this process that the Islamists' political actions, violent reactions, and counterrevolutionary strategies were framed. Whereas this mega strategy succeeded within some limited designates, it was clear from the start that it worked as some sort of "mechanical" rather than an "organic" solidarity in the division of labor between these entities. This is so because there was no way for the Islamists to control these entities "from within." Moreover, because of the different interests and divergent views of each of these groups toward the other, the traditional entities "would then no longer be interested in the support of the modern groups who only represent a tiny minority when it came to votes and national influences. If the traditionalists

took notice of these groups at all, then they saw them as rivals."[39] However, the influence that brought about the change in the Islamists party's character after the 1964 October Revolution was al-Turabi's emulation of the Communist Party vanguard experience. In one way, looking at that experience is a compelling necessity to meet the challenges and to attain some significant moments of opportunities that availed themselves in the post-October era. The Islamism needed to be packaged in different, more modern, attire than the old-fashioned Ikhwan that came to the Sudan with Egyptian schools.

To lead the 2,000 core members of the Islamist movement—composed mostly of students—Ḥasan al-Turabi developed a three-tiered strategy. First, he adopted the name *Islamic Movement* or the *Islamic Current*—the ICF—to replace the name *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* that came with an Egyptian package and represented what could be identified as the old-fashioned group of Islamists. Although in essence, the ICF emulated the Communist vanguard idea, the secret veil of the new ICF covered a few 'ulama, some of Wahabi or Ansār al-Suna groups, some members of Ṣūfi orders, and some the tribal chiefs. This attempt was neither modern in nature nor progressive in composition. Moreover, those who were part of the ICF had neither a voice in nor commitment to the Islamist program. The main reason behind that could be that the Islamists tried to control the new body. As al-Turabi admitted, they "kept for themselves a majority within the Front not only to keep independent of the front but also to control it."[40] That is why the move did not help much in giving al-Turabi the support that he needed to consolidate his new leadership; eventually it created a state of frustration, as the old guards of al-Ikhwan group of the Islamist movement did not receive the change kindly. According to al-Turabi, several factors led to sharp differences that severely shook the organizational and personal structures of the Islamists. These included deeper disagreements between members of the movement, emerging challenging political stances, and the contradiction held within the new situation itself and between the Front and Ikhwan.[41] However, through time as al-Turabi continued to fortify his leadership and shape the movement according to a doctrine that made of him a new and different Islamist ideologue, that frustration turned into a rebellion by those who engaged critically in the movement to al-Turabi's strategies. Hence, it later materialized into an outright split. But according to al-Turabi, this change had a functional necessity. Upon reflecting on the history of that period, he claimed that "after the initial stage of its existence, the movement developed a marked sense of self-awareness, positioning itself accurately within its specific time and place parameters."[42] For some sectors of the movement, then, his vocabulary brought a sense of newness and a more modern appearance that made possible a formulation that helped to borrow more from the Communists' vocabulary and strategies of the party as a vanguard.

Related to this was the rise and recognition of a new breed of young Islamists, who were graduates of University of Khartoum and or British universities. Educated chief among them were Ahmed 'Abdel Rahman, Osman Khalid Mudawi, and 'Abdel Raḥim Ḥamdi who became Ḥasan al-Turabi's main lieutenants for a considerable period of time. As in previous internal conflicts in the Islamist movement, such moves proved to indicate intricate competitions and maybe a rise of a particular bigger group of younger Islamists and the demise of another group, especially those who were Cairo educated or were less educated, older members of the movement. The alternative option, which was provided by that move and the political space that it generated, was a significant change in the leadership and the orientation of the movement. It may well be said that the way and time al-Turabi was elected secretary general to the Islamist movement deeply affected the functioning and the future of Islamism in the Sudan. Ḥasan al-Turabi's rise to prominence was, in a way, a positioning of the movement within the broader frame of Babikir Karrar's ideological parameters of Sudanization. Al-Turabi's rise also fit the movement within its local ground and field action but without Karrar himself at the helm of the organization. Al-Turabi's leadership later merged with an air of modernity that came with the change of his title to secretary general that replaced the Egyptian Ikhwan title, al-Amin al-'ām (secretary general), with its traditional underpinnings.

If history should be considered as an essential part of these changes and the development of Islamism as a phenomenon, we need to trace the genesis of this new formation and how it was different from any previous ones to the post-October revolution and to Ḥasan al-Turabi as a leader as he concentrated all power in his own hands. At the same time, such a move and the new labels and titles attached to the organization and its leadership positions could be perceived as going hand-in-hand not only with modernization of the party, but as an indication that the Islamists had delinked themselves from the auxiliary status and the stigma related to the Brotherhood during the rise of Jamal 'Abdul Nasir and his image as a national leader in the Arab world. Hence, the Islamists joined the crowd who accused Communism of being an alien ideology and a foreign import. It was thus left to stay alone as a representation and a product of *al-mabadi al-mutawrda* (imported ideologies) subject to verbal and physical violence. All that had to fit well with the ambition of the young Sudanese Mahdi, who had a PhD from the Sorbonne, while emerging within the ranks of a fairly modern organization and imposing his own *laïcité* against the 'ulama, Ṣūfi, Salafi, and other Sudanese mainstream social representations of Islamic practice. But if this development arrived from a non-Islamist field, the consolidation of his position as a leader of the Islamists at that critical time had come out of his significant majority win of the electoral seat allotted to the graduates in the first general election after the downfall of 'Abboud's

regime. "The Islamists fielded one hundred candidates, including fifteen in the special graduates' constituencies. . . . [The Islamists] won seven seats of which two (including Turabi's) were from the graduates constituencies."[43] These steps automatically sidelined al-Rashid al-Ṭahir and those who followed the Ikhwan of Egypt school—Jaʿfar Shaikh Idris, Malik Badri, Ṣadiq ʿAbdallah ʿAbd al-Mājid, Mohamed al-Shaikh Omer, and others and who emphasized the *tarbiya* (education) approach rather than politics. In large measure, the formation of the contemporary Sudanese Islamist movement took place and found its growth, most famous and elaborate expression, within that development.

The third tier of al-Turabi's accommodation to the spirit of that strategy and its time can be seen in the rise of an incoming group of the Islamists around al-Turabi replacement of the outgoing group. One of the central characteristics of al-Turabi's strategies to stay in leadership of the Islamists organization was based on his ability to outmaneuver those who were likely to secretly challenge his leadership. Now, and from that point on, al-Turabi played that strategy very carefully and successfully in the struggle against his antagonists before they prepared themselves for a confrontation against him. Without a doubt, he stayed conformable for a while in his leadership seat while putting his new team in place.

As referred to above, Ḥasan al-Turabi pursued new strategies that mimicked the methods of the Communist Party in a way that opened the door for adopting not only its tactics and strategies but also some former members of the Sudanese Communist Party. Yasin Omer al-Imam, the Islamist's commissar, often reminded his audience that he was once a member of the Communist Party. The Islamists formed the ICF, which was described by al-Turabi as "an umbrella for the movement's public activities."[44] The ICF was an improvement and modification to the formula the Islamists previously tried in 1955 under the name of the Islamic Front for the Constitution. It was the Islamists' way of deploying their party as a vanguard to bring in supporters and sympathizers and to have them rally around a certain message or a loose organization. Al-Turabi utilized this strategy effectively to lead the Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood (1964) to the ICF (1964–1969), to the National Islamic Front (1985–1989), and on to the National Congress (1998–2000). He argued that "the expansion in the size of the movement itself necessitated reorganization, and forced it to implement large-scale changes."[45] Additionally, since that time and under the leadership of al-Turabi and his team, the movement built on its organizational potentials and embarked on what they thought of as an Islamist project that many within and outside the Islamist movement describe as "al-Turabi's project." Ḥasan Mekki argued that the entire Islamists' project in the Sudan was more or less al-Turabi's project rather than the Islamists'.

`Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim argued an inclination among the ranks of the "biographers of Ḥasan al-Turabi . . . to see his 'fundamentalism' as an expression of the religious traditions of al-Turabis, a lineage of Ṣūfis, Mahdists, jurists, and clerics that came into existence in the seventeenth century." Such a view, Ibrahim argued, "obscures the politics of a shrewd thinker with a great ability to respond to effect change."[46] Whether it obscured the politics of a shrewd thinker or not, al-Turabi's chief innovation was to introduce violence to the Islamist movement. His longevity as a central and influential figure in the Islamist movement in the Sudan was due to his organizational skills, the mobilization of the movement's political artisans, and his ability to study the strategies of his opponents and to effectively invent and deploy a counter strategy, which was similar to his opponents' strategies. In this way, he was able, with varying degrees of success, to outmaneuver his main rivals' political moves both inside and outside the Islamist movement. Chief among those rivals was always the Communist Party. It is evident that al-Turabi paid close attention to the Communists' political strategies and tactics and tried to counter or reinvent similar ones. He developed his notion of Islamism to supplant the Communist movement as a first step in his overall program, or his grand project, the Islamic Front. He built a tightly regimented organization and supplemented it by the rhetorical stance of those lawyers who dominated the leadership of the movement as a close-knit group that stayed around him for the last 40 years or more. Hence, al-Turabi's biography, vision, political, and intellectual influences warrant investigation. For the left, moving in that direction opened the way for negotiation with the army for a coup and a new despotism as we saw in the May 1969, coup and its totalitarian regime. It is in this sense one can understand Ahmed Suliamān's[47] advocacy for military coups and why he deserted the Communist Party and joined the Islamists. 'Ahmed Suliāman was one of the few civilians in the Sudan who participated in planning for almost the most successful and failed coups in the Sudan except for the 'Abboud one. Before Nimairi's 1969 coup, he wrote a provocative and controversial series of articles in *al-Ayyam Daily* claiming that the failure of the progressive forces and their system that followed the fall of 'Abboud's regime could be attributed to the lack of sustained cooperation between these forces and the faction of the army that helped in expediting the downfall of that regime. He added that future prospects of a progressive regime depend on the cooperation of progressive groups in the army and the left civilian movement. That led to the sharp disagreement between him and 'Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub and ended in support for the Nimiari coup and regime. Later, he joined the Islamists and played a role in promoting the 1989 coup. He sold them his theory about a successful coup. He argues that a successful coup is like a banana fruit you can eat neither when it is too raw nor when it is too ripe.

NOTES

1. Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow, (New York, Vintage Books, 1984) 34.

2. See, Abdullahi Gallab, "A Civil Society Deferred: We—the Sudanese—have not been Liberated Yet." *African Arguments* (http://africanarguments.org/2011/11/23/a-civil-society-deferred-we-the-sudanese-have-not-been-liberated-yet-by-abdullahi-gallab/).

3. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class Ambiguous Identities* (London, Verso, 1991) 86.

4. *Kizan* is a pejorative term used particularly in the Sudanese daily conversational language to ridicule the Islamists. The term refers to an old-fashioned, cheaply handmade, tin watercup. By that term the Islamists political enemies' intended to describe them as not modern or their views as rather archaic. Before the coup of 1989 and the establishment of the Islamists regime in Sudan, the use of the term was confined, to a certain state, to the political language and debates of students of institutions of higher education. After the coup, the term gained popularity particularly within the opposition circles and haters of Islamists regime to indicate strong feeling of dislike of a small group of Sudanese, who separated themselves from the Sudanese community to establish a violent and corrupt state.

5. High leadership is a term coined by Ernest Gellner in his book *Muslim Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981). He later elaborated on the term in his book *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London, Routledge, 1992) to describe leadership such as al-Khomeini's. This fits al-Turabi when he was described by his disciples as "Shaikh Ḥasan" in his aspiration for a Sunni or an Islamist "Wilayat al-Faqih."

6. See John Esposito and John Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).

7. Ḥamid Dabashi, *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism* (London, Zed Books, 2012) XV.

8. See Abdullahi Gallab, *al-Sudan al-Watan al-Mumkin* (Sudan the Possible) https://www.sudaress.com/author/عبد+االله+جلاب

9. Mayer N. Zald, and John D. McCarthy, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics* (Cambridge, Withrop Publishers, 1979) 4.

10. Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010) 45.

11. Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992) 162.

12. Ibid.

13. Nonmovements are what Asef Bayat referred to as "the collective actions of noncollective actors; [which] embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations." See, Bayat, *Life as Politics*, 14 (see chap. 1, no. 12).

14. Ḥemeti is Moḥamed Ḥamdan Dalago, a militia commander of the *janjaweed* who earned global infamy as "devils on horseback." The massive destruction to human life and property and the gravest human life violation by the *janjaweed* in Darfur caused death to more than 200,000 lives and drove about 2 million into displacement at the height of the conflict between 2003 and 2004. The Islamist regime reconstituted, under his command, the *janjaweed* militias that perpetrated brutal crimes against civilians in Darfur, to brutalize demonstrators in any part of the country including the capital of Khartoum. Hemeti was promoted to brigadier general in exchange.

15. The Islamist delegates were Ḥasan al-Turabi, Mohmed Yousif Mohmed, and Osman Khalid.

16. Abdelwahab El-Effendi, "'Discovering the South': Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa," *African Affairs* 89, no. 356 (July 1990) 371–389.

17. Øystein H. Rolandsen and M. W. Daly, *A History of South Sudan from Slavery to Independence* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016) 76.

18. Hamid Dabashi, *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism* (London, Zed Books, 2012) xx.

19. There were eleven Communists and leftists of the Executive Board of the NFPO, which consisted of fifteen members.

20. Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1990) 110.

21. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 73 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

22. Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989*, 110.

23. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976) 217.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 73 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

27. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, 219.

28. The riot eruption of what the Sudanese call *awal Maris* (March First) was against the visit of President Najib of Egypt to attend the opening of the Sudanese Parliament that day. The Umma Party, who stood against unity with Egypt and called for *al-Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin* (Sudan for the Sudanese), foresaw that visit as a grave danger to the independence of the country. A large crowd of unfriendly Ansār, carrying white weapons, met Nijab at Khatoum airport and tried to force their way in. A clash with police followed, which led to death and injuries on both sides. The British governor general declared Martial law and postponed the opening of the Parliament until March 10, 1954.

29. Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in the Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898–1985* (New York, State University of New York, 1987) 228.

30. Ibid.

31. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi el-Sudan: al-Tatour, al-Kasb al-Manhaj*, 2nd ed. (Khartoum, Institute of Research and Social Studies, 1992) 144.

32. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 15 (see chap. 3, no. 22).

33. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, 216.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ḥasan Mekki, *Harakat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fil-Sudan: 1944–1969*, 15 (see chap. 2, no. 7).

39. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 75 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

40. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi el-Sudan*, 29.

41. Ibid.

42. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 14 (see chap. 3, no. 22).

43. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 77 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

44. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 14 (see chap. 3, no. 22).

45. Ibid.

46. ʿAbdullahi ʿAli Ibrāhīm, "A Theology of Modernity," 195–222 (see chap. 3, no. 18).

47. Ahmed Suliamān (1924–2009) was one of the founders of the Sudanese Communist Party and one of the most prominent members of its political bureau. He and other leading members of the party lead a division in support of Nimairi's 1969 coup. Even before the coup, in December of the same year, Ahmed Suliamān wrote in *al-Ayyam Daily* a provocative and controversial series of articles claiming that the failure of the progressive forces and their system that followed the fall of ʿAbboud's regime could be attributed to the lack of sustained cooperation between these forces and the faction of the army that helped in expediting the downfall of that regime. He added that future prospects of a progressive regime depend on the cooperation of progressive groups in the army and the left civilian movement. Later, he joined the Islamists and played a role in promoting the 1989 coup.

Chapter 8

October:
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents

Ḥasan al-Turabi found that, maybe to his own surprise, the Islam for which he had proudly spoken about his own knowledge, inheritance of the earliest Mahdism great-grandfather Ḥamad al-Naḥlān, and or gained a contested claim of a leadership to a modern revolution provided him not more than two thousand student members of an Islamist organization when he assumed its leadership of the Sudanese Brotherhood in 1965. Since the time of Babikir Karrar in the 1940s to the time of 1964 October revolution the gain of Islamism was not more than two thousand members. While, al-Turabi was welcomed them as he risked his prestigious position of the dean of the school of law at the University of Khartoum to lead that small group, some of his Islamist peers did not welcome him as a leader. Nevertheless, nothing could be more characteristic of the disposition of Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, the mentor who turned the movement into a "regime of practice" and his party members into "artisans" locked up in his iron cage; nor could anything better bring out the sharp contrast between Shaikh Ḥasan al-Turabi the ambitious leader for a Sunni *Wilayat al-faqih* and his renegade, cunning, and rebellious disciples than this turn of events when the hegemonic canopy that shaded the Islamist disciplinary society was shattered to the demise of al-Turabi, his Islamism, and Islamists.

Thomas Mann wrote in his essay "Brother Hitler," "The fellow is a catastrophe, but that's not to find him interesting as a personality and destiny." Adding that no one should feel "above dealing with murky figure."[1] For some Sudanese, Ḥasan al-Turabi is an evil person, for other among his disciples he is a prophet, and for others, especially among his observers, he is an enigma. Dr. Shaikh Ḥasan ended up propounded and remunerated for every virtue by some and deprecated for every evildoing by others. All this owes a great deal to al-Turabi himself, his personality cult, his behavior, and his form of Islamism. If historian Nobert Frie claims, "There's never been so

much Hilter," sixty years after the end of second world war then some Suda-
nese would say, "there's never so much al-Turabi" even before his death and
the demise of his Islamism However, by the day of his death, many Sudanese
might have said, "There's never been so much Islamists." Those who fol-
lowed him one day, turned against him the other day, humiliated him, traded
their Moses (Ḥasan al-Turabi) for the golden calf ('Omer al-Bashir) they
harried to his home crying that day even before his burial, and the next day
they filled the airwaves praising his life and character that stirred imagination
evoked boundless devotion, sometimes religious, most of the time political
inside and outside the Sudan.[2]

From the early days of assuming the leadership of the Islamist movement,
al-Turabi lived in the hostile world of his Islamism. It is true that the entire
internal infight and struggle between al-Turabi and his peers had not come
out in the open especially that time; though more importantly, what happened
between him and disciples was wholeheartedly believed or taken as honest by
many Sudanese for very good reason. Almost all of the Sudanese groups, indi-
viduals, media in diaspora, and political parties vigorously debated whether
or not that change of events in the year 2000 or the *al-Mufasala* was a true
rebellious moment ousted al-Turabi from any relationship with the regime or
merely another game similar to the ploy used in the coup of June 30, 1989,
when al-Turabi sent himself to Kober prison as a cover-up while he sent
al-Bashir to the palace, a move he admitted to later.[3] But whether that appall-
ing and peculiar incident was due to the Islamists justification—as they evoked
the Hadith that *al-ḥarb khid'aa* (war is trickery or deceit)—or to al-Turabi's
fear of being implicated had the coup failed, it tells about al-Turabi's character,
the Islamists' moral competency, and the lust to capture the state regardless
of each one's hidden agenda. Moḥamed Ṭaha Moḥamed 'Aḥmed, an editor in
the Islamists hatchet journalism, opinioned once that the coup could have cost
al-Bashir his life, but not al-Turabi had it failed.[4] However that may be, that the
coup as single event has continued to present itself as the mode of operation
whereby the regime acquired its self-image within the Sudanese mind. Hence-
forth, that memorable credibility gap has opened up into an abyss, especially
because that particular event has never been renounced as a great mistake by
any of the Islamist groups regardless of their fighting.

Yet, the more they obscured this complicated and difficult truth, the
more its private and public costs grew and charted the course of Sudanese
Islamism's route from disintegration to oblivion. Sudanese Islamism, hence-
forth, was abrogated as an illusion "incongruent with reality" according to
its own and others' judgments, as truthfulness was never counted as one of
its virtues. That exemplifies an illustration to the essence of Islamism and its
Sudanese model, as explained in the previous chapter, especially as "the more
things change, the more they stay the same" in terms of its regime of practice.
However, it gives an example of how those disciples could be described as a

rising class of a younger generation of Islamists whom he devoted his life to lead them, so as to lead him to victory turned into the kittens who eat their father as John Garang jokingly said to 'Alī 'Osmān on their first meeting.[5] What has been revealed up to now, during the 27 years of the Islamist regime and their internal conflicts and fights gave rise to an uneasy feeling among most Sudanese citizens at home and abroad. Al-Turabi had treated this at one time with denial and later with contempt as emanating from a mixture of disguised disbelief and anger, unwilling to reexamine his diminishing role as the last of the Islamist, and the weathering away of his Islamism.

BROTHERS IN GOD, ENEMIES IN LIFE

Islamists describe their relationship with each other as *Ikhwan fi Allah* (brothers in God). This brotherhood in God might hold to a certain extent while cultivating a brother or forging the ideology. It is true that "all social life is an ecology of human bodies, coming together and moving apart across the landscape." The dialectics of that combine peaceful and violent performances. According to that, some individuals or groups might turn into fierce enemies when some of those brothers move apart as they compete for worldly things including leadership, status, or/and certain awards. Where individuals meet, their encounters sometimes have in varying degrees reflect the qualities which generate what Randall Collins "*interaction rituals chains*"[6] or "archcitypes of interaction which bind members into a moral community, and which create symbols that act as lenses through which members view their world, and as codes by which they communicate." Conflict driven by structural rivalry has always been part of a chain of the social and political encounters along the history of the Islamists from their early days. To follow the social causation of this phenomenon, which is not confined to the Islamists only, does not mean that history is a rigid sequence. Nevertheless, it is not within the realm of this study or the topic of this book.

By the time Ḥasan al-Turabi was in Europe and by the time he left Paris, events were moving very fast. Elements of that movement are clearly apparent had led al-Turabi road to leadership by default and by design. How those events invented forms of contention and how they attempt to seize and transform opportunities, though rather different from what most of his colleagues or previous leaders of Sudanese Islamism experienced, is important. However, some of al-Turabi's biographers, propagandists, and al-Turabi himself narrate that story of rise to leadership sometimes narrated differently, nevertheless they aim to fit a personality cult of a leader they hold in reverence. Sometimes, they dramatically inflate these stories, and sometimes they deliberately drop or do not acknowledge events and roles of other people, or even sometimes they use distortions and falsehoods. Hence, al-Turabi's

story has been told innumerable times dating from widely differing periods. Others, especially some of his "brothers in God" turned enemies approach his story from the "wrong" direction. Not all Sudanese Islamist leaders foster personality cult. This kind of "celebrity worship syndrome" developed at a peculiar speed during the early period of al-Turabi's ascension to leadership and continued to grow through time, although al-Turabi did not make a steady move toward leadership. Immediately after his death, the long of friend and foe became almost autonomous and sacred toward canonizing him. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all these events, as their narrative continue to be repeated or integrated into new forms sociopolitical structures to canonize or demonize the person, play separately or collectively a role in the genesis of the structure of the character of the hero or the villain.

Al-Turabi was a member of the Islamist movement since his early days at the college, but he was not an activist. Inevitably there is some truth to this as many of his contemporaries claim so. Al-Sidiq al-Mahdi, who described himself to me in a message, as the architect of al-Turabi's marriage to his sister Wisal, attests that he was the one who preferred Ḥasan al-Turabi, the nonactivist, who did not propose to her, and who might have had an interest in another female at the law school that time, over al-Rashid al-Tahir, who proposed to Wisal, not directly but by expressing that to al-Sadiq himself.[7] In his letter to the author, al-Sadiq says, "Hasan was an Islamist, though he was neither an activist nor an organized member." He adds that "even Babikir Karār the famous leader at that time described al-Turabi as 'of a Sufi intelligence.'" Al-Sadiq explains further that, he requested a mutual friend, late Yousif S'aid to open the al-Sadiq's idea with Ḥasan. Al-Sadiq further explains the rationale behind that idea was to establish an affinity between him and the Islamists. Al-Sadiq had in mind then two of his Islamist friends: Muddatheir 'Abdel Raḥim and Ḥasan al-Turabi. He adds that he consulted with Wisal but his father rejected the idea when he opened the subject with him. Sayyid Sidiq's rejection was after some consultation with some of the Ansār personalities in the White Nile area who knew al-Turabi's family better. Al-Sadiq was not convinced and asked his mother to help him in convincing the family. Wisal herself affirms that the "the marriage between Hasan and her was semi-arranged by her mother and brother (Sadiq). During Hasan's London period, Wisal's mother met Hasan in Britain when she visited her son, Sadiq, who was in Oxford. Wisal's mother was very impressed by Hasan, and when she came back to Sudan, she told Wisal that Hasan was a very pious man and often quoted the Koran. In those days, in general, members of the Mahdi family chose their partners from within the family group. However, at that time, Sadiq believed it right that a well-educated and brilliant Sudanese man should be able to marry a woman from al-Mahdi family. This idea was accepted from other family members, partly because such interfamily marriage might strengthen the Mahdi family."[8]

Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, who claims to be the true chronicler of al-Turabi's "intellectual and political views and positions,"[9] argues that al-Turabi's marriage into Sudan's first family to Wisal al-Mahdi, "was a consummation of an undeclared alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Sādiq al-Mahdi wing of Ansar."[10] Of course there was no such wing of Ansār that time. But what has been experienced in this field aroused different and diverse responses from both his followers and detractors. The legend and arrangements that emerged out of that development in its complexity had deeply influenced and typified al-Turabi's ambition, his personality cult, and his cult following by producing a multiplicity of ramifications from both al-Turabi followers and detractors. Al-Ṣadiq himself confirmed, in that message, that after the marriage some of al-Turabi's competitors from the Islamists, especially those with Salafi tendency like Ja'far Shaikh Idris, began accusing al-Turabi as a sellout, who fell under the influence of *taifia,* and it was due to this reason al-Turabi began to stay and shy away from them.[11]

Perhaps this has to do with some paradoxical property, by its very nature to instigate in al-Turabi, and the heir of a different Mahdism, and to detect his appeal. His name as "al-Turabi," as well as a graduate from reputable international schools of learning, and his character and capability to lead within that period and his relationship with al-Mahdi family gave all that an added value. Moreover, we might need to cast some light on that paradoxical property from a different way. In May 1962, at al-Ilafoun Islamists Fifth Congress meeting, al-Turabi "proposed that the movement be transformed into an intellectual pressure group on the lines of the British Fabian society, and not to work as an independent party. Instead it should act through all political parties and on all of them. The suggestion was rejected, however, though not without equivocation."[12] A similar proposed idea was given to the communist party by 'Awad Abdel Raziq, who was the secretary general of the party, and his idea was rejected as well.

However, that time, it seems that the Islamist movement was undergoing a serious leadership crisis. The Fifth Congress was not successful in resolving the leadership problem by formalizing the post al-Rashid al-Ṭahir practice of collegial leadership. The Executive Bureau was now formally empowered to choose the leader from among its members, which meant that the leadership was vested in the body as a whole. Al-Rashid al-Ṭahir was "officially removed and his 'unauthorized' coup attempt formally repudiated and censured. The measures unfortunately did not bring a definitive solution to most problems. The congress was silent on some crucial issues, such as whether to adopt the military option or reject it definitively."[13]

When al-Turabi came back finally from Paris, he attended a Shura Council meeting in 1964 before the October Revolution. According to 'Alī al-Ḥaj, who was at the secretariat during that meeting, all members of the Shura

Council unanimously agreed on planning a military action against the 'Abboud regime.[14] Ḥasan al-Turabi, according to al-Ḥaj, was able to persuade the council against the military action. He advised for working with the people for a move against the regime.

The social and political ferment of October revolution is a phenomenon without parallel in the Sudanese history. It must be acknowledged as the combination of the notion of old—al-Mahdi's family—and new networks of the October revolution and its consequences. The Round Table Conference and winning a significant majority of seats of *dawair al-Khrijeen* (Graduates Electoral College) gave him a satisfactory capital that might have ignited his ambition to assume the highest seat as the leader of the Islamists. Where, as not only that but, by that time al-Turabi emerged as a distinguished new leader in Sudan—especially among students from higher education institutions—to give the small and marginal Islamist party a new image. Al-Turabi himself said he was reluctantly pushed into politics and that he would have preferred a nonpolitical role. On November 25, 1964, al-Turabi was elected by the Executive Bureau as the official leader of the Islamist movement. He resigned his prestigious position as the dean of the School of Law at the University of Khartoum, which "was even more significant, given that no such post as 'Ikhwan secretary General existed then. In fact, such a designation contradicted the resolutions of the of the Fifth Congress which insisted on collective leadership as a safeguard against what was seen then an abuse by al-Tahir of his position." However, the communist party, then, awarded a privileged place to the position of the secretary general.

Then it seems that historical difference between the Fifth Congress's idea of collective leadership and al-Turabi's idea of a secretary general imposed a significant disparity. On one hand, the Congress thought that the position of *al-Murshid al-'Aām* had great power and controlled the movement as a dictator. So, when al-Rashid al-Ṭahir took an individual decision and took part in the coup attempt and was imprisoned, the Congress thought the structure of the leadership of the organization should be changed. A collective leadership was advocated. On the other hand, al-Turabi wanted to liberate the movement from the Egyptian Brotherhood influence. This was a deeply rooted impulse in different trends of Sudanese Islamism, but for al-Turabi and his emerging group it became part of their strategy in freely attacking the Sudanese communists, their secretary general 'Abdel Khaliq Maḥjoub, and their relationship with the Egyptian Communist Party and Henri Currel in particular for being both a Communist, an Egyptian, and a Jew. Because of all that he wanted to liberate the movement and intentionally avoided using the name Muslim Brotherhood, and their terminology adopted other names and titles. Accordingly, he wrote a new constitution for ICF. According to al-Turabi, "in 1965 the movement reached another

turning point with the launch of the ICF as an umbrella for the movement's public activities. From then on the movement developed very rapidly, to an extent that neither the leadership nor the organization could match."[15] Most observers agree that was the first step from disconnecting from the Brotherhood structures toward building up a mass movement based on his own Islamism. In April 1965, the ICF participated in the first general elections after October Revolution and won three seats. Ḥasan al-Turabi came first and Mohamed Yousif came last in the list of the graduate electoral college. Al-Rashid al-Ṭahir won in his hometown al-Gadarif regional constituency. Later, two independent members of the parliament and a Ṣūfi leader and a teacher from western Sudan joined the ICF parliamentarians group. According to al-Turabi that "represented 'ahd al-Khirouj (era of coming out) as the popular movement that threatened the traditional parties and raised political issues with originality that transcended the reliance of old politicians to tradition and their control over colonial policies."[16] But it was not the traditional parties who were comfortable with some of the details of that; even within the Islamists themselves some were not happy with the leadership of al-Turabi. From the point of view of al-Turabi himself, or other observers, many problems stemmed from al-Turabi's assumption of leadership and the way it occurred.

First, al-Turabi himself blamed part of that on jealousy. He claims that some members of the movement seemed to feel jealous of him and advocated that al-Ṭahir should become the leader of the opposition group in the parliament. Dr. al-Turabi agreed with their claim and al-Ṭahir became the opposition leader. However, al-Ṭahir soon decided to withdraw from the movement and joined the National Unionist Party. Yet, that was not the end of the story.

Second, in 1966, the issue of the leadership separation between the main body of the movement and the movement and the ICF was raised by members of the anti-al-Turabi group, who wanted to limit Dr. al-Turabi's influence. In short, it was a result of their resentment against Dr. al-Turabi. In the 1960s, Ja'far Shaikh Idris was the main activist among the discontented members against Dr. al-Turabi, who formed an anti-al-Turabi group and cooperated with al-Ṭahir. Idris was older than al-Turabi and was strongly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Malik Badri, a "discontented member" who became the secretary general of the main body after al-Turabi was forced to resign, wanted to put more emphasis on education rather than politics. Mohmed Shaikh 'Omer, another discontented member, had a disagreement with Dr. al-Turabi about the movement's strategy, arguing that the movement was against the government too much.

Third, the conformation of al-Turabi's position as secretary general and the endorsement of a broad-based body immediately ignited a competitive

attitude from the Karār al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya group "who were courting some components of the earlier IFC to form their own grouping."

In the first phase of his leadership to the party and as early as the 1960s, the denunciation of al-Turabi as secretary general by some of the members of the party's executive committee was manifested in four principle forms. The first form, from the early time of his leadership, included some nagging members of this party's executive committee who accused al-Turabi of turning the party into a trila (trailer cart) subordinate to the Umma party.[17]

The second phase was the initiation of al-Turabi's strategic vision of *wahdaniyya* or "oneness." Later al-Turabi explained and continued to promote this idea as his deep-seated grand theory of what he calls "unitarianism," which he has assumed, developed, and followed as his operational and high-status stipulation. According to that, Unitarianism here represents the "fundamental principle that explains almost every aspect of doctrinal or practical Islam."[18] Hence, through time, the idea of Unitarianism, which started as a representation characteristic of "leadership as one," has extended to embrace a total order of "not just that God is one, absolutely one, but also existence is one, life is one; all life is just a program of worship, whether it's economics, politics, sex, private, public or whatever."[19] Hence, leadership as one was initiated and confirmed by "his new grip on the movement [that] was dramatically demonstrated in the decision to issue a communiqué on November 2 in the name of Ḥasan al-Turabi as secretary general of Ikhwan."[20] This move was "even more significant, given that no such a post as Ikhwan secretary general existed then. In fact such a designation contradicted the resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the party [which was held in 1962] that insisted on collective leadership as a safeguard against what was seen then as the abuse by [the previous leader al-Rashid] al-Ṭahir of his position."[21] What is not surprising was the eagerness of the younger college-educated groups, most of whom supported Dr. Ḥasan and his new leadership. They claimed to have drawn inspiration from the 1964 October Revolution and to apply it to the new image and prestige of the University of Khartoum and its environment. That has been a program that al-Turabi and his party continually reproduced, communicated, and accentuated particularly in decisive roles of mobilization and promotion of their own self-image. Al-Turabi repeatedly—especially when called upon to describe his group, mostly to Western audiences of journalists and scholars—claimed that Islamism "is the only modernity." It is in this form that al-Turabi's compact with modernity as he perceives it draws a "marked sense of self-awareness" and a clear line between his and other forms of "traditional" Islamism—the Ikhwan in particular—that adopted the term *al-Amin al-'Aām* (the Secretary General) for *al-Murshid al-'Aām* (the General Guide).[22] Within such an order and the body of politics that emerged out of it comes a very serious foundational aspect of al-Turabi's theory of

practice—the perception of people as one. According to that, neither dissent nor disagreement could be tolerated, and in this sense, the "Other" has been regarded not only as the enemy but as a threat and a heresy from which society, held together with and sustained by the power-as-one, should be protected. This concept constituted the foundation of the Islamist totalitarian pursuit and the violence that ensued out of it.

The third phase of his transformation transpired out of his evolving leadership condition. He transformed from Dr. Ḥasan, the university professor, into the high leader Dr. Ḥasan, head of the political Islamist party.

Here, step-by-step, Ḥasan al-Turabi methodically and successfully consolidated his power with a strict centralization of all the Islamist party's authority in his hand. Simultaneously, al-Turabi's personality cult grew as a work of al-Turabi himself. He, the brilliant student, the acknowledged university professor, and the "fox-like" politician, had always been celebrated as the heart of his disciples' cult.[23] And he continued to be perceived by them as a representation and expression of an Islamist modern *tarīqa* whose exceptionalism they liked to believe in and promote as their image to the Sudanese public. Professor al-Tag Fadalla, former president of the Sudanese International University, noted that "al-Turabi's status as a university professor and dean of faculty of law [at an unusually normal promotion, experience, and early age] in addition to his family background endowed him with a cultural and social capital that facilitated his path to the fields of power within his Islamist group and Sudanese society at large."[24] Dr. ʿAlī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed attributes al-Turabi's prominence to his outstanding ability of getting ahead and staying ahead.[25] He argues that al-Turabi "is not only a brilliant person but also a dynamic thinker and by staying for so long at the helm of the organization he shaped his leadership position and it shaped him."[26]

It was a small organization of no more than a couple thousand members, who mostly were students from universities, higher education institutions, and secondary schools. The ICF advocated an "Islamic constitution" and an "Islamic state." All of these factors added to al-Turabi's personality cult, "grouping around him some of the younger and more militant members, but at the same time alienating some of the old guard who clashed with him repeatedly."[27] ʿAlī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed claims that those old guard members were not sidelined by al-Turabi but would have inevitably found themselves sidelined regardless.[28] In his book, *Min Tarikh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Sudan 1953–1980* (From the History of Muslim Brothers in the Sudan 1953–1980), ʿIesa Makki ʿOsmān Azraq, one of the elders of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, briefly describes some of these clashes and how some of the movement's leaders complained about the harsh language of their new secretary general, Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi. Azraq particularly referred to an incident when some members of the executive committee of the movement demanded an apology

from al-Turabi for publically insulting Dr. Zain al-'Abdin al-Rikabi, another professor, a member of the executive committee, and the editor of the movement paper, *Al-Mithaq*. Al-Turabi refused to apologize and said, according to Azraq's story, that he "has never been used to apologizing in public."[29] Such an account holds significance because this behavior continued to be al-Turabi's pattern, even when he was asked to apologize to the Sudanese people for his role in the 1989 military coup and the atrocities committed as a result of it.

Again, he said he would not apologize and stated that he apologizes only to 'Allah. Hence, he has always placed himself above individuals and colleagues, organizations, the nation, and the state. Accordingly, we are here in front of a personality that floats above history. In his interview with the Egyptian TV host Muna al-Shazali, he explained that by saying that he does not like to padlock himself to any political, partisan, or religious formation. "I would like to talk to the human beings in the world and in existence," he echoed to his interviewer.

It might be important to ponder 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim's reflection on the legacy of 'Abdalla al-Turabi, Ḥasan's father, and his "experience as a cleric in a colonial Judiciary that relegated shari'a law to a humiliatingly inferior position in relation to modern, civil law." This experience, according to Ibrāhim, deeply influenced al-Turabi's assessment of the broader patterns of change in two significant ways. First, "it makes his point that colonial clericalism, as family jurisdiction divorced from the business of the state, was only one example of the long-standing tradition in Islamic clericalism of separating shari'a from state politics in order to safeguard personal piety."[30] Of course, the view that clericalism was incapable of reconciling Islam with modernity was not unique to al-Turabi, but it was shared by the Islamists at large. By its very nature and relationship to the inherited colonialism and the would-be generations of the community of the state, the Islamists have considered that all forms of clericalism, 'ulama, and their institutions amounted to an old-fashioned group "whose education is based on books written hundreds of years ago and who believe nothing better could be produced." Second, "he uses his father's experiences to question the ability of the secular effendis to implement a modernity in which Muslims would feel at home."[31] However, modernity in which Muslims would feel at home has further complexities. These complexities became more serious through time, particularly when al-Turabi assumed power after the 1989 coup. He and his followers saw themselves as having a trust over the religious, moral, and political high ground and a monopoly over its ideals, as they arrogantly claim it. In so doing, they assumed they owned the language, example, and arbitration of ethics, values, and beliefs over and above the ideology. Later, al-Turabi community of the state became as one of the "intimate enemies" of that state. At one time, he asserted that the state should "atone," though he

did not explain how and for what reason. The values of the community of that state club suited al-Turabi's personality cult very well because it provided for "separate pathways to transmission of privilege, and by recognizing competing, even antagonistic, claims to prominence within its own order, the field of elite schools insulates and placates the various categories of inheritors of power and ensures, better than any other device, the pax dominorum indispensable to the sharing of the spoils of hegemony."[32]

THE SALAFI FACTOR: A BLUFF OR A DEAL

The most dangerous flash point in Ḥasan al-Turabi's history and legacy is that his personality cult positioned his life in the subjective experience of himself. The growth of al-Turabi's personality cult and the progression of his monopoly over a total sense of veracity took an irreversible course. Now, it would be difficult to understand Ḥasan al-Turabi outside of his version of Islamism. Dr. Ḥasan Mekki, in a recorded interview with the author, asserted that "the entire Islamists' project in the Sudan is more or less al-Turabi's project rather than the Islamists."[33] Whether it seems that way to some more than others, Ḥasan al-Turabi's disciples and enthusiasts have no more in common with him than his opponents and adversaries. Among Islamist intellectuals, Ḥasan al-Turabi, by all means, is an outsider. He is neither a Muslim brother, nor a typical orthodox mainstream Islamist. To some, he may be a self-made Islamist, but others may seriously doubt whether he is an Islamist at all.

In a special interview with the Egyptian TV host Muna al-Shazali in July 2011, al-Turabi repeatedly affirmed that he is neither a Muslim brother, a Sunni, nor a Shia and that he would prefer not to lock himself within the confines of any political or Islamist representation.[34] However, he definitely adds a different shade to Islamism's many existing shades. From a critical perspective, by contrast, most of his avowed Salafi enemies label him as a secular person propagating "dangerous ideas."[35] At the same time, other opponents from the left label him as *rajee* (backward looking or reactionary). A former disciple of Ḥasan al-Turabi, Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din, questions his integrity. According to Salah al-Din, "Ḥasan al-Turabi used the Islamist movement as a ladder to climb up the peak of power and then throw that ladder away when he thought that he reached the peak. However, he did not find that ladder when he realized that he needed it the most as he did not reach that peak yet."[36]

'Atabani was not alone; others describe him as an opportunist because of his political performance. William Langewiesche, who interviewed al-Turabi several times, claims that he has heard that "al-Turabi is called the Madison Avenue ayatollah."[37] Others would argue that he has always been an

opportunist who uses religion as a useful tool "just to sell you [his] cause," as he conceded in 1989 to Scott Peterson, a *Christian Science Monitor* writer.[38] All this shows how many divergent views of al-Turabi there are that try to define his place in the political and religious fields. Yet, to take all that seriously, it might be helpful to briefly reflect on some of these allegations and how they relate to his Islamism. In the 1980s, the Salafi leader Ahmed Malik, president of the Muslim Union, wrote under the pseudonym Ibn Malik a book titled *al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl fi' al-rad-'Ala al-Turabi Shātim al-Rasūl* (The Unsheathed Sword, in Reply to al-Turabi, Denigrator of the Messenger [of God]) in which he severely attacked Ḥasan al-Turabi and later branded him as an apostate. Later, in the year 2000—when al-Turabi was no longer in power—Ahmed Malik continued to raise these issues about al-Turabi. Al-Amin al-Ḥaj Moḥamed Aḥmed, the teacher of shari'a studies at the Arabic Language Institute at Um al-Qura, University in Mecca also wrote a book that attacks al-Turabi. This kind of criticism of al-Turabi is evidently in line with the Saudi Salafi 'ulamas' and activists' official and private views and attacks on him and his ideas. Such criticism of al-Turabi has united the Saudi, Sudanese, and other Salafis and other conservative individuals of the Muslim Brotherhood from other parts of the Muslim world. Through their criticisms and attacks, they have been determined to show how far away al-Turabi and his brand of Islamism stand from what they consider true Islam. But al-Turabi himself has never hesitated to tell the world that there is something about these groups that is not to be trusted. He himself has explained how distant his Islamism is from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He even refused to give *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance), like Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, to the Egyptian Brotherhood Murshid. He maintains that "the Islamic movement in Sudan is very aware of its own history. It might in early days have assumed the form of Egyptian experience, which in turn had emulated an earlier model of Islamic life, mainly characterized by education and reform."[39] He claims that there is a distinct difference between the two Islamist representations and describes the Egyptian one as a "traditional form of organization."[40] He describes his Islamism as the one that "developed a marked sense of self-awareness, positioning itself accurately within its own specific time and place parameters."[41]

Indeed, it is not surprising to notice that as one examines when and how al-Turabi muscled his way to "position" his Islamism and leadership and how he shaped the movement "accurately within its own specific time and place parameters" during the sixties of last century. The "traditional form of organization"—the die-hard loyalists to the Egyptian Ikhwan, such as Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, Maḥmoud Burat, the Ikhwan group led by Moḥamed Saliḥ 'Omer, and al-Turabi's main rival (later became Salafi) Jafar Shaikh Idris—"made a formidable team that eventually gathered around it

the bulk of the Ikhwan old guard."[42] Antagonism against al-Turabi and his "heretical" ideas continued to grow, as did hostility from those individuals and groups together with regional Salafi circles.

It is true that another and different part of the internal struggle against al-Turabi had not come out into the open. More importantly, it is also true that al-Turabi's strategies, maneuvers, and ways in dealing with his old in-house contenders took peculiar ways and means. By replacing his adversaries and competitors one or more at a time, he disarmed most of them. However, al-Turabi's revolving-door syndrome tactics of bringing younger members of the organization in and hurling others out ultimately backfired—he was thrown out by the very ones he handpicked to replace some of his antagonists.

Although al-Turabi "complained that he had been the target of a politically motivated campaign of vilification by figures from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which was behind most of these allegations," it may well have been that the issue was deeper than that.[43] It is about neither "heresy" nor "dangerous ideas" but primarily about where these forms of Islamism and Salafism collide on the question of ideology and orientation and about where his character had been trying to present itself as different. That, in a sense, reflects on the character of al-Turabi and speaks about the essence of Islamism. Ḥasan al-Turabi is not a Muslim Brother and has never been and never needed to be one.

HOW AL-TURABI ISLAMISM BECAME POSSIBLE

That emergent epoch of the post-October Revolution enabled Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, the young new dean of the School of Law at the University of Khartoum, to develop a new and different construction of himself by assuming the leadership of a movement whose primary constituency at that time were students. His newly constructed self was supported by his win of a significant majority of the electoral seats designated to the graduates in the first general elections after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime. It nearly goes without saying that those who voted for him and his overwhelming victory within that sector of the Sudanese-educated elite or the campus nobility did not represent a nationwide endorsement for the young Sudanese politician over and beyond the power and numbers of that small constituency of Islamists. The Sudanese-educated elite in general and the population affiliated with University of Khartoum that included faculty, staff, and students in particular have always felt, especially after the success of the October 1964 Revolution, that they were tricked by the political rhetoric that they had a mission. Based on the rhetoric, their mission was to modernize their country, while their role

as "vanguards" was always frustrated by what they labeled as "traditional" forces of their parties and regimes.

The real novelty of that situation could be attributed to the spirit of that emergent epoch of the post-October Revolution. At that juncture, one would say that that revolutionary spirit superseded and, to a certain degree, mitigated the intervening differences that already existed, which were taking different forms out of other political commitments or orientations. It was through those young groups and individuals who came of age in a post-October era that commenced a Sudanese time of hope for a new era when human rights could become the political preference for the Sudanese people and the compass that would guide them toward a new Sudan. The formative period of Ḥasan al-Turabi, the new leader of the Sudanese Islamists, was the period when he and that generation of young Sudanese university students needed support from the other. For the university population, he emerged as a representative and a mentor; and from there, he grew his master (teacher) cult. Simultaneously, the support that al-Turabi received from the *khrijeen* (the graduates) at the general elections and from other people at the university led to the perception that the high-achievers and more people with higher education were his constituency and supporters of his leadership. From there, he developed his perception and strategy of life and politics "as a game of chance." At the same time, it was clear that the "old-fashioned" Islamism of the Ṣadiq ʿAbdallah ʿAbdel Māgid group and its Egyptian Ikhwan school were at risk from what was perceived as the rising tide of the left, other Arab and African nationalist movements and discourses, and the internal struggle for power among the Islamists themselves as explained before.[44] The post-October revolutionary evolution opened a democratic environment at home and began a rising tide of new secular schools of governance within the region and other parts of the world. It also promoted the need for new interpreters and advocates for Islamism in the absence of an accepted authority in that field. The post-October dictatorial, counter revolutionary environment, as well as the absence of the new leadership in itself and its different forums, opened the door for opportunities to some of the Islamists' younger generation to fill the void during the absence of their older leaders as will be explained later.

The issue of absence has an equally deeper effect within the universe of Islamism in general, and it is especially important after the oppressive measures taken against the Islamists by the state in Egypt before and during Jamal ʿAbed al-Nasser's (1952–1970) draconian measures against the Ikhwan and its members. As Francois Burgat argues, "their members were long confined to clandestine action or, in most favorable cases, to associative or trade unionist institutional outer fringe of political life. The more their capacity for mobilization was asserted, the more the policies of exclusion of the regimes and the ostracism of Western media cracked down."[45] That had

frozen Islamism and its Egyptian model to the pre-Ḥasan al-Banna assassination period and shifted the discourse to al-Banna's insubstantial message. Accordingly, those who stuck themselves to that brand of Islamism and to the *Bay'ah* from Ḥasan al-Banna and canonized him as an imam, such as Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, found themselves deemed dysfunctional, while the Egyptian model of Islamism was perceived as outdated by that time by the rising generations of post-October Revolution. It is surely worth emphasizing that, as Aḥmed Kamal al-Din argues, *Bay'ah* represented one of the main areas of irreconcilable disagreements between al-Turabi and the local representation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan—Ṣadiq 'Abdullah and his group—and the Egyptian mother organization together with the international organizations. Kamal el-Din argues that for al-Turabi the *Bay'ah* is between a person and his God.[46] Khalid Duran observed that "there is a predominant urge [for the Sudanese] to keep their distance from their Northern cousins [the Egyptians], at least in the sense that they resent playing the role of eternal vassals to a center of the North."[47] Especially the Sudanese Islamists had been accusing their Communist adversaries of playing such a role. Duran added that al-Turabi, with his double doctorate (Oxford and Paris) and felicity of language in Arabic and English, had little difficulty in rising to higher pan-Islamist prominence than the Egyptian Islamist of his days. The aging and ailing 'Umar al-Tilimsāni in Cairo was no match for him."[48]

At the same time, the Sudanese Islamists were warned against Sayyid Qutb's ideas. They were told that the "conclusions that he arrived at on collective excommunication, based on the jahilīyya [ignorance of Islam] and *'uzla,*[49] are intellectually erroneous and practically dangerous."[50] It was explained to al-Turabi's Islamists that their position should stem from "their regard for the characteristics of the Sudanese society, their involvement, and functioning within a multiparty political system, and from the distinct ideological perspective and independent organization that they began to develop from the early 1960s."[51] Hence the new post-October situation in the Sudan and its open democratic environment created the desire and the need for the production of an authority and leadership different from that old-fashioned Egyptian model, its leadership, Sudanese followers, and the intellectually unsound Qutbism. That extraordinary situation brought al-Turabi to the leading edge for not only a precipitous political experience but also for an ideological Sudanese innovation that might fill a glaring gap in terms of its local imports.

Given the sociopolitical conditions that prevailed during that period, al-Turabi wasted no time in introducing his new strategy of attack while investing heavily for the future of his leadership. Simultaneously, he invested heavily on his Islamist movement—shaped by his *laïcité*—while banking on

an opportunity that availed itself within the power relations that underlie that new emerging epoch and its emerging young educated groups. More students from rural Sudan, especially Darfur, equipped with temperament and a cultural capital that would likely make greater numbers of them lean toward whoever would call for Islam, strengthened the Islamist student population, the movement's infrastructure, and the new leader who acted as the center of gravity for the emerging movement. Since that time, al-Turabi became the producer of the ideological and political direction of the movement, and the movement became equivalent with what the leader had done and what he would do and say.

It was a historic moment for the new secretary general and the former dean of the law school to look at the University of Khartoum where growing numbers of students were drawn toward a nonthreatening political orientation, different from Communism, with a modern sugar coating that could be accepted, to a certain extent, by the conservative side of the Sudanese culture. Some families might argue with their young family members who advocate a Communist politics but the same families might take it easy or even feel happy noticing those family members observing their religious duties and they might not question their relationship to Islamism. Having done so, al-Turabi's Islamism, served for some groups and individual students, the Islamist solidarity as functional conformity with home. Moreover, and to a certain extent, it acclimated itself with a new religious and cultural affiliation within the Sudanese's emerging civil and political spheres in what could be perceived and described as a novel way. Having done so, this novel way had to specifically reject Communism, its orientations, and its conduct conceptualized by progressive liberal values. Consequently, this impulse developed not only as a complete rejection of Communist and liberal orientations and values, but it also grew as a totally hostile and violent entity toward the Other, including other Muslim representations, such as Ṣūfi, Salafi, 'ulama, and Maḥmoud Moḥamed Ṭaha Islamism, as well as al-Banna or the Egyptian Brotherhood model. This hostility toward the Other actually represented the core of al-Turabi's *laïcité*. Hence, as the center shifted from the Brotherhood and its underpinning Salafism to al-Turabi's *laïcité*, this new phenomenon became the master signifier of that brand of Sudanese Islamism. At the same time, al-Turabi—who immediately turned into the secretary general of the organization and later in a gradual process into Shaikh Ḥasan by his followers—ascended through his personality cult into the new Mahdi of an emerging Islamism and became its axial point.[52] When the decision was made by al-Turabi the new Islamist secretary general to abolish the Brotherhood and to bring its members into the ICF in 1964, his *laïcité* became the Islam and Islamist signifier for those who followed him together with those who sympathized with him or joined his camp. But this major

transformative move did cause serious conflict. As el-Tigani ʿAbdelgadir reported, "in the inner circles of the Ikhwan, Jabhat al-Mithaq al-Islami [ICF] was seen as victory for the school of "modernizers" over their conservative colleagues."[53] But al-Turabi was especially challenged by those who were not willing to move from the Muslim Brotherhood's school of thought. Those who challenged al-Turabi most vigorously included Moḥamed Saliḥ ʿOmer, Jʿafar Shaikh Idris, and Moḥamed Yousif Moḥamed, and they attacked his leadership possibly because, according to al-Tigani, he was "an innovator who wanted to destroy the Ikhwan and change its Salafi ideological basis." Mahmoud Burat, who was then one of al-Turabi's supporters, argued at the Majlis al-Shura, which was convened to deliberate on this serious issue that "an ideological split has taken place within the Islamic *da'wa* (the Ikhwan). There [are] now two groups and may (or may not) co-exist. Al-Turabi's group, Turabi represents an ideological current. As for Jʿafar and Moḥamed Saliḥ ʿOmer, they stand for disciplinary ethics."[54] It would be too simplistic to explain al-Turabi's Islamism or Islamism in the Sudan in general as a mere after-effect or a consequence of a radical saga with Communism as some of its own historians advocate. As has been explained before, al-Turabi's *laïcité*, which had always been dismissive of all other political and religious representations including Egyptian Islamism, began to float away independent from or delinking itself from the mainstream and the specialized knowledge embedded in the Sudanese Muslim culture, intellectual discourse, and ideologies of other religious and political representations.

Within this development, al-Turabi became the "leader" in the Stalinist sense. Out of this, the seeds of the totalitarian impulse started to grow within the Islamist movement. The organization perceived itself as a novel movement led by a dynamic leader who provided for all members a sense of security and political and religious thought and guidance toward a brighter future as an outcome of the growth and development of the movement. Hence, it would be incumbent upon the members to follow him in the same way students follow their professor and mentor, believe in him the same way they would believe in their religious Shaikh, and meekly serve him as they should serve the leader. It was long overdue to remind Ḥasan al-Turabi as ʿAhmed Abdel Rahman did later, that he "turned the Islamist movement into a Sūfi tariqa and you became its sheikh."[55] In actual fact, that took place long ago, and that is why the Sudanese Islamist movement within more than a half century has produced only one thinker or ideologue; because the ideology and its production became attached to one single "Leader." The rest became disciples, operatives, and "artisans." The relationship of the foundational conservative commitment and the political agenda that came with it was negotiated through the emerging personality of the new young leader who combined the image of the "brilliant professor," a Sorbonne PhD graduate, and the

descendant of Wad al-Turabi. This very special physiognomy of al-Turabi's Islamism began to attract more committed and noncommitted students to the new political star and sometimes to the newly reinvented party. For those who hoped to gain entrance to the community of the state' al-Turabi, with his elegantly tailored full suits and his eloquent though sometimes-aggressive style, became a magnet for growing numbers of event non-Islamists as he was a frequent public speaker at the University of Khartoum Students' Club. The public speeches of al-Turabi at students' clubs continued to draw increasing numbers of students from the University of Khartoum, from other learning institutions, and the capital three cities as well.

This of course was not the time when Islamism began in Sudan. It was the time in which Islamism was born again in its new form and started to gain some prevalence across the public and political spaces. Then it started to draw more diverse groups of young Sudanese who came to the University of Khartoum and other institutions of higher learning. As it happened, many of those who helped define al-Turabi's Islamism and gave it a fairly modern face—different than the traditional rigid Ikhwan appearance—were the University of Khartoum graduates and United Kingdom-educated members who congregated around al-Turabi. They included 'Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Osman Khalid Modawi, Mohamed Yousuf, 'Abdel Raḥim Ḥamdi, and others. It follows that what al-Turabi himself has said, "the students who were at the center of the entire Islamic movement [while] chapters of the community outside the institution were only external branches of the movement in the University."[56] The deeply buried social and mental structures of that situation created an emerging social universe with the University of Khartoum at its core. Within this social universe, it became an incentive for the new recruits to al-Turabi Islamism to adopt the posture of their new iconic leader who was presented as a role model par excellence in his field of studies.

The qualities that defined this social universe were complex as it emerged as a master signifier that structured a new and different brand of Islamism, which Ḥasan al-Turabi represented in all forms, ideological orientations, and strategic planning. It was an Islamism that did not fall either into the ideological essentialism, theological imports, the international aspect, nor the cultural particularism of the Egyptian Brotherhood. T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone noticed that al-Turabi "in the past always down played the international aspects of Ikhwan."[57] In fact, it was more than that. Al-Turabi, as stated in chapter three, perceived the Egyptian Brotherhood as "traditional" and never mentioned a belief or an intimate relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood as practice or common values. That explains why he abolished the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood entity when he issued his first communiqué as the ICF's secretary general in 1964 in which he "declared that all Ikhwan public activities would henceforth be conducted through ICF channels."[58] For that reason,

al-Turabi Islamism or *laïcité* has been used here as a metaphor to describe a Sudanese development in the field of political Islam that emerged following Ḥasan al-Turabi's assumption of leadership for the movement in 1964. That explains his claim of "novelty" as one of the main characteristics of the Islamist movement in Sudan. At the same time, it reflects the controversial presence of al-Turabi's ideology in the Islamist and non-Islamist market of ideas and how it was received with acceptance from some and rebuff and severe criticism from others. Later, in a series of interviews with Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, he reflected on this important aspect of his Islamism. He recalled that the movement "is very much aware of its own history. It might in early days have assumed the form of Egyptian experience, which in turn emulated an earlier model of Islamic life, mainly characterized by education and reform. Within a short time, however, and after the initial stage of its existence, the movement developed a marked sense of self-awareness, positioning itself accurately within its own specific time and place parameters."[59]

This key moment of al-Turabi's Islamism that characterizes the historical past of the movement, which could be found reiterated in the narrations of the different generations of Islamist scholars and politicians, was consistent in the way it reconstructed the history of the movement as a unique and self-made organization that came from nowhere. By promoting such an instructive method for their own social construction and historical interpretation of the movement, al-Turabi and his Islamists chose two initial approaches to systemize the distinction between them and their surroundings. They did so by locating themselves within a place, space, and scope of events, which they determined.

NOTES

1. Volker Ullrich, *Hitler: Ascent 1889–1939* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2016) 1.

2. The Quran states the golden calf is hollow and produces a loud sound when the wind passes through it. The pro-al-Turabi Islamists described 'Alī 'Osmān as the magician or the false prophet who lead the Islamists stray.

3. This is the Sudanization of the name Cooper. The prison was named after Mr. R. M. Cooper, the first director of the prison.

4. Quoted in 'Abdelgani Ahmed Idris, *al-Islamiyoun Azmat al-Roya wa al-Qiyada* (London, Sinnar Publishing House, 2012) 91.

5. It was related to John (1945–2005), Chairman of SPLM Sudan Liberation Movement, first Vice president of the republic of Sudan from July 9 to July 30, 2005, during his 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha during the Naivasha Negotiations between the SPLM and the ruling Nation Congress (2003–2005); Garang said jokingly "we have heard of the revolution that eats its children, the cat that eats its kittens, but we have never heard of the kittens who eat their father."

6. Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change, (Cambridge, The Belknap Press Harvard University Press, 1998), 21.

7. In an e-mail communication between al-Sādiq al-Mahdi and the author, July 2017.

8. Masaki Kobayashi, *The Islamist Movement in the Sudan: The Impact of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement* (Durham, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham, 1996) 259 Unpublished PhD Thesis.

9. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of An Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Ḥasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) ix.

10. Ibid.

11. Author's communication with al-Sādiq al-Mahdi.

12. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 64.

13. Ibid.

14. Author's recorded interview with 'Alī al-Ḥaj in Bonn Germany July 2012.

15. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*, 14.

16. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka sl-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan: al-Tatour, al-Kasb al-Manhaj* (The Sudanese Islamic Movement: Development, Gain, Method) (Khartoum, Institute of Research and Social Studies, 1992) 28.

17. 'Iesa Makki 'Omān Azraq, *Min Tariekh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Sudan, 1953–1980* (Khartoum, Dar al-Balad Publishing, n.d.) 95–121. The word *trila* (trailer cart) was a part of the profound conflict between al-Turabi and Ja'afar Shaikh Idris, which continues up to this day, where Ja'afar continues to accuse al-Turabi of blasphemy.

18. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan Turabi* (Tampa, The World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993) 13.

19. Ibid.

20. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 75.

21. Ibid.

22. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 14.

23. Many of his political enemies describe him as such.

24. 'Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 5.

25. Dr. 'Alī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed is the deputy secretary general of the Sudanese Islamist Popular Congress Party. He lives in exile in Germany.

26. Ibid.

27. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 75.

28. 'Alī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed, interview by author, audio recording, Bonn, Germany, July 24, 2012.

29. 'Iesa Makki 'Osman Azraq, *Min Tarikh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Sudan 1953–1980* (Khartoum, Dar al-Balad Publishing, n.d.) 105.

30. 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim, "A Theology of Modernity," 195–222.

31. Ibid.

32. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, xxi (see chap. 2, no. 12).

33. Ḥasan Mekki, interview by author, audio recording, Khartoum, Sudan, December 28, 2006.

34. Interview with Egyptian TV host Muna al-Shazali, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksTo7V0JeIs&feature=relmfu.

35. Salafi and conservative-leaning Islamists in Sudan and some of the 'ulama in Saudi Arabia, including the late Shaikh 'Abdul-'Aziz Bin Bāz, campaigned locally and abroad against al-Turabi by accusing him of being a secularist.

36. Ghazi Ṣalāḥ al-Din, interview by author, audio recording, Khartoum, Sudan, December 30, 2005. The idea that al-Turabi manipulated the Islamist movement for his own gain was repeated again and again in all the interviews I conducted with Ḥasan Mekki, al-Tayib Zain al-'Abdeen, and Ghazi Salah al-Din.

37. William Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law." *Atlantic Monthly* 274, no. 2 (1994) 26–33.

38. Scott Peterson, "Sudan's Struggling Government Offers to Go '100 Percent Islamic.'"*Christian Science Monitor* August 7, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0807/Sudan-s-struggling-government-offers-to-go-100-percent-Islamic.

39. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 14.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 87.

43. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, "Ḥasan Turabi and the Limits of Modern Islamic Reformism." In Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', ed., *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* (Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 144–160.

44. Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid took over the leadership of the Sudanese Brotherhood after al-Rashid al-Ṭahir was forced out of office because of his involvement in a failed coup attempt during the 'Abboud regime. 'Abdel Magid, who received his university studies in Egypt during the 1940s, knew Ḥasan al-Banna, and he was one of the Sudanese Muslim Brothers who gave *Bay'ah* to Ḥasan al-Banna. He kept faithful to that up to this day.

45. Francois Burgat, "From National Struggle to the Disillusionments of 'Recolonization' the Triple Temporality of Islamism." In Fredreic Volpi, ed., *Political Islam: A Critical Reader* (London, Routledge, 2011) 34.

46. Ahmed Kamal al-Din in an internet interview, March, 2012.

47. Khalid Duran, "The Centrifugal Forces of Religion in Sudanese Politics." *Orient* 26 (December 1985) 587.

48. Ibid.

49. Qutb coined the term *al-'uzla al-shu'uriyya* and *al-Mufasalah al-Shu'uriyya* to indicate a psychological separation from society by feeling and consciousness as opposed to actual or physical separation.

50. Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir Ḥāmid, "Islam, Sectarianism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Modern Sudan, 1956–1985," PhD dissertation, Department of Economics and Political Studies, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1989), 138.

51. Ibid.

52. See 'Abdel Rahim 'Omer Muhi eldin, *Al-Islamiuoon fi l-Sudan*: *Drasat ta Tour wa al-fikir al-Syasi 1969–1985*, 127, for a quote about young al-Turabi: "al-Turabi, his yearning to remote horizon where looming assurances of prophet hood and good tidings of God's promise of succession."

53. Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir Hāmid, "Islam, Sectarianism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Modern Sudan, 1956–1985," PhD dissertation, Department of Economics and Political Studies, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1989), 104.

54. Ibid.

55. 'Abdel Rahim 'Omar Muhi al-Din, *al-Turabi wa al-Igahd: Siraa' al-Hawa wa al-Hawiya* (Khartoum, Maroe Bookshop, 2006) 180.

56. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi el-Sudan*, 132

57. T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone, *In Whose Image? Political Islam and Urban Practice* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994) 162.

58. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 76.

59. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of An Islamic Political Leader*, 14.

Part IV

THE SHAIKH

Chapter 9

The Two Tails of Counterrevolution

One of the most peculiar aspects of Ḥasan al-Turabi, his Islamists, and Islamism is how each one of them perceives political opportunity in a crisis. The October Revolution exposed "severe pathologies in the scared ideologies of nationhood. Hence, the structure of political opportunity "should be understood not as an invariant model inevitably producing a social movement but as a set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge and will set in motion a chain of causation that may ultimately lead to sustained interaction with authorities and these to social movement" or otherwise not. Ḥasan al-Turabi and ʿAlī ʿOsmān in particular as strategists sought to exploit crisis for the achievement of opportunities for their particular ends and to identify the conditions that promoted or impeded their designs. For their Islamists, later after the 1989 coup, which is/was a counter revolutionary act, they perceived opportunities that their leaders described as *tamkeen* and *kasb*, and the Sudanese citizens described as corruption "shaped by features of political system, that, in turn, shape patterns of interaction between movements and political parties."[1]

They all took the logic and full premises of the counter-revolution. However, ʿAlī ʿOsmān had overturned al-Turabi, and al-Bashir finally overturned them both; so too did their Islamists who all remained loyal to the idea of the opportunity structure. The only particularity is that each was circumstantial in nature.

After the fall of ʿAbboud regime, the Sudanese society was dominated by the most complex feeling of euphoria, hope, fear, and anxiety. New challenges invented new forms of contention or opportunities to outwit, evade, or surprise existing conditions. The principle purpose of the successful collective action of the October Revolution, in one side, is the constitution of freedom and the foundation of the republic; all that is governed by the ideal

of "We the Sudanese People." Reading within its language of modernity, new concepts, ideas, aspirations, imagination needs to come to terms with the inaugural moment toward a new Sudan. The exploitation of political opportunities in crises, within the post-October development as a trope, distorts social life, and lived experience, among other things, by both the "right" and the "left," as each separately came from the invention of forms of contention, which I call counterrevolution, is case in point.

For al-Turabi and his Islamists the unbroken thread of the long pre-October story of the phantoms of antagonism toward the Other, (*al-ilmanieen* [the secularists]), in general, and the Communists in particular, was added to the one they describe as *taifiyya* (sectarian parties)—also what they call traditional the political parties. All of these fears then escalated with the emergence of Ḥasan al-Turabi as the new leader. It remained closely connected to him and to his renegade disciples, who were then students at high institutions of learning during 1964 and who later forced him out of power in 2000. It is true that the 1964 October Revolution and its aftermath brought the war between the Islamists and their sworn enemies, the Communists, from the open space of university campuses to the public space. This, the culmination of the counter revolution as it materialized in the 1989 coup, shift led that to the curtailment of public space and the deprivation of citizens—including the Islamist themselves—from all forms of public goods during the first and second Islamist republics. This brings into view the different forms of violence as the dark underside of the Islamist political attitude and mode of governance. The basis and roots for these attitudes and polity can be found in the history of Islamism from its early days and later as one of the strands of Ḥasan al-Turabi's *laïcité* as it redefined its field of action and evolved in different directions that concurred on the attitude but differed in reason and strategy. Perhaps it might be clearer now, at this juncture, when Islamism has run into oblivion and has been subjected to systematic historical critique that even some of its adherents can plainly see how it has acted as a counter revolutionary force.

After the end of 'Abboud's regime, both the Communists and their Islamist rivals claimed the leading role in the revolution while each one was trying to lessen the role of the other. But at a more profound level, this new major fault line over which the battle between the two continued widened and spilled beyond the university campuses, high schools, and institutions of learning to include the entire Sudanese political landscape. These first started when the Islamists discovered that the Communists held more leadership roles in most professional organizations and trade unions and were successful in dominating the NFPO that emerged as the ruling body after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime.[2] The NFPO was established on October 25, 1964, and initially consisted of Sudanese faculty members of the University of Khartoum, Khartoum Technical Institute, representatives from student

unions, and representatives of physicians, lawyers, and judges. Almost immediately, they were joined by representatives of engineers, teachers, the Gezira Tenants Association, and the SWTUP. After the downfall of 'Abboud, negotiations between different political groups and organizations led to the formation of a transitional government under the premiership of Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa. Khalifa was known as a neutral person with good knowledge, and he was highly respected in the South "which was hoped would stand him in good stead in dealing with the southern question."[3] The Islamists claimed that the "communists had for the first time the chance to be the virtual rulers of Sudan" through the NFPO.[4] However, the October government that succeeded 'Abboud's regime was not explicitly threatening because it was of a transitional nature by composition, structure, and mandate. The Islamists were not alone because other political parties and actors felt threatened too. Out of the 15-member government of Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, seven were from the NFPO, including al-Shafi 'Ahmad al-Shaikh of the SWTUF and Shaikh al-Amin Moḥamed al-Amin of the Gezira Tenants Association. Five members were from the political parties (one each from the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, the People's Democratic Party, the ICF, and the Communist Party), and two were from the South and what has been considered as strategic ministries. It was clear that the cabinet "represented a number of ideological strands, mainly of the left but by no means all communists."[5] However, the idea of the NFPO emerged as a representation of what the Sudanese perceived as the new or modern political players who made the 1964 October Revolution a success. It presented an attractive alternative to the basic structure of the political parties, or what the Communists described as the old or traditional forces; yet, this was not clear at the beginning. But it did not take that long for political groups to enunciate louder what they suspected as a significant latent threat, which turned into a possibility of a new coalition or unified politics that would follow—sooner or later—the ideology or strategy of the Communist Party. It was clear that the animosity that lay beneath this surface of fighting between these parties spawned a new culture war. That sense of threat and its alarming prospects arose less from any NFPO policy during its early days than from when some of the NFPO members began to promote ideas that could result in a serious change of political practice, which induced terror in the hearts of the main political parties, the Umma Party, and the Unionists in particular. This collective feeling of threat served to bring the Islamist political parties together with other right-leaning parties, especially the Umma party, other political groups in opposition of the NFPO, and those who stood behind it. This culture war escalated even more when the NFPO and the left's arguments started to take an ideological path and a political stand blaming all the ills of the Sudan on what they described as the reactionary forces that came

from an alleged long hibernation rather than a time of clandestine activity. The crisis started to show its face when the set of meanings and realities of the NFPO started to speak not as NFPO but as an ideological group. On the other side, the renewed set of meanings were not adopted retrogressively to fit the spirit of October Revolution but rather to fit what some feared, and hence they wasted time picking fights with ghosts of pre-October times. Hence, the left and those who dominated the NFPO perceived themselves as the real revolutionary forces that organized the overt and covert struggle against the 'Abboud regime and mobilized the Sudanese in an unprecedented movement that led to the downfall of the regime. For these reasons the NFPO began to voice demands for themselves and that their constituencies should have a place and a space not only within the public sphere, but a metamorphic role within the legislative and the ruling structure that would accommodate and secure them a space at the state's helm. The political parties and the Islamists perceived one of these demands not only as a threat, but as a direct challenge to their authority and a serious impasse that would lead the ruling system astray; the NFPO demanded that 50 percent of the parliament seats be allocated for the modern forces. The NFPO "proposed special constituencies for workers, tenants, and intellectuals and finally tried to resurrect the old Graduates' Constituencies."[6] In addition, the radical policies that the new government of Sir al-Khatim set out to enact was more alarming for the political parties and their main allies and supporters. These included a collective purge of senior government officials, preparatory plans for dissolving the native administration, and active policies supporting the Arab, Soviet, and international leftist regimes, their organizations, and radical liberation movements. Consistent with that agenda, "branches of the front were being established in different parts of the country, and it seemed possible that the front would engage as one unit in forthcoming elections."[7] Considered in this light, the overall agenda of the professional front, and the Communist Party behind it, was perceived by the political parties as a serious threat to their right to exist. They immediately "realized that such an arrangement would, in effect, perpetuate the status quo and, indecently do away with their political organizations."[8] This development counts not for its particulars or suggestions, but for diverting the discourse of the 1964 October Revolution away from an agreed-upon conversation toward a new covenant. The agreed-upon conversation would have followed the round table modality where—at the very least—citizens could have been involved and motivated by civic virtue that would open the door for innovation for liberating the Sudanese people from tyrannical states and uniting them rather than turning it into a lukewarm monologue uniting only convinced sectors of the population.

In a clear response to the mere content of these claims and actions, the Communist Party and its allies in the left planned, somewhat imperfectly, to

phase out other political representations in serious contradiction to the ideals of October. Given such a move from the left, it would have been odd not to expect a strong counterreaction within these other representations. But, on its own terms, the other side resorted to another route that also diverted from the ideals of October. The expansion of these special agenda structures, when coupled with street violence from one side, turned both sides into a field of counter revolutionary forces. This had serious consequences, and it critically damaged the Sudanese momentum to seize the opportunity to liberate the country from the clutches of the inherited state. Further, these diversions from the spirit and the ideals of October have certainly overshadowed the political life on a continuous and a regular basis since, and they are likely to do so as long as the current state or one similar is in power. It was al-Turabi who seized the moment as an opportunity to change from a critic of yesterday as *taiffiya* and traditional party to an ally of today against those he amalgamates as "the communists."

COUNTER-REVOLUTION: THE ART OF A BLUFF NOT THE ART OF A DEAL

Over and above this, the added dimension of violence within all its forms and frequencies augmented one further serious tier in this counter revolutionary development. The enormous implication of this serious step change has to be sought in the complex formations of discourse and actions that transformed the nature of political responses to the violent takeover of the state. The ideological discourses, effects, and patterns of practice were not necessarily produced by the real superiority of power of either party, as both the left and the Islamists were still at the fringes of the Sudanese field of power. For this reason, each one tried to negotiate terms and pursue an indisputably larger internal power in order to declare a certain victory and advocate for their own sociopolitical, nationalistic, or religious standard for the future society. Here, all groups sanctioned one form of revolutionary or religious violence. For each one of these groups, violence emerged as neither aberrant nor abhorrent.

For al-Turabi it was an opportunity to negotiate terms and pursue a joint encounter against his Communist enemies. He relied on a common cause that other groups with related concerns about the new left agenda that NFPO also acknowledged. As long as these other groups represented an indisputably larger internal power, and they exercised violence, his new strategy would lead to a victory in the name of "saving the country from Communism." The success of this strategy taught him a lesson as a strategist for his new political style of opposition and as a self-reinforcing approach.

On one hand, the window of opportunity availed itself in many curious ways. It took the forms of individual and group campaigns that simultaneously opposed most things in a manner that would pave the way for self-enforcement. Al-Turabi, instead of criticizing the NFPO its associations, and unions or its government and their programs, he launched a campaign against Communism itself, its local party, and its allies to underpin concern and opposition to various aspects of any sociopolitical change. Finding himself successful in attracting other anti-Communist groups, he went a step further to organize "the National Front of Parties (NFP) as a counterweight to the leftist-dominated NFPO and then started a battle over NFPO, aiming to control it, or failing that, to destroy it."[9]

But whatever the case, the most important aspect here is that the Islamists under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Turabi transformed a political event into a religious one to achieve specific political goals. Here is what we can see how opportunity structures put in play to pave the ground to an emerging counter revolutionary path. That is by innovation and counter-innovation of dissimilar groups to find common ground based on their concerns about Communism, and they transgressed new complaints by innovating a new language to encourage a themed platform "to save the country from Communism." By taking this approach, the Islamists were able to control and lead these concerned parties "from without." The change from what October provided for as a right for all political parties to openly practice all liberties to protect the otherwise "atomized" citizen from dictatorship and tyranny. As a result, the NFP was able to apply pressure, and the Umma Party's Ansār brought people en masse from western and central Sudan, who demonstrated by "roaming the streets at night and chanting Mahdiyyah war songs."[10] This evoked recent memories of violent riots on March 1, 1954, that were incited by the Ansār against the visit of Egypt's General Muhammed Najib[11] to the Sudan. The streets, which were the pride of October revolutionary for their peaceful demonstrators who expanded the public space, were intensified by violent rural Ansār members. A counterrevolution in action reduced the public space by threatening the urban citizens and expanding the urban rural fault line.

The NFPO government of al-Khalifa conceded to the pressure by submitting its resignation. Six days later, al-Khalifa "formed a new government, composed of ministers from the Umma Party, the NUP, the Islamic Charter Front, and the southern Front. The radical experiment was over."[12] Throughout their collaborations, the Islamists depicted themselves as traditional rather than modern as the Communists had described them, so the Islamists were able to frustrate their rival's program. In other words, what al-Turabi's worldview shared in common with what he described as *taifiyya* has typified how the counterrevolution program worked regardless of the al-Turabi's prevailing assumptions and the concepts he used about the divergent interests

of these new bedfellows, who had been on the opposite end of the political spectrum.

Nevertheless, the impulses and orientations of those who described themselves as modern forces stayed alive in the Sudanese political life. And within their internal reading to an evolving world, they allured the imagination and the support of the left without asking themselves from where and what point of view they operated. Within less than three months, al-Turabi and his emerging young Islamist group "managed to get enough signatures among the nineteen or so founding organizations within NFPO to disavow its Communist-dominated leadership. When presented to the government, the prime minister agreed to withdraw recognition of NFPO, and from then on to deal only with representatives of political parties."[13]

On the other hand, al-Turabi, who became the new secretary general of the Islamists, wasted no time in his stratagem of reappropriation of the Other's comparable political strategies, especially when they proved to be successful as a source of insight to future rebuilding of an Islamist vanguard party and the oversight of the left. This became apparent at a more subtle level regarding how to emulate the Communist Party's vanguard model as a new opportunity and a field of conflict within his own party at the same time. Al-Turabi noted that the Islamist movement was influenced "through competition by numerous Communist approaches and ways of doing things such as strict obligation of secrecy, careful member selection, and founding of what might look as innocent platforms and intensifying tactics and focus on the strengths of modern sectional organizations."[14] According to al-Turabi, "in 1965 the movement reached another turning-point with the launch of the Islamic Charter Front as an umbrella for the movement's public activities. From then the movement developed very rapidly, to an extent that neither the leadership nor the organization could match."[15] But one could go farther to argue that the most visible sociopolitical properties of the ongoing battles between the Islamists and the Communists stemmed out of the Islamists' sense of fear. These most visible properties also caused both parties diverged from the field of liberation and the challenge to each group's own limits. This means that liberation was not just the way in which structural interests of the Sudanese citizens were imminently looming, it was also the action by which the means, ways, and interest of the state and the country conducted themselves. Taking a thoroughly historical approach to the study, the deeply rooted fear turned into and continued to comprise and reproduce the Islamists' competing program of animosity since the early days of the movement. The success of the Communist vanguard model in regard to the 1964 October Revolution and the stances adopted in the aftermath of the downfall of 'Abboud's regime compounded their fear and turned the Islamists' performance into a single-issue politic.

It was an eye-opener to the Islamists and their new secretary general that the success of the Communist Party of Sudan was due to three main factors. First, it was the role they "played over the years as a major campaigner for various social and economic reforms."[16] Second, it was the Communists' ability to build, and most of the time infiltrate the leadership of professional associations and trade unions. Even though political parties were officially outlawed during the six years of 'Abboud's military rule, "the communists had continued to function, albeit underground, while all others actually disintegrated as organizations."[17] Third, through their organizational experience, the Communists were "able to gain access to, and frequently control of, professional associations despite their own small numbers."[18] Hence, the lesson learned from the Communists Party's effective re-emergence after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime was the means by which it positioned itself as a vanguard and a "proponent of the interests of workers and tenants, whereas the other Sudanese parties generally ignored those interest groups."[19] The vanguard model put the Communist Party, to a certain extent, at the fore of a mass-action political movement of the 1964 October Revolution. That experience provided the practical and political leadership that led to close ties between the Communist Party and the Sudanese left, which was clear during the early days after the success of the 1964 October Revolution. This constituted ideological threats to the Islamists, especially when it turned into a generalized political action of the Communists in as much as there was apparent sympathy for the party from wide sectors of the Sudanese-educated elite. That sympathy translated into the leading program for the NFPO and later the victory of most of the Communist Party candidates at the Graduates Electoral College of 1965 general elections. But even before the general elections, the Islamists and their new allies felt that there was something significant at stake. Yet as troubling as such feelings were "the more radical the actions and pronouncements of the Front (NFPO) became, the more vociferous were the demands of the old politicians to change the composition of the cabinet. There was talk of and even genuine concern over 'saving the country from Communism.'"[20] This, then, opened a window of opportunity for the Islamists to act as a counter-revolution. The chance came about not because of their enmity to the Communists and their allies, which had always been there, but more importantly because the Islamists overturned the original idea of dialogue invested in the political public sphere as one of the main ideals of 1964 October Revolution. Thereafter, they assumed a different direction that invested in violent actions as a viable future voucher to politics. Most significantly, and what speaks to al-Turabi the strategist, the Islamists under his leadership increasingly developed two-tiered mega and minor institutional frameworks within which internal and external conflicts took shape and were challenged. More to the point, these minor and mega

institutional frameworks developed around larger conflicts. These larger conflicts simultaneously grew out of and exploited the political or religious capital of the opposing ends. Al-Turabi defined the opposing ends as Ṣūfī- or Salafi-oriented groups or an internal power group to be realigned for a specific goal while he and his Islamist standing continued to be adamantly partisan both in nature, violent persuasion, and agenda. The mega strategy emerged and was successfully presented by the association and the collective move with what the Islamists and other "ideological parties" described as "the traditional parties." They then banded together with their new Islamists allies to constrain the NFPO and its political program. This move helped the Islamists to rethink their political presence and their program of action over and beyond their traditional anti-Communist pursuit. According to their own historian, Ḥasan Mekki,[21] the Islamists were aware, maybe for the first time, that they "did not seem to have made any substantial breakthrough anywhere in the modern sector. . . . In trade unions, among educated women and in the professional organizations the hold of the left seemed secure."[22]

Nevertheless, the Islamists instead tried to deploy a "from without" mega strategy that would bring together some of the concerned "traditional political parties" and groups to move with violence and speed to meet a specific political goal. It was through this process that the Islamists' political actions, violent reactions, and counter revolutionary strategies were framed. Whereas this mega strategy succeeded within some limited designates, it was clear from the start that it worked as some sort of "mechanical" rather than an "organic" solidarity in the division of labor between these entities. This is so because there was no way for the Islamists to control these entities "from within." Moreover, because of the different interests and divergent views of each of these groups toward the other, the traditional entities "would then no longer be interested in the support of the modern groups who only represent a tiny minority when it came to votes and national influences. If the traditionalists took notice of these groups at all, then they saw them as rivals."[23] However, the influence that brought about the change in the Islamists party's character after the 1964 October Revolution was al-Turabi's emulation of the Communist Party's vanguard experience. In one way, looking at that experience is a compelling necessity to meet the challenges and to attain some significant moments of opportunities that availed themselves in the post-October era. The Islamism needed to be packaged in different, more modern, attire than the old-fashioned Ikhwan that came to the Sudan with Egyptian schools.

To lead the 2,000 core members of the Islamist movement—composed mostly of students—Ḥasan al-Turabi developed a three-tiered strategy. First, he adopted the name Islamic Movement or the Islamic Current—the ICF—to replace the name *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* that came with an Egyptian package and represented what could be identified as the old-fashioned group

of Islamists. Although in essence, the ICF emulated the Communist vanguard idea, the secret veil of the new ICF covered a few 'ulama, some of Wahabi or Ansār al-Suna groups, some members of Ṣūfi orders, and some of the tribal chiefs. This attempt was neither modern in nature nor progressive in composition. Moreover, those who were part of the ICF had neither a voice in nor commitment to the Islamist program. The main reason behind that could be that the Islamists tried to control the new body. As al-Turabi admitted, they "kept for themselves a majority within the Front not only to keep independent of the front but also to control it."[24] That is why the move did not help much in giving al-Turabi the support that he needed to consolidate his new leadership; eventually it created a state of frustration, as the old guards of al-Ikhwan group of the Islamist movement did not receive the change kindly. According to al-Turabi, several factors led to sharp differences that severely shook the organizational and personal structures of the Islamists. These included deeper disagreements between members of the movement, emerging challenging political stances, and the contradiction held within the new situation itself and between the Front and Ikhwan.[25] However, through time as al-Turabi continued to fortify his leadership and shape the movement according to a doctrine that made of him a new and different Islamist ideologue, that frustration turned into a rebellion by those who engaged critically in the movement to al-Turabi's strategies. Hence, it later materialized into an outright split. But according to al-Turabi, this change had a functional necessity. Upon reflecting on the history of that period, he claimed that "after the initial stage of its existence, the movement developed a marked sense of self-awareness, positioning itself accurately within its specific time and place parameters."[26] For some sectors of the movement, then, his vocabulary brought a sense of newness and a more modern appearance that made possible a formulation that helped to borrow more from the Communists' vocabulary and strategies of the party as a vanguard.

Related to this was the rise and recognition of a new breed of young Islamists who were graduates of University of Khartoum and or British universities. Chief among the educated were 'Ahmed 'Abdel Rahman, 'Osman Khalid Mudawi, and 'Abdel Raḥim Ḥamdi, who became Ḥasan al-Turabi's main lieutenants for a considerable period of time. As in previous internal conflicts in the Islamist movement, such moves proved to indicate intricate competitions and possibly a rise of a particular bigger group of younger Islamists and the demise of another group, especially those who were Cairo educated or were less educated, older members of the movement. The alternative option, which was provided by that move and the political space that it generated, was a significant change in the leadership and the orientation of the movement. It may well be said that the way and time al-Turabi was elected secretary general to the Islamist movement, the functioning and the future of

Islamism in Sudan was deeply affected. Ḥasan al-Turabi's rise to prominence was, in a way, a positioning of the movement within the broader frame of Babikir Karrar's ideological parameters of Sudanization. Al-Turabi's rise also fit the movement within its local ground and field action but without Karrar himself at the helm of the organization. Al-Turabi's leadership later merged with an air of modernity that came with the change of his title to secretary general, which replaced the Egyptian Ikhwan title, *al-Amin al-'ām* (secretary general), and its traditional underpinnings.

If history should be considered as an essential part of these changes and the development of Islamism as a phenomenon, we need to trace the genesis of this new formation and how it was different from any previous ones to the post-October revolution and to Ḥasan al-Turabi as a leader as he concentrated all power in his own hands. At the same time, such a move and the new labels and titles attached to the organization and its leadership positions could be perceived as going hand-in-hand not only with modernization of the party but also as an indication that the Islamists had delinked themselves from the auxiliary status and the stigma related to the Brotherhood during the rise of Jamal 'Abdul Nasir and his image as a national leader in the Arab world. Hence, the Islamists joined the crowd who accused Communism of being an alien ideology and a foreign import. It was thus left to stay alone as a representation and a product of *al-mabadi al-mutawrda* (imported ideologies) subject to verbal and physical violence. All that had to fit well with the ambition of the young Sudanese Mahdi, who had a PhD from the Sorbonne, while emerging within the ranks of a fairly modern organization and imposing his own *laïcité* against the 'ulama, Ṣūfi, Salafi, and other Sudanese mainstream social representations of Islamic practice. But if this development arrived from a non-Islamist field, the consolidation of his position as a leader of the Islamists at that critical time had come out of his significant majority win of the electoral seat allotted to the graduates in the first general election after the downfall of 'Abboud's regime. "The Islamists fielded one hundred candidates, including fifteen in the special graduates' constituencies . . . [the Islamists] won seven seats of which two (including Turabi's) were from the graduates constituencies."[27] These steps automatically sidelined al-Rashid al-Ṭahir and those who followed the Ikhwan of Egypt school—Ja'far Shaikh Idris, Malik Badri, Ṣadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Mājid, Mohamed al-Shaikh Omer, and others and who emphasized the *tarbiya* (education) approach rather than politics. In large measure, the formation of the contemporary Sudanese Islamist movement took place and found its growth, most famous and elaborate expression, within that development.

The third tier of al-Turabi's accommodation to the spirit of that strategy and its time can be seen in the rise of an incoming group of the Islamists around al-Turabi replacement of the outgoing group. One of the central

characteristics of al-Turabi's strategies to stay in leadership of the Islamists organization was based in his ability to outmaneuver those who were likely to secretly challenge his leadership. Now, and from that point on, al-Turabi played that strategy very carefully and successfully in the struggle against his antagonists before they prepared themselves for a confrontation against him. Without a doubt, he stayed conformable for a while in his leadership seat while putting his new team in place.

As referred to above, Ḥasan al-Turabi pursued new strategies that mimicked the methods of the Communist Party in a way that opened the door for adopting not only its tactics and strategies but also some former members of the Sudanese Communist Party. Yasin Omer al-Imam, the Islamist's commissar, often reminded his audience that he was once a member of the Communist Party. The Islamists formed the ICF, which was described by al-Turabi as "an umbrella for the movement's public activities."[28] The ICF was an improvement and modification to the formula the Islamists previously tried in 1955 under the name of the Islamic Front for the Constitution. It was the Islamists' way of deploying their party as a vanguard to bring in supporters and sympathizers and to have them rally around a certain message or a loose organization. Al-Turabi utilized this strategy effectively to lead the Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood (1964) to the ICF (1964–1969), to the National Islamic Front (1985–1989), and on to the National Congress (1998–2000). He argued that "the expansion in the size of the movement itself necessitated reorganization, and forced it to implement large-scale changes."[29] Additionally, since that time and under the leadership of al-Turabi and his team, the movement built on its organizational potentials and embarked on what they thought of as an Islamist project that many within and outside the Islamist movement describe as "al-Turabi's project." Ḥasan Mekki argued that the entire Islamists' project in the Sudan was more or less al-Turabi's project rather than the Islamists'. 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhim argued an inclination among the ranks of the "biographers of Ḥasan al-Turabi . . . to see his 'fundamentalism' as an expression of the religious traditions of al-Turabi's, a lineage of Ṣūfis, Mahdists, jurists, and clerics that came into existence in the seventeenth century."[30] Such a view, Ibrāhim argued "obscures the politics of a shrewd thinker with a great ability to respond to effect change."[31]

Whether it obscured the politics of a shrewd thinker or not, al-Turabi's chief innovation was to introduce violence to the Islamist movement. His longevity as a central and influential figure in the Islamist movement in the Sudan was due to his organizational skills, the mobilization of the movement's political artisans, and his ability to study the strategies of his opponents and to effectively invent and deploy a counter strategy, which was similar to his opponents' strategies. In this way, he was able, with varying

degrees of success, to outmaneuver his main rivals' political moves both inside and outside the Islamist movement. Chief among those rivals was always the Communist Party. It is evident that al-Turabi paid close attention to the Communists' political strategies and tactics and tried to counter or reinvent similar ones. He developed his notion of Islamism to supplant the Communist movement as a first step in his overall program, or his grand project, the Islamic Front. He built a tightly regimented organization and supplemented it by the rhetorical stance of those lawyers who dominated the leadership of the movement as a close-knit group that stayed around him for the last 40 years or more. Hence, al-Turabi's biography, vision, political, and intellectual influences warrant investigation. For the left, moving in that direction opened the way for negotiation with the army for a coup and a new despotism as we saw in the May 1969, coup and its totalitarian regime.

It is in this sense one can understand 'Ahmed Suliamān's[32] advocacy for military coups and why he deserted the Communist Party and joined the Islamists. Ahmed Suliamān was one of the few civilians in the Sudan who participated in planning for almost the most successful and failed coups in the Sudan except for the 'Abboud one. Before Numairi's 1969 coup he wrote in *al-Ayyam Daily* a provocative and controversial series of articles claiming that the failure of the progressive forces and their system that followed the fall of 'Abboud's regime could be attributed to the lack of sustained cooperation between these forces and the faction of the army that helped in expediting the downfall of that regime. He added that future prospects of a progressive regime depend on the cooperation of progressive groups in the army and the left civilian movement. That led to the sharp disagreement between him and 'Abdel Khaliq Maḥjoub and ended in support for the Nimiari coup and regime. Later, he joined the Islamists and played a role in promoting the 1989 coup. He sold them his theory about a successful coup. He argues that a successful coup is like a banana fruit you cannot eat either when it is too raw or when it is too ripe.

OUTLINE OF THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION AS A STATE: THE BANALITY OF EVIL

After the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, established by the UN Security Council, released its report on Darfur on January 25, 2005, the ICC issued its first arrest warrants. The warrant, dated April 27, 2007, was against Ahmed Harun, a Sudanese minister, and 'Ali Kushayb, a *janjawid* militia leader, and eventually 'Omer al-Bashir, the president of the Sudan, charging him initially with war against humanity (March 4, 2009) and ultimately with genocide (July 12, 2010). Joachim J. Savelsberg quotes W. I.

Thomas (1928) who said that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" while introducing his argument about mass violence and atrocities. According to that Savelsberg argues that "politicians, diplomats, military leaders, NGO activists, jurists, journalists, and citizens define situations. Their definitions codetermine how the world responds to events such as those in Cambodia in 1970s, in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in 1990s, or Darfur in 2000s." He questions "it thus matters whether we define mass violence as a form of genocide specifically, as criminal violence generally, or as something else altogether."[33] However, those who experience the Islamists counter-revolution in action when they traded in their lifelong call and slogan: *al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the solution) for "violence is the solution," they presented a new model that different forms of genocide pale in comparison. To reconsider the nature of the Sudanese Islamist state, one needs to abandon visions and ideas about the religio-political dimensions of Islam, or what appears to have been advocated for one day but has been abandoned a long time ago: "al-Islam hwa al-Hall." One also needs to recognize the state's blind belief in violence or the "darkness of its holiness rather than its light." Only here can we see that neither Islam nor militarism but constant violence forms the basis on which Sudan's regime is founded. That is to say, every aspect of the state is secular, and religion itself has turned against the Islamists, their regime and their leader, al-Turabi.

The coup and the regime that emerged from it, which I refer to as the first and second Islamist Republics, proved to be a particular political phenomenon. The 1989 coup was unique compared to other successful or attempted coups in Sudanese political history. In the Sudan, the military's role expanded to handle internal issues when insurgency started in the southern part of the country immediately after the country's independence from Britain in 1956. Later, by 1958, the military's assumption of power and its scope in Sudanese life had become unrestricted. The officers and regime that obtained power in the coup became highly involved in politics. El Ferik Ibrāhim 'Abboud became, in addition to his position as a commander in chief of the Sudanese army, head of state and head of the ruling high Supreme Council, while high-ranking officers became ministers and military rulers for the provinces. 'Abboud, his senior officers, and a few civilian collaborators ruled the country with an iron fist until 1964 when they were removed from power by a popular uprising. Overt and covert oppositions to the regime—represented by armed insurgency in the south and intransigent political parties, intellectuals, and trade unions in the north, respectively—were dealt with as security issues and met with violent actions by the government. Violence and torture became the mode of governance. Different ways to inflict physical and psychological injury to political dissidents began to creep across the country from the south to the north. A nascent security community "involved in the planning

and execution of repression, intelligence gathering, interrogation and torture" became part of the state apparatus.

The 1969 coup of Ja'far Nimairi and its state (1969–1985) expanded the military's role further. The Gamal 'Abdel Nasser regime of Egypt spawned the clandestine "free officers" movement in the Sudanese army. The development of the security apparatus and a controlled one-party system dominated the army and Sudanese political life.

What happened in 1989 was, to a significant extent, a particular political event and a peculiar military phenomenon compared to previous coups in the Sudan. These factors are important in relation to the most distinct, planned for and discrete developments that followed. In a sense, the 1989 coup shaped some of the regime's later characteristics. What was unique about the Islamists' coup and the emergent regime was affirmed by the nature, the individuals, and the group or community to which each element belonged.

First, the Islamists, not the army, planned, organized, and executed every aspect of the coup. That is to say the Islamist movement transformed itself into a military entity while preparing for the coup and, in particular, on the night of the coup's execution. Therefore, Omer al-Bashir was chosen by the Islamists rather than by the military. In fact, he was neither the first nor the second candidate of the Islamists for "leading" the coup. The first candidate, Brigadier Kamal Ali Mukhtar, died when Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces shot down his plane in 1988. The second candidate, Brigadier Osman Ahmed al-Ḥasan, the leader of an underground Islamist group in the Sudanese army, insisted that the army should have full control over political power after the coup. The Islamists replaced him with al-Bashir a few days before the coup. Another peculiar aspect of the coup was that it might have been the first of its kind in which civilians *(Malakiyat Nafie)* dressed in army costumes took a major role in the coup's execution.

Later, the regime organized and officially recognized the paramilitary National Defense Force (NDF). Al-Turabi described the NDF as "an alternative to the National Army to carry out the mission of jihad and to protect the regime from armed opposition in the north and rebellion in the south."[34] The society's militarization took different forms that included the *dababeen* (paramilitary tank bombers forces), *janjaweed* (rural militia), and *siihoun* in urban areas. Each one of these elements reveals different aspects of how the first and only Islamist Republic in the Sunni Muslim world developed. In the same way torture, secret detention, and *janjaweed* violence and atrocities, as initially happened in the south, crept across the country—but this time it spread from Darfur and in a larger and more violent way, especially in Kurdufan and Khartoum.

The counterrevolution, as a functioning phenomenon within this development, brought about a complex set of inventions of the self-imaging of the

leader, the group, and the strategies that had underlain al-Turabi's Islamism, their discourses and the group's violent and nonviolent actions all through his life. At the same time, the conditions that created these complex inventions of such self-imaging and narrations of the movement's history have an enduring impact on the mode and politics of the movement and its mission to violently destruct the Other. When the Islamists were planning for the 1989 coup, Yasin 'Omar al-Imam suggested that the first thing they should do after the success of the coup is to liquidate all of what he called the "traditional" leadership of the Sudanese political parties and "to free the country from the endless conflicts between those big families who did not contribute anything of value to the progress of the country."[35] It is true that the Islamists did not liquidate any of those political leaders, but their new regime took an active policy that developed into a systematic selection and extermination of human beings. That policy started in December 1989, with the execution of three Sudanese individuals who were accused of acquiring foreign currency. It was a well-known fact then that *tujar al-Jabha* (the Islamist merchants) were the main dealers in foreign currency in both the black and white markets. Those three people were selected as the launch of a gruesome systematic selection policy. Those three Sudanese were Magdi Mahjoub Mohamed 'Ahmed, a member of a well-known financial and intellectual family, Gergis al-Qus, a civil aviation pilot of a Christian Coptic origin, and the southern Sudanese student Arkinglo Ajado, who was preparing to leave the country to study in a neighboring nation. In the case of Magdi Mahjoub, "whose one-day trial inside a military compound . . . witnesses reported that Major Ibrahim Sham el-din, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, attended the trial and influenced the judge to order the defendant's lawyer to leave the military compound where the trial was taking place, a serious violation of due process."[36] Not only that, but it has been reported that "on the day the sentence was carried out, December 14, 1989, Major Shams al-din was seen outside Kober prison awaiting confirmation of the execution. Contrary to the regulations of the General Administration of Prisons—whereby executions are carried out immediately after Dawn Prayer, about 3 am—on this day the sentence was executed at thirty minutes past midnight. This speed in execution was possibly an effort to avoid any last minute review of the case or clemency."[37] Other selective killings included Dr. 'Alī Fadl (medical doctor and an activist), Dr. Mamoun Mohamed Hussain (head of the Medical Association), al-Taya 'Abu 'Agla (student), and advocate Ḥamdan Ḥasan Kuri to mention very few. It did not take the Islamists a long time to create a multifaceted system of selective elimination of human beings that included the "ghost houses," the military defense force, *dababeen* (tank bombers force), and the *janjaweed*, which was a system that utilized coercion as a prime mover of social engineering and dehumanization.[38] The regime that they installed

represented a massive reaction against the spirit of every aspect of happiness and optimism that the Sudanese people dreamed for since they gained independence in 1956. This stands at the heart of the Islamist counter-revolution, as violence was a common denominator of the movement even before assuming power through the military coup, which is in essence a violent act. Then the centrality of violence as a source of political authority and a mode of governance started from the first day of the coup and continued unevenly across the country, as they put faith in violence and perceived coercive measures to be the most effective, if not the only, mode of governance and social control. Starting from this premise one can say how al-Turabi Islamists by default and by design positioned their Islamist model on violence. This long episode has been a complicated saga not only against the Other but also against former fellow adherents and their supreme leader. This trend of violence and its glorification by the movement's members and later the regime has its own cipher or encryption code and curious particularity that is inherent in the grandiose theory of Islamism and its mission, which needs to be deciphered to make understanding this phenomenon possible. This mode that put faith in violence has opened the way for a remorseless and never-ending war against all shades of Muslims and non-Muslim Others—being citizens or former fellow Islamists who all have been perceived as ephemeral. For al-Turabi's Islamists, violence is neither aberrant not abhorrent, and in a broader perspective, their inventions of self-imaging and the reproduction of violence, which has been rooted, performed, and celebrated by the Islamists, has three important developments in the life of the movement. It has been a long unbroken line of evil from attacking peaceful students at the Examination Hall to the coup and the violent state that emerged out of it.

First, T. 'Abdou Maliqalim Simone was one of the very few, if not the only, sociologist who spent "nearly two years as both academic and consultant to the Islamic movement in Khartoum."[39] Simone's book and the basic question that came out of his serious firsthand experience with the Islamists, their regime, and the state is *In Whose Image?* Did political Islam and its urban practices emerge?[40] Of course, there is more than one image that includes, the self-image of al-Turabi Islamism, the image of the state of their dream, and the image of the rhetorical stance associated with both. The Islamist self-image, as explained before, defends "the essence or experience itself rather than promote the full knowledge of it and its entanglements and dependencies on other knowledges."[41] In this sense, al-Turabi Islamists sought to "demote the different experience of others to a lesser status."[42] At the same time, they never reflected on their violent obsessions and conduct that produced an unprecedented death toll, misery, and destruction everywhere in the country for almost a quarter century. Second, the Islamist basic theory and belief that ignores the social, economic, and political conditions meant to delink them

from other cultural milieus within which other Sudanese communities existed in its diverse religious, cultural, and social settings and histories. But this provided them with such a powerful and vicious ideology, which they used to "purge" Muslim societies in different parts of the country—primarily Darfur—and incite jihād against Sudanese citizens whom they labeled as "impurities" and *hasharat* (insects) and turn the world of Ḥasan al-Turabi and his followers upside down.[43]

Finally, the most important aspect of this discourse and its historical narration is that it makes the Sudanese Islamists a self-sufficient political association rather than a religious movement. Ḥasan Mekki, as noted before, described that as al-Turabi's own project. Through this medium of excellence cult to which both educational and political institutions conformed, grew a complex situation that has shaped and constrained—at the same time—the Islamist movement ever since. This situation has revealed other worlds that were long in the making. The first one became clear by strategically promoting some new student members to stardom within the movement according to each one's academic success, which I call "the new class." This promoted a deeper sense of individualism and continued to be the invisible hand behind negative attitudes of jealously, selfishness, viciousness, and finger pointing that developed later through the modes of competition as they bred into conflict, character assassination, and identity management and engineering. The contemporary individual and factional internal wars within the ranks of the Islamists were not just expressions of different opinions or attitudes; they were deeper than that. And they emerged after the culmination of the comprehensive peace agreement that would have incorporated the different visions for the new Sudan and the collective demands of the Sudanese for rebuilding their nation, their state, and sociopolitical order. But, the Sudanese can only succeed if they can see now, in this unhappy hour, which their long and complex experiences of failure and success do point to matters of considerable weight. These things can also enable them to draw upon a deep repertoire to make sense of a history of experiences, values, and complex inheritances. All of this has yielded a variety of responses that shaped their lifeworld and endeavored to constrain their social sphere. These have been combined with violent actions and reactions that the state, along with the enterprises they involved themselves in, caused either to further certain agendas or to use its power to subjugate each other. Yet they can see through the thin line separating things that they have the potential to reconstruct a civil society. A new generation of Sudanese citizens and a new order are emerging. They can see them "emerging from the outer shadows of these 'zones of waiting' unprecedented" social life within which they can create a space where active and peaceful engagement is vital over the long term.[44] This could be achieved by building up

their inner resources to construct their state to meet their all-encompassing self-definition.

But at the same time, counterassertions and reactions to the 1964 October Revolution and the meanings and the content of this emerging phenomenon have acted, galvanized, and amplified in the counterrevolution where everything is perceived as a threat. Such counteractivist discontents—emerging from a different, bipolar extreme of playing out imagined threats—are explored in ways that may degrade the revolution's content and substance. Already, scholars, pundits, journalists, and think tanks are producing publications, panels, and blogs and are initiating conversations addressing various facets of this "revolutionary spring." These proliferations of that phenomenon, in their elementary form, point to the first impulse toward fundamental change, its complex conversations, and its supporting discourses. The 1964 October Revolution and its legacy gave generations of students a sense of their own power and continued to endow them and the university with the esteem and prestige of an institutional space regarded as the country's seat and flagship of opposition to dictatorship and a mainstay of activism for civil and political rights.

Whereas the student unions operated openly, state terror had erupted from time to time subjecting the leaders of these unions and student activists to harassment and imprisonment. As a result, that phase of the Nimairi period provided the Islamist movement with a new generation of party members and activists whose life experiences were shaped and deeply influenced by two conflicting dynamics: the special status of the university and state terror perpetrated by a regime that viewed itself as threatened. Another important dynamic to consider was the mutual violence that both the regime and its opponents exercised against each other and the mistreatment of political opponents combined with the hardships that characterized the Nimairi period, which opened the door for a culture of violence. This culture of violence was demonstrated in the students' lives by al-Tayyib Ibrāhīm Mohamed Khair, nicknamed the Iron Rod or *sikha*, who was notorious for the use of such a rod against political opponents. Sikha's violent assaults on students at campuses stand as the example and the symbol of the conformation between the Islamist students at institutions of higher education and their opponents, especially the Communists and the Republican Brothers. From the late 1960s through the 1990s, these Islamist students resorted to violence in order to intimidate their opponents and advance their causes. Many students lost their lives in these campus wars. Later, *Sikha* played a key role in the execution of the coup and afterward became an important member of the regime.

This brand of hard violence was complemented by a softer but perhaps more pervasive form of violence. With the tremendous rivalry and antagonism among the Islamists and other political groups, a group of university

students among the ranks of the Islamist activists promoted written vio-lence. These students provided campus wallpapers with a language and expressive hostility that complemented Sikha's violent pursuits. This violent style evolved over time to become one of the Islamists' ways of attacking, intimidating, and sometimes assassinating their opponents' characters. As the movement progressed, these unruly students matured with it, and they began to import their tactics from campus wallpapers to newspapers like *Alwan*. Among these students turned journalists were Hussein Khojali and the late Moḥamed Ṭaha Moḥamed Aḥmed, who was kidnapped from his home by unknown kidnappers on September 6, 2006. His body was found decapitated in a remote area of Khartoum. Ṭaha's aggressive style of journalism that the Islamist movement incubated, nurtured, and utilized against its enemies turned against al-Turabi, his son, and the National Congress Party (NCP) before Ṭaha's tragic death.

That went in tandem with al-Turabi's grand strategy to significantly change the balance in favor of the Islamists, especially after the gains the Commu-nist Party had achieved in the aftermath of the 1964 October Revolution. The fact that the Communist Party "virtually ruled the Sudan in the early post-October months and scored a decisive win over Ikhwan [the Islamists] in the graduate constituencies made Ikhwan even more wary."[45] This happened at a time when the forces of the left appeared to be making progress through-out the Arab and Muslim worlds and in Nasser's Egypt in particular. What the Islamists needed to do "was to fight communism" so as to alter that balance.[46] To achieve that goal, the Islamists needed an organized cadre of party artisans to rally the Muslim sentiment in the country behind an Islamic constitution and to work diligently on "the unmasking of the treacherous ele-ments represented by the Sudanese Communist Party."[47] Within such a strat-egy of reductionism or banality of evil, the Islamists initiated or participated in major violent acts against all shades of what they perceived as part of the Communist Other. Hence, violence by the Islamists and their rivals claimed the lives of many students and thousands of other ordinary Sudanese citizens and has continued to blemish the image of the Islamists, as well as other groups that have collaborated with them ever since.

NOTES

1. Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 33.

2. There were 11 Communists and leftists of the Executive Board of the NFPO, which consisted of fifteen members.

3. Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1990) 110.

4. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 73 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

5. Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989*, 110.

6. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976) 217.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 73 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

10. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, 219.

11. The eruption of the riot the Sudanese call *Awal Maris* (March First) was against the visit of President Najib of Egypt to attend the opening of the Sudanese Parliament that day. The Umma Party, who stood against unity with Egypt and called for *al-Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin* (Sudan for the Sudanese), foresaw that visit as a grave danger to the independence of the country. A large crowd of unfriendly Ansār carrying white weapons met Nijab at Khartoum airport and tried to force their way in. A clash with police followed, which led to death and injuries on both sides. The British governor general declared Martial law and postponed the opening of the Parliament until March 10.

12. Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in the Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898–1985* (New York, State University of New York, 1987) 228.

13. Ibid.

14. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi el-Sudan: al-Tatour, al-Kasb al-Manhaj*, 2nd ed. (Khartoum, Institute of Research and Social Studies, 1992) 144.

15. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) 15.

16. Peter K. Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976) 216.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ḥasan Mekki, professor of political science at the African University in Khartoum, was the first Islamist scholar to write the history of the movement. His book, *Harakat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi l-Sudan 1946–1969: Tarikhaha wa Khitabaha al-Siyasi*, was published in Arabic by Khartoum, Dar al-Fikr al-Sudaniyya lil Kitab) in 1980. Mekki Presented to a large extent the movement's early history mixed with an imagined myth of origin as narrated through the formal chain of memory concerning details of its early emergence.

22. Ḥasan Mekki, *Harakat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fil-Sudan: 1944–1969: Tarikhaha was Khitabaha al-Siyasi* (Khartoum, Dar al-Fikr al-Sudaniyya lil Kitab, 1980) 15.

23. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 75.

24. Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi el-Sudan: al-Tatour, al-Kasb al-Manhaj* (Khartoum, Ma'ahad al-Bihouth wa al-Dirasat al-Ijtmaiyya, 1992) 29.

25. Ibid.

26. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) 14.

27. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 77.

28. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998) 14.

29. Ibid.

30. 'Abdullahi 'Ali Ibrāhīm, "A Theology of Modernity: Hasan al-Turabi and Islamic Renewal in Sudan." *Africa Today* 46, no. 3 (1999) 195–222.

31. Ibid.

32. Ahmed Suliāman (1924–2009) was one of the founders of the Sudanese Communist Party and one of the most prominent members of its political bureau. He and other leading members of the party led a division in support of Nimairi's 1969 coup. Even before the coup, in December of the same year, Ahmed Suliāman wrote in *al-Ayyam Daily* a provocative and controversial series of articles claiming that the failure of the progressive forces and their system that followed the fall of 'Abboud's regime could be attributed to the lack of sustained cooperation between these forces and the faction of the army that helped in expediting the downfall of that regime. He added that future prospects of a progressive regime depend on the cooperation of progressive groups in the army and the left civilian movement. Later, he joined the Islamists and played a role in promoting the 1989 coup.

33. Joachim J. Savelsberg, *Representing Mass Violence: Conflicting Responses to Human Rights Violation in Darfur* (Oakland, University of California Press, 2015) 1.

34. J. Millard and Robert O. Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State* (Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2003) 18.

35. 'Abdel Rahim 'Umar Muhi al-Din, *al-Turabi wa al-Igahd: Siraa' al-Hawa wa al-Hawiya* (Khartoum, Maroe Bookshop, 2006) 180.

36. Jemera Rone, *Behind the Redline: Political Repression in Sudan* (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1996) 106.

37. Ibid.

38. Ḥasan al-Turabi claims that a member of a Darfur investigation committee told him that al-Bashir said to the committee members at his meeting with them that "any Darfuri women should feel proud for being raped by a J'ali person."

39. T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone, *In Whose Image? Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994) ix.

40. Ibid.

41. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc, 1993) 32.

42. Ibid.

43. That is how 'Omer al-Bashir described al-Ḥaraka al-Shabiyya (the SPLM) as al-Ḥashara al-Shabiyya.

44. Jean-Francois Bayart, *Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007) 268.

45. 'Abdelwhahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution, Islam and Power in Sudan* (London, Grey Seal Books, 1991) 76.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

Chapter 10

No Turban No Crown

In 1969 an event occurred that affected the Sudan as a country, a state, and its citizens and their human experience with drastically contrasting effects. Many different forms of counterrevolution from the left and the Islamists and their affects and aftereffects rejuvenated. The attractive aspects of Sudanese twentieth-century experience, the 1964 October Revolution, the April 1985, uprising, and the repulsive aspects of each that appeared in the 1969 left counter revolutionary coup and its regime, as well as the 1989 coup and its state, represented a milestone in planting violence and serious drifts in Sudanese life. This peculiar experience has offered the idea of an open-ended form of violence coming to term with the Sudanese condition. To see this event as an open-ended form of violence is to see the Sudanese colonial experience of the state as colonizing the Sudanese subjects, propelled by the two-pair ends of the counterrevolution impulse. Millions of Sudanese in different parts of the country were killed before and after the separation. No one can say with certainty how many Sudanese were killed in the fateful years of totalitarian regimes of the counterrevolutionary experiences and their regimes. Within both counterrevolution experiences, the Sudanese suffered escalating radical evil that "corrupted the basis of moral law, exploded legal categories, and defied human judgment." One would agree with Mahmoud Mamdani that "we may agree that genocidal violence cannot [be] understood as rational; yet, we need to understand it as thinkable."

Ḥasan al-Turabi survived, contributed to, and suffered from the effects of the counterrevolution. ʿAlī ʿOsmān too, survived the May 1969 regime and the *Ingaz* regime. He is the only one from all the Islamists—excluding the military—who assumed the highest rank in the state and maintained that for the longest time as well. He victimized many during the Islamist regime and he ended by being one of the throw away of it. He was of course younger

than Ḥasan al-Turabi, though his encounter with him was longer and more complicated than most other Islamists. However, al-Turabi did not survive 'Alī 'Osmān, one of the most cunning and ruthless individuals in the history of those who ruled Sudan. Other questions that arise but are overlooked pertain to whether or not he is the disciple in disguise of or a collaborator in his own way with 'Salafi' Ja'far Shaikh Idris al-Turabi's sworn enemy? Was he a person with a mission to write al-Turabi out of history? However, the beneficiary of both al-Turabi and 'Alī 'Osmān's demise is 'Omer al-Bashir. Is 'Ali "a man apart" in a different sense? Who is he then?

WHO IS 'ALĪ 'OSMĀN?

In June 2017, 'Alī 'Osmān said in a secret meeting with *al-Sihoon* radical Islamist group that "we will never apologize for the 1989 military coup. The coup happened on a blessed night in which God looked at the Sudan with satisfaction."[1] In fact, the Sudanese indictment of 'Alī 'Osmān, al-Bashir, al-Turabi, their Islamist regime, and its personalities when they were asked to apologize for what they did, has reached beyond these people and their regime to the historical world in which true thinking has vanished, and as a result, crimes against humanity became increasingly "thinkable." The degradation of thinking worked hand-in-hand with the destruction of populations. That means 'Alī 'Osmān's failure to think one way and remember that God blessed the "Blaming Self" *al-Nafsil-Lwwamah* (The accusing voice of man's own conscience).[2]

It might be extremely difficult for the best chronicler of the Islamist movement in the Sudan and its personalities to write two pages about 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha (November 1944–present), the previous first vice president of the republic. Many of those who know him very well describe him as *katoom* (very secretive). Others will describe him as an insular militant, intellectually archaic, and politically brutal. It has been understood that 'Alī 'Osmān was the "architect-in-chief" of planning and execution of the June 1989 military coup. 'Alī 'Osmān's ascent to power started even earlier than the newly formed National Islamic Front (NIF) general conference in 1987 when he was elected as the deputy secretary general of the party.[3] That was a surprise to many as he became the second person after Ḥasan al-Turabi in the presence of many leading elder Islamists, including Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Yasin Omer al-Imam, Moḥmed Yousif Moḥmed to name a few. According to 'Alī al-Ḥaj, most of those members of the "old guard" were not in agreement with the nomination and election of 'Alī 'Osmān to the position, if not resentful.[4] However, it was hardly difficult to find anybody within the political field or even among the Islamists who tried to expose 'Alī 'Osmān's character or

the nature of his behavior to show how they both or individually relate to an ambitious though discrete political player who climbed the ladder of power through co-optation rather than election. For that and other reasons, before the 1999 palace coup, 'Alī 'Osmān was always associated with Ḥasan al-Turabi and was described as his most loyal, trustworthy, and obedient disciple. The French paper *Jeune Afrique* described him as Ḥasan al-Turabi, *un homme de confiance* (a man of confidence). He has always been perceived by most Sudanese observers as a political bureaucrat that Ḥasan al-Turabi handpicked and trained. Although there was no relationship of patronage—articulated or perceived as nepotism of kinship, preferentialism of friendship, peer relationship, or religious favoritism—between the two men that might have played their role in building networks and suggesting some sort of solidarity. However, some try to insinuate opportunistic and Machiavellian relations and temporary collaborations would and could also have taken advantage of justifiable and unthinkable opportunities. 'Alī al-Ḥaj claims that Ḥasan al-Turabi resented his nomination of Ali 'Osman later because he does not read and was not happy about his performance.[5] A serious scrutiny of developments after the 1969 coups could give a different interpretation of 'Alī 'Osmān's rise to power within the Islamists ranks after the post-*intifada* Sudan. That is to say, if the October Revolution raised young Ḥasan al-Turabi to the highest within the Islamists movement, the 1975 Intifada raised 'Alī 'Osmān to the highest as well.

One of the very few non-Sudanese who wrote positively about 'Alī 'Osmān's character was Hilde Johnson, the former Norwegian Development Minister (1997–2000). Other international observers and journalists together with most Sudanese intellectuals who belittled 'Alī 'Osmān described him as a shadowy figure raised and protected by al-Turabi. Johnson was one of the international personalities who played an important role in the 2005 Nivasha peace negotiations. Hilde seemed to find the secret behind 'Osman's power. She stated that 'Alī 'Osmān's "aura of quiet authority derived from his role behind the scenes of government and the Islamist movement."[6] She described 'Alī 'Osmān as

> rather withdrawn. Resolute when he wanted something done, he was a careful political planner and had stamina and staying power. He did not take risks, was never in a rush, and preferred to pull the strings and lead from behind. Reflective by nature, 'Alī 'Osman was a very good listener; he gave people space, preferred to hear people out, assessing them, before saying anything himself. An intellectual, he saw issues from different angles, discerning what was possible and what was not, he was a pragmatist.[7]

So it is clear that peculiar situations do not merely express the complexity and the diversity of odd and unorthodox relations, but most of the time they

create them. And in this way, they might have created 'Alī 'Osmān as the person who was perceived by many Islamists as the embodiment of whoever was keeping and maintaining the power in the politics of Islamism by holding all the keys of power in his hands and affirming that position at each turning point. Meanwhile, Ali's own low-key style, which is a mixture of opportunism and astuteness, in addition to his child-like features and deceptively quiet demeanor, allowed many people to overlook his manipulative, conniving, and ruthless character. But these qualities that made of him an obscure figure on the one hand prevented him, on the other, from being an ideological leader with any intellectual capital that could make him appear as the studious heir, a close champion, or even a possible competitor to Shaikh/Dr. Ḥasan. Many would argue that as one of the main reasons that al-Turabi kept him so close.

Most parts of 'Alī 'Osmān's life are not known to the public or even to his Islamist colleagues; yet most Sudanese know what makes them feel proud, or sometimes sarcastic or ashamed, of their past and present political characters, celebrities, religious, and even historical leaders. Those who feel that they have a duty to inform the public about 'Alī 'Osmān's background as one of the Islamists' political leaders are among his sympathizers, antagonists, and enemies, and they speak about his modest upbringing and background. He is one of the economic margins who through the Islamists' long power struggle devised what could be described as identity management and its pedigrees according to which I call the corporation before the coup and the state after it field and class. However, such an issue of modest background in the Sudan, a country where most of its elite came from a similar, if not more modest, social background is not a big issue. Yet most Sudanese within similar situations do not feel shy about it; most likely feel proud, as if they "made it" the hard way. Another aspect that relates to the rural urban divide background has its complicated problems with the power struggle among the ranks of the Islamists as it permeates not only politics but culture, as for example tribalism bundled in everyday codes, narratives, and sometimes hidden transcripts of constructions and reconstructions that emphasize actions on the state and social levels. That may have been forefront in 'Alī's 'Osman's mind, and this perspective helped guide his swift ascent to power. Although the Islamist scholars and writers are not the only interpreters of the "myth of origin" and development of the Islamist movement, most of their writings very rarely mention 'Alī 'Osmān, his persona, his role, and particularly how these characteristics or developments were cultivated. 'Alī never helped himself by writing anything that could attest to the development of his thoughts or reflect his "insights as well as his blindness." But if one looks at this within a broader and more thought-provoking exploration, one might entertain an interesting idea that might give that peculiar situation a political sense, as his rise to power was rather based on objective factors contrary to his supreme leader

Ḥasan al-Turabi, who built a personality cult that ensured his political capital. It is thus possible that this anti-hero image worked very well for him when he assumed possession of power in the state and the movement from al-Turabi after the year 2000 as a humble person who had not planned for it. All these issues cannot be disregarded. Yet, when recognizing the existence of such counter-insightful observations or developments in the life of 'Alī 'Osmān, one cannot disregard such broader propensities in the realm of the Sudanese public culture. Hence, 'Alī 'Osmān's story needs to be approached and written down in its own perplexity, complexity, and encryption, which has to be deciphered to make an understanding of that character possible.

To speak of 'Alī 'Osmān's political career and the conditions that made his ascension to power possible is to speak of the complexity of the backstage of al-Turabi's Islamism in practice. Erving Goffman has pointed out that "back regions are typically out of bounds to members of the audience."[8] This, in a sense, represents parts of the political circumstances the Sudanese society, in general, and the Islamist community, in particular, experienced after the 1964 October Revolution, which played a role in shaping developments that could by now be considered, for some Sudanese, a distant past. But to another extent, for some, this adds to what could be described as embedded capacities of what the Sudanese describe as *makr* (scheming). The backstage behavior worked very well for 'Alī 'Osmān for a while with 'Omer al-Bashir where he could "regularly derogate the audience in a way that is inconsistent with the face-to-face treatment that is given to the audience."[9] It could, however, also be a strategy that consciously 'Alī 'Osmān followed, which enables us to account for the processes that he ascribed to during his political career. 'Alī al-Ḥaj and al-Maḥboob 'Abdelsalam confirmed that al-Turabi and 'Omer al-Bashir met without a third-person audience only after the Hosni Mubarak assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995. But some of these backstage developments became front stage scenes performed at will when required. But sometimes the performances provided a chance for al-Turabi or 'Alī 'Osmān to gain favor during the absence of the other. Some of the present-day manifestations, one would assume, might be the contemporary carriers of political tumors that asserted relationships to the underground politics (backstage) that derive from the style and time of the Islamists' way of doing politics. 'Abdelgani 'Ahmed Idris states in his book, *al-D'awah lil dimocratiyya awa al-Islah al-Siasis fi al-Sudan* (Call for Democracy and Political Reform in Sudan), that 'Omer al-Bashir confronted his previous security chief, Ṣalah 'Andulla Gosh,[10] and said to him "your tribe has a deceitfulness mentality; and that he, al-Bashir, benefited from that one day during the election for the presidency of *Shura* council."[11] Al-Bashir was referencing 'Alī 'Osmān who conspired with him (al-Bashir) against al-Turabi for the position and for his own nomination instead. Al-Bashir is as hollow as

the Samiri golden calf, and the wind passing through it would not produce a sound. But the strategy of absence would not have assumed the significance we now give to it had there not been important developments related to it with ‘Alī ‘Osmān’s rise to and stay in power.

ABSENCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY

The most meaningful of the Islamist occurrences in connection to ‘Alī ‘Osmān is the emergence of al-Turabi Islamism, its relationship to the University of Khartoum, and its community from one side and the military coup of Ja‘afr Nimairi and his regime from the other. The University of Khartoum became not only an antecedent to and the originator of a prestigious position within the community of the state, but it also became endowed with sociopolitical status, symbolic value, and an image as the main citadel of al-Turabi’s Islamism. Underlying the endorsement of that combination of reproduction and promotion, the ideology and image of Islamism within the ranks of expanding numbers of younger, second-generation, Islamists at the University of Khartoum, in particular, reflected the growing belief in al-Turabi’s personality cult, which followed his defiant and violent style of conversation as its manifesto and took pride in disseminating the news of the growing numbers of his disciples.

The military coup of 1969 altered the whole political scene in the country. The new regime banned all political parties, arrested the political and trade unions’ leaders, and nationalized the press. Some of the political activities and most of the activists who were not imprisoned went underground. At the same time, the coup was a test that uncovered another face of some of the October revolutionaries—both civilian and military—and their sham belief in the “October Creed,” or *mabādi October* (October ideals), as they revoked what was not long ago considered a mission of the nation as a whole. Within the left, a conspiracy and collaboration among some left groups within the Sudanese Communist Party, some factions of pan-Arab Nassirites, and similar groups in the army, brought another military rule to the country.[12] The coup decisively strained the public and private spheres.

Ja’far Nimairi who seized power in 1969 in a military coup and who “promised ‘everything must change’ . . . for sixteen dramatic years he lead Sudan on an extraordinary political dance that reached every corner of the political spectrum, from close alignment with the Communists, to aggressive secular developmentalism, peace with the south, embrace of the conservative sectarian parties he had deposed, an eccentric version of radical Islamism and—in his final days in power—the hint of yet another twist.”[13] Furthermore, Nimairi “in his time in power, espousing [the]Nasserite revolution, Nimeiri

savagely crushed the Ansār and Muslim Brothers, then turned on his former Communist allies, and survived repeated coup attempts and invasions."[14] Within the back stage of the Sudanese political theater, the University of Khartoum, its students, and some of its faculty were able to a certain extent to protect their turf. Thus, a new situation arose in which the university became a signifier whose meaning was expressed by its ability to protect and preserve part of its freedoms within its campus and campus life. Once emerged, it was congealed by the spirit and the legacy of 1964 October Revolution. Within the underground politics of that period, the development directed and indicated something beyond the campus as a field in itself into a field by itself. As its picture emerged, so did the university developed into a launching pad for opposition to the regime. Al-Turabi's Islamists, while waiting for their secretary general who was in "occultation"—away in prison for seven years—formed an important opposition body of the Students Unity Front.

Within that environment, between 1969 and 1971, 'Alī 'Osmān was a law student at the University of Khartoum. He was elected as the president of the University of Khartoum Students' Union in 1970. This, to a certain degree, opened up new fields of possibilities and leads us to examine the significance of an absence as an opportunity. In the absence of al-Turabi and the top leadership of his Islamism, the young Islamists at the University of Khartoum were uplifted to show defiance. Although, that standoff was perceived by some as the ideological Islamist right against the left-leaning regime of Nimairi in so far as the left was on the wrong side of history and far away from the spirit of October and what the University—the citadel of October—stood for. It was said that 'Alī 'Osmān, as the Islamist president of the Students' Union, vainly placed himself up to the occasion; nevertheless, the Islamists hailed him as part of their victorious defiance to the regime.[15] That was not only an ideological phenomenon; it was a political phenomenon, too. Since that day, we have witnessed all the cues and provocations by which the "militant" young Islamists placed themselves as an opposition group and the ways they began to utilize the campus as space to reconstitute a national field of resistance to the regime.

After graduation, 'Alī 'Osmān was appointed a judge in the judiciary. After that, he started a private law practice and then entered politics where he has worked ever since. At the same time, he assumed responsibility of the Islamist party's student sector. During the absence of most of the senior Islamist leadership, when they were either in prison or in exile, 'Alī 'Osmān not only inherited the authority of secretary general in that field, but he also found himself deeply seated at the heart of one of the most dynamic political groups of young Sudanese struggling to find their route to the Sudanese community of the state and their way within the groups who opposed Nimairi's regime.

It is important to note that several important aspects of the students' sector at that time gained prominence in the underground and overground arenas of major political conflict in the country. One of the major aspects of that is the opposition to the idea of the coup and the totalitarian system that came out of its regime. It is only against that background that one can see an emerging important phenomenon that made overt political activities more difficult on a national scale, except on campus. At the same time, it made covert activities more important countrywide except in the university zone. Aḥmed Kamal al-Din described his first secret lecture at one of the university halls. It was 1978 and the speaker was ʿAlī ʿOsmān. In his speech, he said, "it was for the first time I felt that I joined a secret organization with open activities."[16] This situation made the university and its students, in particular, a very important political community that both the regime and its opponents beheld very seriously.

In addition, the country witnessed patterns of rural to urban migration, improvements in transportation and communication, the introduction of free higher education, opportunities for higher and graduate education in Britain, Egypt, and the United States, and undergraduate education prospects in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were among the most important developments in the postcolonial setting and during Nimairi's early period. By the 1970s, "a large number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters had become teachers in Western provinces (Kordofan and Darfur), and consequently there was major support for the Brotherhood among Sudanese pupils. When they then went to the university, they dominated students' politics to such extent that until this year (1984) the Muslim Brotherhood's candidates had swept to victory in all union elections."[17] ʿAlī al-Ḥaj added that some high school students from Ḥantoub and others who studied in Egypt, who were government employees in Niyala, also participated in recruiting some local children to the Brotherhood from an early time.[18] Such developments provided more new opportunities for many students, including those from the periphery, such as Darfur, Kordofan, southern and eastern Sudan, and the lower and middle classes. These higher education institutions opened the entire Sudanese landscape for new social groups from different parts of the country to gain upward mobility.

The aboveground campus environment at the University of Khartoum and other university campuses provided an additional value to their political, journalistic, and intellectual activism. Notably, this growth of university students that multiplied every year corresponded to the emergence of a new breed of Islamist student leaders of a similar variety who came from different regions. Most likely due to age factors and similar educational experiences, the impulse for togetherness among these young Islamist student leaders and ʿAlī ʿOsmān as their leader had gone beyond mere ideological affinity.

Through time, the political structure and the atmosphere of togetherness became was very important.

While there were many elements out of which the togetherness of the 'Alī 'Osmān phenomenon was consolidated among the younger generations of educated Islamists, the increasing presence of younger Islamists who migrated to Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, in particular, after graduation for work added another dimension to the phenomenon. It came at a time of the vast rise in oil prices of the 1970s and the steady decline of the Sudanese economy. The high increases in revenues of Arab states and private beneficiaries provided for unlimited resources in the hands of these entities and through them some of the Sudanese Islamist expatriates. At the same time, these new conditions came with new transformative makings and productions in the Arab countries and in the Sudan in particular. As these Arab countries continued to get richer, some of the ramifications of that situation kept the Sudan and the Sudanese poorer primarily for geographical factors, bad luck, and wrong policies. These policies included the military coup and the plunder contained within its resulting regime. By the beginning of the early time of Nimairi's regime and its acceleration through the 1970s, high numbers of Sudanese left the country as an outcome of intended and unintended consequences of that plunder. It is impossible not to notice the deep effects of that period in the history of Sudan. These effects are reflected in the *hijra* (migration) to Arab countries, its concurrent development of underdevelopment in the Sudan, and of its participation in the development of the other parts of these Arab countries.[19]

Islamists of all ages and qualifications migrated to Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States in order to find a temporary refuge from what they perceived, experienced, or feared in an oppressive Communist regime. The first groups of Sudanese Islamists, such as 'Usman Khalid Modawi who fled the country, confirmed to King Faisal (1904–1975), the Saudi authorities, and other Arab rulers that not only Nasserism, Baathism, and other secular ideologies, but also an imminent Communist threat was sneaking in through the Saudi back door.[20] The anti-Communist stance of the Sudanese groups afforded them easy access to positions of rank and responsibility in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Thousands of young Islamists together with other Sudanese expatriates crossed the Red Sea by air to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries. It is in this connection through the 1970s and 1980s that the Sudanese economic problems of hard currency started to come to the fore as a serious preoccupation for the state, the private sector, and the ordinary citizens.

At the same time, migration turned from a gain into a serious brain drain that took its toll on every aspect of the Sudanese life. In 1979 "the figures estimated suggest that migrants constituted 10 percent of the male population

between the ages of 20 to 34." Moreover, in "1985, it was estimated that two-thirds of Sudan's professional and skilled workers were employed outside the country."[21] As a result, we can say that Islamists expatriates' money and experiences served the consolidation of a new emerging economic structure and transformation of the party and some of its members. For example, "the policy makers and advisors were hoping to find compensation through the injection of migrants' remittances and savings, [which] were expected to bail Sudan's economy out from its growing indebtedness and balance payments deficits," but it went elsewhere to Islamist party and its new commercial and money exchange units.[22] However, "through the years which followed the *mughtaribin*[23] boom, the fall of Nimairi and after, the Sudanese governments conspicuously failed even to approximate this goal. Instead the country's socioeconomic situation continued to deteriorate from bad to worse."[24] As the economic retreat of Nimairi's regime continued, the Islamist party showed itself to be financially prospering. Three of the most consequential aspects of this development shaped an emerging Islamist party and the situation of 'Alī 'Osmān as one of the persons not only firmly connected with young Islamists at home and abroad but also as one of the few people who were holding the reins of the reality and the evolution of this new development.

The first consequence was that the Sudanese Islamists in Arab countries accomplished a significant break with the traditional thinking of the *hijra* and other Sudanese *mughtarbin*. In their newfound refuge, they created new networks, discovered new forms of inter- and intragroup solidarity, and achieved political and financial empowerment by collecting and channeling money to the other end of the Islamist private (black or white) money market at home, which became a daily routine. These networks grew into the Islamist *maktab al-Mughtarbin* (the Mughtarbin bureau). Later when severe famine affected the Sudan in 1984, a number of relief organizations were established. Both the Bureau and the relief organizations, according to al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir, were left to those who administered them with capitalist mentality.[25] By the 1977 national reconciliation between Nimairi and the opposing political parties including the Islamists, these networks were operational. By channeling money from the oil-rich Arab countries, the Islamists became the most important underground and aboveground group dealing in money in the country. This situation clearly represented and presented a set of practices where the money exchange dealers and dealerships established new habits and consequences similar to the IMF recipe of devaluation of the local currency.

With the decline of local currency, the hard currency became a high-demand commodity with unfavorable terms. The same became true of the value of the Sudanese *mughtarib* in the Saudi and Arab labor markets, as it had been subordinated to the requirements of markets that demanded a cheaper commodity. This commodity was none other than human beings themselves of

which every human community, society, or nation consists. Hence, under the *kafeel* (sponsorship) system and its conditions that turned labor almost into a feudalist system, the devaluation of local currency deeply affected those who were already subjected to the market mechanism or those who were subordinated to the dreams of a better life, which was the requirement to join al-*mughtarbin* in the land of plenty.[26] So, in both situations of the Sudanese money and human resources as commodities, "the desire to make a profit by buying low and selling high could easily shade into various forms of sharp practice . . . closely associated with the common view that the act of exchange itself, expressed through trade, was morally dubious, since one party always seemed to come better than the order in any purely instrumental exchange."[27] Hence, this phenomenon created its own universe and form of Islamists' accumulation, which was represented by its new riches, who were primarily active in currency dealings, such as al-Tayib al-Nus, Shaikh 'Abdelbasit, and others.

The second fundamental point that possesses critical normative, political, and economic dimensions and that needs to be added here, which became one of the greatest elements of the empowerment of the Islamists in Sudan, was the growth and the consequences of a new phenomenon of Islamic economics and its financial institutions. Equally important, people behind that phenomenon strove to make the argument that it was the alternative to other forms of economy. They worked hard to make the Sudan the main example for the implementation of the new economic system. The earliest debate about this issue took different forms in different parts of the Muslim world. However, "the efforts of Indian Muslims, beginning in the 1930s, to create a Muslim state on the former territory of British India following Britain's withdrawal gave rise to intense debates about an Islamic system for an Islamic state."[28]

Later, there were two basic influences underlying the resurrection and the growth of the issue anew: (1) the first of these influences was related to the growing numbers of Islamist scholars like Khurshid Aḥmed, N. Naqvi, and N. Siddqui who dominated the International Center for Islamic Economics at King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University, Jeddah. What was of more significance here was that the Islamists "grafted their political interests onto the Saudi pipeline, even though Kuwait offered them greater freedom of movement than they enjoyed in the Kingdom."[29]

(2) The second of these influences, by the mid-1970s, young Islamist economists and groups of businessmen in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf started the first Islamic Banks in Dubai, the Sudan, and Egypt. Moreover, other Islamic economic institutions began to grow to cover areas of investment, business, and finance, in addition to relief and *da'wa*. In relation to the *da'wa*, "Saudi policy is determined by a powerful clerical machinery, such as the Muslim World League with its sheer number of organizations and institutions."

One of the most important developments after the national reconciliation and the inclusion of the Islamists within the Nimairi's regime was the transformation of the Islamist movement into an invisible corporation with a national and international scope hiding behind the Islamic economy, its banking system, and their Islamist managers and workers. Different Islamist groups and individuals including managers and workers have been transferred and promoted back and forth from the party to the private institutions, from government to the public sectors and from private and public sector to government. In this way these groups developed and shared knowledge, accumulated wealth, and developed new tastes as markers that set them apart from the rest of population and fellow Islamists as a new and a distinctive class. Within their different phases of ascendancy to wealth, status, and power, these groups and individuals worked together within the expanding Islamic economy and its banking system, with new groups of what was called *tujar al-jabhah* (the Islamic Front merchants) and their Islamist state.

The structure of relations and mutual interests they developed as they worked together and exchanged benefits developed an ideological and political hegemony giving them the ability to control the social and political experience of the Islamist party and later the state. Some of the Islamist scholars discovered very late that "the market mentality and the capitalist groups that started to become active and expanded until they were about to 'swallow' what was remaining from our Islamic organization which we did not join in the first place except for running away from wild capitalism."[30] Other Islamist scholars saw only one side of this development, namely the power that a group within the political organization has gained from its relationship with this complex development. That way Abdelwahab el-Affendi described what happened to the organization as the empowerment of a "super party" that emerged out of this development. He argues that a secret apparatus not accountable to anybody within the broader Islamist organization, except for al-Turabi, was established. He adds that this closed and secretive body has developed "from an early time its 'special language' that has become a reference for itself. If this body says today that the Islamic belief requires a war against the United States and the world, then it would be like that, and if it came back to brag about providing services to the CIA then that would be the *jihad* incumbent upon every Muslim."[31] In fact, it was not the party that took over the financial systems, as 'Abdel al-Gadir claims, but rather it was the financial institutions that took over the party, transforming it into a corporation in order to oversee all political activity and to control the livelihoods of those affiliated with the party. On the other hand, this development produced not only a secret group or a "super *tanzim*" (super apparatus) as el-Affendi explains, but also an objective quality of the Islamist organization itself that has changed the reconstruction of group solidarity among an emerging social

class and opened the way for serious transformative processes that led to the development of what I call a corporation.

The more the institutions of this corporation—banks and other financial institutions—and their affiliates—*Monazamt al-Dawa* and other organizations—expanded their influence into the economic and the social fields and coalesced into the party, the more they shaped the party, undertaking its political and social roles and turning it into a corporation to oversee that expanding structure. Sharing a mutually compatible top-down model, the nature of the universe that emerged out of this phenomenon was essentially inherent in the nature of the corporation and in the expressive culture of the Islamist movement as expressed by al-Turabi. Within these developments serious internal changes emerged and expressed themselves in a political and economic regime and a state that identified itself as Islamic that particular al-Turabi ideology. One can clearly see examples of the manner of what could be described as different aspects of identity management and its pedigrees, and the ways and means of admission into the new Islamist corporate field and class. In a recent article published in the Sudanese daily al-Sahafa, al-Tijani 'Abdel al-Gadir disclosed that the young Islamist journalist 'Abd al-Maḥmud al-Kurunki wrote an article in the early 1980s critical of the behavior of some of Faisal Islamic Bank's employees and submitted it to Yasin 'Omar al-Imam, who was the chairman of *al-Ayam Newspaper* Editorial Board. The article ended up in the hands of al-Turabi, who did not like it, and accordingly summoned the author, advising him not publish it, but rather to meet with those bank managers and to convey the content of the article to them in the form of advice instead. Young al-Kurunki refused and explained his situation by saying to his *Shaikh* al-Turabi, "suppose that I gave them my advice and later al-Tayib al-Nus [the wealthiest of *tujar al-jabhah*] gave them a different advice, which one would they take?"

Such an example cannot be the utility of one person's values or assumptions as other experiences add to that phenomenon as indicators to determinants of utilities of identity management. T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone gave different examples including that of Abu Gassim Goor Hamid whom he described as ethnically "a Baqqara—his father was a Baqqara *shaykh* and his mother part Azande, Dinka, and Baqqara. Gassim is dark-skinned, African featured. A shepherd as a child, he worked his way up through the provincial schools to earn a degree in theater at the University of Khartoum." Simone explains that although Gassim cofounded *al-Wan*, which was to become one of the most popular Islamist tabloid papers, "he was not the man with the money" that comes from the Islamic financial institutions. The publisher "paid Gassim's meager salary over years and gave him space for his idiosyncratic and provocative texts, but maintained him in a perpetual state of marginality in the organizational structure." Other aspects of identity management include

social status, aptitudes, and perhaps even certain ethnic relations and attitudes that qualify or disqualify individuals for access to the different strata of the corporation. These emerging groups within their distinctive regional and ethnic backgrounds came to be housed in collective strata within the changing Islamists structure as a class for itself whose practice mediated factors and conditions and the state of the system.

The Islamist wing of Saudi foreign policy is likewise fond of the Sudan, although for different purposes. The Sudan was to be the matrix of an Islamist network meant to bring African popular Islam in line with fundamentalism, or at least, orthodoxy, and then to spread it out to the rest of non-Muslim Africa."[32] It was not Nimairi and his regime who received "considerable political and financial backing from such powerful vested interests," but it was the Islamists who did.[33] All that led to a major transformation of the Islamist movement by turning some of its members from barefoot intellectuals into a new propertied middle class. This new middle class was made of a new breed of merchants called *tujar al-jabhah* (NIF merchants) and other white-collar professionals who emerged from the new Islamic banking institutions, and organizations that generated the opportunities, motives, and means for the change of status, which was distinguished by viewing the image of wealth as a symbol of success. When the Islamist movement was bloated with money, it successfully transformed into a corporation.[34] Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir described that development by recalling that "the market mentality and the capitalist groups that started to become active and expanded until they were about to 'swallow' what was remaining from our Islamic organization which we did not join in the first place except for running away from wild capitalism."[35] Another viewpoint that still persists is even more critical of this "market mentality." He called it *Uhud mentality* referring to the Uhud battle, which was fought in AD 625 between a force of the small Muslim community of Madina and a force from Mecca, the town from which many of the Muslims including Prophet Mohamed emigrated in AD 622 after years of persecution. During that battle while the Muslim force had been close to victory, some of the Muslim forces, especially the archers, breached Prophet Mohamed's orders and rushed to collect Meccan spoils. That move allowed for a surprise attack from the Meccan force, which caused chaos and disorder within the position of Muslim forces. Many Muslims were killed, and even Prophet Mohamed himself was badly injured. Such a rush to collect the spoils was described in the Sudanese satire *al-habaro malu* as reinventing the relics of an old famous Sudanese Ṣūfi verse that refers to those who rushed toward piety and gained their rewards from God to mean the opposite, scramble for the spoils of the state. Another form of an assault or scramble for the spoils of the state was described by 'Abdel Gadir who exemplified "our *gubsh* [barefoot] brothers who used to eat with us fava

beans and lentils [poor people food]and reside with us in *Um Dirawa wa al-Droushab* [poor neighborhoods], those wretched of the earth became ministers and governors. We felt at first that was a good omen . . . as we felt that we found a rock that would close the gate for corruption and blocks the road to brokers and mafias and turns toward the poor and disadvantaged." But that was too great, as some of them turned to look only to what was around them, built only their high buildings, and spent only on their entourage and closest clan. Such provocative arguments might have started and continued as part of the younger generations residue of a legacy of resistance to the older generation and Ḥassan al-Turabi's agreement to reconcile with Ja'far Nimairi's regime in 1977. For those younger Islamists who joined the Sudanese National Front, an armed opposition groups in Libya, and who participated in the military operation against the regime in 1976, the reconciliation was a big betrayal to those who gave the most in fighting against the regime.[36] In their memos, many of them were bitter, and with increasing frequency, those fighters blamed their Islamist leadership who accepted the reconciliation with the regime for never visiting the fighters in their camps in the Libyan desert, or consulting with them in such a serious and dangerous matter.

Before the evolution of these developments in 1969, almost everything of significance in the Islamist movement lay within the control of Ḥasan al-Turabi. But during the absence of Ḥasan al-Turabi in prison, these developments became integrated and grew within a new organized system that matured under the direct control of 'Alī 'Osmān and to a certain extent 'Alī al-Ḥaj.[37] However, 'Alī 'Osmān was the organizational nucleus of the most complex emerging group of the younger Islamists, as they were transforming into a new middle class and later very serious transformation through identity management into some kind of civic patronage. As they say, "it is impossible to understand the magic without the magic group" Most of the younger Islamists began to look at their relationship with al-Turabi Islamism as activist positions rather than ideologically based roles. The separation between ideology and activism prompted all other factors including religion, ideology, and ethics to distance themselves from Islamism, Islam, and any Sudanese creed. Hence, every attitude toward the other could be hostile and violent. That explains why violence has been the modus operandi of this group before and after they assumed power in 1989.

In the wake of the national reconciliation, the younger Islamist group intensified its activities due to certain developments. First, the growth of that occurred in this internal system within the front stage of the students of the University of Khartoum in particular and other schools of higher education in general. Second, the clear effect of the increased numbers of *mughtaribeen* and the way the movement channeled their remittances to strengthen the movement's economic might. Third, those who were in the United States and

Western Europe with graduate degrees from different universities returned. Fourth, the return of the Islamist fighters who came from the Libyan desert added to the diversity and strength of the group. All that had an important transforming result on the democratic composition and the internal discourse within the backstage of the Islamists movements and its underground tributaries. All that held back to put 'Alī 'Osmān as the deputy secretary general in the first general conference for the movement when the movement went overground. The general conference, when the movement moved above ground, opened a new field for the nascent middle class formed by ambitious younger groups of Islamists to gain recognition by ascending the upper echelons of the organization. That move caught some of the old guard of the movement by surprise. These new Islamist middle class people were themselves the bearers of their own interest. And they were not necessarily whole-hearted believers in al-Turabi's Islamism or happy with the control of the older generation over leadership positions in the movement since 1964. Many were caught by surprise that 'Alī 'Osmān was elected to the position of the deputy secretary general of the Islamist movement. Later, Moḥammed Ṭaha Moḥammed Aḥmed (killed in 2006), a Sudanese Islamist journalist and the editor of the *Al-Wifaq* who was known for his violent approach to writing, reminded his readers and 'Alī 'Osmān as well that they—the young emerging group—were the ones behind his rise to the deputy secretary general position. In a sense, that conference was a condolence meeting for a certain aspect of al-Turabi's Islamism and some of its leaders. The emergence of 'Alī 'Osmān and his new young Islamist middle class as a paradigm case was not only a subversive Other of the older generation of the Islamists but in essence of al-Turabi and his Islamism in the first place.

We might need to look at this phenomenon not within the growth and development of al-Turabi's Islamism and its political party but as a distinctive creation that involves a parallel form of power, status, and authority relations. For a considerable period of time, this phenomenon had three levels of complexity: (1) it continued to grow as a self-sustaining movement of *a new class* moving to gain new grounds within entrepreneurial behavior of greed and individualism within an organization or an appropriate corporate culture; (2) the Islamist movement field was a predominantly underground system of identity management differentiating die-hard believers (mostly from western Sudan: geographical margin) from pragmatic nonbelievers (primarily revarians: primarily the economic-geographical margin); and (3) showing belief in either Hasan al-Turabi, or his Islamism, was a functional necessity as long as that would help endow the core group with all the privileges and the way for upward mobility.

In an interview with al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir he argued that al-Inqaz "turned over the page of political parties as well as the Islamist movement

that elevated to governance."[38] Of course, many see the growth of that development the way al-Tigani saw it, as a new element in the life of Sudanese Islamism that came with and as an outcome of the coup. Later Sudanese Islamism linked to the state as a practice to the exclusion of other groups, their behaviors, and the benefits of those other emerging groups. In reality, that could be true, but the facts might be different. That impulse started to sprout and gradually emerge as Ḥasan al-Turabi started to turn his Islamism against his surrounding political culture, its old and new representations, and dead and alive personalities. As an outcome of the gradual replacement of most of the old dominant strata or what he called the traditionalists before his imprisonment in 1969, he started to systematize how this new class reproduced and maintained itself before and after his release in 1977. From the perspective of those who watched al-Turabi's very closely early on, one can easily see the rise of this new class not as conflicting but rather providing a better picture of how al-Turabi's style became the brand and the *vade mecum* or the referential book that ʿAlī ʿOsmān "in particular and his group adopted, learnt by heart, and followed with great caution." This was the case at least for a while because they could never succeed in distinguishing themselves from him. By the time they disconnected themselves from Ḥasan al-Turabi, certain characteristics of this new class started to surface. One of these characteristics was greed. As more these groups began to comply with the values of the city, the more that different forms of unchecked or controlled wilding developed. Such behavior was bred by selfishness and indulgence in pleasures of all things worldly, including multiple marriages and what Ḥasan al-Turabi describes as *fintant al-mal* (lust for wealth), that incapacitated the virtues and integrities of public, social, and religious life.[39] This situation involved a separate synchronized form of deploying the state and its violent apparatus to secure the savage separation of religion and state. It also helped the construction of the group routed in certain economic relations coming from essential functions related to the way that the group used its new status to accumulate wealth as a primary characteristic of this newly constructed group. The system that they developed and perfected was described by Sudanese as *fasad* (corruption). The international community perceived the Sudan as extremely "corrupt, and all available data and country reports indicate persistent, widespread, and endemic forms of corruption, permeating all levels of society."[40] According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception index, the Sudan ranked "(177 out of 183 assessed countries) with score of 1.6 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale."

However, different opportunities of absence provided many of those young Islamists with most opportunities to act slowly and sometimes discreetly to climb up the organization before the 1985 conference and with a faster pace after the general conference. But absence neither keeps normal hours nor this

formula, and its rules were established by the party. Most importantly, when such an occasion occurred, a person, a number of individuals, or a group moved up and would be recognized as if they were chosen through a legitimate process of selection or election. It has given rise in and of itself to the symbolic capital that is augmented and amplified with the degree and the status of the positions and to a certain extent the reputation or the background of the group so established. Be that as it may, these opportunities of absence should not conceal how these younger generations started to create their own networks for the democratic process and the impatience of some of them to find a shortcut to power through a military coup. These unusual and sometimes peculiar developments can only be explained if we realize that the social enterprise and consequences of the positioning persons or groups into higher levels are most likely blurred by similar peculiar circumstances as the ones explained earlier. Thus, we will see in the next chapter how ʿAlī ʿOsmān climbed into a situation not governed by roles that go beyond tyranny itself; this could be called 'savage inequalities.'

It was once said, that "believing, with Max Weber, that man [and, presumably, woman] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he [she] himself [herself] has spun, and the analysis of it to be therefore not experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."[41] One might add that it is not only "man" or "woman" but also human beings and things that create these "webs of significance," and that the meanings generated out of them come with their ironies too. By all means, what has been going on in the Sudan in the field of Islamism, in particular, in the last three decades and the resulting transformations are not isolated phenomena. The way the Islamists assumed power in the Sudan in 1989 through a military coup has provided its own ironies as well; but it has been hardly an issue that would satisfy many, including the Islamists themselves who seek an answer to the difficult question that must be asked again and again: who killed who?—Islamism, religion, or the state? Each one of these has its own identity not only in terms of origin but also in context and field of power. And each has been suspended in their webs of significance and entanglements that mark their places and the way they work within the particular and general Sudanese experience. It is true that the political expectations of the Sudanese populace, from the first day of the coup, were rather modest.

Most of the Islamists and some of their leading elite, such as Abdelwahab el-Affendi, had higher hopes for a more measured approach to governance that was similar to that of ʿOmar Ibn ʿAbdel ʿAziz, as stated earlier. But they ended up in resentful loud cries: "Where is my Islamist dream?" For the Sudanese Islamist experience, this and other kinds of questions, their aggregate of answers and enthused results, and the debate generated out of all the discourses that emerged would lead us to adequately understand why the Sudanese Islamist project in particular heralded toward oblivion a long time

ago while other Islamist projects elsewhere were heading the same way. This is not based on comparisons but rather by looking at the particular extent of the phenomenon's changes that affected the field of production within each one's sociological reality and how it defines each one's difference. It is true that internal and external changes and the initiative of transformation owe their independent causal and dynamic factors to new modes of thought, and it seems that each century is a gravedigger of one or more "isms." If the nature and causes of the transformation of the Sudanese experience from disintegration to oblivion are easy to see now, then such projection for the fate of other Islamist experiences may also be easy to observe, whereas rudiments of degeneration of the other ones are grounded in and asserted by each one's field of action. Neither the decline of the Sudanese experience nor the projection for the fate of other Islamisms can be attributed only to the Sudanese people's determination to get rid of Islamism. It also cannot be ascertained that the decline was only a consequential effect of the gradual encroachment that has triggered social change as an integral part of the Sudanese populace's everyday life and the effects of the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary" as people of different classes struggled to survive within their social worlds.[42] The reasons could be external factors related to social space that invoked significant persistence of specific forms and processes of mechanistic causalities inherent in encroachment and sometimes impingement factors that intensified degeneration and debilities of the system itself. In addition, it is the idea that Islamism and its encounter with the state from within as the only ruling regime in the Sunni Muslim world, not from without as an opposition group as happened with other Islamist representations in other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries that might help us to understand the phenomenon and its future. The significance of such an example and the production of different vistas that emerge out of that experience with or without their lessons, values, and conventionality could transpose that discourse and appropriate it for such a projection.

The withering of Sudanese Islamism, therefore, also projects the end of similar forms of Islamism, and our observations of this might help us to conceive a new type of investigation into what might arise to outmode "passé" Islamism, profoundly transform it, and in both cases push it into oblivion or the past. By seriously addressing these issues, this chapter explored the Sudanese Islamist experience within the ironies that came out of its web of significance.

NOTES

1. The story was published first in al-Siihoon website and later published in al-Raboba website.

2. The Quran, Surah 75 verse 2.

3. The NIF al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah was formed in April 1986, in a Congress attended by some 3,000 delegates. According to al-Affendi the grouping was in effect and a new name was given to the broad alliance Ikhwan was busy forging during the latter part of Nimairi era. Besides the core of known Ikhwan leaders, the founding Congress included Ṣūfi leaders, ulama, some tribal leaders, and a significant contingent of ex-army officers. There was also a significant presence of women and youth formations Ikhwan had developed earlier. In addition, some 140 delegates represented southern Muslim groups. The NIF became a storm shelter for many groups harassed by the reigning The National Salvation of the Homeland (NGSH) which emerged as a self-appointed parliament of the uprising the removed Nimairi from power in April 1985.

4. In a recorded interview.

5. Ibid.

6. Hilde F. Johnson, *The Waging of Peace in the Sudan: the Inside Story of Negotiations that Ended Africa's Longest Civil War* (Briton, Sussex Academic Press, 2011) 13.

7. Ibid.

8. Erving Goffman, *The Representation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York, Anchor Books, 1959) 124.

9. Ibid.

10. Major General Ṣalah 'Abdalla nick named "Gosh" is the former Presidential National Security Advisor (2009–2011). Prior to that he was the former head of internal security, and then the director of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) for the period from 2004 to 2009. Ṣalah 'Abdalla Gosh, graduate of the Faculty of Engineering Department of Civil, University of Khartoum. His relationship with the Islamists security system and spy work started when he established an "information bureau" to provide the movement's leadership with intelligence on political activity within the university. After the Islamist coup of 1989, Gosh devoted himself purely to intelligence work, acquiring the position of director of operations in the new regime's security bureau. It was in this position that he collaborated with Ayman al-Zawahiri, other jihādist residents in Khartoum, and other Islamists groups based within the wider Middle Eastern region. It was also in this role that he helped to provide Osama bin Laden with the economic and military infrastructure to make Sudan an early base of operations for al-Qa'eda. He later came to be known by the Americans as "our man in Sudan." It seems that under Gosh the contribution of the NISS to the "War on Terror" was more substantial. In 2005, a state department official told a reporter from the Los Angeles Times that the information provided by NISS was "important, functional, and current."

He is one of the power group around Vice President 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha. Wikileaks cables released in 2011 showed that as early as 2008 Gosh had been considering exploiting the International Criminal Court indictment against Omer al-Bashir to enable 'Alī 'Osman Ṭaha to displace him and take power himself. He was arrested along with twelve other top army officers in November 2012, over a suspected coup attempt, which the government described as a "plot" to destabilize the country.

11. 'Abdelgani Aḥmed Idris, *al-D'awah lil Dimocratiyya awa al-Islah al-Siasis fi al-Sudan* (London, Sinar Publishing House, 2012) 80.

12. In his memoirs, *Mayo Sanuat al-Khasb wa al-jafaf (Many Years of Fertility and Drought)* (Khartoum, Markaj Mohamed 'Umar Bashir lil Dirasat, 2011), Zain al-'Abdien Mohamed Ahmed, a military officer who played a key role in the 1969 coup and a member of the Revolutionary Command Council of what was called the May Revolution, claims that the leader of the coup, Ja'far Nimairi, met with 'Abdel Kahliq Maḥjoub, the secretary general of the Communist Party, and members of his general secretariat the morning of the coup to seek the party's collaboration by backing in the coup and its regime. According to Moḥamed Aḥmed, Maḥjoub's refusal to accept that request lead to a major split in the Communist Party as a faction led by Mou'awia Sourij and 'Ahmed Suliamān to collaborate with Nimairi and his new regime.

13. Alex De Waal, "Late J'afar Nimeiri—Reflections on His Life" (*African Arguments*, 2009) http://africanarguments.org/2009/05/31/reflections-on-the-life-of-the-late-ja'far-nimeiri/.

14. Ibid.

15. 'Alī al-Ḥaj claims that al-Turabi confided to some of his confidants that 'Alī 'Osmān showed some cowardice at that situation.

16. Dr. Aḥmed confided that to author in a personal e-mail conversation.

17. Charles Gurdon, *Sudan at the Crossroads* (Kent, Menas Press, 1984) 69.

18. 'Alī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed, interview by author, audio recording, Bonn, Germany, July 24, 2012.

19. One of the stories that could summarize this situation was of the Saudi ambassador, which has circulated for a long time. The ambassador, after getting fed up trying to find a good plumber in Khartoum to mend his water supply, sent for a plumber from Riyadh, who turned out to be Sudanese.

20. 'Osman Khalid Modawi, a lawyer, a business person, and an Islamist who played an important role in the external opposition to Nimairi's regime.

21. 'Abdel Salam Sidaḥmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996) 195.

22. Ibid.

23. The Sudanese expatriates and workers who migrated and temporarily stayed in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries because of employment there.

24. Ibid.

25. Al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir, 'al-Rasimaliyoon al-Islamiyoon, mada yafaloun fi al-Harka al-Islamiyya' (The Islamists Capitalists: What do They do With the Islamic Movement? Khartoum: al-Sahafa Daily, December 12, 2006).

26. The Kafalaa or the Kafeel system is used in many oil-rich Arab countries with the exception of Bahrain. According to this system, foreign workers are allowed to come into any of these countries only when sponsored by a national employer. The worker's visa remains entirely in the hands of the employer who acts as the visa sponsor and who can withdraw permission at any time from the employee if they quit the job or leave the country on vacation, and the employers use the visa as blackmail. The Kafeel system, which has been criticized by the International Labor Organization, governments, and human rights organizations, has been responsible for creating a foreign workforce in these countries that is repeatedly abused and overworked, blackmailed into working for little pay, long hours, and no benefits. Many sponsors do not allow the transfer of one employee to another sponsor.

27. Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: Challenge of Capitalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 106.

28. Volker Nienhaus, *Fundamentals of an Islamic Economic System Compared to Social Market Economy* (Berlin, KAS International Reports, 2010) 75.

29. 'Akbar 'Ahmed, *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society* (London and New York, Routledge, 2002) 201.

30. Al-Tigani Ḥamid 'Abdel Gadir, "al-Rasimaliyoon al-Islamiyoon, mada yafaloon fi al-Harka al-Islamiyya" (The Islamist Capitalists: What do they do with the Islamist movement?) Khartoum, al-Sahafa Daily, December 12, 2006.

31. 'Abdelwahab al-Affendi, "Mudilitat al-Super Tanzeim fi Siraat al-Islamein (al-sabigin) fi al-Sudan" (The Dilemma of the Super Organization in the Struggle among the (former) Islamists in the Sudan), Khartoum, al-Sahafa Daily, November 29, 2009.

32. Khalid Duran, "The Centrifugal Forces of Religion in Sudanese Politics." *Orient* 26 (1985) 572–600.

33. Ibid.

34. See more elaboration on the transformation of the Islamist movement into a corporation in Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (London, Ashgate, 2008), see chapter One.

35. Al-Tigani Hamid 'Abdel Gadir, *al-Rasimaliyoon al-Islamiyoon, mada yafaloun fi al-Harka al-Islamiyya* (The Islamists Capitalists: What do They do with the Islamic Movement?).

36. On June 2, 1976, one of the bloodiest confrontations between the Nimairi regime and National Front—the opposition group lead by the Umma, Unionists, and Islamists—took place as "one thousand fighters from the Ansar and fifty from the Islamists" who had military training in Libya were sneaked into the country from their training camps in the oasis of Kufra and launched a surprise attack on the capital. The operation, which Nimairi labeled as *mutazagh* (mercenary) attack, was led by retired army colonel—Mohamed Nur Sa'ad—failed. Some of the participants including Sa'ad were captured and killed, and others were tortured and imprisoned. A few found their way back to Libya while al-Sādiq al-Mahdi, al-Sharif al-Hindi, and other ringleaders of the failed attack were sentenced to death in absentia.

37. According to 'Alī al-Ḥaj in his interview with the author in Bonn in July 2012, he was responsible for the party affairs while Ḥasan al-Turabi was in prison after 1969.

38. Osman Naway Post: al-professor al-Tigani 'Abdel Gadir, al-Inqaz kant Inglaban Muzdawagan alaa al-Ahzab wa alaa al Haraqa al-Islamiyya (al-Inqaz staged two coups at the same time. The first was against the political parties while the second was against the Islamists movement, http://osmannawaypost.net/?p=6427.

39. It became almost a state policy to encourage the Islamists to marry more than one wife. 'Omer al-Bashir married a second wife and continued to encourage his fellow Islamists to follow suit.

40. Transparency International, U 4 Expert Answer, 4.

41. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* (New York, Basic Books, 1977) 5.

42. Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics*, 14 (see chap. 1, no. 12).

Chapter 11

The Anatomy of Death

What is the 1989 coup, the presence of which has been so central to the Sudanese actions and reactions for almost three decades, and which has been rejected, resisted, and still continues to reproduce itself through violence, self-interest that provides a basis for correspondence between greed, individualistic accumulation, reorientations of persons and networks, and the ordered system of corruption, arbitrary power, and violence? Was it a coup against a democratically elected government of al-Sādiq al-Mahdi or was it against a party based on Ḥasan al-Turabi's Islamism, or against al-Turabi himself, or all of the above? Today, three decades after the success of a peculiar military coup in nature and "excursion," these abovementioned categories have been confused as the regime itself has bundled many aspects and regimes of violence to exercise its "Islamist" banality of evil within a life of its own in front of the Sudanese citizens, Muslims, and the entire human race. The fact that this regime evil has become banal is because it has been "committed in a daily way, systematically, without being adequately named and opposed."[1] Now, it has not been routinized and committed without moral revulsion but also even the victimizers became victims of the evil that their system incubated and hatched.

Let us "position ourselves within this new paradigm in order" to have a new look in an attempt to reveal "a new landscape before our very eyes."[2] That was the end of Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamism and the real start of ‘Alī ‘Osmān and his state Islamism. ‘Alī ‘Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha[3] was an obscure figure who was extremely reserved, calculated, controlling, and ruthless. And he always acted as a very humble person in his manner and his quiet demeanor. The December 1999 events made his indignant Islamists colleagues—who never accepted the palace coup on the fourth day of the fasting month of Ramadan—describe him as *as-Samiri* (the

Samaritan) who led the Israelites astray during the absence of Moses and persuaded them to worship the golden calf. That day, the most indignant person was Ḥasan al-Turabi, the Moses of the Islamists, who led the Sudanese to the desolate Sinai Desert of the first Islamists republic through the coup of 1989. In this peculiar allegory, 'Alī 'Osmān assumes the role of the happy magician, the false prophet, or he has been called, *as-Samiri*, while the golden calf is 'Omer al-Bashir. The Qur'an describes how the golden calf is hollow and how the wind passes through it producing a loud sound. However, for historical Moses who regained his leadership of the Israelites, who purged themselves, the meaning is different to that of latter-day Moses—Ḥasan al-Turabi—whose Islamist disciples acted belligerently and cold-heartedly. They stripped him not only of his prophethood but also of all other worldly positions. 'Alī 'Osmān and his golden calf, who both survived that experience, have continued to lead Sudanese Islamism astray and into oblivion since that day.

There are at least three ways related to this particular development that might help us address the significance of this event as a landmark in the withering of Islamism in Sudan. The first has to do with 'Alī 'Osman Moḥmed Ṭaha as a person. The second has to do with what I call "the opportunity of absence" as 'Alī 'Osmān, in particular, and others of the younger al-Turabi Islamists, climbed the movement's ladder by taking advantage of the absence of their leaders while they were in prison or exile. The third one deals with the "pathology" produced and the community created out of that pathology. All that makes the wilting of Islamism in the Sudan a unique experience with nothing to compare it to, as no other Islamist group has ever assumed power the way the Sudanese did. In this sense, such developments have made the Sudanese Islamism a "one item set" in the society in which it occurred. Nevertheless, it sheds light on and adds a lot to the study of the essence of Islamism at large. It is most likely from this view that one can understand one of the routes to the end of Islamism in Sudan.

THE ISLAMIST STATE MODEL
AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The dramatic event of the 1989 Islamist coup encouraged more scholars to seek a genuinely new paradigm or a framework to study Islamism and the Islamists' thoughts and plans for assuming and exercising power. Both meaning and action draw attention, and deservedly so because it is more than mare intellectual or political curiosity. In one sense theory, birth of ideas and execution of practice are all interwoven in everyday life. In the other, the Sudanese Islamist state is the first of its kind in the Sunni Muslim world.

Moreover, both the Sudanese citizens and other world population have been witnessing in the Islamist state as a singular kind of human experience. From here comes the big irony suspended in the military coup, the state that emerged out of it, and their webs of significance. The modern military profession is, by all means, "expert and limited. Its members have specialized competence and lack that competence outside their field."[4] It seems that the Sudanese civilians who collaborated, or thought that they might use the military to initiate a coup as a short cut to assume power, never learned the simple lesson that "the task of the military man is to view all problems in terms of fighting efficiency. The moment he finds himself being forced of this clear line on the vagaries of political argument he will be in danger. He will begin to lose the confidence of the politician, who wants his military advice, and he will be false to fighting services, who look to him as their professional leader."[5] Hence, it is incumbent that "the military command must never allow his military judgment to be warped by political expediency."[6] Military institutions of any society "are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function."[7] Moreover, "it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations."[8] Using the coup as a system for change is not only an acceptance to go with the violent logic of the state and one of its institutions—the army—but it is also a restoration of an open project of unmitigated disposition for advancing the cause of violence over all other causes of governance from day one. In this sense the Sudanese Islamists and their leaders, by initiating the coup, abandoned their project—*al-Islam hwa al-Hall* (Islam is the solution)—and replaced it with another project that says: violence or militarism is the solution.

The irony here has many different faces. First, according to ʿAlī al-Ḥaj when Ḥasan al-Turabi came from Paris to the Sudan "in June or July, 1964, he found members of the Islamists *Haiat al-Shura* council on weeks long deliberation over the viability of a military coup option against the ʿAbboud regime and how to do that."[9] Al-Ḥaj remembers that there was an agreement among the members of *Haiat al-Shura* on the coup option, and some even suggested robbing local banks for money to finance the coup. Al-Ḥaj, a member of the secretariat team of *Haiat al-Shura* at the time recollected that al-Turabi, who attended his first meeting—as he was immediately included in *Haiat al-Shura*—argued forcefully against the military coup idea, and he successfully won the debate by convincing all members of *Haiat al-Shura* against the military option.

But it seems that al-Turabi had not come to such views from a life of isolation. It appears likely that al-Turabi's peak performance began to spark and sprout. He "was impatient with the constraint imposed on Ikhwan by the elitist organizational framework inherited from Egypt, and had been pushing for opening up the movement, either transcending the movement itself and turning it into a pressure group with access to parties, or by joining the other big parties in a united front."[10] And so the web of significance and its ironies that relate to military action might have started to show their trickery ways and different roads in relationships, opportunities, and consequences to ascend up the organization and make himself more visible within the Sudanese political scene. In the course of the anti-coup strategies during the time of rising hate for the 'Abboud military regime, it might have been the smartest way to challenge that distinct enemy by expressing such negative views and attitude against the idea of a military coup. That is what worked perfectly well for al-Turabi later when he was invited to speak at a different setting in the panel organized by the Social Studies Society at the University of Khartoum in 1964. As explained in previous chapters, that brief speech did not take up the Islamist organization alone, but gave him nationwide recognition and a big up leap to lead and introduce his Islamism.

Thinking deeply about the coup option might bring us back not only to the Islamist counter revolutionary impulse and pursuit but also its web of violence, the entanglements of the entire weave of al-Turabi's ascendancy to power, his downfall, and where these ironies hold each one's yarn. In his book, *al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan: Dairat al-Ḍow wa khiuot al-Dhalam* (The Islamic Movement in the Sudan: The light Circle and the Threads of Darkness), al-Maḥboob 'Abdel Salaam argued that it was the circumstances that accompanied al-Nimairi military coup of May 1969, and the detention of al-Turabi before other main political party's leaders that made him rethink his position on the military coup. Al-Maḥboob, the secretary of external relations for Ḥasan al-Turabi's Popular Congress Party and one of al-Turabi's very loyal disciples, claims that it was Yasin 'Omar al-Imam who tried and failed at an earlier time to persuade the Islamist leadership to plant cells for the movement in the army. However, according to al-Maḥboob, when Ḥasan al-Turabi the secretary general of the movement and the Islamic Charter Front, found himself to be the first one to be detained in the morning of May 25, 1969, coup "even before the Prime Minister and the minister of defense, although he was a secretary general of a small party that had not had more than two members in the constituent Assembly [the parliament], he got convinced by the correctness of logic of [Yasin] the Islamist leader of a Marxist background and the falsehood of the logic of the academic members of the party"[11] who opposed the idea of the coup before. In this sense, the 1989 coup that the Islamists chose as a platform for the government or what

they called *Thawarat al-Ingaz* (salvation revolution) is not revolutionary at all. Of course, calling it salvation does not make it so; nor does calling something a revolution make it so. It is a counter-revolution and a substitution to the promised and advocated statement: *hiya lil allah* (it [the state] is for God). Further, the Islamists have turned their Islamist republic and governance experience into a colossal beast of coercion immediately after their violent takeover of the Sudanese state through the coup. It follows that the first distinction between the two lies in the "lack of legitimacy, that is to say, their [military regime] lack of a moral title to rule,"[12] which invited challenge by other citizens of the country who did not choose the Islamists or favor their regime to rule over them. And if "force creates right," wrote Rousseau, "the effect changes with the cause. Every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity disobedience is legitimate; and the strongest being is always the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest."[13] No wonder the role and pursuit of that state and its ability to invent different types of violent means, or violence as a political project, that included but was not limited to the ghost houses, massive purges of government officials, jihād against its own citizens, and counterinsurgency on the cheap such as the *janjaweed*,[14] has become and has been preserved as the institutional framework germane to such practices. As a consequence, what continued to be and consisted of "a nonlinear processes [of violence] in which every effect is a cause of yet another outcome in a complex and endless array of"[15] was the mode and actualization of an innovative inter- and intra-violence as the symptom and the temperament of the Islamist state and its true normative essence. 'Omer al-Bashir continued to say every now and then "we took it by the gun and who would like to take it from us have to take it by the gun."

Thus, it is not as though the inadequacy of religion and the state remains universally valid. It is also the model of Islamism in itself and by itself—from the first day of the Sudanese Islamists state and within every day of its development—that has been parading Islamism and its path toward oblivion.

That is to say that the model of the Islamist state became detached not only from Islam but also from the spirit of a good society, which led to the failure of both the Islamist governance (if there was any) and a nation-state—not based on citizenry—as a political project. That is why, as failure has shown itself at all levels, the Sudanese satire has been very accurate in describing the five pillars of *al-Inqaz*[16] regime as: "*bunia al-Inqaz ala khams, halat tawari, hirasat kabari, noum ijbari, mashi kadari, and banzeen tijari li man istata aliyhi sabelan*" (the five pillars of *al-Ingaz* are as follows: state of emergency, guarding bridges, forced asleep, walking barefoot, and commercialized petrol for those who could afford it). Later, as the violence of the regime escalated, another version of these pillars circulated:

"*takul ma tashbaa, talbas maragga, tamashi al-janoob ma tarjaa, indak ma indak tadfaa, tftah khashmak einak tatlaa*" (you do not find enough food to eat, you wear rags, you go to the South of Sudan to die, you have to pay [taxes] whether you have money or not, and you will suffer if you open your mouth). The second distinction between the two also lies in the absurd conviction that led to the Islamists idea of society as one and that the whole society should share one belief system or should be coerced or forcefully organized to do so. This is how the Sudanese Islamists found and organized a common ground of a new model that separates religion and state that is to say the state became the field of violence and religion was designated a different ambiguous field. The Sudanese satire descript that by say: *al-Kizan dakhalowna al jamii wa dakhalo al-Souq* (The Islamists *kizan* took us to the mosque and they rushed to the market).

AL-TURABI IN PRISON

The second irony is the result of al-Turabi sending himself to prison the first day of the coup and 'Omer al-Bashir to the Palace. This key moment in the history of the Sudanese Islamists' experience and their state has been viewed with irreverence and turpitude. Regardless of the ploy behind that incident and/or the oversimplifications or misinterpretation of the meaning of that sinister act as recounted by the Islamists, that action by its result and by the way that it was done gave a practical endorsement to the state and a license for it to turn violent logic into a rule and wreak havoc on human beings including al-Turabi himself. Hence, they laid the groundwork conditions that made the state's violent disciplinary conduct not only possible but it made it the governance on behalf of God. This most ungodly representation of God became an indelible mark that continued to ring true of the vile conduct of the Islamist state. By enduring, however, such sequences of dealings, the Islamists have initiated and legitimized using the state monopoly of violence, its disciplinary apparatus, and the use of force to curtail human rights rather than to preserve them.

The prison that Ḥasan al-Turabi sent himself to during the first coup of 1989 as a ploy to save himself and his dreamed-of Islamist state from repercussions was not the prison "his disciples" sent him to. The prison which he sent himself to as a ploy, if we can take his word for that, was for a short time, one month and to then be released to resume all his duties. But the prison which his disciples sent him to, that day, took him six months in real prison in addition to another six months in home arrest. His home arrest was similar to what Jamal Abdel Nasir did the primary leader of the 1952 Egyptian revolution. Najeeb was isolated in house arrest from 1954 until 1972.

However, the prison and house arrest gave 'Alī 'Osmān the opportunity to consolidate his old on the reign of power. Although the political parties, trade unions, and associations were banned from the first day of the coup, the Islamist movement and its party was dissolved. When Ḥasan al-Turabi was released from house arrest he was faced by the hard reality and the transformations that not only shaped but changed the essential nature of the Islamist movement and incorporated into its orientation and its daily pursuit an internal governing regime that made the movement a new different "creature" following its own course, with unchecked power, ruling from the top down, with management free from any system of supervision or accountability. This in turn, was reflected in dissolving the party and instating a shadowy body called the council of Forty that was handpicked from a diverse group from the privileged social status that included members of the military, some managerial Islamists, and some business personalities who share loyalty to 'Alī 'Osmān. 'Ali and his core group supervised the security force. What 'Alī 'Osmān did was getting rid of Ḥasan al-Turabi and Islamism and replaced that by a narrow clique of "bureaucratic centralism" he firmly controlled and left Ḥasan al-Turabi at best *mustashar la ustachar*.[17] However, a hidden struggle between the residues of Ḥasan al-Turabi's assumed power and 'Alī 'Osmān's real gained power continued. This struggle took different shapes and took some time to be stilled completely by what was called the memorandum of ten and al-Mufasala which was described by some as the palace coup or the power struggle between the palace, where the official power rests and al-Manshiyya, where Ḥasan al-Turabi resides. By the end of that struggle al-Turabi's fate was sealed and the prison to which he was sent by his disciples this time was for real and repeatedly as a sequel of removing him from power and to shield the same state from what they considered as his vice. Hence, the palace coup against Ḥasan al-Turabi on December 12, 1999, was similar to the 1989 coup, as both radically changed the political environment in the Sudan and to a lesser extent in the wider region by giving an "added value" to the state as "a morally empty space, a set of lifeless procedures, and culturally alien institutions that could be given life"[18] through such violent acts. Both developments gave rise to an uneasy feeling among most Sudanese citizens and political groups, who vigorously debated whether or not the palace coup was merely another ploy or a game the Islamists were playing that was similar to the events of June 30, 1989, when al-Turabi sent himself to prison as a cover-up. However, the resulting developments out of that occurrence exhumed memories of past events not only as a tragedy but also as "a farce."[19] More information about the prison and occultation as an opportunity is provided in chapters 7 and 8.

It was a reminder of December 1965, when al-Turabi, as the principal figure, expelling the 11 elected members of the Communist Party from the parliament

and banned the Communist Party altogether. Such a ban was impossible before when "Yahia al-Fadli failed to achieve with the help of the first regime of the parties [1956], and what 'Abdalla Khalil was, agonizingly, reluctant to do without the advice of his Attorney-General."[20] On December 9 of the same year, a law was enacted that banned the Communist Party and confiscated its property. The Communist Party "decided to take the matter to the Supreme Court and got a ruling against the ban, but the Government decided to ignore it."[21] The same happened when al-Turabi raised his case against the state in 1999.

The second tragedy was the moral dearth of the Islamist regional parties and personalities who hurried to Khartoum in at attempt for reconciliation and mediation between the two warring camps of Sudanese Islamists. Those regional Islamist parties and personalities remained silent through the years when the regime of the Sudanese Islamists was slaughtering, torturing, and annihilating its opponents and waging wars against Sudanese people all over the country. Did the Sudanese reign of terror seem contrary to what those regional Islamists were subjected to in the past? It could not be so; it might even more. Nevertheless, those high-level Islamists from abroad gave no attention to the decade-long, sharp accusations that continued to fill the local media and that soon focused both local and international minds on the reality of the situation in Sudan. It soon became clear that not only the conflict was real, but also the route to the Islamist second republic lacked legitimacy and moral authority the same way the first one did. However, the course of the Islamist movement and its politics, the human beings, the things that created the "webs of significance, the meanings generated out of railing the movement toward the dethroning of Ḥasan al-Turabi, and directing Islamism toward oblivion started a long time before the first and second coups in 1989 and 1999 respectively." It evolved about four decades before now out of changing patterns and internal and external shifts in the balance of power that provided for new, young actors to emerge. However, we cannot understand that unless we carefully follow the route of the social commotions from which all that emerged, sometimes unnoticed, sometimes by luck, and sometimes by careful calculation. But in most a momentous way, certain groups of younger Islamists claiming no particular intellectual or ideological loyalty expanded in place through time. Most of them were well educated but lived by the dormant value of their individual ambitions and the nature and nurture mindset that Ḥasan al-Turabi taught them. In the ultimate paradox, they deposed him while they continued to maintain his style and follow his conduct.

THE SALAFI/SHII FACTOR

Perhaps the two inexplicable sets of ironies are those that stemmed from the rise of Salafism and Shiism, each within its own terms, together within each

one's sentiment toward the other, and within the Sudanese socioreligious field of action in relation to al-Turabi Islamism, its Islamists, and their political practice. The irony is that we cannot tell who belongs with whom within these warring groups and for what purpose. As a general rule, many have felt that the Salafi tradition within its different representations as a non-movement was without a clear political program. Hence, as alliances between or collaborations among different parties are experiences of willed association, Salafist groups are expected to shy away from becoming involved in the political fray. With the shifting relationships between the al-Turabi Islamists and the neo-Salafi Islamists, that is no longer the case. The second irony is that the Sudan for its entire history has been perceived a Shii-free zone. That is no longer true for the post-Khomeini political Shiism. The third irony was that, since its early days, al-Turabi's Islamism rejected Salafisim and Shiism within their different orientations. Simultaneously, none of these orientations was known for its history or relationship with or sympathy for Sudanese Islamism and especially Ḥasan's al-Turabi who never hesitated to denigrate both and consider them as relics of the past.[22] Given the importance the system of meaning in the Sudan, until very recently, the terms Salafi and Salafiyya were associated with Ansar al-Sunnah or Wahabi groups and individuals. As a general rule, Ansar al-Sunnah or Wahabi in the Sudan were known for spreading their messages through *al-dawa* (preaching) and leading severe attacks on the Sufiyya, their rituals, and their religious practices. That is why, however, a great sector of the Sudanese Muslim community and, in particular, the Sufiyya have been often suspicious of the Ansar al-Sunnah and consider their agenda as a deviation from the Islam that they knew if not offensive to what the majority of Sudanese Muslims follow. Al-Makawi, the most famous of the Samaniya Ṣūfi *ṭarīqa* bards, accused the Salafiyya of ingratitude in his very famous *madha* (poem), which he dedicated for his Shaikh Abdel Mahmoud Nur al-Diem. He describes such a person as *jaḥid al-fadul shin basu* (what is the significance of the thankless).

The Islamists in power after 1989 presented a situation where the two religo-political representations, the official Salafiyya state (Saudi Arabia) and the Sufiyya, as the nemeses to the Islamists and their state. While they were involved in bitter institutionalized struggle against each other, the Islamists in their new state waged a war of words on the Wahabi kingdom and its ruling family. They described their king as *khainan al-Haramien instead of khadim al-Haramien* (the traitor instead of the custodian of the two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Madina). They also described the Saudi royal family as *Yahood Yahood Al Saud*, meaning that the Saudi royal family members are Jews in disguise. The Ansar al-Sunna groups in the Sudan became very strong in their opposition to the regime while their benefactors in Saudi Arabia set their sight on Ḥasan al-Turabi whom they accused of not only being secular but also being an apostate. Moreover, a new alliance between the Sudanese

Wahabi group and al-Turabi's sworn enemies from the Muslim Brotherhood was forged around the opposition to the new Islamists regime. Ansar al-Sunna's mosques in Khartoum became the preferred platforms for Muslim Brothers' preachers, such as Dr. al-Ḥibir Nour al-Diam, who attracted more and more audiences not only for prayer but also for listening to bitter attacks on the regime. With such antagonism and tremendous rivalry between the Sudanese and the Saudi states, a more controversial development took place in 1991 when the Khartoum regime gave refuge to Osama bin Ladin as a prominent guest after he fell out with his Saudi ruling royal family over their support for the United States during the first US Gulf War against Ṣaddam Ḥussien. The presence of Osama bin Ladin and his collaborators, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and their jihādists from the Afghan Arabs, turned the Sudanese field into a place for an open war waged by proxy between Saudi Arabia represented by its Wahabi followers and the Sudanese regime represented by its ally Osama bin Ladin. Many thought that it was al-Turabi's plan to strengthen his position by threating 'Alī 'Osmān by bin Ladin and his Arab jihadists being on his side.

Another development that coincided with the arrival of bin Ladin, the Afghan Arab jihādists, and others to the Sudan was the deportation to the country of some the Sudanese Sururi Salafi individuals from Saudi Arabia and other neighboring Gulf Arab countries. The Sururis, or *al-Sururiyyyun* in Arabic, are named after their founder, the Syrian ex-Muslim Brother Mohamed Surur Niyaf Zayn al-'Abidin who belonged to one of the groups that emerged with the broader social movement in Saudi Arabia and some Gulf countries called *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Awakening). The Sururi *jamaa'ah*, or group, that introduced a new generation of Saudi public intellectuals during and after 1980s, most notably including Salman al-'Awdah, Aid al-Qarni, Safar al-Hawali, and Nasir al-'Umar, emerged as a *takfiri* and developed later into a dissident jihādist group that mixed forms of Sayyid Qutb Islamism while remaining within the confines of the Wahabi Salafism. The Sururi, in particular, and the other *Sahwa* groups directed their hostility first toward what they depicted as secularists. They relied "on a substantial library of ideological texts inherited from early theorists such as Moḥammad Qutb and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Dawsari and consistently developed by contemporizes like Safar al-Hawali."[23] The Sayyid Qutb ideas and the ideology behind it and the Saudi educational system were behind the generation that called itself *jil Al-Sahwa* (the Sahwa generation). This generation made this ideology "operational in the late 1980s. Under its tutelage, the Sahwa generation soon saw itself as the collective victim of vast "secular-Masonic plot."[24] The Sururis brought in their intellectual group via their publication, *al-Bayan*, "non-Saudi thinkers," which demonstrated the extension of the Sururi network beyond the kingdom's borders. Among them

were two substantial figures, the Egyptian Gamal Sultan and the Sudanese Ja'afar Shaikh Idris, Jamal Sultan was a critic of the Muslim Brotherhood in his country while Ja'afar Shaikh Idris was not a critic of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan, but rather a sworn enemy of Ḥasan al-Turabi. Within the tremendous rivalry and antagonism among the born again Sudanese Sururis, who lived in Saudi Arabia, the *takfir*[25] of Ḥasan al-Turabi took shape in publications and continued in different forms of venomous verbal and written attacks ever since. Another old enemy of Ḥasan al-Turabi was Zayn al-'Abidin al-Rikabi, who "turned over the faculty of *D'awa* and Communication of Imam University . . . [into a place] where the Sahwis had an overwhelming majority."[26]

By 1989, the year the Sudanese Islamists assumed power through a military coup, things began to change in all directions for the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, especially after 1991 and the Gulf War. Chief among these developments was the Sudanese Islamists' establishment of their first Islamist republic (by hijacking the state) in the Sunni Muslim world. This event coalesced and grew with the presence of Osama bin Ladin in the Sudan "hijacking the *Sahwa* protest and its symbols,"[27] to initiate the ideology of global jihād. By that time the al-Sahwa movement itself "was running out of steam in Saudi Arabia . . . primarily to state repression";[28] and the Sudanese Sururi preachers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf were deported to their country. Top among those deported was Mohamed 'Abdel Karim, the former imam and preacher of Al-Kawthar Mosque in Jeddah, who was deported in 1993. Others included 'Abdel-Hai Yusuf, the former imam and preacher at the Mohamed bin Zayed Mosque in Abu Dhabi, who was deported to the Sudan the same year, and Mudathar 'Aḥmed Ismāil. All of those Salafi jihādists studied in Saudi universities, graduated, and worked there or in the Gulf countries before being deported to Sudan. To the surprise of many academics in the Sudan, Mohamed 'Abdel Karim, 'Abdel Hai Yusuf, and 'Ala' al-Din al-Zaki were offered important positions in different departments at the University of Khartoum. They held positions at the university with other religious scholars who graduated from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and publicly carried out missionary and political activities through formal networks of charity organizations, such as *Mishkat* Charity Organization.[29] Here some observers point to how the alliance of 'Alī 'Osmān, who some accuse him of being Ja'far Shaikh Idris's disciple in disguise, and that group of Sudanese Salafis.

Despite what might look like similarities between these neo-forms of what could be called jihādi Islamism and al-Turabi in person, there is a divisive difference, and as explained elsewhere here, that difference is crucial. The most important similarities between Islamism and jihādism in general is that they "share a common premise, namely that Islam and politics are one and the

same; they both believe that their receptive programs represent paths that are distinct from and independent of the religious and political establishments; that unlike the later, the Islamic principles that Islamists and jihadis live by are uncompromised by the ephemeral interests."[30] The similarity on which one can see the emerging relationships among neo-Salafi Islamists, 'Alī 'Osmān that goes beyond the very principles of similarities and dissimilarities among these groups, was the foundation of any form of political connection among them was their common enemy Ḥasan al-Turabi. Nevertheless, once settled in the Sudan, Mohamed 'Abdel Karim, in addition to the university position, was given access to the Sudanese government-owned TV to preach in public nonpolitical Salafi ideas. At the same time, he began to gather young Sudanese at his mosque in al-Kalaka, whom he organized as *al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya al-Musalaha* (the Armed Islamic Front).

About the same time, what emerged then, by the rise of the Sudanese— al-Turabi in particular—and the bin Laden's *takfiri* Salafism in the Sudan were different forms of violence and new lines of conflict together with fissures within each one of these groups. *Takfiri* hostilities toward each group not only surprised the Sudanese society, but it alarmed its urban members. The first violent act from what the Sudanese described as the local *al-Takfir wal-Hijra*[31] took place in the al-Gezira region in a place called *Compo* (camp) 10. At the end of 1993, contemporary Muslim rulers were declared as *ṭawāqhit* (tyrants and apostates) and the state as *kafira*. They also proclaimed that the acceptance of government-issued documents such as passports, citizenship cards, identity cards, and the use of paper currency as manifestations of *bid'aa* or heresy. Hence, 'Abdel Karim's young followers planned their *hijra* by walking on foot to distance themselves from that society and settling in that place which is called *Compo* 10, about 250 miles south of Khartoum. Upon their arrival there, some of the village residents reported to the authorities the presence of an armed group in the village. The local authorities demanded the group to surrender their arms. Following their view that obedience to the state police is a heresy, they refused. A clash ensued, which led to the death of the group's emir, 'Awad Jumaa Sayla, and a number of his followers, along with the death of some members of the local police force. Jumaa Sayla was one of 'Abdel Karim's close disciples. 'Abdel Karim was arrested after that event and charged with illegal acquisition of arms hidden at his al-Kalakla Mosque.

The next year in 1994, a group of Arab Afghans under the leadership of a Libyan jihādist and one of Osama bin Laden's personal bodyguards, 'Abdul Rahman Al-Khulaifi, carried out a massacre of 'Ansar al-Sunnah members in Omdurman. A similar event happened in a Wad Madani Ansar al-Sunnah Mosque as explained before. Even though these Salafi jihādists claimed they were not organized within political parties or militias, their video and cassette recording, as well as their mosque speeches reflected the skill and military

experience of the Afghan Arabs who came to the Sudan, and their militaristic activities escalated. As a result, the Sudan witnessed several cases of bloody violence among the Salafis themselves, which later extended outward toward other groups. Mohamed 'Abdel Karim and his disciples, together with his other Sururi Salafi jihādists, introduced a new form of violent fiery speeches at their mosques where they emphasized religious fervor rather than *dawa* or education that traditional Ansar al-Sunnah of Shaikh al-Hadiyya were known for. In addition to the mosque, they used old and new communication and media systems including cassette and video tapes recordings, YouTube, and other social media. In their speeches, they emphasize *fatwa*s of *takfir*, which denounced high-level personalities and organizations as apostates and heretics. One of the most famous cases in this field was the statement Abu al-Dardaa al-Ṣadiq Ḥasan issued in which he called for killing some of the Sudanese journalists and opinion writers whom he accused of being apostates. In 1995, Mohamed 'Abdel Karim distributed a cassette-recorded tape titled "*Farfarat Zindeeq*" (a convulsion of a hypocrite) in which he declared Dr. Ḥasan al-Turabi a heretic and demanded his execution. Shortly thereafter, other *fatwa*s were issued declaring the heresy of anyone who joined or had already joined the Sudan People's Liberation Movement led by the late John Garang. Moreover, these *fatwa*s continuously produced to demean other political personalities, secular political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations. Paradoxically enough, they accused the ruling NCP of being secular. Moreover, they issued a *fatwa* that declared participation in the country's elections as a heresy because democracy for them was *bidaa* (an innovation) and accordingly elections were considered *haram* (forbidden) or a heresy. In 2006, the jihādists were accused of killing journalist Mohamed Ṭaha Moḥamed 'Ahmed whom they denunciated with blasphemy.

After *al-Mufasala*, both 'Alī 'Osmān and the Sururi Salafis openly rallied around a common enemy, and al-Turabi was that common enemy. The escalating armed and a civil opposition to the regime eroded the power of the Islamist state and its rhetorical stance. That was when the Salafis began to gain more political momentum as its leaders started to get involved in a series of violent acts, or they instigated violence by making speeches or issuing *fatwa*s that led to such acts. Such activities included *fatwa*s that declared the Shi'ia as heretics and asked the Sudanese government, in a press conference, to shut down the Iranian embassy and the Iranian Cultural Center in Khartoum. Some *fatwa*s also asked the Sudanese government to collect and burn Shi'ia books on display in a wing of the 2006 Khartoum Book Fair, as some of these books were considered, by the Salafi spokesperson as disparaging to Prophet Mohamed's companions and his wife Aisha.

But most importantly that the Salafi groups renewed their denunciation of Ḥasan al-Turabi of heresy because, he said in one of his public lectures,

women could lead both men and women as an imam in group prayer. Mohamed 'Abdel Karim publicly called for implementing *hud al-Rida* (apostasy capital punishment) on him. Mohamed 'Abdel Karim and other Salafi jihādists issued another *fatwa* declaring al-Sādiq al-Mahdi, leader of Umma Party and Imam of the Sudanese Ansār, an apostate for his unorthodox views regarding women's equal right in inheritance. Other violent acts committed by the jihādists included the vital shooting of the US diplomat John Granville and his driver by a young *takfiri* group on New Year's Eve in 2008. The four men sentenced to death for Granville's murder escaped from prison in 2009. In September 2009, during the opening ceremony of the Communist Party headquarters in Khartoum, some of Mohamed 'Abdel Karim's followers barged into the inaugural event and clashed with the gathering audience. Later, 'Abdel Karim declared members of the Sudanese Communists as heretics, and he asked the government to ban the party and stop off its activities.

One of the recent violent acts attributed to the jihādists was the clash that took place between them and a group of Ṣūfis during the *mawlid* (birthday of Prophet Muhammad) celebrations on January 31, 2012. Many bystanders were injured before the Sudanese police arrived to stop the fighting. As Salafi groups became more politically involved, 'Alī 'Osmān took his relationship with them a step further. In 2004, the first international conference for the Islamic *dawa* was convened in Khartoum under his sponsorship. The conference, which brought together member organizations of Salafi jihādists from different parts of the globe, was followed by the establishment of *Majlis Ahl al-Qibla* (Council of the People of the Qibla [direction that should be called when Muslim pray]). This new Salafi-jihādist Comintern is a reminder and may be an alternative of Ḥasan al-Turabi's defunct *al-Mu'tamar as-sha'bi al-'Arabi al-Islami,* (the Popular Arab-Islamic Conference [PAIC]). The conference was followed by the establishment of *Haia'at 'Ulama al-Sudan* (The Sudanese Bureau of 'Ulama) to add to already existing structures; 'Abdel Hai Yusuf became its deputy secretary, and 'Abdel Karim was its member. The Bureau became the regime's scarecrow that distributed *takfir fatwa*s against whoever the regime wanted to scare or intimidate. At the same time, this new body added to other state structures that include senior Salafis in its boards. These bodies include, "the College of Islamic Jurisprudence, Mujam'a al-Fiqh al-Islami. Dr. 'Abdel Kareem is a member of the Consultative Committee for the minister of Religious Affairs and Properties. Dr. 'Abdel al-Hai Yousouf is a member of the College for Islamic Jurisprudence, Dr. 'Alaa al-Din al-Zaaki is a member of the Committee for Drafting the Curriculum in the Ministry for Higher education."

In so arguing, both sets of government manipulation appeared to be important policies for intimidating its enemies through *takfir* and the jihādist feeling of success in establishing the new Comintern as Mohamed Sarur

Bin Nayif Zayn al-Abidin. The founder of Saruri Salafist orientation became a regular visitor to Khartoum, and he was hosted by his former Sudanese disciple Mohamed 'Abdel Karim. These developments may explain the speculations that within the growing political, economic, and security challenges, their might have been a window of opportunity for the neo-Salafi Islamists to emerge as an alternative Islamist party that could have contradicted the program that the rebels, liberals, and secular groups adopted to provide an Islamic opposition that could have inherited the regime of President 'Omer al-Bashir.

PLAYING THE TERRORISM CARD

Through the better part of the lifetime of the first Islamist republic, from 1989 until 2000, events graphically illustrated that the impulse and rhetorical stance of the Islamists and their state went far beyond a mere ideological rage. In many cases, there were efforts toward what some perceived as instigation of a global jihād or open hostility toward what they described as *al-istikbar al-'alami* (the international arrogance) in a direct reference to the West and the United States in particular. Every now and then, the Khartoum official media reminded the Sudanese population that *Ameryca ud dana 'azabouha* (America's suffering will come soon).

But the Khartoum global jihād era and its web of significance had its ironies too. Mansoor Ijaz[32] has written about the role he played between the Sudanese Islamist regime and the American government. He has also testified on the issue before the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives and at congressional hearings, and he appeared on TV shows. In his 1996 testimony before the US Congress, Ijaz submitted a then recent letter sent by President 'Omer al-Bashir to Representative Lee Hamilton (D-NH), the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the time. In that letter, al-Bashir stated that "we extend an offer to the FBI's Counterterrorism units and any other official delegations which your government may deem appropriate, to come to Sudan and work with [us] in order to assess the data in our possession and help us counter the forces your government, and ours, seek to contain."[33] That might be in reference to the extensive files on al-Qaeda that the Sudan gathered during the time bin Ladin stayed in Sudan. Ijaz claimed that he discussed the letter with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Clinton National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Susan Rice, who served as President Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, but he had no success. What confuses the matter, according to the *Christian Science Monitor*, was that Ijaz provided a paper with what appeared to be copies of letters from Dr./Shaikh Ḥasan al-Turabi, who was

considered by many, especially in Western media then, the real power behind the Islamist regime in the Sudan, offering President Clinton a bid to extradite bin Ladin to the United States to back his assertions. In more details, Ijaz, wrote about his discussion with Qutbi al-Mahdi, Former Head of the External Security Organization. Ijaz claimed that the purpose of his meeting with al-Mahdi was "to see if we could glean any insights into the data Sudan has on those who have been attending the Popular Arab & Islamic Conference meetings convened by Hasan al-Turabi." Ijaz quoted Qutbi telling him, "as you recall, during our August meeting, I told you I thought this data could be invaluable in genuinely assessing terrorism risk from Sudan and neighboring countries." Ijaz explains that, Qutbi's "central contention is that Sudan is prepared to share data on those people attending the conferences and belonging to banned groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Egyptian *Islamic Jihād*, *al-Jamaah Islamiyah*, and others, if we are prepared to genuinely engage and incent the Sudan away from its present course." Qutbi al-Mahdi, according to Ijaz, complained bitterly about repeated efforts to communicate with the administration, which are as I understand it, being blocked at very low levels because of what he called "blind spots." Ijaz claims that "al-Mahdi showed him some files in which the data seemed pretty compelling—names, bio data like dates and places of birth, passport copies to show nationality, recent travel itineraries in some cases, and a brief description of each individual to delineate which groups they claim loyalties to." Ijaz maintained in short, "it seemed to me everything we discussed in August was available. I strongly suggest we test the Sudanese on the data, perhaps even try to get at the data on an unconditional basis."[34] The irony here is that the Sudanese Islamist state in one side who gave global jihādists the opportunity to build an infrastructure and operational base, and Ḥasan al-Turabi on the other, put the global jihadists, Islamism itself, and their actors on sale.

That market was not open only to the United States, but it was open to Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, and who knows what others. In April 1990, *mutamar fʻāliyāt al-Umma* (The Congress for the Umma Events) was inaugurated in Khartoum in front of a big attendance of Islamist leaders, leaders of liberation movements, activists, and other political leaders from different parts of the world.

But even before inviting other Islamists to an Umma Congress or an "Islamist Comintern," al-Turabi jubilantly shared his vision with other Islamists worldwide that the demise of that brand of Communism coincided with what he believed to be the promise of an emerging new Islamist order that would liberate the entire human race "from the clutches of all kinds of material, political, occult, or psychological control."[35] After the first phase of secret battle between him and his disciples who kept him in prison for more than the time agreed upon under house arrest after that, al-Turabi began touring the

world advocating the Sudanese Islamist state model would act as a launching point for "pan-Islamic rapprochement . . . proceeding from below."[36] He argued that that model "would radiate throughout the Muslim World."[37] Hence, al-Turabi's laborious work in which he diligently spent time and effort explaining might not have been synonymous with the model he left behind at home. He argued that "if the physical export of the model is subject to Islamic limitations in deference to international law, the reminiscence of the classical Khilāfah and the deeply entrenched Islamic traditions of free migration (*hijra*) and fraternal solidarity would make such a state a focus of pan-Islamic attention and affection."[38] This is because Ḥasan al-Turabi, the "present growth of Islamic revivalism means a sharper sense of inclusive-exclusive identity, a deeper experience of the same culture and stronger urge for united action, nationally and internationally."[39] What was that formative period for, which he further referred and elaborated that "once a single fully-fledged Islamic state is established, the model would radiate throughout the Muslim world"[40] He did not mention that in name or implicitly.

But when and how does that become sufficiently possible to generate the momentum toward that state? Whatever such a situation might indicate, al-Turabi made some attempts toward a tipping point in that direction. By its inadequacies, al-Turabi transformed the Sudanese new state and its capital Khartoum into a hub and base of operations for receiving, training, and providing a sanctuary for a network of radical individuals and groups from different parts of the Muslim world. Osama bin Ladin, his four wives, children, 'Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Tanzim al-Jihād[41] group, and more than a thousand Afghan Arabs who chose the Sudan "for two main reasons. First, the restless, radicalized veterans of the Afghan war were unwelcome in most Arab countries but Sudan left its doors open. Second, bin Laden liked Sudan's politics."[42] On the other side, the official account of the justification of that situation was that "the Sudanese accepted bin Laden as an investor."[43] It might be true that he was an investor and a business person in Sudan. However, he "had never really ceased running his terrorist networks."[44] CIA director George Tenet of the CIA later commented in his book *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* that "the then-obscure name 'Osama bin Laden' kept cropping up in the intelligence traffic. . . . [The CIA] spotted bin Laden's tracts in the early 1990s in connection with funding other terrorist movements. They didn't know exactly what this Saudi exile living in Sudan was up to, but they knew it was not good."[45] Bin Ladin "rented a number of houses and bought several large parcels of land that would be used for training."[46]

'Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Tanzim al-Jihād were already in Sudan. He bought a farm north of the capital. The neighbors began complaining about the sound of explosions coming from the untilled fields. Bin Ladin

was being explicit when he brought "bulldozers and other heavy equipment, announcing his intention to build a three hundred-kilometer road in eastern Sudan as a gift to the nation. The leader of Sudan greeted him with garlands of flowers."[47] But he was implicit when he brought and used "an $80,000 satellite phone and al-Qaeda members used radios to avoid being bugged."[48] Based on the testimony of former bin Ladin aides in the United States during the trial, especially that of Jamal 'Ahmed Al-Fadl,[49] "bin Laden appears to control a sophisticated international network of operatives and has developed links to other terrorism organizations around the world."[50] The London Times, however, claimed that "Bin Laden is mistaken in his belief that satellite phones cannot be monitored; a satellite phone he bought in 1996 will be monitored as well."[51]

But there were divergences, convergences, and several consequences that flowed from that grand scheme that translated into new policies by al-Turabi and the Islamists' regime in the Sudan and bin Ladin and his al-Qaeda "government" during the time he was in Sudan. While the regime continued granting Sudanese citizenship to anyone who might not meet the eligibility conditions. This provision was said to have been intended to help solve the problems of prominent Islamic activists who were persecuted in their own countries and were needed by Sudan. By 1994, the *la e lahila ila Allah* (no God but God) passport was deliberated on by the parliament regarding what action to take toward more than one million Africans, most of whom were Muslims, living in the country but who were not eligible for Sudanese nationality. The Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee in the National Assembly, Ḥasan al-Beli, stated that "our nationality and passport under shari'a is *la ilaha illa Allah* "No God but Allah"[52] and Sudan is an open country for all Muslims especially those who fight for the Islamic state and those who are persecuted in their own countries and who look to Sudan as a safe haven."[53] This went hand-in-hand with the developments of emerging strategies fashioned out of the policy of the regime which expected to work in coordination with the host global Islamist allies as they expected to work together and to draw support from each other. The Sudanese Islamists under the direction of al-Turabi, secretary general of PAIC, established a new international organization that claimed the leadership of the world Islamic movement. After April 1991, al-Turabi organized PAIC in Khartoum and called for its first meeting, which was attended by about 500 delegates. According to the British newsmagazine *The Economist*, the PAIC "was the culmination of a quarter–century of study, political activity, and international travels by Turabi during which he had met with the Islamists of the Muslim world where his rhetoric and ability were acknowledged in the exclusive fraternity."[54] The delegates at these meetings represented various Islamist groups from around the world, hoping to promote the Sudanese capital as a major center in the Islamic world and to

claim the leadership of the world Islamic movement. According to al-Turabi, the PAIC represented a radical alternative to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) "led by intellectuals and not reactionary traditionalists." On the other side, Osama bin Ladin and the pan-Islamic brigades who came to Afghanistan from different parts of the Muslim world had returned to their countries after the defeat of the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan. This first generation Arab Afghans who received training in warfare techniques in Afghanistan and forged through their experiences an Islamist ideology of global jihād based on armed struggle, found in the Sudan a base—which I call the federated al-Qaeda—for spreading this ideology. I call it federated because it acted as an autonomous entity with a high degree of independence from the Sudanese state. The strategic location of the Sudan made it an ideal place for the nascent al-Qaeda to build a power base and start to operate in a certain manner so as to influence change in the Arab and Muslim world. The Sudanese regime gave shelter to Osama bin Ladin, 'Ayman al-Zawahiri, and global jihādists to use the Sudanese territory as their base of operations. This new kind of activism and the politics that emerged out of it had invoked feelings of fear at home and alarm and frustration abroad, especially when Sudan's Arab and African neighbors started accusing the Khartoum regime of deliberately acting to destabilize the region by battling these countries through the infiltration of "trained terrorists" and by giving different types of assistance to internal radical Islamists groups actively engaged in the under-mining of the security of governments in these countries.

The PAIC consolidated al-Turabi's position as the leader of and spokesperson for the revolutionary global Islamist movement. According to al-Turabi, the quick success of this global Islamist movement has turned "the Islamic phenomenon into a mass movement." He elaborates, that "it is no longer Islamic movements; it is now Islamic masses who have taken over control." This expansion of global Islamism territorially and ideologically introduced an alternative to the traditional Islamist Brotherhood, both local and international bodies, which had always been at the center of al-Turabi and 'Ayman al-Zawahiri's criticism and scorn. Al-Turabi argued that "many Islamic movements are now completely outflanked. It is not only the gov-ernments that are being undermined by this massive movement of Muslim people, but it is the Islamic movements themselves; the Jama't Islami and the Ikhwan Muslimun for example. They have to go popular or perhaps perish."[55]

For the Sudanese Islamists, the PAIC represented "the most significant event since the collapse of the Caliphate" and the "first occasion where representatives from mass movements from all over Muslim world came together in one place" to represent an alternative to the timidity and acrimo-nious backbiting between the Arab League and the OIC."[56] In this instance, the Sudanese Islamists and their benefactors inside and outside the country

had expected the emergence of a model that could reinstate a certain version of political Islam as an alternative ideology and act as an example after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Eastern European socialism. Hence, it did not take bin Ladin that long to confide to his friends "this man [Hasan al-Turabi] is a Machiavelli. . . . He doesn't care what methods he uses." Although they still needed one another, Turabi and bin Ladin began to see themselves as "rivals."[57] As for 'Alī 'Osmān and his regime and its government "who called bin Laden "the moving bank," they had squeezed him for all they could, demanding bribes, kickbacks, and especially "loans" to pay for roads, airports, and other infrastructure projects. When it was time for bin Laden to pack (with profit), the government pled poverty and compensated him with money-losing, state-run enterprises."[58]

Considering all these developments together might lead us to see the internal evolution and progression of the disintegration processes of Islamism by adding to other factors that collectively dipped it into oblivion. These processes and factors are always contingent on conditions and on what sometimes looks as cooperative processes that Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamists themselves created individually and collectively. We may say that most of these factors were not predicted, neither their end results nor the consequences that lent to fermenting violence and streams of blood which were not addressed adequately.

THE END

The 8th[59] General Conference of the Sudanese Islamic Movement[60] was held in Khartoum between November 16 and 17, 2012, and whatever significance is attributed to it, it was an open book for and a reminder of the route that Islamism in the Sudan had headed toward digging its grave. The conference was preceded by a vigorous debate and hot-tempered exchange among former and existing Islamists and followed by a military coup attempt. For a month before the conference was convened, former Islamists debated vigorously with Islamist state officials on the issue of whether there is anything remaining of what they once called an "Islamist movement." Most of the Sudanese and outside observers would agree with Mona 'Abdel Fatah in her assertion that the Inqaz government relied mainly on holding that conference to assemble "the remaining some of the dispersed population of the Islamist movement whom it neglected for more than two decades."[61] 'Abdel Fatah continued to ask the pertinent question, "after sixty years to the founding of the Sudanese Islamist movement, and after its transformation from an ideological movement into a state of influence and authority, who would be more deserving of the inheritance of the Sudanese Islamic Movement? Are they the

ones who were excluded or their brothers who have been enjoying the luxury of power?"[62] Neither Ḥasan al-Turabi, ʻAlī ʻOsmān or their Islamists inherited it. It is ʻOmer al-Bashir, his second wife Widad and their families who did.

Ḥasan al-Turabi, who was not even invited to the conference as a guest, addressed some of the unavoidable conclusions in a letter addressed to foreign Islamist movement leaders attending the event. First, he described the conference as a charade planned by those hypocritical politicians who sought their own personal gain to monopolize Islamism and exclude him. No doubt al-Turabi knew that he had not only been excluded by those "hypocritical politicians" whom he once considered his own disciples, but he knew they had sent him to prison for a long time as well. Second, al-Turabi contended in his letter to foreign Islamists that the "genuine Islamists are excluded and languishing in prisons as political detainees."[63] Third, the former leader and the sole ideologue of Sudanese Islamism, who has left no space for an intellectual, an ideologue, or a political thinker other than himself to emerge within his movement, complained that "he knows of no intellectual, political or ethical connections [between the conference] and what can be truly ascribed to Islam.[64] In an interview with the *Sudan Tribune*, al-Turabi described the Islamic Movement, which he disbanded after the coup, as "nothing but an NCP-affiliated organization . . . whose members are united only by power and tribal links." He also revealed that "his party intends to meet Islamist figures from outside the country to explain the PCP position on the conference and why they decided to boycott because they want to disassociate themselves from the "faces that tarnished the image of Islam."[65]

In 2016 Ḥasan al-Turabi died at the age of 84, half of that time he spent fighting with other Islamists, Salafis, and his disciples. Some of those came to his houses after years of being away from him and the house crying. Were they bemoaning Ḥasan al-Turabi, his Islamism or themselves?

NOTES

1. Judith Butler, Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Adolf Eichmann, *The Guardian*, Monday 29 August, 2011 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/29/hannah-arendt-adolf-eichmann-banality-of-evil.

2. Alain Touraine, *The New Paradigm for Understanding Today's World* (London, Polity Press, 2007) 1.

3. For more about ʻAlī ʻOsmān and his state Islamism see: Abdullahi Gallab, *Their Second Republic: Islamism in the Sudan from Disintegration to Oblivion* (Surrey, Ashgate Publishers, 2014) chapters 7 and 8.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) 70.

5. General Sir Richard N. Gale, "Impact of Political Factors on Military Judgment." *Royal United Service Institution, Journal* 99 (February/November 1954) 37.

6. Ibid.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 70.

8. Ibid.

9. `Alī al-Ḥaj Moḥamed, interview by author, audio recording, Bonn, Germany, July 24, 2012.

10. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 75 (see chap. 3, no. 14).

11. al-Mahboob 'Abdelsalaam *al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya fi al*-Sudan, 24 (see chap. 1, no. 6).

12. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1988) 12.

13. J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Book 1. Chapter 3. Quoted in S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 12.

14. See Alex de Waal, "Counterinsurgency on the Cheap." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 102 (December 2004) 716–725.

15. James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003) 12.

16. The Hadith says that Islam has five primary obligations, or pillars of faith, that each Muslim must fulfill in his or her lifetime. The Sudanese satire contrasts that by claiming that the regime has five obligations forced upon people which are the fundamentals of the regime.

17. A term the Sudanese satire describes presidential advisers whose advice is not called.

18. Thomas Bloom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999) 50.

19. One of Marx's most quoted statements that history repeats itself: "the first as tragedy, then as farce."

20. Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution* (London, Kegan Paul International, 1990) 222.

21. Ibid.

22. See Ḥasan al-Turabi, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sunna and Shia Worlds* (London, The Sudan Foundation, 1997).

23. Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011) 152.

24. Ibid.

25. The term *takfir* is derived from the Arabic Qur'anic term *kufr* and *kafir* (to accuse), or it refers to the practice of one Muslim declaring another Muslim an unbeliever or *kafir*. The term is reinvented to describe a situation of excommunication of a group or an individual. Such individuals and groups who excommunicate others are labeled as *kufar* or *kafiroon*. The term gained currency in the public discourse and the Arabic and later the international media after 1970s in connection to Sayyid Qutb ideology and, in particular connection to, the Egyptian Islamist Shukri Mustafa and his group *Jama'at al-Muslimin*, which became labeled by the media as *al-Takir wa al-Hijra* [excommunication and exile]. Specific Sunni Islamist groups in Egypt and neo-Salafi groups in the Sudanese are described as *takfiris*.

26. Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 44.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. For more about their different activities, see a report written by Dr. Einas Ahmed, *The Rise of Militant Salafism in Sudan*, www.cedej-eg.org/../ Einas_Ahmed_-_The_Rise_of_Militant_Salafism_i.

30. Nelly Lahoud, *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010) 106.

31. Generally translated into English "Excommunication and Exodus," but most of the time as "excommunication and emigration." It is the popular name given to a radical Islamist Egyptian group who call themselves *Jama'at al-Muslimin.* It was founded by Shukri Mustafa in the 1960s as an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood inspired by Sayyid Qutb's ideas of *'uzla*. Although the group was crushed by Egyptian security forces after its members kidnapped and murdered the Egyptian minster of Islamic Endowments Mohamed Hussian al-Zahabi in 1977. Today, it is believed, *Takfir wal-Hijra* has members or supporters, not related to Egypt, in several other countries including Sudan allied to Al-Qaeda.

32. Mansoor Ijaz (1961–) is an American-Pakistani businessperson, an investment financier, and founder and chairperson of Crescent Investment Management LLC, a New York investment partnership since 1990. His firm's partnership includes retired General James Alan Abrahamson, former director of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Between 1993 and 1996, he was part of a select group who claimed to have been "friends of Bill" Clinton. He wrote extensively about his role as a broker between the Sudanese Islamist regime and the American government. He claims that his role was supported by the American Ambassador in Khartoum, Timothy Carney, 1995–1997. Moreover, it has been understood that Ijaz has had ties with the CIA and its former director James Woolsey. Many media reports say he negotiated as a private citizen with the Clinton administration in April 1997, when Sudan offered to share intelligence data on al-Qaeda, bin Laden, and other terrorist groups

33. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=madeleine_albright. April 5, 1997, US Again Not Interested in Sudan's Al-Qaeda Files.

34. Mansoor Ijaz, "The Clinton Intel Record: Deeper Failures Revealed," *National Review Online* http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/206745/clinton-intel-record/ mansoor-ijaz#.

35. Moḥamed E. Ḥamdi *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader*, 14 (see chap. 3, no. 22).

36. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. "Islamic Fundamentalism in the 'Sunna' and 'Shia' Worlds," Part One: Press Conference Given by Dr. Turabi in Madrid August 2, 1994 (Religion File No. 6, The Sudan Foundation, 1998). Available at http://www.sufo. demon.co.uk/reli006.htm.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Tanzim al-Jihād or al-Jihād was formed in 1980 from a merger of two clusters of Islamist groups: a Cairo branch, under the leadership Mohamed 'Abd-al-Salaam

Faraj, and an upper Egypt branch under the leadership of Karam Zuhdi. Faraj wrote the 1980 short book titled *al-Faridah al-Ghaiba* (The Neglected Obligation). He coordinated the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981.

Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Egyptian contingent fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the *Mujahideen* there and escape persecution at home after they were released from prison. They became the brain trust of al-Qaeda. Bin Laden, al-Zawhiri, and their jihādists moved to Sudan after the 1989 coup. Later, al-Zawahiri became the second person of al-Qaeda and later its leader after the death of bin Laden.

42. David Rose, "The Osama Files," *Vanity Fair* (January 2002), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2002/01/osama200201.

43. Ibid.

44. Richard Miniter, *Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror* (Washington, DC, L. Regnery Publishing, 2003) 15.

45. George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York, HarperCollins, 2007) 100.

46. Lawrence Wright, *Looming Tower: al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York, Knopf, 2006) 164.

47. Ibid.

48. *History Commons*, http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a98 saifchechnya.

49. Jamal 'Ahmed al-Fadl is a Sudanese member of al-Qaeda. He testified for the prosecution in in 2001. He was recruited to bring money for the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan, as he claimed in his testimony through al-Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn in the United States in the mid-1980s. He was sent to Peshawar, Pakistan, to become a "senior employee" of al-Qaeda. He worked for Maktab al-Khidmat, the Services Bureau, which was run by 'Abdallah 'Azam and Osama bin Laden, to help new recruits when they came to Afghanistan. Al-Fadl became a business agent for al-Qaeda in Sudan when bin Laden moved there, but he resented receiving a salary of only $500 a month while some of the Egyptians in al-Qaeda were given $1,200 a month. In his testimony, he admitted that he had embezzled about $110,000 from bin Laden. When discovered, Fadl then defected and became an informant for the United States.

50. See court transcript http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/trial.html.

51. *History Commons*, http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a020598 sudanletter.

52. That indicates that for Muslims no passport is needed to enter Sudan.

53. Quoted in Ali Dinar's *Sudan News and Views*, 4 (1994).

54. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Ḥasan Turabi* (Tampa, The World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993) 55.

55. Arthur L. Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West*, 56 (see chap. 2, no. 44).

56. Ibid.

57. Lawrence Wright, *Looming* Tower, 166.

58. Richard Miniter, *Losing Bin Laden*, 103.

59. According to the official history of the Islamist historians, the first conference was convened on August 21, 1954, at the Omdurman Cultural Club. It was called the Eid Congress. At that conference, there was a serious conflict between the Egyptian Ikwan-oriented group and the Babikir Karrar Sudanese-oriented group. The al-Ikhwan group won the day. They removed Ali Talib Allah, Mohamed Khair Abdel Gadir (Egyptian educated) and replaced him; and the name al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon was adopted. Babkir Karrar and his follower seceded, and they established their own organization which they called it *al-Jam'aa al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group). It was difficult for the Islamists to hold a conference during military dictatorial rules in the country, which was why they convened the second one 1969 in al-Aylafoon, south of Khartoum. After the Islamists assumed power in 1989, they started holding it once every four years.

60. It was al-Turabi who came up with the name after the end of the 1970s to distance himself from the Muslim Brotherhood and to operate under a different name during the Ja'far Nimairi regime.

61. Mona 'Abdel Fatah, al-Hukuma al-Sudaniyya al-Taluq bi astar al-haraka al-Islamiyya (the Sudanese Government covering [itself] with the clothing of the Islamist Movement, al-Dawha, al-Marifa: aljazeera Net, 2012). http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/ae33f997-6e0e-4bd3-a1ed-e00ba62c6b41.

62. Ibid.

63. Sudan's Turabi repudiates the "Islamic Movement" Conference: *Sudan Tribune*: Plural News and Views on Sudan, November 16, 2012 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44552.

64. *Sudan Tribune* obtained a copy of the letter and gave a brief summary of its contents in the above cited story.

65. Ibid.

Chapter 12

Conclusion

On March 5, 2016, late afternoon Ḥasan al-Turabi died at the age of 84. He was rushed to hospital earlier on that Saturday early afternoon after suffering a heart attack, according to medical sources. Many Sudanese who rushed to the hospital and then to his house raised their eyes to heaven some in sorrow others in an attempt trying to resist exhaustion that can "beset a fidelity to truth." Other Sudanese politely, but may be with different degrees of surprise, watched via local and regional TV channels. These were not only those who had abandoned the man for the rewards of the state long time ago, but also those who viciously attacked and tormented him through home and real prison arrest for years, crying and trying to show TV cameras their tears. In all probability, it was harder to imagine some of those malicious voices of some of the Sudanese and others Salafi individuals who did not conceal their glee for his death by describing him *al-Halik*[1] and asking people frantically not to request mercy for him from God. A request most Muslims usually do in such situations when a fellow Muslim dies.

In his short message, from Cairo the day al-Turabi died, to al-Turabi's family, his party and to the Sudanese in general, Sayyid al-Sadiq, al-Turabi's son-in-law, expressed in a subtle way how their relationship developed as early as during the University of Khartoum, London schools days until the blow struck enigmatically. Long time before, al-Mahdi recorded the long history of their relationship in a short book titled *al-wifaq wa al-fraq* as explained before. He reflected on that history of their relationship as that accumulated, gathered together, and as they it depart ways. Al-Sadiq's message which was meant in a way to console his moaning sister and her family explains how some members of the post-October 1964 Sudanese community of the state found themselves transformed into social and political actors defined by bitter situations of competition as power struggles hovering between catastrophe

and crisis that could no longer influence the path of social progress in and for the country.

At the opposite end of that scene that night at al-Turabi's house, what was noticed by most observers, was the brief attendance of 'Omer Ḥasan Aḥmed al-Bashir, the president of the republic. Al-Turabi or/and his party handpicked and supported al-Bashir's coup and political ascendance to the highest position in the country one day only to turn into a staunch political rival to both and enemy to al-Turabi himself. After a brief attendance to al-Turabi's house that night to pay his condolences to the family, he rushed to catch his plane to Jakarta to attend the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The collaboration between the two men through the years of al-Bashir's rule had never been cordial or as the relationship between the two persons was among equals. The difference between the two persons grew, that it must be said was not only due to al-Turabi's personality, his bossy sense of superiority as the "Leader," his refusal to compromise as his strong belief that he was right but for other reasons the Islamists thought they were clever enough to overcome. Not only al-Turabi nor other civil Sudanese politicians learned the lesson from the historical description of civil-military relations in general nor of any of the Sudanese civil-military relationships in particular as they both conspired to take the state via a coup. As part of the three successful coups in the Sudan "any system of civil-military relations thus involves a complex equilibrium between the authority, influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the ideology of nonmilitary groups, on the other."[2] So, the presence and hasty departure of 'Omer al-Bashir from al-Turabi funeral house was a reminder to those of the Islamists present that night swamped in their bitterness, to the long path that lead them, their party, leadership, and political experience to destruction.

'Omer al-Bashir's presence that day was a reminder of January 2014 when Ḥasan al-Turabi and his other Islamists were at the center of the Sudanese public gaze at home and abroad as they were all brought together for the first time in fourteen years after *al-Mufasala* of the year 2000 waiting for 'Omer al-Bashir's surprise address. That night only 'Omer al-Bashir by himself was at the high table. 'Alī 'Osmān caught the attention of the Sudanese TV viewers of that night for the first time in twenty-four years to take a back seat among those present at the Friendship Hall attending the same event. The most disheartening of all may be that all those who handpicked 'Omer al-Bashir and walked him through the corridors of power were waiting to offer their service to the General—not the Leader—as the General alone captured the state. The greatest disappointment of the night to the thousands of Sudanese audience who sat behind their TV sets at their homes expecting al-Bashir's address that would carry an initiative of magnitude: to resign his position as the president of the state or to delegate his powers to his comrade in arms whom he recently appointed as the first vice

president Bakri Ḥasan Ṣalih. However, his speech, which went over an hour, was a clear *wathpa* (leap) in the dark over the corpus of a long dead al-Turabi Islamism, its leader, and its members. So, the night of March 5, 2016, marked the performative dimensions of complex human experience in the political history of Sudan; where Ḥasan al-Turabi departed to his grave, ʿOmer al-Bashir departed to Malaysia, al-Turabi Islamism departed to oblivion leaving behind those remaining Islamists languishing in their feeling of failure.

Remembering, repeating, and working through what that night of March 5, 2016, had evoked in the minds of those present during al-Turabi's struggle against ʿAlī ʿOsmān and its silent sometimes peculiar and tragic as it ended in destructing both men and their Islamism and wrecking the country. However, to take that a step further, if al-Turabi in his last political maneuvers, until the last day of his life, was he merely seeking revenge or had been seeking power or was it late to stop the fateful consequences of his own mistakes. After the removal of ʿAlī ʿOsmān, the first vice president, and Nafie ʿAli Nafie in December 2013, from power, many Sudanese observers were not surprised by al-Turabi's move toward unconditional dialogue with al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP). And yet, one cannot speak of this without drawing the attention to the nature and long-term consequence of al-Turabi's Islamism, where acute internal conflicts of attitudes, violence toward each other, including long-term periods of prison to Shaikh Hasan and some of his closest loyalists, can easily be turned into privilege guided by material interest of one or the other the Islamists warring parties or groups. Al-Turabi's Islamism, the "child of opportunism" that has died, wrought its ghosts upon the air. A few days after ʿOmer al-Bashir's *Wathba* address at the Friendship Hall, "that brought nothing new and lacked a diagnosis of the country's problems and offered no fundamental solutions," according to al-Turabi to the Sudan official News Agency (SUNA), the surprise came with al-Turabi's NCP party's declaration that it accepts unconditional dialogue with al-Bashir's NCP party in line with the president's *hiwar* (dialogue) agenda. Kamal ʿOmer, al-Turabi party's political secretary who until the last minute acted as the spokesperson of the Sudanese Opposition Alliance, the National Consensus Forces (NCF), "slipped as if on a banana peel from the antics of 'overthrowing the regime' to slick 'dialogese." Kamal, who became the joke of the town, accused the allies of yesterday, primarily the Communist Party and the fractured remnants of the Nasserite and Baathist parties, of unwarranted recalcitrance and wished for a reunion of the parties of the historic Islamic movement, the NCP and the PCP, in a heavenly gush of Islamic accord. Moreover, al-Turabi's deputy ʿAbdullahi Ḥasan Aḥmed, went even a step further, stressing that their party holds no grudges against fellow Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers) of the NCP, not even against ʿAlī ʿOsmān and Nafi ʿAli Nafi.

At the same time, it was equally important that night and during the burial of al-Turabi that the presence of 'Alī 'Osmān and some of his group members was barely noticeable. That, however, was not all we can learn from that day of al-Turabi's last day. Ḥasan al-Turabi, toward the end of his life and until his last day, began playing with another idea that might have had tremendous consequences and could have opened a new horizon for him by putting him at the helm of what he called *al-Nizam al-Khalif*.[3] In light of this idea of *al-Nizam al-Khalif*, had it reached its fulfillment, it could have given al-Turabi's Islamism and Islamism in general a rebirth to overcome the social and political problems of their particular character which was associated with the creation of tensions, conflict, violence, societal crisis that had affected the life of everybody in the Sudan and brought misery to its population and disintegration, and death that resulted from different modes of thought related its end. However, the growing autonomy of speculative imperative within the ranks of Sudanese population saw no way for a rebirth of al-Turabi or of his Islamism or a way of going back to the world before its disastrous fate which was brought to it as an outcome of the internal and external power, conflict and what had happened to it does not foretell well about the future.

Certainly, nobody expected al-Turabi himself to last forever. However, on one hand, indeed many of his remaining disciples tried, even before his death, as they have been engaged in the long difficult process of separating al-Turabi from the evils of the early period of historical Islamism of al-Inqaz (1989–2000), to surmount the obstacles and evil that accumulated and continued ever since. Such an attempt could be described as false remembering of the history of *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan*[4] and its brutal and evil state power. However, many would argue that both the first and second Islamist *Republics* could be attributed to 'Alī 'Osmān and his generation whose turn in power could be described as much mockery and temperamentally dissimilar from Ḥasan al-Turabi the person. Nevertheless, one can well argue that the brutality and violence al-Turabi Islamists exercised, from the first day of their regime which was based on a military coup, was inherent in al-Turabi Islamism by affirming a counter revolutionary tendency and accordingly, it was similar to all other ISMs and their totalitarian regimes. This is why their project is similar to other projects "doomed from the beginning and genuinely tragic: an authentic emancipatory vision condemned to failure from its very victory."[5] No doubt that many Islamists attending the funeral that day could have been confronted with a moment of truth at what the Sudan has turned into due to the destruction caused by their Islamist experience in power by 2016. A few could have found themselves in a deep thought about "what if" history had taken a different turn in 2000 and won the struggle of al-*Mufasala* that day. Others wished what would have happened had al-Turabi survived a few years longer

to turn the table on his opponents specially 'Alī 'Osmān and Nafi 'Ali Nafi and won the game by implementing his new alternative vision of *al-Nizam al-Khalif*. What so ever the case, there are two important lessons to be learned from the Islamist experience in general and Ḥasan al-Turabi in particular, as the later had the opportunity to establish a regime and rule over the Sudanese citizens for more than a quarter of a century, compared to other ISMs that by itself placed Ḥasan al-Turabi and his Islamists at the bad side of history. The first lesson is that and as Etienne Balibar deduced from Paul Ricoeur's *lectures on Ideology and Utopia*[6] that, "ideology points to the elements in which philosophy itself is formed, not just soothing 'unthought' within it, but as a relation to social interest and intellectual difference itself, a relation forever irreducible to simple opposition between reason and unreason."[7] That is to say, similar to other ISMs, al-Turabi Islamism's "flagrant shortcomings has been precisely the blind spot which its own ideological functioning, its own idealization of the 'meaning of history,' and its own transformation into a secular mass party and state religion have represented for it."[8] All that happened to the country, to the Islamists, and their experience in power by elevation of al-Turabi and his Islamism to the absolute. At the same time, neither al-Turabi nor those who parted ways from his Islamism, and those who continued to criticize the regime and not the idea of Islamism and how it dominated the fields of "thought of thought" or "idea of idea" and practice in general, are not conscious that there is no way for them to escape from what they outlined and practiced. Hence, al-Turabi as a person, his Islamism, and his disciples and renegades, without giving any attention to the gap between the Islamist system of authority and when this forced claim to legitimacy as it has been imposed on the "other," who was considered an enemy and as it happened on the Sudanese citizens as a trapped population, cannot escape their place at the bad side of history. As the bombardment and violence of forcing such claim to legitimacy, together with the Sudanese citizens' response and reactions in terms of their belief in their humanity and human rights and the high cost resulting from the discrimination and the state progressive violence associated with that cast, was considered anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and anti-Sudan and anti-Sudanese. Al-Turabi's Islamism during his presence as the leader and even against him when he was in prison has clearly shown the increasingly widespread violation of fundamental human rights with the cost of prestige and respect for the country and its citizens as a bona fide imperative. The successes in affirming a different Islam than the one in whose name their state claim to speak: *la li doniya qud 'amilna nahno llidien fida* (for no this worldly gains we worked; we are for are devotees' to religion) represents a model of separation of religion and state as the state was designated to the field of violence. No wonder, we have an example of the sitting president of the country and many of his top government aids been subject to ICC arrest warrant since 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

From deep inside and outside look, disagreeing, despising, or being congruent of form or function in an attempt to reveal what happened in that spectacular scene of group tears shed that night when al-Turabi was declared dead and after, during the funeral the next day, might need to be looked at according to how and why these Islamist individuals and groups together within al-Turabi's Islamism's transformation and development modified the emergence and falling-off of some or all of those individuals and groups within the overground, as a regime and the period of its life. This period included the democratic period from 1985 to 1989 and the nondemocratic first and second Islamist republics from 1989 to the present. The fact remains whether implicitly or explicitly, these developments were productions of net, as said before, of al-Turabi's Islamism and its webs of significance and ironies. This according to conception of time and memory and according "to which consciousness is both the deceptive *mask* and the operative *trace* of events that organize the present."[9] That is "believing, with Max Weber, that man [and presumably woman] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he [she] himself [herself] has spun, and the analysis of it to be therefore experimental science in search of law but an imperative one in search of meaning,"[10] and the meanings generated out of them come with their ironies too. It is interesting that whenever those individuals and groups faced new developments or when they perceived their momentous possibilities, they addressed them with violence and sometimes tears instead of taking refuge in the dispositions of the past or with an ideological textbook or reference or "thinking business."[11] It is now clear that remembering or talking about the reality and the way these events and conflicts took place and materialized into serious hostilities among the Islamists brings no comfort to most of those who lived these experiences. Such an attitude could be attributed to what I call "an Islamist moral panic," which is part of the opposing voice of some of the Islamists over what they consider un-Islamist governmentality. This is the conduct that they call *fitnat al-sulta* (the arrogant behavior) of other Islamists in power. Different forms of it are somewhat dated, but the discourse remained exceedingly bitter. The bitterness reflected itself within each one of these groups' proximity to the Islamist state, its right hand of rewards and its left hand of violence, overtly or covertly uplifted or rejected one person, group, or another. That "Islamist moral panic" impulse also reflects itself in a feeling of inferiority or shame that manifests in a constant need for an institutional reassurance that would be approved by being employed by the state; otherwise they would live locked in a state of suspended isolation blaming themselves and their fellow Islamists for abandoning their leader. This time it turned into group tears.

On the other hand, some of the remaining disciples of Ḥasan al-Turabi wasted no time in their attempt to canonize their deceased *Shaikh* as a modern day thinker. On Saturday, January 7, 2017, they prepared a well-organized and well-attended panel at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum. The title of the panel

was *al-Turabi al-Athr al-Baqi* (The Effect of the Rest), which was chosen from a eulogy written by the Mauritian Islamist Dr. Moḥamed Mouktar al-Shingiti—the professor at the University of Qatar. At the same time, an editorial board of 17 members of the young Islamists headed by Osman al-Bashir al-Kabashi collected most of the articles, eulogies, and messages of condolences in a book titled *Ḥasan al-Turabi: Towqi'aāt 'Ala Kitab al-Raḥeel.* (*Ḥasan al-Turabi: Signatures in the Book of Departure*). The new book was distributed the same night of the panel. Ḥasan al-Turabi was now without question the "prophet"[12] as one or more of his disciples described him or at least the unprecedented supreme moral and intellectual authority of Islamist modern age. Neither anyone in the panel nor the book collection tried to humanize the man by attributing to him even a minor mistake.

It is not, alas, easy to understand why al-Turabi was so obsessed with power. However, he did not try to figure out the laws of motion of power. Otherwise he could have understood why the Islamist experience, similar to other ISMs, was prone to crisis. In his book *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan: al-Tatour, al-Kasb wa al-Manhaj*, he explained how they as a movement benefited from the Sudanese Communist Party's experience of the Leninist vanguard party model. In addition, he talked endlessly about being *Ibn al-Thaqafa al-Frenciya* (the Son of the French Culture). At the same time, he continued to attack secularism and secularist without giving attention to the deleterious impacts that he brought to himself and to his movement by teaching his disciples to consider othering and continued on the lifelong abomination toward the left that the Islamist movement had initiated since the early days of Babikir Karrar. Through time, the Islamists did not base their hatred toward other Sudanese citizens—secular, non-Muslim; other Muslims: Ṣūfi; and 'Ulama—on reason but as a political, religious, and nationalist duty.

Al-Turabi's last struggle against 'Alī 'Osmān, continued until the day before his death. Some Sudanese observers joked that al-Turabi avenged for himself from 'Alī 'Osmān and Nafie 'Ali Nafie when his interviews with Ahmed Mansour of al-Jazeera TV channel were released after his death. In those ten serialized interviews, al-Turabi disclosed the role of 'Alī 'Osmān and Nafie in the assassination attempt of Ḥosni Mubarak in June 1995, when gunmen ambushed his motorcade as he arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for a summit of African leaders. But al-Turabi's anger from any of his political enemies proves to wax and wane according to his own considerations. A few weeks before his death, Aḥmed 'Abdel Rahman Moḥmed arranged for a meeting with him at his home. Although, nothing came out to the media from that meeting, but it had all the marks of a proper tragedy: it was not a melodrama in which the "hero" fights a villain, but a story in which both hero and villain, while sitting on the heaps of their tragic fate, became aware that it was too late to do anything about their fateful tragic end and of both

of their Islamism and the country which they drove into bankruptcy, wars, and divisions.

In 1922 V. I. Lenin wrote "On Climbing a High Mountain," which could be taken to describe the fate of both himself and in a sense Ḥasan al-Turabi.

Let us picture to ourselves a man ascending a very high, steep and hitherto unexplored mountain. Let us assume that he has overcome unprecedented difficulties and dangers and has succeeded in reaching the summit. He finds Himself in a position where it is not only difficult and dangerous to proceed in the direction and along the bath he has chosen, but positively impossible. He is forced to return back, descend, seek another path, longer, perhaps, but one that will enable him to reach the summit. The descent from the height that no one before him has reached proves, perhaps, to be more dangerous and difficult for our imaginary traveler than the ascent—it is easier to slip; it is not so easy to choose a foothold; there is not that exhilaration that one feels in going upwards, straight to the goal, etc. One has to tie a rope round oneself, spend hours with an alpenstock to cut footholds or a projection to which the rope could be tied firmly; one has to move at a snail's pace, and move downwards, descend, away from the goal; and one does not know where this extremely dangerous and painful descent will end, or whether there is a fairly safe detour by which one can ascend more boldly, more quickly and more directly to the summit.

It would hardly be natural to suppose that a man who had climbed to such an unprecedented height but found himself in such a position did not have his moments of despondency. In all probability these moments would be more numerous, more frequent and harder to bear if he heard the voices of those below, who, through a telescope and from a safe distance, are watching his dangerous descent, which cannot even be described as what the *Smena Vekh* people call "ascending with the brakes on"; brakes presuppose a well-designed and tested vehicle, a well-prepared road and previously tested appliances. In this case, however, there is no vehicle, no road, absolutely nothing that had been tested beforehand.

The voices from below ring with malicious joy. They do not conceal it; they chuckle gleefully and shout: "He'll fall in a minute! Serve him right, the lunatic!" Others try to conceal their malicious glee and behave mostly like Judas Golovlyov.

They moan and raise their eyes to heaven in sorrow, as if to say: "It grieves us sorely to see our fears justified! But did not we, who have spent all our lives working out a judicious plan for scaling this mountain, demand that the ascent be postponed until our plan was complete? And if we so vehemently protested against taking this path, which this lunatic is now abandoning (look, look, he has turned back! He is descending! A single step is taking him hours of preparation! And yet we were roundly abused when time and again we demanded moderation and caution!), if we so fervently censured this lunatic and warned everybody against imitating and helping him, we did so entirely because of our devotion to the great plan to scale this mountain, and in order to prevent this great plan from being generally discredited!

Happily, in the circumstances we have described, our imaginary traveler cannot hear the voices of these people who are "true friends" of the idea of ascent; if he did, they would probably nauseate him. And nausea, it is said, does not help one to keep a clear head and a firm step, particularly at high altitudes."[13]

Peter Holt once described al-Khalifa Abdullahi, the Mahdist Sudan ruler (1885–1899), as "prisoner of his own circumstances"; al-Turabi, however, was prisoner of his political enemies, his disciples, and his own circumstances. *Rahimahu Allah.*

NOTES

1. The Quranic verse "Kulu shyin halikun illa wajhah" al-Qaṣaṣ 28:88 means everything is bound to perish save His (eternal) self. However, most Salafis and some of the Brotherhood use the term to mean falling from God's grace into Hell.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) viii.

3. *Al-Nizam al-Khaalif* or the alternative system or successor Regime according to the paper al-Turabi presented to *Moatanr al-Hiwar*. The National Dialogue Conference (March 2015–2017) which was organized by the regime based on an initiative for National Dialogue, the Sudanese President 'Omer al-Bashir called upon political forces to take part in it to achieve consensus on how the Sudanese crisis should be tackled. According to al-Turabi sources, *al-Nizam al-Khaalif* could be summarized as follows:

1. To unite Sudanese Islamists—who have been sidelined by al-Bashir's increasingly totalitarian nature—ideally into one party or coalition in an attempt of unifying Ahl al-Qibla ("those who face Mecca"), within a wide umbrella that includes the Islamists, traditional parties (the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party), and other Arab nationalist parties such as the Baathists and Nasserites.
2. To guarantee a place for the largely marginalized Islamist leaders (himself included) in any future dispensation of power.
3. Al-Turabi and what he calls the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) to distance themselves from al-Bashir and the regime to which they are historically linked.

4. See Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* First published 2008 by Ashgate Publishing and published 2016 by Routledge.

5. Slavojzizek, ed., *Lenin 2017: Remembering, Repeating and Working Through* (London, Verso, 2017) xiii.

6. Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986).

7. Etienne Balibar, *The Philosophy of Marx* (London, Verso, 2007) 120.

8. Ibid.

9. Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 3.

10. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* (New York, Basic Books, 1997) 5.

11. The activity of thinking that conditions persons against evildoing.

12. Dr. 'Amar al-Sajād, one of leaders of al-Turabi's party al-Turabi as the prophet of his time. https://www.alrakoba.net/news-action-show-id-213335.htm.

13. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works: Volume 33 August 1921–March 1923* (Mosco, Progress Publisher, 1973) 204.

Appendix

UNIVERSITE DE PARIS
FACULTÉ DE DROIT ET DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES

LES POUVOIRS DE CRISE

DANS LES DROITS ANGLO-SAXONS ET FRANÇAIS
ÉTUDE DE DROIT COMPARE

THESE

POUR LE DOCTORAT EN DROIT

Présentée et soutenue le 6 Juillet 1964

PAR

HASSAN A EL TURABI

MASTER OF LAWS (LONDRES)
DIPLOME D'ETUDES SUPERIEURES DE DROIT PUBLIC
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